defined standard in Pennsylvania

1958In Livingstone v. Boston Insurance Company, 255 Pa. 1 (1916), the court defined the clause “sole and unconditional ownership” by saying: “The provisions of an insurance policy are construed favorably to the assured, and where he has an insurable interest and is the substantial owner of the property so that the entire loss falls on him, it satisfies the above quoted clause as to ownership, although he may not have a perfect legal title to the insured property.” In Commonwealth ex rel.

1940This court defined the clause, “sole and unconditional ownership”, in Livingstone v. Boston Insuranee Co., 255 Pa. 1 , when, in speaking through Mr. Justice Walling, we said (p. 4) : “The provisions of an insuranee policy are construed favorably to the assured; and where he has an insurable interest and is the substantial owner of the property so that the entire loss falls on him, it satisfies the above quoted clause as to ownership, although he may not have a perfect legal title to the insured property.” (Italics added.) As we have stated above, the Act of 1938, supra, places the expense of i

1947There is, however, an exception to the general rule of strict compliance which is stated, as follows in the case of Fornera’s Estate, 139 Pa. Superior Ct. 252 (1940), at page 255: “There is a well defined exception to the above general rule, which gives effect to the intention of the insured to change the named beneficiary in a policy without strict compliance with its terms, where the insured has done everything he could do to make the change, even though the new beneficiary has not been designated in the manner prescribed by the policy.” See also Riley v. Wirth, 313 Pa. 362 (1933), Gannon v.

1939There is a well defined exception to the above general rule, which gives effect to the intention of the insured to change the named beneficiary in a policy without strict compliance with its terms, where the insured has done everything he could do to make the change, even though the new beneficiary has not been designated in the manner prescribed by the policy: Riley v. Wirth, 313 Pa. 362 , 169 A. 139 ; Gannon v. Gannon, 88 Pa. Superior Ct. 239 .

1947There is, however, an exception to the general rule of strict compliance which is stated, as follows in the case of Fornera’s Estate, 139 Pa. Superior Ct. 252 (1940), at page 255: “There is a well defined exception to the above general rule, which gives effect to the intention of the insured to change the named beneficiary in a policy without strict compliance with its terms, where the insured has done everything he could do to make the change, even though the new beneficiary has not been designated in the manner prescribed by the policy.” See also Riley v. Wirth, 313 Pa. 362 (1933), Gannon v.

1939There is a well defined exception to the above general rule, which gives effect to the intention of the insured to change the named beneficiary in a policy without strict compliance with its terms, where the insured has done everything he could do to make the change, even though the new beneficiary has not been designated in the manner prescribed by the policy: Riley v. Wirth, 313 Pa. 362 , 169 A. 139 ; Gannon v. Gannon, 88 Pa. Superior Ct. 239 .

2025Id. 16 sometimes consider cases brought by plaintiffs who have not yet exhausted, but only when a defined exception to the exhaustion requirement applies, such as when “the constitutionality of a statutory scheme or its validity is challenged,” or “legal or equitable remedies are unavailable or inadequate.” Keystone ReLeaf, 186 A.3d at 514 (quoting Empire Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Res., 684 A.2d 1047, 1054 (Pa. 1996)).

2025Id. 16 sometimes consider cases brought by plaintiffs who have not yet exhausted, but only when a defined exception to the exhaustion requirement applies, such as when “the constitutionality of a statutory scheme or its validity is challenged,” or “legal or equitable remedies are unavailable or inadequate.” Keystone ReLeaf, 186 A.3d at 514 (quoting Empire Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Res., 684 A.2d 1047, 1054 (Pa. 1996)).

2020Any conflict in the evidence must be resolved in the verdict winners’ favor.” James, 170 A.3d at 1165 . - 13 - J-S20016-20 requested severance of paragraph 12.

2017The Commonwealth also points to Commonwealth v. Loughnane, 128 A.3d 806 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal granted in part, 158 A.3d 1224 (Pa. 2016), to support its argument, stating that case held “a) police were not required to obtain a search warrant prior to seizing the defendant’s vehicle, and b) mere -7- J-S12018-17 mobility presented sufficient exigent circumstances to justify the seizure.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 18 (citation omitted).4 Our standard of review of a trial court’s order granting a defendant/appellee’s motion to suppress evidence is well established: When the Commonwealth appeals f

2017The Commonwealth also points to Commonwealth v. Loughnane, 128 A.3d 806 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal granted in part, 158 A.3d 1224 (Pa. 2016), to support its argument, stating that case held “a) police were not required to obtain a search warrant prior to seizing the defendant’s vehicle, and b) mere -7- J-S12018-17 mobility presented sufficient exigent circumstances to justify the seizure.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 18 (citation omitted).4 Our standard of review of a trial court’s order granting a defendant/appellee’s motion to suppress evidence is well established: When the Commonwealth appeals f

1999This appeal followed. ¶ 3 The Commonwealth presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in raising an issue of proof sua sponte; and (2) whether the trial court committed an error of law in its interpretation and application of Snyder v. Commonwealth, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. 178 , 640 A.2d 490 (1994). ¶ 4 When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the e

1999This appeal followed. ¶ 3 The Commonwealth presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in raising an issue of proof sua sponte; and (2) whether the trial court committed an error of law in its interpretation and application of Snyder v. Commonwealth, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. 178 , 640 A.2d 490 (1994). ¶ 4 When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the e

1999In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299 , 724 A.2d 326 (1999) (Zappala, J., concurring, Castille, J., concurring separately), this Court defined the standard for demonstrating ineffectiveness under the PCRA.

1999In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299 , 724 A.2d 326 (1999) (Zappala, J., concurring, Castille, J., concurring separately), this Court defined the standard for demonstrating ineffectiveness under the PCRA.

1999Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676 , 102 S.Ct. at 2089 . [3] In adopting this standard, the Supreme Court applied the central double jeopardy equation, balancing the competing interests of the defendant and the public.

1999Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676 , 102 S.Ct. at 2089 . [3] In adopting this standard, the Supreme Court applied the central double jeopardy equation, balancing the competing interests of the defendant and the public.

1997See Noll v. Keagy, 549 Pa. 591 , 702 A.2d 362 (1997) (petition for allowance of appeal granted; superior court order affirming trial court order transferring venue to another county reversed; case remanded to the original county forum for further proceedings consistent with Cheeseman opinion); Hofmann v. ACME Markets, 549 Pa. 582 , 702 A.2d 357 (1997) (same); Godshall v. Blatt, 549 Pa. 583 , 702 A.2d 357 (1997) (same); Leiser v. Atlantic Ref. & Mktg.

1997See Noll v. Keagy, 549 Pa. 591 , 702 A.2d 362 (1997) (petition for allowance of appeal granted; superior court order affirming trial court order transferring venue to another county reversed; case remanded to the original county forum for further proceedings consistent with Cheeseman opinion); Hofmann v. ACME Markets, 549 Pa. 582 , 702 A.2d 357 (1997) (same); Godshall v. Blatt, 549 Pa. 583 , 702 A.2d 357 (1997) (same); Leiser v. Atlantic Ref. & Mktg.

1997See Noll v. Keagy, 549 Pa. 591 , 702 A.2d 362 (1997) (petition for allowance of appeal granted; superior court order affirming trial court order transferring venue to another county reversed; case remanded to the original county forum for further proceedings consistent with Cheeseman opinion); Hofmann v. ACME Markets, 549 Pa. 582 , 702 A.2d 357 (1997) (same); Godshall v. Blatt, 549 Pa. 583 , 702 A.2d 357 (1997) (same); Leiser v. Atlantic Ref. & Mktg.

1997See Noll v. Keagy, 549 Pa. 591 , 702 A.2d 362 (1997) (petition for allowance of appeal granted; superior court order affirming trial court order transferring venue to another county reversed; case remanded to the original county forum for further proceedings consistent with Cheeseman opinion); Hofmann v. ACME Markets, 549 Pa. 582 , 702 A.2d 357 (1997) (same); Godshall v. Blatt, 549 Pa. 583 , 702 A.2d 357 (1997) (same); Leiser v. Atlantic Ref. & Mktg.

1997See Noll v. Keagy, 549 Pa. 591 , 702 A.2d 362 (1997) (petition for allowance of appeal granted; superior court order affirming trial court order transferring venue to another county reversed; case remanded to the original county forum for further proceedings consistent with Cheeseman opinion); Hofmann v. ACME Markets, 549 Pa. 582 , 702 A.2d 357 (1997) (same); Godshall v. Blatt, 549 Pa. 583 , 702 A.2d 357 (1997) (same); Leiser v. Atlantic Ref. & Mktg.

1997See Noll v. Keagy, 549 Pa. 591 , 702 A.2d 362 (1997) (petition for allowance of appeal granted; superior court order affirming trial court order transferring venue to another county reversed; case remanded to the original county forum for further proceedings consistent with Cheeseman opinion); Hofmann v. ACME Markets, 549 Pa. 582 , 702 A.2d 357 (1997) (same); Godshall v. Blatt, 549 Pa. 583 , 702 A.2d 357 (1997) (same); Leiser v. Atlantic Ref. & Mktg.