64 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2016Here, because the suppression court’s findings are uncontested, and because the State has not challenged the suppression court’s determination that Figueroa was subjected to custodial 7 interrogation, we consider only the adequacy of Agent Hooper’s Miranda warnings and the validity of Figueroa’s Miranda waiver. [¶13] In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized by the compelling pressures inherent in custodial interrogation. 2016Here, because the suppression court’s findings are uncontested, and because the State has not challenged the suppression court’s determination that Figueroa was subjected to custodial 7 interrogation, we consider only the adequacy of Agent Hooper’s Miranda warnings and the validity of Figueroa’s Miranda waiver. [¶13] In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized by the compelling pressures inherent in custodial interrogation. | 6 | 15 |
State v. Linscottgreen2 sentences2013See United States v. Castro, 129 F.3d 226, 229 (1st Cir.1997); Linscott, 521 A.2d at 703 . [¶ 10] The State did not contest at trial whether Butsitsi properly invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege to protect himself against criminal liability. 1 The tri *1259 al court stated: “[W]hat I think I have to give the benefit of the doubt about is that it’s possible that the act of obtaining the gun was a criminal act, and if it was, it’s an uncharged crime.” Although the Fifth Amendment requires “[Reasonable cause on the part of the person questioned to really apprehend danger of prosecution,” we def 2013See United States v. Castro, 129 F.3d 226, 229 (1st Cir.1997); Linscott, 521 A.2d at 703 . [¶ 10] The State did not contest at trial whether Butsitsi properly invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege to protect himself against criminal liability. 1 The tri *1259 al court stated: “[W]hat I think I have to give the benefit of the doubt about is that it’s possible that the act of obtaining the gun was a criminal act, and if it was, it’s an uncharged crime.” Although the Fifth Amendment requires “[Reasonable cause on the part of the person questioned to really apprehend danger of prosecution,” we def | 3 | 4 |
Schmerber v. Californiagreen2 sentences1983Because a blood-alcohol test does not violate the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 , 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1830-31 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 914 (1966), the issue is, therefore, whether a blood-alcohol test is a “critical stage” of the prosecution. 1983Because a blood-alcohol test does not violate the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 , 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1830-31 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 914 (1966), the issue is, therefore, whether a blood-alcohol test is a “critical stage” of the prosecution. | 2 | 3 |
Dickerson v. United Statesred2 sentences2016See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434-35 (2000) (discussing Miranda). 2016See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434-35 (2000) (discussing Miranda). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Castrogreen2 sentences2014State v. Butsitsi, 2013 ME 2, ¶ 9 , 60 A.3d 1254 ; State v. Robbins, 318 A.2d 51, 59 (Me.1974); see also United States v. Castro, 129 F.3d 226, 229 (1st Cir.1997) (explaining the standard of appellate review of trial courts’ determinations on witnesses’ invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege). [¶ 7] The Fifth Amendment guarantees both defendants and witnesses the right to refuse to give self-incriminating testimony. 2014State v. Butsitsi, 2013 ME 2, ¶ 9 , 60 A.3d 1254 ; State v. Robbins, 318 A.2d 51, 59 (Me.1974); see also United States v. Castro, 129 F.3d 226, 229 (1st Cir.1997) (explaining the standard of appellate review of trial courts’ determinations on witnesses’ invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege). [¶ 7] The Fifth Amendment guarantees both defendants and witnesses the right to refuse to give self-incriminating testimony. | 2 | 2 |
Collett v. Bithergreen2 sentences2013See United States v. Castro, 129 F.3d 226, 229 (1st Cir.1997); Linscott, 521 A.2d at 703 . [¶ 10] The State did not contest at trial whether Butsitsi properly invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege to protect himself against criminal liability. 1 The tri *1259 al court stated: “[W]hat I think I have to give the benefit of the doubt about is that it’s possible that the act of obtaining the gun was a criminal act, and if it was, it’s an uncharged crime.” Although the Fifth Amendment requires “[Reasonable cause on the part of the person questioned to really apprehend danger of prosecution,” we def 2013See United States v. Castro, 129 F.3d 226, 229 (1st Cir.1997); Linscott, 521 A.2d at 703 . [¶ 10] The State did not contest at trial whether Butsitsi properly invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege to protect himself against criminal liability. 1 The tri *1259 al court stated: “[W]hat I think I have to give the benefit of the doubt about is that it’s possible that the act of obtaining the gun was a criminal act, and if it was, it’s an uncharged crime.” Although the Fifth Amendment requires “[Reasonable cause on the part of the person questioned to really apprehend danger of prosecution,” we def | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Peter Licavoli, Sr.green2 sentences1992“A waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege is limited to the particular proceeding in which the waiver occurs.” State v. Linscott, 521 A.2d 701, 703 (Me.1987), quoting United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 623 (9th Cir.1979). 1992“A waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege is limited to the particular proceeding in which the waiver occurs.” State v. Linscott, 521 A.2d 701, 703 (Me.1987), quoting United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 623 (9th Cir.1979). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Reesgreen2 sentences2018The Hunt Court cited approvingly to Chief Justice Saufley's dissent when it explained, "' [w )here the Fifth Amendment analysis seeks to determine whether the defendant's confession was compelled, a due process analysis asks whether the State has obtained the confession in a manner that comports with due process.'"4 Hunt, 2016 ME 172 , ,r 19, 151 A.3d 911 (quoting Rees, 2000 ME 55 , ,r 36, 748 A.2d 976 (Saufley, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2018The Hunt Court cited approvingly to Chief Justice Saufley's dissent when it explained, "' [w )here the Fifth Amendment analysis seeks to determine whether the defendant's confession was compelled, a due process analysis asks whether the State has obtained the confession in a manner that comports with due process.'"4 Hunt, 2016 ME 172 , ,r 19, 151 A.3d 911 (quoting Rees, 2000 ME 55 , ,r 36, 748 A.2d 976 (Saufley, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 3 |
Hoffman v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2013See United States v. Castro, 129 F.3d 226, 229 (1st Cir.1997); Linscott, 521 A.2d at 703 . [¶ 10] The State did not contest at trial whether Butsitsi properly invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege to protect himself against criminal liability. 1 The tri *1259 al court stated: “[W]hat I think I have to give the benefit of the doubt about is that it’s possible that the act of obtaining the gun was a criminal act, and if it was, it’s an uncharged crime.” Although the Fifth Amendment requires “[Reasonable cause on the part of the person questioned to really apprehend danger of prosecution,” we def 2013See United States v. Castro, 129 F.3d 226, 229 (1st Cir.1997); Linscott, 521 A.2d at 703 . [¶ 10] The State did not contest at trial whether Butsitsi properly invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege to protect himself against criminal liability. 1 The tri *1259 al court stated: “[W]hat I think I have to give the benefit of the doubt about is that it’s possible that the act of obtaining the gun was a criminal act, and if it was, it’s an uncharged crime.” Although the Fifth Amendment requires “[Reasonable cause on the part of the person questioned to really apprehend danger of prosecution,” we def | 1 | 3 |
State v. Robbinsgreen2 sentences2014State v. Butsitsi, 2013 ME 2, ¶ 9 , 60 A.3d 1254 ; State v. Robbins, 318 A.2d 51, 59 (Me.1974); see also United States v. Castro, 129 F.3d 226, 229 (1st Cir.1997) (explaining the standard of appellate review of trial courts’ determinations on witnesses’ invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege). [¶ 7] The Fifth Amendment guarantees both defendants and witnesses the right to refuse to give self-incriminating testimony. 2014State v. Butsitsi, 2013 ME 2, ¶ 9 , 60 A.3d 1254 ; State v. Robbins, 318 A.2d 51, 59 (Me.1974); see also United States v. Castro, 129 F.3d 226, 229 (1st Cir.1997) (explaining the standard of appellate review of trial courts’ determinations on witnesses’ invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege). [¶ 7] The Fifth Amendment guarantees both defendants and witnesses the right to refuse to give self-incriminating testimony. | 1 | 3 |
Wong Sun v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019In addition, though, "Wong Sun requires not merely that the statement meet the Fifth Amendment standard of voluntariness but that it be 'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint."' Brown, 422 U.S. at 602 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963)). 2019In addition, though, "Wong Sun requires not merely that the statement meet the Fifth Amendment standard of voluntariness but that it be 'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint."' Brown, 422 U.S. at 602 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963)). | 1 | 2 |
Colorado v. Connellygreen2 sentences2018CJ Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 ( 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("the Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official 4 Notably, the Law Court in Hunt did not explicitly state compulsion is a necessary element under Article I, § 6's privilege against se/f-incrimination----only noting it was necessaiy under the Fifth Amendment. 2018CJ Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 ( 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("the Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official 4 Notably, the Law Court in Hunt did not explicitly state compulsion is a necessary element under Article I, § 6's privilege against se/f-incrimination----only noting it was necessaiy under the Fifth Amendment. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2017State v. Brown, 321 A.2d 478, 483 (Me. 1974) ("A party seeking to question a witness may not claim that the court prevented relevant questioning or intimidated witnesses into silence by virtue of the fact that the court advised such witnesses of their constitutional rights."). 1977In State v. Brown, supra, the defendant’s right to cross-examine was restricted by the witness’ fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Crossgreen2 sentences2014The judge evaluating the claim “must give the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the person claiming the privilege.” Vickers, 309 A.2d at 327-28 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 11] From a practical standpoint, the moment it becomes apparent that a witness intends to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege, in order to avoid any prejudice resulting from his or her Fifth Amendment claim, “the witness should be interrogated outside the hearing of the jury by counsel, and by the [c]ourt if necessary.” Robbins, 318 A.2d at 57 ; State v. Cross, 1999 ME 95, ¶ 6 , 732 A.2d 278 (“[C]alling a witness to the 2014The judge evaluating the claim “must give the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the person claiming the privilege.” Vickers, 309 A.2d at 327-28 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 11] From a practical standpoint, the moment it becomes apparent that a witness intends to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege, in order to avoid any prejudice resulting from his or her Fifth Amendment claim, “the witness should be interrogated outside the hearing of the jury by counsel, and by the [c]ourt if necessary.” Robbins, 318 A.2d at 57 ; State v. Cross, 1999 ME 95, ¶ 6 , 732 A.2d 278 (“[C]alling a witness to the | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2012See Washington, 431 U.S. at 190, 97 S.Ct. 1814 (“Since warnings were given, we are not called upon to decide whether such warnings were constitutionally required.”); Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 582 n. 7, 96 S.Ct. 1768 (“[t]he fact that warnings were provided in this case to advise respondent of his Fifth Amendment privilege makes it unnecessary to consider whether any warning is required”); see also United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 350, 360 (6th Cir.1997) (stating that the issue of what warnings may be required for grand jury target witnesses has not been decided); United States v. Gillespie, 974 F 2012See Washington, 431 U.S. at 190, 97 S.Ct. 1814 (“Since warnings were given, we are not called upon to decide whether such warnings were constitutionally required.”); Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 582 n. 7, 96 S.Ct. 1768 (“[t]he fact that warnings were provided in this case to advise respondent of his Fifth Amendment privilege makes it unnecessary to consider whether any warning is required”); see also United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 350, 360 (6th Cir.1997) (stating that the issue of what warnings may be required for grand jury target witnesses has not been decided); United States v. Gillespie, 974 F | 1 | 2 |
Thompson v. Keohanegreen2 sentences2007Quoting further Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995). 1998The United States Supreme Court has defined “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 107 (1995) (quotations omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Kastigar v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2000The foremost pronouncement on the Fifth Amendment privilege remains Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 , 12 S.Ct. 195 , 35 L.Ed. 1110 (1892), overruled in part on other grounds by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 449-62 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 , 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972), an early case in which the Supreme Court examined the scope of the privilege. *983 Although subsequently limited, [6] Counselman established that the federal privilege is applicable when there is compulsion in the form of a requirement that one testify before a grand jury. 2000The foremost pronouncement on the Fifth Amendment privilege remains Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 , 12 S.Ct. 195 , 35 L.Ed. 1110 (1892), overruled in part on other grounds by Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 449-62 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 , 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972), an early case in which the Supreme Court examined the scope of the privilege. *983 Although subsequently limited, [6] Counselman established that the federal privilege is applicable when there is compulsion in the form of a requirement that one testify before a grand jury. | 1 | 2 |
Florida v. Powellgreen2 sentences2025Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966); Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 59-60 (2010); see State v. Figueroa, 2016 ME 133, ¶¶ 13-14 , 146 A.3d 427 . 2025Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966); Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 59-60 (2010); see State v. Figueroa, 2016 ME 133, ¶¶ 13-14 , 146 A.3d 427 . | 1 | 1 |
Vincent Coppola v. Ronald L. Powell, Etc.green2 sentences2025See id. 2025See id. | 1 | 1 |
State of Maine v. Michael D. Figueroagreen2 sentences2025Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966); Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 59-60 (2010); see State v. Figueroa, 2016 ME 133, ¶¶ 13-14 , 146 A.3d 427 . 2025Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966); Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 59-60 (2010); see State v. Figueroa, 2016 ME 133, ¶¶ 13-14 , 146 A.3d 427 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Figueroagreen2 sentences2025Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966); Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 59-60 (2010); see State v. Figueroa, 2016 ME 133, ¶¶ 13-14 , 146 A.3d 427 . 2025Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966); Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 59-60 (2010); see State v. Figueroa, 2016 ME 133, ¶¶ 13-14 , 146 A.3d 427 . | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences2022See generally Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (“Past decisions of this Court demonstrate that the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.”). 2022See generally Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (“Past decisions of this Court demonstrate that the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.”). | 1 | 1 |
State of Maine v. Michael R. McNaughtongreen2 sentences2018See State v. McNaughton, 2017 ME 173 , ,r 29, 168 A.3d 807 ("[t]he Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination provides a suspect with a right to cut off questioning after he has received Miranda warnings and waived those rights"); United States v. Odeh (In re Terrorist Bombings ofthe US. 2018See State v. McNaughton, 2017 ME 173 , ,r 29, 168 A.3d 807 ("[t]he Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination provides a suspect with a right to cut off questioning after he has received Miranda warnings and waived those rights"); United States v. Odeh (In re Terrorist Bombings ofthe US. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Mardengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pennsylvania v. Munizgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fisher v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Baustgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Vickersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States of America and L. Simmons, Revenue Officer, of Internal Revenue Service v. Alberto E. Argomanizgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Adam v. MacDonald Page & Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| State of Maine v. Daudoit Butsitsigreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. David Lordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Ashleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Thomas P. Gillespie, Jr.green | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Gregory L. Myersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Millaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Dominiquegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wainwright v. Greenfieldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moffett v. City of Portlandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Rosegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Minnesota v. Murphy
green
2 sentences2017Although a person ordinarily must invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination to receive the benefit of its protections, see Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429 , 104 S. Ct. 1136 , 79 L. 2017Although a person ordinarily must invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination to receive the benefit of its protections, see Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429 , 104 S. Ct. 1136 , 79 L. | 3 | 1992–2017 |
Miller v. Fenton
green
2 sentences2016“Where thé Fifth Amendment analysis seeks to determine whether the defendant’s confession was compelled, a due process análysis asks “whether the State has obtained the confession in a manner that comports’ with due process.’ ” State v. Rees, 2000 ME 55, ¶ 36 , 748 A,2d 976 (Saufley, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 , 106 S.Ct. 445 , 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985)). 2016“Where thé Fifth Amendment analysis seeks to determine whether the defendant’s confession was compelled, a due process análysis asks “whether the State has obtained the confession in a manner that comports’ with due process.’ ” State v. Rees, 2000 ME 55, ¶ 36 , 748 A,2d 976 (Saufley, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 , 106 S.Ct. 445 , 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985)). | 3 | 2000–2016 |
Malloy v. Hogan
green
2 sentences2000Rather, the Court retained its focus on the Fourteenth Amendment "even after holding, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to the States." Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163 , 107 S.Ct. 515 (citations omitted). [¶ 35] Between Malloy and Connelly , the Supreme Court continued to apply both the privilege against self-incrimination and due process protections to compulsion cases. 2000Rather, the Court retained its focus on the Fourteenth Amendment "even after holding, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to the States." Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163 , 107 S.Ct. 515 (citations omitted). [¶ 35] Between Malloy and Connelly , the Supreme Court continued to apply both the privilege against self-incrimination and due process protections to compulsion cases. | 3 | 1973–2000 |
Garrity v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences1989Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497-98 , 87 S.Ct. 616, 618-19 , 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967). 1989Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497-98 , 87 S.Ct. 616, 618-19 , 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967). | 2 | 1979–1989 |
Smith v. State
green
2 sentences2022Instead, we must focus on the actual message communicated to jurors.”); Smith v. State, 787 A.2d 152 , 156 n.6 (Md. 2001) (noting that “the crucial question is not the prosecutor’s intent” when analyzing prosecutorial comments on a defendant’s exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege); State v. Loughbom, 470 P.3d 499 , 506 (Wash. 2020) (stating that “we do not assess a prosecutor’s subjective intent when deciding whether error occurred”). 2022Instead, we must focus on the actual message communicated to jurors.”); Smith v. State, 787 A.2d 152 , 156 n.6 (Md. 2001) (noting that “the crucial question is not the prosecutor’s intent” when analyzing prosecutorial comments on a defendant’s exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege); State v. Loughbom, 470 P.3d 499 , 506 (Wash. 2020) (stating that “we do not assess a prosecutor’s subjective intent when deciding whether error occurred”). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
United States v. Rogers
neutral
2 sentences2021Next, the court noted that the "penalty" exception to the requirement that the Fifth Amendment must be invoked, "only applies when the very ability to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege is penalized." Id. at 113 . 2021Next, the court noted that the "penalty" exception to the requirement that the Fifth Amendment must be invoked, "only applies when the very ability to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege is penalized." Id. at 113 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In re Logan M.
green
2 sentences2019The court did not commit error-much less obvious error-by drawing an adverse inference from the father's invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege. [¶14] The court also committed no error by considering evidence of the father's long history of substance use and his drug-related criminal conduct, established in part by the adverse inferences discussed above, as factors that contributed to the determination of parental unfitness. 7 See In re Logan M. , 2017 ME 23 , ¶ 3, 155 A.3d 430 . 2019The court did not commit error-much less obvious error-by drawing an adverse inference from the father's invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege. [¶14] The court also committed no error by considering evidence of the father's long history of substance use and his drug-related criminal conduct, established in part by the adverse inferences discussed above, as factors that contributed to the determination of parental unfitness. 7 See In re Logan M. , 2017 ME 23 , ¶ 3, 155 A.3d 430 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State of Maine v. Timothy M. Hunt green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Nadeau green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Caminetti v. United States green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Brown v. United States green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| United States v. Lee Howard Montgomery, Howard Lee Montgomery, AKA Lee Howard Montgomery v. United States green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Richardson v. Marsh green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Griffin v. California green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Warren green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| United States v. Mandujano green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Alaska Steamship Co. v. Petterson green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Taylor v. Illinois green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. McConkie green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Aldus green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Brown v. Illinois green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| United States v. Doe green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Safe Flight Instrument Corp. v. Sundstrand Data Control, Inc. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.