Fifth Amendment privilege in Connecticut

2002A court may not deny a witness’ invocation of the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination unless it is “perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have [a] tendency to incriminate.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 200 Conn. 310, 319 , 511 A.2d 1000 (1986), quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 , 71 S. Ct. 814 , 95 L.

2002A court may not deny a witness’ invocation of the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination unless it is “perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have [a] tendency to incriminate.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 200 Conn. 310, 319 , 511 A.2d 1000 (1986), quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 , 71 S. Ct. 814 , 95 L.

2002A court may not deny a witness’ invocation of the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination unless it is “perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have [a] tendency to incriminate.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 200 Conn. 310, 319 , 511 A.2d 1000 (1986), quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 , 71 S. Ct. 814 , 95 L.

2002A court may not deny a witness’ invocation of the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination unless it is “perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have [a] tendency to incriminate.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 200 Conn. 310, 319 , 511 A.2d 1000 (1986), quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 , 71 S. Ct. 814 , 95 L.

2020In appraising a fifth amendment claim by a witness, a judge must be governed as much by his personal perception of the peculiarities of the case as by the facts actually in evi- dence.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Martin v. Flanagan, 259 Conn. 487 , 495–96, 789 A.2d 979 (2002).

2020In appraising a fifth amendment claim by a witness, a judge must be governed as much by his personal perception of the peculiarities of the case as by the facts actually in evi- dence.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Martin v. Flanagan, 259 Conn. 487 , 495–96, 789 A.2d 979 (2002).

2020The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination ‘‘not only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecu- tion but also privileges him not to answer official ques- tions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or crimi- nal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Olin Corp. v. Castells, 180 Conn. 49, 53 , 428 A.2d 319 (1980), citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 , 94 S. Ct. 316 , 38 L.

2020The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination ‘‘not only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecu- tion but also privileges him not to answer official ques- tions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or crimi- nal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Olin Corp. v. Castells, 180 Conn. 49, 53 , 428 A.2d 319 (1980), citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 , 94 S. Ct. 316 , 38 L.

2016Subsequent to the enactment of § 54-84(b), the United States Supreme Court decided Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 450 U.S. at 305 , 101 S.Ct. 1112 , which followed its decision on prosecutorial comment in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 , 614, 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), and required judges to protect a defendant's assertion of the fifth amendment privilege from the "toll" of undue juror speculation by instructing juries, at the "proper request" of the defendant, that they may not draw adverse inferences from the defendant's election not to testify.

2016Subsequent to the enactment of § 54-84(b), the United States Supreme Court decided Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 450 U.S. at 305 , 101 S.Ct. 1112 , which followed its decision on prosecutorial comment in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 , 614, 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), and required judges to protect a defendant's assertion of the fifth amendment privilege from the "toll" of undue juror speculation by instructing juries, at the "proper request" of the defendant, that they may not draw adverse inferences from the defendant's election not to testify.

1995"A court may not deny a witness' invocation of the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination unless it is `"` perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have [a] tendency' to incriminate."' (Emphasis in original.) State v. Williams, 200 Conn. 310 , 319 , 511 A.2d 1000 (1986), quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 , 488 , 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951); State v. Simms, 170 Conn. 206 , 209 , 365 A.2d 821 , cert. denied, 425 U.S. 954 , 96 S.Ct. 1732 , 48

1995"A court may not deny a witness' invocation of the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination unless it is `"` perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have [a] tendency' to incriminate."' (Emphasis in original.) State v. Williams, 200 Conn. 310 , 319 , 511 A.2d 1000 (1986), quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 , 488 , 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951); State v. Simms, 170 Conn. 206 , 209 , 365 A.2d 821 , cert. denied, 425 U.S. 954 , 96 S.Ct. 1732 , 48

1995"A court may not deny a witness' invocation of the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination unless it is `"` perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have [a] tendency' to incriminate."' (Emphasis in original.) State v. Williams, 200 Conn. 310 , 319 , 511 A.2d 1000 (1986), quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 , 488 , 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951); State v. Simms, 170 Conn. 206 , 209 , 365 A.2d 821 , cert. denied, 425 U.S. 954 , 96 S.Ct. 1732 , 48

1995"A court may not deny a witness' invocation of the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination unless it is" " perfectly clear , from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have [a] tendency' to incriminate.'" (Emphasis in original.) State v. Williams , 200 Conn. 310 , 319 , 511 A.2d 1000 (1986), quoting Hoffman v. United States , 341 U.S. 479 , 488 , 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951); State v. Simms , 170 Conn. 206 , 209 , 365 A.2d 821 , cert. denied, 425 U.S. 954 , 96 S.Ct. 1732 ,

1995"A court may not deny a witness' invocation of the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination unless it is `"` perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have [a] tendency' to incriminate."' (Emphasis in original.) State v. Williams, 200 Conn. 310 , 319 , 511 A.2d 1000 (1986), quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 , 488 , 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951); State v. Simms, 170 Conn. 206 , 209 , 365 A.2d 821 , cert. denied, 425 U.S. 954 , 96 S.Ct. 1732 , 48

1995"A court may not deny a witness' invocation of the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination unless it is" " perfectly clear , from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have [a] tendency' to incriminate.'" (Emphasis in original.) State v. Williams , 200 Conn. 310 , 319 , 511 A.2d 1000 (1986), quoting Hoffman v. United States , 341 U.S. 479 , 488 , 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951); State v. Simms , 170 Conn. 206 , 209 , 365 A.2d 821 , cert. denied, 425 U.S. 954 , 96 S.Ct. 1732 ,

2022The petitioner’s claim that his appellate counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to raise a Morales claim concerning the state’s failure to preserve the police officers’ vehicle was unavailing; contrary to the petitioner’s contention, even if counsel had performed deficiently by not raising a Morales claim in the petitioner’s direct appeal from his conviction, her performance did not prejudice the petitioner, as more than a reasonable probability existed that a reviewing court would have rejected a Morales claim under the first condition of State v. Golding ( 213 Conn. 233 ), the re

2015Alternatively, the defendant requests review of this unpreserved claim pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989).6 The state argues that the record is not sufficient in this case to review the defendant’s claimed error because it is ‘‘devoid of any factual findings relating to any potential fifth amendment violation.’’ The state also contends that his alleged constitutional claim is actually an evidentiary claim masquerading as a violation of his privilege against self-incrimination.

2021See, e.g., State v. Marro, 68 Conn. App. 849, 859 , 795 A.2d 555 (2002); see also Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63 n.6, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011); Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction, 111 Conn. App. 138 , 140 n.1, 958 A.2d 790 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 905 , 962 A.2d 793 (2009).

2021See, e.g., State v. Marro, 68 Conn. App. 849, 859 , 795 A.2d 555 (2002); see also Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63 n.6, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011); Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction, 111 Conn. App. 138 , 140 n.1, 958 A.2d 790 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 905 , 962 A.2d 793 (2009).

2021See, e.g., State v. Marro, 68 Conn. App. 849, 859 , 795 A.2d 555 (2002); see also Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63 n.6, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011); Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction, 111 Conn. App. 138 , 140 n.1, 958 A.2d 790 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 905 , 962 A.2d 793 (2009).

2021See, e.g., State v. Marro, 68 Conn. App. 849, 859 , 795 A.2d 555 (2002); see also Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63 n.6, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011); Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction, 111 Conn. App. 138 , 140 n.1, 958 A.2d 790 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 905 , 962 A.2d 793 (2009).

2021See, e.g., State v. Marro, 68 Conn. App. 849, 859 , 795 A.2d 555 (2002); see also Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63 n.6, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011); Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction, 111 Conn. App. 138 , 140 n.1, 958 A.2d 790 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 905 , 962 A.2d 793 (2009).

2021See, e.g., State v. Marro, 68 Conn. App. 849, 859 , 795 A.2d 555 (2002); see also Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 125 Conn. App. 57 , 63 n.6, 6 A.3d 213 (2010), cert. denied, 299 Conn. 926 , 11 A.3d 150 (2011); Coleman v. Commissioner of Correction, 111 Conn. App. 138 , 140 n.1, 958 A.2d 790 (2008), cert. denied, 290 Conn. 905 , 962 A.2d 793 (2009).

2020When a witness’ invocation of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination conflicts with a defendant’s right to present a defense, the defendant’s right must ‘‘bow to accommodate other legitimate inter- ests in the criminal trial process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 , 107 S. Ct. 2704 , 97 L.

2020When a witness’ invocation of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination conflicts with a defendant’s right to present a defense, the defendant’s right must ‘‘bow to accommodate other legitimate inter- ests in the criminal trial process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 , 107 S. Ct. 2704 , 97 L.

2016The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina- tion is one of those interests.’’ (Footnote omitted.) State v. Bryant, 202 Conn. 676, 685 , 523 A.2d 451 (1987).

2016The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina- tion is one of those interests.’’ (Footnote omitted.) State v. Bryant, 202 Conn. 676, 685 , 523 A.2d 451 (1987).

2016Subsequent to the enactment of § 54-84(b), the United States Supreme Court decided Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 450 U.S. at 305 , 101 S.Ct. 1112 , which followed its decision on prosecutorial comment in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 , 614, 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), and required judges to protect a defendant's assertion of the fifth amendment privilege from the "toll" of undue juror speculation by instructing juries, at the "proper request" of the defendant, that they may not draw adverse inferences from the defendant's election not to testify.

2016Subsequent to the enactment of § 54-84(b), the United States Supreme Court decided Carter v. Kentucky, supra, 450 U.S. at 305 , 101 S.Ct. 1112 , which followed its decision on prosecutorial comment in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 , 614, 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), and required judges to protect a defendant's assertion of the fifth amendment privilege from the "toll" of undue juror speculation by instructing juries, at the "proper request" of the defendant, that they may not draw adverse inferences from the defendant's election not to testify.

2004Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant who introduces psychiatric evidence has “no Fifth Amendment privilege against the introduction of [the psychiatric reports of the defendant’s experts] by the prosecution.” Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 423 , 107 S. Ct. 2906 , 97 L.

2004Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant who introduces psychiatric evidence has “no Fifth Amendment privilege against the introduction of [the psychiatric reports of the defendant’s experts] by the prosecution.” Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 423 , 107 S. Ct. 2906 , 97 L.

1996Id., 462-63 .

1995The state of Connecticut’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 37 Conn. App. 456 (AC 12513), is granted, limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial court’s improper failure to hold a hearing regarding the witness’ purported claim of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not harmless?”

1995Id.

1993Id.

1995Therefore, "before refusing to allow the privilege, the trial court must find that the answers to any questions proposed cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate." State v. Cecarelli, 32 Conn. App. 811 , 819 , 631 A.2d 862 (1993). "[T]he right to one's privilege against prosecution that could result from the testimony sought does not depend upon the likelihood of prosecution but upon the possibility of prosecution." State v. Williams, supra, 200 Conn. 319 . "`To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that

1995Therefore, "before refusing to allow the privilege, the trial court must find that the answers to any questions proposed cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate." State v. Cecarelli, 32 Conn. App. 811 , 819 , 631 A.2d 862 (1993). "[T]he right to one's privilege against prosecution that could result from the testimony sought does not depend upon the likelihood of prosecution but upon the possibility of prosecution." State v. Williams, supra, 200 Conn. 319 . "`To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that

1991Because Bryant, Person, State v. Reddick, 197 Conn. 115 (1985), and Namet make it clear that it is error for the trial court to present to the jury a witness' invocation of the fifth amendment privilege, which claim was properly preserved at trial and properly raised on appeal, the only question that remains to be answered is whether that error harmed the defendant-appellant in that it can be determined that it was more probable than not that it affected the jury's verdict.

1990A second theory seems to rest upon the conclusion that, in the circumstances of a given case, inferences from a witness’ refusal to answer added critical weight to the prosecution’s case in a form not subject to cross-examination, and thus unfairly prejudiced the defendant.’ ” State v. Reddick, 197 Conn. 115, 126 , 496 A.2d 466 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1067 , 106 S. Ct. 822 , 88 L.

1991The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is "limited to is historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records." Lieberman v. Reliable Refuse Co., 212 Conn. 661 , 668 (1989), citing, inter alia, United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 , 701 (1944); Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); and Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).

1991The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is "limited to is historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records." Lieberman v. Reliable Refuse Co., 212 Conn. 661 , 668 (1989), citing, inter alia, United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 , 701 (1944); Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); and Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).

1991The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is "limited to is historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records." Lieberman v. Reliable Refuse Co., 212 Conn. 661 , 668 (1989), citing, inter alia, United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 , 701 (1944); Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); and Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).

1991The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is "limited to is historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records." Lieberman v. Reliable Refuse Co., 212 Conn. 661 , 668 (1989), citing, inter alia, United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 , 701 (1944); Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); and Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).

1986Ed. 2d 441 (1963); State v. Federici, 179 Conn. 46, 53 , 425 A.2d 916 (1979); or, in the alternative, that the statement must be suppressed as having been obtained in violation of the fifth amendment under the rule announced in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S. Ct. 1880 , 68 L.

1986Ed. 2d 441 (1963); State v. Federici, 179 Conn. 46, 53 , 425 A.2d 916 (1979); or, in the alternative, that the statement must be suppressed as having been obtained in violation of the fifth amendment under the rule announced in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S. Ct. 1880 , 68 L.