Fifth Amendment privilege in Idaho

2024Thereafter, in Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44 , 218 P.3d 388 (2009), the Court held that Estrada did not announce a new rule of law: As the district court observed, we stated in Estrada that our earlier “decisions clearly indicate that both at the point of sentencing and earlier, for purposes of a psychological evaluation, a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination applies.” 143 Idaho at 563 , 149 P.3d at 838 (emphasis added).

2024Thereafter, in Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44 , 218 P.3d 388 (2009), the Court held that Estrada did not announce a new rule of law: As the district court observed, we stated in Estrada that our earlier “decisions clearly indicate that both at the point of sentencing and earlier, for purposes of a psychological evaluation, a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self- incrimination applies.” 143 Idaho at 563 , 149 P.3d at 838 (emphasis added).

2019Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices BRODY, BEVAN and STEGNER concur. 1 Wolfe claimed that she was borrowing the phone from a friend. 2 State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299 , 336 P.3d 232 (2014). 3 For example, if a defendant improperly cited Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) in support of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, this would not preserve the defendant's ability to later raise a Fifth Amendment issue for the first time on appeal. 4 The highly unusual facts of this case necessitate that this holding is a narrow one.

2019Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices BRODY, BEVAN and STEGNER concur. 1 Wolfe claimed that she was borrowing the phone from a friend. 2 State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299 , 336 P.3d 232 (2014). 3 For example, if a defendant improperly cited Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) in support of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, this would not preserve the defendant's ability to later raise a Fifth Amendment issue for the first time on appeal. 4 The highly unusual facts of this case necessitate that this holding is a narrow one.

2019“Miranda warnings are premised on and designed to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, while the exclusion of involuntary confessions is ‘grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it applies to any confession that was the product of police coercion, either physical or psychological, or that was otherwise obtained by methods offensive to due process.’” Id. (quoting State v. Doe, 130 Idaho 811, 814 , 948 P.2d 166, 169 (Ct. App. 1997)).

2019“Miranda warnings are premised on and designed to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, while the exclusion of involuntary confessions is ‘grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it applies to any confession that was the product of police coercion, either physical or psychological, or that was otherwise obtained by methods offensive to due process.’” Id. (quoting State v. Doe, 130 Idaho 811, 814 , 948 P.2d 166, 169 (Ct. App. 1997)).

2020First, the Court emphasized the long line of decisions prohibiting penalties for the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights, holding “[o]ur decisions have made clear that the State could not constitutionally carry out a threat to revoke probation for the legitimate exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege.” Id.

2020First, the Court emphasized the long line of decisions prohibiting penalties for the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights, holding “[o]ur decisions have made clear that the State could not constitutionally carry out a threat to revoke probation for the legitimate exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege.” Id.

2025See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1976).

2020Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). 7 incriminating evidence ordinarily must assert the privilege rather than answer if he desires not to incriminate himself.” Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429 ; see also Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 (1976) (“If a witness under compulsion to testify makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the government has not ‘compelled’ him to incriminate himself.”).

2009In discussing Lankford , the Estrada Court held: This Court’s decisions clearly indicate that both at the point of sentencing and earlier, for purposes of a psychological evaluation, a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies. 2 See State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 871 , 781 P.2d 197, 208 (1989) (“The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to counsel apply to custodial psychiatric exams conducted pri- or to sentencing as well as those conducted prior to trial.”).

2009In discussing Lankford , the Estrada Court held: This Court’s decisions clearly indicate that both at the point of sentencing and earlier, for purposes of a psychological evaluation, a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies. 2 See State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 871 , 781 P.2d 197, 208 (1989) (“The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to counsel apply to custodial psychiatric exams conducted pri- or to sentencing as well as those conducted prior to trial.”).

2020In State v. Harmon, 131 Idaho 80 , 952 P.2d 402 (Ct. App. 1998), this Court explained: In Schmerber, the United States Supreme Court held that a state-compelled blood test to determine alcohol concentration is physical evidence, not testimony or a communicative act, and therefore is unprotected by the Fifth Amendment privilege.

2020In State v. Harmon, 131 Idaho 80 , 952 P.2d 402 (Ct. App. 1998), this Court explained: In Schmerber, the United States Supreme Court held that a state-compelled blood test to determine alcohol concentration is physical evidence, not testimony or a communicative act, and therefore is unprotected by the Fifth Amendment privilege.

2006This Court’s decisions clearly indicate that both at the point of sentencing and earlier, for purposes of a psychological evaluation, a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies. 2 See State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 871 , 781 P.2d 197, 208 (1989) (“The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to counsel apply to custodial psychiatric exams conducted prior to sentencing as well as those conducted prior to trial.”); State v. Wilkins, 125 Idaho 215, 217-18 , 868 P.2d 1231, 1233-34 (1994) (holding that the Fifth Amendment

2006This Court’s decisions clearly indicate that both at the point of sentencing and earlier, for purposes of a psychological evaluation, a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies. 2 See State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 871 , 781 P.2d 197, 208 (1989) (“The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to counsel apply to custodial psychiatric exams conducted prior to sentencing as well as those conducted prior to trial.”); State v. Wilkins, 125 Idaho 215, 217-18 , 868 P.2d 1231, 1233-34 (1994) (holding that the Fifth Amendment

2020The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination “protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.” Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761 .

2020The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination “protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.” Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761 .

2009In McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177-78 , 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2209 , 115 L.Ed.2d 158, 168 (1991), the Court stated that “to invoke the Sixth Amendment interest is, as a matter of fact, not to invoke the Miranda-Edioards 6 interest.” (Emphasis in original.) In Estelle, 451 U.S. at 471, n. 14 , 101 S.Ct. at 1877, n. 14 , 68 L.Ed.2d at 374, n. 14 , the Court noted that “[b]ecause [pretrial] psychiatric examinations ... are conducted after adversary proceedings have been instituted, we are not concerned in this case with the limited right to the appointment *458 and presence of counsel recognized

2009In McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177-78 , 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2209 , 115 L.Ed.2d 158, 168 (1991), the Court stated that “to invoke the Sixth Amendment interest is, as a matter of fact, not to invoke the Miranda-Edioards 6 interest.” (Emphasis in original.) In Estelle, 451 U.S. at 471, n. 14 , 101 S.Ct. at 1877, n. 14 , 68 L.Ed.2d at 374, n. 14 , the Court noted that “[b]ecause [pretrial] psychiatric examinations ... are conducted after adversary proceedings have been instituted, we are not concerned in this case with the limited right to the appointment *458 and presence of counsel recognized

2017The general rule regarding waiver of the privilege is that “a witness, in a single proceeding, may not testify voluntarily about a subject and then invoke the privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about the details.” Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 321 (1999).

2016The Court based its holding on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999) and White v. Woodall, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1697 (2014) and on several lower court decisions interpreting Mitchell.

2015The Court has since confirmed the narrowness of the Mitchell holding in White v. Woodall, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1703-05 (2014) (explaining that the Mitchell holding only precludes negative inferences of a defendant’s assertion of his or her Fifth Amendment privilege pertaining to the facts of the underlying crime during sentencing and left open whether sentencing courts might permissibly draw some inferences for other purposes).

2015The Court has since confirmed the narrowness of the Mitchell holding in White v. Woodall, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1703-05 (2014) (explaining that the Mitchell holding only precludes negative inferences of a defendant’s assertion of his or her Fifth Amendment privilege pertaining to the facts of the underlying crime during sentencing and left open whether sentencing courts might permissibly draw some inferences for other purposes).

2014The plurality opinion held that the defendant’s “Fifth Amendment claim fail[ed] because he did not expressly invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in response to the officer’s question.” 3 Id. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 2178 , 186 L.Ed.2d at 382-383 .

2014The plurality opinion held that the defendant’s “Fifth Amendment claim fail[ed] because he did not expressly invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in response to the officer’s question.” 3 Id. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 2178 , 186 L.Ed.2d at 382-383 .

2010The Court said, “If a defendant requests such an evaluation or presents psychiatric evidence, then, at the very least, the prosecution may rebut this presentation with evidence from the reports of the examination that the defendant requested.” Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 422-23 , 107 S.Ct. at 2917-18 , 97 L.Ed.2d at 355 .

2010The Court said, “If a defendant requests such an evaluation or presents psychiatric evidence, then, at the very least, the prosecution may rebut this presentation with evidence from the reports of the examination that the defendant requested.” Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 422-23 , 107 S.Ct. at 2917-18 , 97 L.Ed.2d at 355 .

2023See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758 (1983).

2023See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758 (1983).

2016In 1964, the United States Supreme Court held “that the Fifth Amendment’s exception from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by. the States.” Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 , 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1492 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653, 658 (1964).

2016In 1964, the United States Supreme Court held “that the Fifth Amendment’s exception from compulsory self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by. the States.” Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 , 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1492 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653, 658 (1964).

2019State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 795 , 69 P.3d 1052 , 18 1056 (2003) (citing Doe I, 137 Idaho 519, 523 , 50 P.3d 1014, 1018 (2002)).

2019State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 795 , 69 P.3d 1052 , 18 1056 (2003) (citing Doe I, 137 Idaho 519, 523 , 50 P.3d 1014, 1018 (2002)).

2015See State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 297 , 178 P.3d 658, 662 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding the defendant’s failure to assert the privilege in regard to the use of suppressed statements in his PSI, and his reiteration of his version of the crime to the PSI investigator, was fatal to his Fifth Amendment claim); State v. Curless, 137 Idaho 138, 143 , 44 P.3d 1193, 1198 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the defendant’s failure to assert the Fifth Amendment during a PSE precluded him from asserting the privilege on appeal).

2015See State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 297 , 178 P.3d 658, 662 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding the defendant’s failure to assert the privilege in regard to the use of suppressed statements in his PSI, and his reiteration of his version of the crime to the PSI investigator, was fatal to his Fifth Amendment claim); State v. Curless, 137 Idaho 138, 143 , 44 P.3d 1193, 1198 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the defendant’s failure to assert the Fifth Amendment during a PSE precluded him from asserting the privilege on appeal).

2015See State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 297 , 178 P.3d 658, 662 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding the defendant’s failure to assert the privilege in regard to the use of suppressed statements in his PSI, and his reiteration of his version of the crime to the PSI investigator, was fatal to his Fifth Amendment claim); State v. Curless, 137 Idaho 138, 143 , 44 P.3d 1193, 1198 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the defendant’s failure to assert the Fifth Amendment during a PSE precluded him from asserting the privilege on appeal).

2015See State v. Person, 145 Idaho 293, 297 , 178 P.3d 658, 662 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding the defendant’s failure to assert the privilege in regard to the use of suppressed statements in his PSI, and his reiteration of his version of the crime to the PSI investigator, was fatal to his Fifth Amendment claim); State v. Curless, 137 Idaho 138, 143 , 44 P.3d 1193, 1198 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the defendant’s failure to assert the Fifth Amendment during a PSE precluded him from asserting the privilege on appeal).

2013A person is in custody, for Miranda purposes, from the moment of formal arrest or as soon as the person’s “freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest.’ ” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 335 (1984) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279 (1983)).

2013A person is in custody, for Miranda purposes, from the moment of formal arrest or as soon as the person’s “freedom of action is curtailed to a ‘degree associated with formal arrest.’ ” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 , 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 335 (1984) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 , 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279 (1983)).

2020Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction. 7 7 Even if I agreed that the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction should be vacated and the case remanded under Le Veque such that this Court would be obligated to follow the remedy from that case as well (appointment of a different judge), I note that it is unclear to me why the Court in Le Veque adopted that remedy from Van Komen, 160 Idaho at 540 , 376 P.3d at 744 .

2020Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction. 7 7 Even if I agreed that the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction should be vacated and the case remanded under Le Veque such that this Court would be obligated to follow the remedy from that case as well (appointment of a different judge), I note that it is unclear to me why the Court in Le Veque adopted that remedy from Van Komen, 160 Idaho at 540 , 376 P.3d at 744 .

2013Relying on our decisions in Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 , 149 P.3d 833 (2006), and State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 , 967 P.2d 702 (1998), Dunlap also asserts that admission of evidence of Dr. Brooks’ report and portions of Dr. Estess’ 1992 report violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

2013Relying on our decisions in Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 , 149 P.3d 833 (2006), and State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 , 976 P.2d 702 (1998), Dunlap also asserts that admission of evidence of Dr. Brooks’ report and portions of Dr. Estess’ 1992 report violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

2017Id.

2015Id. at 1134 (citations omitted).