defined rule in California

1999“Discretionary acts are those wherein there is no hard and fast rule as to the course of conduct that one must or must not take and, if there is a clearly defined rule, such would eliminate discretion. [Citation.]” (Elder v. Anderson (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 326, 331 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 48 ].) A duty is ministerial when it is the doing of a thing unqualifiedly required.

1999“Discretionary acts are those wherein there is no hard and fast rule as to the course of conduct that one must or must not take and, if there is a clearly defined rule, such would eliminate discretion. [Citation.]” (Elder v. Anderson (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 326, 331 [ 23 Cal.Rptr. 48 ].) A duty is ministerial when it is the doing of a thing unqualifiedly required.

1999(Ham v. County of Los Angeles (1920) 46 Cal.App. 148 [ 189 P. 462 ].) Whether the Board’s duty to act under the FPA is mandatory or discretionary is a justiciable issue.

1999(Ham v. County of Los Angeles (1920) 46 Cal.App. 148 [ 189 P. 462 ].) Whether the Board’s duty to act under the FPA is mandatory or discretionary is a justiciable issue.

2004The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting Summary Judgment Each of appellants' causes of action against respondents was based on Kallsen and Jensen's alleged negligence in failing to observe and supervise Mrs. Hernandez, failing to restrain her and prevent her from straying from their care, and failing to apprehend her once she had done so. [2] To prove their case, appellants were required to show that respondents owed Mrs. Hernandez a duty of care, which they breached by conduct falling below a defined standard of care, plus causation and damages. ( Wright v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 219 Cal.

2004The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting Summary Judgment Each of appellants' causes of action against respondents was based on Kallsen and Jensen's alleged negligence in failing to observe and supervise Mrs. Hernandez, failing to restrain her and prevent her from straying from their care, and failing to apprehend her once she had done so. [2] To prove their case, appellants were required to show that respondents owed Mrs. Hernandez a duty of care, which they breached by conduct falling below a defined standard of care, plus causation and damages. ( Wright v. City of Los Angeles (1990) 219 Cal.

1974There is nothing whatever in the record to suggest that petitioner was denied any of the essentials of “due process and fair treatment” made mandatory in In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 30 [ 18 L.Ed. 2d 527, 548 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]; he was represented by counsel and a judicial determination was made pursuant to a defined standard, to wit, that the authority given the probation officer was reasonably required for the care of petitioner and was “remedial care” which appeared necessary.

1974There is nothing whatever in the record to suggest that petitioner was denied any of the essentials of “due process and fair treatment” made mandatory in In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 30 [ 18 L.Ed. 2d 527, 548 , 87 S.Ct. 1428 ]; he was represented by counsel and a judicial determination was made pursuant to a defined standard, to wit, that the authority given the probation officer was reasonably required for the care of petitioner and was “remedial care” which appeared necessary.

1968For example, in Elder v. Anderson (1962) 205 Cal. App.2d 326, 331 [ 23 Cal. Rptr. 48 ], the court defined discretionary acts as "those wherein there is no hard and fast rule as to the course of conduct that one must or must not take and, if there is a clearly defined rule, such would eliminate discretion." (See also Doeg v. Cook (1899) 126 Cal. 213, 216 [ 58 P. 707 , 77 Am.St.Rep. 171 ]; Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles (1965) 233 Cal. App.2d 131, 134-135 [ 43 Cal. Rptr. 294 ]; Glickman v. Glasner (1964) 230 Cal. App.2d 120, 125 [ 40 Cal. Rptr. 719 ].) "Generally speaking, a discretionary act i

1968For example, in Elder v. Anderson (1962) 205 Cal. App.2d 326, 331 [ 23 Cal. Rptr. 48 ], the court defined discretionary acts as "those wherein there is no hard and fast rule as to the course of conduct that one must or must not take and, if there is a clearly defined rule, such would eliminate discretion." (See also Doeg v. Cook (1899) 126 Cal. 213, 216 [ 58 P. 707 , 77 Am.St.Rep. 171 ]; Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles (1965) 233 Cal. App.2d 131, 134-135 [ 43 Cal. Rptr. 294 ]; Glickman v. Glasner (1964) 230 Cal. App.2d 120, 125 [ 40 Cal. Rptr. 719 ].) "Generally speaking, a discretionary act i

1968For example, in Elder v. Anderson (1962) 205 Cal. App.2d 326, 331 [ 23 Cal. Rptr. 48 ], the court defined discretionary acts as "those wherein there is no hard and fast rule as to the course of conduct that one must or must not take and, if there is a clearly defined rule, such would eliminate discretion." (See also Doeg v. Cook (1899) 126 Cal. 213, 216 [ 58 P. 707 , 77 Am.St.Rep. 171 ]; Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles (1965) 233 Cal. App.2d 131, 134-135 [ 43 Cal. Rptr. 294 ]; Glickman v. Glasner (1964) 230 Cal. App.2d 120, 125 [ 40 Cal. Rptr. 719 ].) "Generally speaking, a discretionary act i

1968For example, in Elder v. Anderson (1962) 205 Cal. App.2d 326, 331 [ 23 Cal. Rptr. 48 ], the court defined discretionary acts as "those wherein there is no hard and fast rule as to the course of conduct that one must or must not take and, if there is a clearly defined rule, such would eliminate discretion." (See also Doeg v. Cook (1899) 126 Cal. 213, 216 [ 58 P. 707 , 77 Am.St.Rep. 171 ]; Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles (1965) 233 Cal. App.2d 131, 134-135 [ 43 Cal. Rptr. 294 ]; Glickman v. Glasner (1964) 230 Cal. App.2d 120, 125 [ 40 Cal. Rptr. 719 ].) "Generally speaking, a discretionary act i

1968Discretion has also been defined as meaning equitable decision of what is just and proper under the circumstances." ( Burgdorf v. Funder (1966) 246 Cal. App.2d 443, 449 [ 54 Cal. Rptr. 805 ].) Finally, "[a] discretionary act is one which requires `personal deliberation, decision and judgment' while an act is said to be ministerial when it amounts `only to ... the performance of a duty in which the officer is left no choice of his own.'" ( Morgan v. County of Yuba (1964) 230 Cal. App.2d 938, 942 [ 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 ], citing Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964) p. 1015.) We follow equally sound

1968Discretion has also been defined as meaning equitable decision of what is just and proper under the circumstances." ( Burgdorf v. Funder (1966) 246 Cal. App.2d 443, 449 [ 54 Cal. Rptr. 805 ].) Finally, "[a] discretionary act is one which requires `personal deliberation, decision and judgment' while an act is said to be ministerial when it amounts `only to ... the performance of a duty in which the officer is left no choice of his own.'" ( Morgan v. County of Yuba (1964) 230 Cal. App.2d 938, 942 [ 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 ], citing Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964) p. 1015.) We follow equally sound

1968Discretion has also been defined as meaning equitable decision of what is just and proper under the circumstances." ( Burgdorf v. Funder (1966) 246 Cal. App.2d 443, 449 [ 54 Cal. Rptr. 805 ].) Finally, "[a] discretionary act is one which requires `personal deliberation, decision and judgment' while an act is said to be ministerial when it amounts `only to ... the performance of a duty in which the officer is left no choice of his own.'" ( Morgan v. County of Yuba (1964) 230 Cal. App.2d 938, 942 [ 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 ], citing Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964) p. 1015.) We follow equally sound

1968Discretion has also been defined as meaning equitable decision of what is just and proper under the circumstances." ( Burgdorf v. Funder (1966) 246 Cal. App.2d 443, 449 [ 54 Cal. Rptr. 805 ].) Finally, "[a] discretionary act is one which requires `personal deliberation, decision and judgment' while an act is said to be ministerial when it amounts `only to ... the performance of a duty in which the officer is left no choice of his own.'" ( Morgan v. County of Yuba (1964) 230 Cal. App.2d 938, 942 [ 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 ], citing Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964) p. 1015.) We follow equally sound

1968For example, in Elder v. Anderson (1962) 205 Cal. App.2d 326, 331 [ 23 Cal. Rptr. 48 ], the court defined discretionary acts as "those wherein there is no hard and fast rule as to the course of conduct that one must or must not take and, if there is a clearly defined rule, such would eliminate discretion." (See also Doeg v. Cook (1899) 126 Cal. 213, 216 [ 58 P. 707 , 77 Am.St.Rep. 171 ]; Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles (1965) 233 Cal. App.2d 131, 134-135 [ 43 Cal. Rptr. 294 ]; Glickman v. Glasner (1964) 230 Cal. App.2d 120, 125 [ 40 Cal. Rptr. 719 ].) "Generally speaking, a discretionary act i

1968For example, in Elder v. Anderson (1962) 205 Cal. App.2d 326, 331 [ 23 Cal. Rptr. 48 ], the court defined discretionary acts as "those wherein there is no hard and fast rule as to the course of conduct that one must or must not take and, if there is a clearly defined rule, such would eliminate discretion." (See also Doeg v. Cook (1899) 126 Cal. 213, 216 [ 58 P. 707 , 77 Am.St.Rep. 171 ]; Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles (1965) 233 Cal. App.2d 131, 134-135 [ 43 Cal. Rptr. 294 ]; Glickman v. Glasner (1964) 230 Cal. App.2d 120, 125 [ 40 Cal. Rptr. 719 ].) "Generally speaking, a discretionary act i

2021Preventing litigants from “playing ‘fast and loose with the courts’” in this fashion, in turn, serves “‘to protect parties from opponents’ unfair strategies’” and, more importantly, to ‘“maintain the integrity of the judicial system.”’ (Aguilar v. Lerner (2004) 32 Cal.4th 974, 986 (Aguilar); Minish, at p. 449).

2021Judicial Estoppel, Defined The doctrine of judicial estoppel, which is sometimes referred to as the “‘doctrine of “‘“preclusion of inconsistent positions,”’”’” is designed to prevent litigants from “‘“‘gaining an advantage by taking one position [in litigation], and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position.’”’” (MW 2 By this time, plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed its promissory estoppel claim. 6 Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412, 422 (MW Erectors); Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437, 448 (Mi

2021Judicial Estoppel, Defined The doctrine of judicial estoppel, which is sometimes referred to as the “‘doctrine of “‘“preclusion of inconsistent positions,”’”’” is designed to prevent litigants from “‘“‘gaining an advantage by taking one position [in litigation], and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position.’”’” (MW 2 By this time, plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed its promissory estoppel claim. 6 Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412, 422 (MW Erectors); Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437, 448 (Mi

2014Governing law and standard of review Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part: "The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." In In re Marriage of Eben-King & King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 118 (King), the court defined the standard of review that an appellate court is to apply in reviewing an order denying a motion to set aside under Code of Civil Proce

2014(United States v. Martinez (9th Cir. 2005) 406 F.3d 1160, 1163-1164 (Martinez).) The court defined this doctrine as containing three requirements: “(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property[;] (2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence[; and] (3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.” (Id. at p. 1164.) The Martinez court pointed o

2014(United States v. Martinez (9th Cir. 2005) 406 F.3d 1160, 1163-1164 (Martinez).) The court defined this doctrine as containing three requirements: “(1) The police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property[;] (2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence[; and] (3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.” (Id. at p. 1164.) The Martinez court pointed o

2011(County of Riverside, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 804 [“Therefore, we think the Bill of Rights Act is, like many other statutory schemes enacted for the protection of a class of employees, not subject to blanket waiver.”].) But then the court defined the waiver issue before it narrowly.

2001(See People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564 , 828 P.2d 705 ] [reasonable likelihood standard applies when reviewing claims of ambiguous instructions].) Defendant broadly asserts the trial court’s instructions allowed the jury to consider evidence of his background, character, and social history as factors in aggravation.

2001(See People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564 , 828 P.2d 705 ] [reasonable likelihood standard applies when reviewing claims of ambiguous instructions].) Defendant broadly asserts the trial court’s instructions allowed the jury to consider evidence of his background, character, and social history as factors in aggravation.

1966The presumptions declared in section 2235 are activated upon the making of a contract that comes within that section by which the attorney obtains “any advantage”—it “need not be an unfair advantage.” (Ferrara v. La Sala, 186 Cal.App.2d 263, 271 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 179 ] ; Bradner v. Vasques, 43 Cal.2d 147, 151, 152 [ 272 P.2d 11 ]; Rader v. Thrasher, 57 Cal.2d 244, 250 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 736 , 368 P.2d 360 ].) In Bradner 3 the court stated at page 151: “It is plaintiff’s contention that the advantage gained by the fiduciary must be an unfair advantage before the presumptions of section 2235 are properl

1966The presumptions declared in section 2235 are activated upon the making of a contract that comes within that section by which the attorney obtains “any advantage”—it “need not be an unfair advantage.” (Ferrara v. La Sala, 186 Cal.App.2d 263, 271 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 179 ] ; Bradner v. Vasques, 43 Cal.2d 147, 151, 152 [ 272 P.2d 11 ]; Rader v. Thrasher, 57 Cal.2d 244, 250 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 736 , 368 P.2d 360 ].) In Bradner 3 the court stated at page 151: “It is plaintiff’s contention that the advantage gained by the fiduciary must be an unfair advantage before the presumptions of section 2235 are properl

1966The presumptions declared in section 2235 are activated upon the making of a contract that comes within that section by which the attorney obtains “any advantage”—it “need not be an unfair advantage.” (Ferrara v. La Sala, 186 Cal.App.2d 263, 271 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 179 ] ; Bradner v. Vasques, 43 Cal.2d 147, 151, 152 [ 272 P.2d 11 ]; Rader v. Thrasher, 57 Cal.2d 244, 250 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 736 , 368 P.2d 360 ].) In Bradner 3 the court stated at page 151: “It is plaintiff’s contention that the advantage gained by the fiduciary must be an unfair advantage before the presumptions of section 2235 are properl

1966The presumptions declared in section 2235 are activated upon the making of a contract that comes within that section by which the attorney obtains “any advantage”—it “need not be an unfair advantage.” (Ferrara v. La Sala, 186 Cal.App.2d 263, 271 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 179 ] ; Bradner v. Vasques, 43 Cal.2d 147, 151, 152 [ 272 P.2d 11 ]; Rader v. Thrasher, 57 Cal.2d 244, 250 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 736 , 368 P.2d 360 ].) In Bradner 3 the court stated at page 151: “It is plaintiff’s contention that the advantage gained by the fiduciary must be an unfair advantage before the presumptions of section 2235 are properl

1966The presumptions declared in section 2235 are activated upon the making of a contract that comes within that section by which the attorney obtains “any advantage”—it “need not be an unfair advantage.” (Ferrara v. La Sala, 186 Cal.App.2d 263, 271 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 179 ] ; Bradner v. Vasques, 43 Cal.2d 147, 151, 152 [ 272 P.2d 11 ]; Rader v. Thrasher, 57 Cal.2d 244, 250 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 736 , 368 P.2d 360 ].) In Bradner 3 the court stated at page 151: “It is plaintiff’s contention that the advantage gained by the fiduciary must be an unfair advantage before the presumptions of section 2235 are properl

1966The presumptions declared in section 2235 are activated upon the making of a contract that comes within that section by which the attorney obtains “any advantage”—it “need not be an unfair advantage.” (Ferrara v. La Sala, 186 Cal.App.2d 263, 271 [ 9 Cal.Rptr. 179 ] ; Bradner v. Vasques, 43 Cal.2d 147, 151, 152 [ 272 P.2d 11 ]; Rader v. Thrasher, 57 Cal.2d 244, 250 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 736 , 368 P.2d 360 ].) In Bradner 3 the court stated at page 151: “It is plaintiff’s contention that the advantage gained by the fiduciary must be an unfair advantage before the presumptions of section 2235 are properl

1930(McDonald v. Smith, 68 Fla. 77, 78 [ 66 South. 430 ] ; Daniels v. Towers, 79 Ga. 785 [ 7 S. E. 120 ].) There is nothing in France v. Superior Court, supra, cited by respondent, that sustains its contention.

1930(McDonald v. Smith, 68 Fla. 77, 78 [ 66 South. 430 ] ; Daniels v. Towers, 79 Ga. 785 [ 7 S. E. 120 ].) There is nothing in France v. Superior Court, supra, cited by respondent, that sustains its contention.