Fifth Amendment privilege in Iowa

2026As to the admissibility of his statement, we find no Fifth Amendment violation because Willer was not in custody as envisioned by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), when the officer asked about the bulge in his shirt pocket.

2022Fifth Amendment We next turn to Torres’s contention that he experienced a custodial interrogation without the benefit of the advisory mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (safeguarding Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination).

2021Just as the commentary in Griffin described that the penalty for exercising the Fifth Amendment privilege “cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly,” Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614, 85 S. Ct. at 1232–33, Kilby’s lawful refusal to consent to an otherwise unlawful search cannot be so penalized.

2021Just as the commentary in Griffin described that the penalty for exercising the Fifth Amendment privilege “cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly,” Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614, 85 S. Ct. at 1232–33, Kilby’s lawful refusal to consent to an otherwise unlawful search cannot be so penalized.

2025See In re R.B., 832 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (“[T]he government need not make the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege cost free.” (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 41 (2002))).

2025See In re R.B., 832 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (“[T]he government need not make the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege cost free.” (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 41 (2002))).

2019See State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa 1997) (“We utilize a dual test in determining the admissibility of a defendant’s inculpatory statements over a Fifth Amendment challenge.

2019See State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa 1997) (“We utilize a dual test in determining the admissibility of a defendant’s inculpatory statements over a Fifth Amendment challenge.

2025While “[t]he State may not penalize [the mother] for noncompliance with a court order impinging on [her] right against self-incrimination,” “this is as far as the Fifth Amendment privilege extends.” In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Iowa 2002).

2025While “[t]he State may not penalize [the mother] for noncompliance with a court order impinging on [her] right against self-incrimination,” “this is as far as the Fifth Amendment privilege extends.” In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Iowa 2002).

2017See Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 131 , 132 S. Ct. 617, 626 (2012) (declining to recognize a Bivens action against individual private employers running a federal prison); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 , 549–62, 127 S. Ct. 2588 , 2597– 605 (2007) (denying a Bivens Fourth and Fifth Amendment claim based on Bureau of Land Management extortion because plaintiff had ample other remedies and because claims in the case were ill-suited for judicially crafted relief); Corr.

2017See Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 131 , 132 S. Ct. 617, 626 (2012) (declining to recognize a Bivens action against individual private employers running a federal prison); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 , 549–62, 127 S. Ct. 2588 , 2597– 605 (2007) (denying a Bivens Fourth and Fifth Amendment claim based on Bureau of Land Management extortion because plaintiff had ample other remedies and because claims in the case were ill-suited for judicially crafted relief); Corr.

2020As part of the expansion of federal authority, in 1964, the Supreme Court held “the Fifth Amendment’s exception from compulsory self- incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States.” Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 , 84 S. Ct. 1489, 1492 (1964).

2020As part of the expansion of federal authority, in 1964, the Supreme Court held “the Fifth Amendment’s exception from compulsory self- incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by the States.” Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 , 84 S. Ct. 1489, 1492 (1964).

2012The justification given for the rule is straightforward: “[T]he need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. at 657 , 104 S.Ct. at 2632 , 81 L.Ed.2d at 558 .

2012The justification given for the rule is straightforward: “[T]he need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. at 657 , 104 S.Ct. at 2632 , 81 L.Ed.2d at 558 .

2025See In re R.B., 832 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (“[T]he government need not make the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege cost free.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).

2025See In re R.B., 832 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (“[T]he government need not make the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege cost free.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).

2022“The voluntariness of a waiver of this privilege has always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not on ‘free choice’ in any broader sense of the word.” Id.; accord Tyler, 867 N.W.2d at 174–75 (“[A] Miranda waiver is involuntary only when it is shown to be the product of police misconduct or overreaching.”). “[A]ny evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 .

2019See id.

2021See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 , 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2488 (1982) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation ‘of the most basic sort.’ ” (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S. Ct. 663, 668 (1978))); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 , 1351– 52 (9th Cir. 1978) (prohibiting government from commenting on defendants silence); Bargas v. State, 489 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska 1971) (“It would make meaningless the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures if the exercise of that

2021See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 , 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2488 (1982) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation ‘of the most basic sort.’ ” (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S. Ct. 663, 668 (1978))); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 , 1351– 52 (9th Cir. 1978) (prohibiting government from commenting on defendants silence); Bargas v. State, 489 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska 1971) (“It would make meaningless the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures if the exercise of that

2021See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 , 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2488 (1982) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation ‘of the most basic sort.’ ” (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S. Ct. 663, 668 (1978))); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 , 1351– 52 (9th Cir. 1978) (prohibiting government from commenting on defendants silence); Bargas v. State, 489 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska 1971) (“It would make meaningless the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures if the exercise of that

2021See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 , 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2488 (1982) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation ‘of the most basic sort.’ ” (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S. Ct. 663, 668 (1978))); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 , 1351– 52 (9th Cir. 1978) (prohibiting government from commenting on defendants silence); Bargas v. State, 489 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska 1971) (“It would make meaningless the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures if the exercise of that

2021Id. at 186 (concluding, because defendant failed to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege, 2“[T]he Fifth Amendment is not violated by the use of prearrest silence to impeach a criminal defendant’s credibility.” Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980); accord State v. Goodrich, No. 00-1644, 2002 WL 984477 , at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 15, 2002) (citing Jenkins); cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) (holding Fifth Amendment guaranty against self-incrimination prohibits impeachment based on a criminal defendant’s silence after receipt of Miranda warnings). 11 “the prosecution’s use of hi

2020The plurality opinion held the defendant’s “Fifth Amendment claim fail[ed] because he did not expressly invoke the privilege against self- incrimination.” Id. at 181 , 133 S. Ct. at 2178 .

2021See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 , 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2488 (1982) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation ‘of the most basic sort.’ ” (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S. Ct. 663, 668 (1978))); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 , 1351– 52 (9th Cir. 1978) (prohibiting government from commenting on defendants silence); Bargas v. State, 489 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska 1971) (“It would make meaningless the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures if the exercise of that

2021See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 , 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2488 (1982) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation ‘of the most basic sort.’ ” (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S. Ct. 663, 668 (1978))); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 , 1351– 52 (9th Cir. 1978) (prohibiting government from commenting on defendants silence); Bargas v. State, 489 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska 1971) (“It would make meaningless the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures if the exercise of that

2021See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 , 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2488 (1982) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation ‘of the most basic sort.’ ” (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S. Ct. 663, 668 (1978))); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 , 1351– 52 (9th Cir. 1978) (prohibiting government from commenting on defendants silence); Bargas v. State, 489 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska 1971) (“It would make meaningless the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures if the exercise of that

2021See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 , 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2488 (1982) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation ‘of the most basic sort.’ ” (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S. Ct. 663, 668 (1978))); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 , 1351– 52 (9th Cir. 1978) (prohibiting government from commenting on defendants silence); Bargas v. State, 489 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska 1971) (“It would make meaningless the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures if the exercise of that

2021See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 , 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2488 (1982) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation ‘of the most basic sort.’ ” (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S. Ct. 663, 668 (1978))); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 , 1351– 52 (9th Cir. 1978) (prohibiting government from commenting on defendants silence); Bargas v. State, 489 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska 1971) (“It would make meaningless the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures if the exercise of that

2021See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 , 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2488 (1982) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation ‘of the most basic sort.’ ” (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S. Ct. 663, 668 (1978))); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 , 1351– 52 (9th Cir. 1978) (prohibiting government from commenting on defendants silence); Bargas v. State, 489 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska 1971) (“It would make meaningless the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures if the exercise of that

2021See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 , 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2488 (1982) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation ‘of the most basic sort.’ ” (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S. Ct. 663, 668 (1978))); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 , 1351– 52 (9th Cir. 1978) (prohibiting government from commenting on defendants silence); Bargas v. State, 489 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska 1971) (“It would make meaningless the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures if the exercise of that

2021See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 , 102 S. Ct. 2485, 2488 (1982) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation ‘of the most basic sort.’ ” (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S. Ct. 663, 668 (1978))); United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 , 1351– 52 (9th Cir. 1978) (prohibiting government from commenting on defendants silence); Bargas v. State, 489 P.2d 130, 132 (Alaska 1971) (“It would make meaningless the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures if the exercise of that

2020See Byers, 402 U.S. at 430–31, 92 S. Ct. at 1539 (noting that the “stop and identify” statute found not to violate the Fifth Amendment “is essentially regulatory, not criminal,” that it is “directed at the public at large,” and that the required disclosures “simply do not entail the kind of substantial risk of self-incrimination involved in [prior cases where a Fifth Amendment violation was found]” (second quote Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79 , 86 S. Ct. at 199 )); Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79 , 86 S. Ct. at 199 (“Petitioners’ claims are not asserted in an essentially noncriminal and regulatory area o

2020See Byers, 402 U.S. at 430–31, 92 S. Ct. at 1539 (noting that the “stop and identify” statute found not to violate the Fifth Amendment “is essentially regulatory, not criminal,” that it is “directed at the public at large,” and that the required disclosures “simply do not entail the kind of substantial risk of self-incrimination involved in [prior cases where a Fifth Amendment violation was found]” (second quote Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79 , 86 S. Ct. at 199 )); Albertson, 382 U.S. at 79 , 86 S. Ct. at 199 (“Petitioners’ claims are not asserted in an essentially noncriminal and regulatory area o

2019She subpoenaed her companion as a witness in her criminal trial, but the witness asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination “as to the whole subject matter of the case.” Id. at 500 .

2013See, e.g., State v. McDowell, 247 N.W.2d 499, 500 (Iowa 1976) (noting a Fifth Amendment privilege is personal to the witness); State v. Knight, 204 Iowa 819, 823-24 , 216 N.W. 104, 107 (1927) (noting privilege of witness not to disclose confidential communication to physician is personal and cannot be asserted by opposing counsel); see also 1 Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 73. 1, at 470-71 (7th ed. 2013) (noting that while other persons present at trial may call to the court’s attention the existence of a privilege, only the party vested with the privilege has the right to make an o

2016See State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 367 , 368–69 (Iowa 1976) (sodomy); State v. Gruver, 260 Iowa 131, 134 , 148 N.W.2d 405, 407 (1967) (forgery); Kotek v. Bennett, 255 Iowa 984, 988 , 124 N.W.2d 710, 712 (1963) (first-degree murder, under a Fifth Amendment challenge); State ex rel.

2016See State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 367 , 368–69 (Iowa 1976) (sodomy); State v. Gruver, 260 Iowa 131, 134 , 148 N.W.2d 405, 407 (1967) (forgery); Kotek v. Bennett, 255 Iowa 984, 988 , 124 N.W.2d 710, 712 (1963) (first-degree murder, under a Fifth Amendment challenge); State ex rel.

2016See State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 367 , 368–69 (Iowa 1976) (sodomy); State v. Gruver, 260 Iowa 131, 134 , 148 N.W.2d 405, 407 (1967) (forgery); Kotek v. Bennett, 255 Iowa 984, 988 , 124 N.W.2d 710, 712 (1963) (first-degree murder, under a Fifth Amendment challenge); State ex rel.

2016See State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 367 , 368–69 (Iowa 1976) (sodomy); State v. Gruver, 260 Iowa 131, 134 , 148 N.W.2d 405, 407 (1967) (forgery); Kotek v. Bennett, 255 Iowa 984, 988 , 124 N.W.2d 710, 712 (1963) (first-degree murder, under a Fifth Amendment challenge); State ex rel.

2020Id. (first quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 425, 427 , 104 S. Ct. 1136 , 1141–42 (1984); and then quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 , 75 S. Ct. 668, 674 (1955)).

2020Id. (first quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 425, 427 , 104 S. Ct. 1136 , 1141–42 (1984); and then quoting Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164 , 75 S. Ct. 668, 674 (1955)).

1980Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 , 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1833 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 916-17 (1966).

1980Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 , 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1833 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 916-17 (1966).

2020And in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177 , 181–82, 187, 190–91, 125 S. Ct. 2451 , 2456, 2459, 2461 (2004), the Supreme Court found no Fifth Amendment violation when an individual was convicted of disobeying a law that required a detained person to “identify himself,” but also provided he “may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer.” The Court noted, 12 The narrow scope of the disclosure requirement is also important.

2011See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist., 542 U.S. 177, 189 , 124 S.Ct. 2451, 2460 , 159 L.Ed.2d 292, 305 (2004) (“To qualify for the Fifth Amendment privilege, a communication must be testimonial, incriminating, and compelled.”).

2019It does not protect an accused from the compulsory display of measurable or identifiable physical characteristics.” Rauhauser, 272 N.W.2d at 436 .

2019It does not protect an accused from the compulsory display of measurable or identifiable physical characteristics.” Rauhauser, 272 N.W.2d at 436 .

2017The inquiry into whether a waiver is valid “has two distinct dimensions.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).

2006The inquiry into whether a waiver is valid “has two distinct dimensions.” Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 , 106 S.Ct. at 1141 , 89 L.Ed.2d at 420-21 .