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9 Kansas opinions name it 3 courts 1967–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Estate of Draper v. Bank of America, N.A.green2 sentences2018See Estate of Draper v. Bank of America, N.A. , 288 Kan. 510 , 528, 205 P.3d 698 (2009) ("While good faith ... [is] usually [a question] of fact, summary judgment may be appropriate if the facts are uncontroverted and establish that a defined standard has not been met."). 2018See Estate of Draper v. Bank of America, N.A. , 288 Kan. 510 , 528, 205 P.3d 698 (2009) ("While good faith ... [is] usually [a question] of fact, summary judgment may be appropriate if the facts are uncontroverted and establish that a defined standard has not been met."). | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dougan v. Rossville Drainage District
green
2 sentences2003Discretionary acts are defined “as those acts wherein there is no hard and fast rule as to course of conduct that one must or must not take and, if there is a clearly defined rule, such would eliminate discretion.” Dougan v. Rossville Drainage Dist., 243 Kan. 315, 321 , 757 P.2d 272 (1988). 2003Discretionary acts are defined “as those acts wherein there is no hard and fast rule as to course of conduct that one must or must not take and, if there is a clearly defined rule, such would eliminate discretion.” Dougan v. Rossville Drainage Dist., 243 Kan. 315, 321 , 757 P.2d 272 (1988). | 2 | 1993–2003 |
In re the Estate of Smidt
green
2 sentences1990The court noted: “In such situations, the wife, by force of necessity, must establish a separate domicile and her act in so doing accomplishes for practical purposes a removal of the marital res sufficient to authorize the court possessing jurisdiction at the domicile so established by her to exercise authority over it. [Citations omitted.]” 162 Misc. at 599 . 1990The court noted: "In such situations, the wife, by force of necessity, must establish a separate domicile and her act in so doing accomplishes for practical purposes a removal of the marital res sufficient to authorize the court possessing jurisdiction at the domicile so established by her to exercise authority over it. [Citations omitted.]" 162 Misc. at 599 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences1987The Court defined a waiver as an intentional waiver of a known right, made with full awareness of the effect, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 82 L. 1987Ed. 2d 1461 , 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Talley v. Skelly Oil Co.
green
2 sentences1983In Talley v. Shelly Oil Co., 199 Kan. 767, 772-73 , 433 P.2d 425 (1967), the court qualified the rule stated in Hunter : “The rule pronounced in Hunter recognizes a well defined exception to the general principle that exculpatory agreements voluntarily entered into by parties standing on an equal footing are enforceable as between the contracting parties themselves. 1983In Talley v. Shelly Oil Co., 199 Kan. 767, 772-73 , 433 P.2d 425 (1967), the court qualified the rule stated in Hunter : “The rule pronounced in Hunter recognizes a well defined exception to the general principle that exculpatory agreements voluntarily entered into by parties standing on an equal footing are enforceable as between the contracting parties themselves. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences1982In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 (1972), the court defined the factors to be considered upon a constitutional claim of denial of speedy trial. 1982In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 (1972), the court defined the factors to be considered upon a constitutional claim of denial of speedy trial. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Otis Elevator Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences1967(Otis Co. v. Maryland Co., 95 Colo. 99 , 33 P. 2d 974 .)” (pp. 618, 619.) The rule pronounced in Hunter recognizes a well defined exception to the general principle that exculpatory agreements voluntarily entered into by parties standing on an equal footing are enforceable as between the contracting parties themselves. 1967(Otis Co. v. Maryland Co., 95 Colo. 99 , 33 P. 2d 974 .)” (pp. 618, 619.) The rule pronounced in Hunter recognizes a well defined exception to the general principle that exculpatory agreements voluntarily entered into by parties standing on an equal footing are enforceable as between the contracting parties themselves. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.