defined exception in Illinois

1922That it was the intention of the. framers of the constitution to apply the prohibition of section 23 of article 5 of that instrument to appointive State officers has also been recognized in Foreman v. People, 209 Ill. 567 , where this court, after review-1 ing the clauses of the constitution affecting the salaries of different officers as herein referred to, said: “When we examine the various provisions of the constitution with reference to a change of salary during a term of office, we find that no particular set of words is used to express the limitation on the power of the legislature, but

1915In Foreman v. People, 209 Ill. 567 , it is said (p. 572) : “When we examine the various provisions of the constitution with reference to a change of salary during a term of office we find that no particular set of words is used to express the limitation on the power of the legislature, but that there is a well defined rule running through the whole instrument that the salary attached to any public office having a fixed term shall not be increased or diminished during that term.

2009Cook County II, 232 Ill. 2d at 241-45 .

2009Cook County II, 232 Ill. 2d at 241-45 .

2005Congregation of the Passion , 159 Ill. 2d at 162-64 .

2005Congregation of the Passion, 159 Ill. 2d at 162-64 .

1938Schmidt, 281 Ill. 211 .) The well defined exception to the above rule is that where the relator is illegally removed from his office and the salary has been paid to another person illegally appointed in his stead a writ of mandamus will be awarded requiring the re-instatement of the relator in office and the payment of his salary during his illegal removal.

1925(People v. Schmidt, 281 Ill. 211 .) The well defined exception to the above rule is that where the relator is illegally removed from his office and the salary has been paid to another person illegally appointed in his stead a writ of mandamus will be awarded requiring the re-instatement of the relator in office and the payment of his salary during his illegal removal.

2004Nowhere does Boose require the defendant to show actual prejudice. *1093 Later that same year, in In re Staley, 67 Ill.2d 33 , 7 Ill.Dec. 85 , 364 N.E.2d 72 (1977), the court considered the propriety of handcuffing a juvenile during an adjudicatory hearing.

2004Nowhere does Boose require the defendant to show actual prejudice. *1093 Later that same year, in In re Staley, 67 Ill.2d 33 , 7 Ill.Dec. 85 , 364 N.E.2d 72 (1977), the court considered the propriety of handcuffing a juvenile during an adjudicatory hearing.

1996We must first decide whether the fourth amendment prohibits pretextual traffic stops. *1131 In People v. Guerrieri, 194 Ill.App.3d 497 , 141 Ill.Dec. 580 , 551 N.E.2d 767 (1990), appeal denied, 132 Ill.2d 549 , 144 Ill.Dec. 261 , 555 N.E.2d 380 (1990), this court defined the standard for testing the legitimacy of a traffic stop motivated by reasons other than enforcement of the Illinois Vehicle Code.

1996App. 3d 497 , 551 N.E.2d 767 (1990), appeal denied, 132 Ill. 2d 549 , 555 N.E.2d 380 (1990), this court defined the standard for testing the legitimacy of a traffic stop motivated by reasons other than enforcement of the Illinois Vehicle Code.

1994(Constantine, 217 Ill.

1991(City of Chicago v. Westphalen (1968), 95 Ill.

1979App. 3d 822, 826 , 378 N.E.2d 805, 808-09 , the court defined the test in determining constitutionality of a statute as follows: “It is, however, generally true that, in order for a statute to pass constitutional muster in terms of the due process clause, the statutory means selected by the legislature must bear a real and substantial relation to the objective sought to be regulated for the health, morals, welfare, and safety of the community. [Citations.] The traditional test for equal protection is not whether a statute results in unequal treatment, but whether the statutory inequality of tr

1973Stat. 1874, *225 ch. 40, par. 1 et seq. ), which is the basis of our existing act, this court reaffirmed the doctrine. ( Bast v. Bast (1876), 82 Ill. 584 . ) The subject was reviewed again in Duberstein v. Duberstein (1897), 171 Ill. 133 , where the court defined the doctrine in the following terms: "`A party charged with cruelty may justify himself or herself by showing that the other party was equally to blame. * * * The law is for the relief of an oppressed party, and the courts will not interfere in quarrels where both parties commit reciprocal excesses and outrages.' * * * Divorce is a re

1973(Bast v. Bast (1876), 82 Ill. 584 .) The subject was reviewed again in Duberstein v. Duberstein (1897), 171 Ill. 133 , where the court defined the doctrine in the following terms: “ ‘A party charged with cruelty may justify himself or herself by showing that the other party was equally to blame. *** The law is for the relief of an oppressed party, and the courts will not interfere in quarrels where both parties commit reciprocal excesses and outrages.’ *** Divorce is a remedy provided for an innocent party; (5 Am. & Eng.

1973Stat. 1874, *225 ch. 40, par. 1 et seq. ), which is the basis of our existing act, this court reaffirmed the doctrine. ( Bast v. Bast (1876), 82 Ill. 584 . ) The subject was reviewed again in Duberstein v. Duberstein (1897), 171 Ill. 133 , where the court defined the doctrine in the following terms: "`A party charged with cruelty may justify himself or herself by showing that the other party was equally to blame. * * * The law is for the relief of an oppressed party, and the courts will not interfere in quarrels where both parties commit reciprocal excesses and outrages.' * * * Divorce is a re

1973(Bast v. Bast (1876), 82 Ill. 584 .) The subject was reviewed again in Duberstein v. Duberstein (1897), 171 Ill. 133 , where the court defined the doctrine in the following terms: “ ‘A party charged with cruelty may justify himself or herself by showing that the other party was equally to blame. *** The law is for the relief of an oppressed party, and the courts will not interfere in quarrels where both parties commit reciprocal excesses and outrages.’ *** Divorce is a remedy provided for an innocent party; (5 Am. & Eng.

1971The court described the principle of subrogation as an expanding doctrine, “which originated in equity, and is now an integral part of the common law * * ( 17 Ill.2d 181 at page 190.) At the same point in the opinion, the court defined the principle as follows: “Under this doctrine of subrogation, a person who, pursuant to a legal liability, has paid for a loss or injury resulting from the negligence or wrongful acts of another will be given the rights of the injured person against the wrongdoer.” Another case supporting this view is New Amsterdam Casualty Company v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 34

1971The court described the principle of subrogation as an expanding doctrine, “which originated in equity, and is now an integral part of the common law * * ( 17 Ill.2d 181 at page 190.) At the same point in the opinion, the court defined the principle as follows: “Under this doctrine of subrogation, a person who, pursuant to a legal liability, has paid for a loss or injury resulting from the negligence or wrongful acts of another will be given the rights of the injured person against the wrongdoer.” Another case supporting this view is New Amsterdam Casualty Company v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 34

1967No. 8 v. Lilly, 373 Ill 431, 26 NE2d 489 , the court defined a presumption at page 438: A presumption is an inference which common sense draws from the known course of events or from circumstances usually occurring in such cases.

1967(Sears v. Vaughan, 230 Ill 572.) In Johnson v. Pendergast, 308 Ill 255, 139 NE 407, at 261 , the court said: Where two facts are so related to each other that in reason and human experience the existence of one may fairly be inferred from the other, the law may declare that proof of one shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the other.

1966In Seyferlich v. Maxwell, 28 Ill App2d 469, 171 NE2d 806 (1961), where the admissibility of evidence relating to insurance coverage was thoroughly discussed, it was stated at page 476: ...

1966In Seyferlich v. Maxwell, 28 Ill.

1926If the law were otherwise, as the court said in Mattox v. Board of Education of Liberty County, 148 Ga. 577, 579 , “a governmental board constituted for ministerial purposes might deprive the people themselves of their right to select their own public officers.” For the reasons set forth, the judgment is affirmed.

1926Bank of Peoria v. Nichols & Shepard Co., 223 Ill. 41 , 53: “To the general rule that notice to the agent is notice to the principal there is a well defined exception, that notice will not be imputed to the principal where the facts authorize the inference that the agent will conceal the information.

1925(People v. Brady, 262 Ill. 578 ; People v. Stevenson, 270 id. 569; People v. Coffin, supra.) The relator in this case was clearly entitled to be paid his salary from December 18, 1922, the date of the judgment of the circuit court in the certiorari proceedings, and is entitled to the writ to compel the payment of the same.

1925(People v. Brady, 262 Ill. 578 ; People v. Stevenson, 270 id. 569; People v. Coffin, supra.) The relator in this case was clearly entitled to be paid his salary from December 18, 1922, the date of the judgment of the circuit court in the certiorari proceedings, and is entitled to the writ to compel the payment of the same.

1913In Wolf v. Hope, 210 Ill. at page 61 , Mr. Justice Scott speaking for the court says: “In our judgment the provision quoted from section 11 of Article 9 of the Constitution was intended to include all officers not specifically mentioned in other provisions of the constitution, occupying offices created by the laws of the State in and for any of the political subdivisions of the State.” Certainly the election commissioners “occupy offices created by the laws of the state in and for a political subdivision of the state.” The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

1904(Wilcox v. People, 90 Ill. 186 ; People v. Loeffler, 175 id. 585.) When we examine the various provisions of the constitution with reference to a change of salary during a term of office, we find that no particular set of words is used to express the limitation on the power of the legislature, but that there is a well defined rule running through the whole instrument that the salary attached to any public office having a fixed term shall not be increased or diminished during that term.

1904With reference to the legislature, section 21 of article 4 provides that “no change shall be made in the compensation of members of the General Assembly during the term for which they may have been elected.” As to the executive department, including the Governor and other State officers, section 23 of article 5 provides that the salary “shall not be increased or diminished during their official terms.” Article 6 concerns the judicial department, and section 7 provides that salaries of the judges of this court “shall not be increased or diminished during the terms for which said judges shall ha

1897Scofield v. Olcott, 120 Ill. 362 .