Fifth Amendment privilege in Wyoming

2025The prosecution, therefore, may not use at trial the fact that an accused remained silent or claimed his Fifth Amendment right in the face of accusation.”). [¶12] In Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844, 846 (Wyo. 1978), overruled by Richter v. State, 642 P.2d 1269 (Wyo. 1982), we held an improper comment on a defendant’s constitutional right to remain silent is prejudicial per se and requires reversal of the defendant’s conviction.

2025The prosecution, therefore, may not use at trial the fact that an accused remained silent or claimed his Fifth Amendment right in the face of accusation.”). [¶12] In Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844, 846 (Wyo. 1978), overruled by Richter v. State, 642 P.2d 1269 (Wyo. 1982), we held an improper comment on a defendant’s constitutional right to remain silent is prejudicial per se and requires reversal of the defendant’s conviction.

2021Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 , 107 S.Ct. 851, 857 , 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987).

2021Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 , 107 S.Ct. 851, 857 , 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987).

2015Serafino, 82 F.3d at 518 . "[The Fifth Amendment privilege should be upheld unless defendants have substantial need for particular information and there is no less burdensome effective means of obtaining it." Id. (citing Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1272 (D.C.Cir.1981)).

2015Serafino, 82 F.3d at 518 . "[The Fifth Amendment privilege should be upheld unless defendants have substantial need for particular information and there is no less burdensome effective means of obtaining it." Id. (citing Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1272 (D.C.Cir.1981)).

2015As the Ninth Circuit stated, "To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." Baker, 647 F.2d at 917 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 , 71 S.Ct. 814, 818 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951)). [114] When Mr. Debysh invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege in answering the Division's discovery, he stated: At this time the Division is threatening [ 1 ] criminal pro

2015As the Ninth Circuit stated, "To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." Baker, 647 F.2d at 917 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 , 71 S.Ct. 814, 818 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951)). [114] When Mr. Debysh invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege in answering the Division's discovery, he stated: At this time the Division is threatening [ 1 ] criminal pro

2015As the Ninth Circuit stated, "To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." Baker, 647 F.2d at 917 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 , 71 S.Ct. 814, 818 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951)). [114] When Mr. Debysh invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege in answering the Division's discovery, he stated: At this time the Division is threatening [ 1 ] criminal pro

2015As the Ninth Circuit stated, “To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.” Baker, 647 F.2d at 917 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 , 71 S.Ct. 814, 818 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951)). [¶14] When Mr. Debyah invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege in answering the Division’s discovery, he stated: 5 At this time the Division is threatening[1] criminal pros

2015First, the court must ask whether "the party resisting discovery properly asserted] his Fifth Amendment privilege[.]" Davis, 650 F.2d at 1159 .

2015First, the court must ask whether “the party resisting discovery properly assert[ed] his Fifth Amendment privilege[.]” Davis, 650 F.2d at 1159 .

2009In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the Supreme Court explained that blood evidence obtained from a suspect's body is not testimonial or communicative evidence and does not, therefore, fit within the Fifth Amendment privilege. [The privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and ... the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in question in this case did not involve compulsion to these ends.

2009In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the Supreme Court explained that blood evidence obtained from a suspect's body is not testimonial or communicative evidence and does not, therefore, fit within the Fifth Amendment privilege. [The privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and ... the withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in question in this case did not involve compulsion to these ends.

2006Herdt, 891 P.2d at 797 ; Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 50-51 , 107 S.Ct. 2704 , 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987).

1998Herdt, 891 P.2d at 797 ; Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 50-51 , 107 S.Ct. 2704 , 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987).

2004Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 100 , 96 S.Ct. 321, 325 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975).

2004Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 100 , 96 S.Ct. 321, 325 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975).

2023Ed. 2d 336 (1987))); Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 , 154–56, 78 S. Ct. 622 , 2 L.

2023Ed. 2d 336 (1987))); Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 , 154–56, 78 S. Ct. 622 , 2 L.

2023Ed. 2d 551 (“[I]f a defendant requests a psychiatric examination in order to prove a mental-status defense, he waives the right to raise a Fifth Amendment challenge to the prosecution’s use of evidence obtained through that examination to rebut the defense.” (discussing Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 , 422–23, 107 S. Ct. 2906 , 97 L.

2023Ed. 2d 551 (“[I]f a defendant requests a psychiatric examination in order to prove a mental-status defense, he waives the right to raise a Fifth Amendment challenge to the prosecution’s use of evidence obtained through that examination to rebut the defense.” (discussing Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 , 422–23, 107 S. Ct. 2906 , 97 L.

2019Tai, 44 Cal. Rptr.2d at 258 ; see also United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, 461 (2nd Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Stembridge, 477 F.2d at 876 . [¶32] Ms. Herrera’s reliance on Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 , 108 S.Ct. 2341 , 101 L.Ed.2d 184 (1988), to suggest otherwise is misplaced.

2019Tai, 44 Cal. Rptr.2d at 258 ; see also United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, 461 (2nd Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Stembridge, 477 F.2d at 876 . [¶32] Ms. Herrera’s reliance on Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 , 108 S.Ct. 2341 , 101 L.Ed.2d 184 (1988), to suggest otherwise is misplaced.

2019Tai, 44 Cal. Rptr.2d at 258 ; see also United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, 461 (2nd Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Stembridge, 477 F.2d at 876 . [¶32] Ms. Herrera’s reliance on Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 , 108 S.Ct. 2341 , 101 L.Ed.2d 184 (1988), to suggest otherwise is misplaced.

2019Tai, 44 Cal. Rptr.2d at 258 ; see also United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, 461 (2nd Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Stembridge, 477 F.2d at 876 . [¶32] Ms. Herrera’s reliance on Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 , 108 S.Ct. 2341 , 101 L.Ed.2d 184 (1988), to suggest otherwise is misplaced.

2019Tai, 44 Cal. Rptr.2d at 258 ; see also United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, 461 (2nd Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Stembridge, 477 F.2d at 876 . [¶32] Ms. Herrera’s reliance on Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 , 108 S.Ct. 2341 , 101 L.Ed.2d 184 (1988), to suggest otherwise is misplaced.

2019Tai, 44 Cal. Rptr.2d at 258 ; see also United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457, 461 (2nd Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Stembridge, 477 F.2d at 876 . [¶32] Ms. Herrera’s reliance on Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 , 108 S.Ct. 2341 , 101 L.Ed.2d 184 (1988), to suggest otherwise is misplaced.

2018However, he explained: ‘What it was was the soft spot on my kid’s head, which everybody knows the plate grows together, and they were saying I dropped my kid on his head.” We have observed that a parent’s “attempt to minimize the event and his failure to take responsibility for his past abusive conduct was important and relevant evidence that the district court could properly take into account in determining Appellant’s current parental fitness.” AJJ, ¶ 17, 242 P.3d at 971 .

2017Dept. of Game and Fish, 2016 WY 4 , ¶ 21 n.2, 367 P.3d 619 , 624 n.2 (Wyo. 2016). [¶20] Other than citing one case for the general principle that a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination exists, Farnsworth provides no authority to support the Fifth Amendment claim he advances for the first time on appeal.

2017Dept. of Game and Fish, 2016 WY 4 , ¶ 21 n.2, 367 P.3d 619 , 624 n.2 (Wyo. 2016). [¶20] Other than citing one case for the general principle that a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination exists, Farnsworth provides no authority to support the Fifth Amendment claim he advances for the first time on appeal.

2013As we noted in Couch [v. United States] supra, 409 U.S. [322], at 328, 93 S.Ct. [611], at 616 [ 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) ], the 'privilege is a personal privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him.' In this instance disclosure of the relevant portions of the defense investigator's report would not impinge on the fundamental values protected by the Fifth Amendment.

2013As we noted in Couch [v. United States] supra, 409 U.S. [322], at 328, 93 S.Ct. [611], at 616 [ 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) ], the 'privilege is a personal privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him.' In this instance disclosure of the relevant portions of the defense investigator's report would not impinge on the fundamental values protected by the Fifth Amendment.

2013Nobles, 422 U.S. at 232-234 , 95 S.Ct. at 2167-2168 (footnotes and citations omitted). [1 71] The final U.S. Supreme Court case we include in our discussion is Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988).

2013Nobles, 422 U.S. at 232-234 , 95 S.Ct. at 2167-2168 (footnotes and citations omitted). [1 71] The final U.S. Supreme Court case we include in our discussion is Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988).