defined exception in Texas

2008"Even though the inconsistent position may not fit the mold of a better defined principle, an election will bar recovery when the inconsistency in the assertion of a remedy, right, or state of facts is so unconscionable, dishonest, contrary to fair dealing, or so stultifies the legal process or trifles with justice or the courts as to be manifestly unjust." Id.

2008“Even though the inconsistent position may not fit the mold of a better defined principle, an election will bar recovery when the inconsistency in the assertion of a remedy, right, or state of facts is so unconscionable, dishonest, contrary to fair dealing, or so stultifies the legal process or trifles with justice or the courts as to be manifestly unjust.” Id. 8 The trial court conducted a further hearing March 11, 2005, at the behest of appellees.

1990“A well defined exception to the general rule thus stated is that one who is not privy to the written agreement may demonstrate satisfactorily that the contract was actually made for his benefit and that the contracting parties intended that he benefit by it so that he becomes a third-party beneficiary and eligible to bring an action on such agreement.” Id.

1988Republic National Bank, 427 S.W.2d at 79 .

1997Ellington, 151 B.R. at 97 .

1984In Banks, supra, the Court defined the standard for reviewing the sufficiency of direct evidence, writing: “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.

1973“This is permitted because experts are considered to have a special knowledge not generally possessed by jurors and are better able to draw conclusions from the facts than the jurors.” To the same effect see Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. Locker, 436 S.W.2d 592 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1968).

1973The obvious and logical explanation of what Sykora said in the memorandum was that having examined the notes in question in the light of his experience as an expert in such matters the “contracts as set up are in error.” The Supreme Court in Loper v. Andrews, 404 S.W.2d 300 (1966), discussed the identical question and stated that although a witness is generally permitted to testify only to facts within his personal knowledge, a well defined exception to this rule is represented by the testimony of a qualified expert in the expression of an opinion in the field of his qualifications.

1971Schnitzer v. Southwest Shoe Corporation; 364 S.W.2d 373 ; 374 (Tex. Sup. 1963): A contract by the trustees of a hospital giving a doctor a five year exclusive.right to perform surgery in such hospital was approved in Jeanes v. Burke, 226 S.W.2d 908 , (Tex. Civ.

1971Schnitzer v. Southwest Shoe Corporation; 364 S.W.2d 373 ; 374 (Tex. Sup. 1963): A contract by the trustees of a hospital giving a doctor a five year exclusive.right to perform surgery in such hospital was approved in Jeanes v. Burke, 226 S.W.2d 908 , (Tex. Civ.

1967Cochran v. Wool Growers Central Storage Co., 140 Tex. 184 , 166 S.W.2d 904 (1942); M.

1967Cochran v. Wool Growers Central Storage Co., 140 Tex. 184 , 166 S.W.2d 904 (1942); M.

1965In reaching such decision, reasonable probabilities for future use, either by the owner or others, if sufficiently near in time and definite in kind to be of practical importance, may be considered.’ In re Paving Streets in Floyd Park Addition, Sioux City, 197 Iowa, 915 , 196 N.W. 597 , 599, the Supreme Court of Iowa used the following language in point: ‘Indeed, the benefits to be derived in such cases are ordinarily not instant upon the inception or completion of the improvement, but materialize with the developments of the future.

1943Fitzgerald v. State, 140 Tex. Cr.

1935Co., 15 S.W.2d 560 ; City of San Antonio v. Jones, 28 Tex. 19 , 33; 6 Ruling Case Law, § 178, pp. 177, 178. 6 In the absence of a well defined standard or rule in the statutes defining the public policy of the State with respect to the mineral interests, the Railroad Commission would be without authority to promulgate rules, regulations, or orders relating to the protection of oil and gas.

1922I. 530, 77 Atl. 775 , the word is defined as follows: “ ‘Waiver’ is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, which may be done by such conduct as warrants an inference of relinquishment.” In Currie v. Continental Casualty Co., 147 Iowa, 281 , 126 N. W. 164 , 140 Am.

1922I. 530, 77 Atl. 775 , the word is defined as follows: “ ‘Waiver’ is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, which may be done by such conduct as warrants an inference of relinquishment.” In Currie v. Continental Casualty Co., 147 Iowa, 281 , 126 N. W. 164 , 140 Am.

1922I. 530, 77 Atl. 775 , the word is defined as follows: “ ‘Waiver’ is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, which may be done by such conduct as warrants an inference of relinquishment.” In Currie v. Continental Casualty Co., 147 Iowa, 281 , 126 N. W. 164 , 140 Am.