defined rule in New York

1992Likewise, in Bell, the Court examined the Waterfront Commission Act and construed the clause " 'knowingly or willingly advocates the desirability of overthrowing the government of the United States by force or violence,’ to proscribe only that type of advocacy (1) which is intended to indoctrinate or incite to action in furtherance of the defined doctrine and (2) which is accompanied by a 'clear and present danger’ of success.” (Matter of Bell v Waterfront Commn., supra, at 62.) I decline to follow the only reported case on this issue, People ex rel.

1991Although Bell (supra) was decided prior to Brandenburg ( 395 US 444 , supra), its language closely traces the standards set forth in that landmark case, and is an undeniable example of the reasoning of the highest court of this State, when measuring statutes by those standards: "Accordingly, as required by the First Amendment, we read the Waterfront Commission Act and construe the clause, 'knowingly or willingly advocates the desirability of overthrowing the government of the United States by force or violence,’ to proscribe only that type of advocacy (1) which is intended to indoctrinate or i

2018The establishment of a clearly defined rule of action would be the end of discretion" ( The Styria, Scopinich v. Morgan, 186 U.S. 1 , 9, 22 S.Ct. 731 , 46 L.Ed. 1027 [1902] [emphasis omitted] ).

2018The establishment of a clearly defined rule of action would be the end of discretion" ( The Styria, Scopinich v. Morgan, 186 U.S. 1 , 9, 22 S.Ct. 731 , 46 L.Ed. 1027 [1902] [emphasis omitted] ).

2018"When invoked as a guide to judicial action, it means a sound discretion, that is to say, a discretion exercised not arbitrarily or willfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances" ( Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 , 541, 51 S.Ct. 243 , 75 L.Ed. 520 [1931] ).

2018"When invoked as a guide to judicial action, it means a sound discretion, that is to say, a discretion exercised not arbitrarily or willfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances" ( Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 , 541, 51 S.Ct. 243 , 75 L.Ed. 520 [1931] ).

2026Medical Ctr., 248 AD2d 358 [2d Dept 1998]; see e.g., Prete v Rafla-Demetrious, 224 AD2d 674 [2d Dept 1996]; Canter v Mu/nick, 60 NY2d 689 [ 1983]; see also Fridovich v David, 188 AD2d 984 [3d Dept 1992]; Ferrara v. South Shore Orthopedic Associates, 178 AD 2d 364 [ I st Dept 1991]).

2026Medical Ctr., 248 AD2d 358 [2d Dept 1998]; see e.g., Prete v Rafla-Demetrious, 224 AD2d 674 [2d Dept 1996]; Canter v Mu/nick, 60 NY2d 689 [ 1983]; see also Fridovich v David, 188 AD2d 984 [3d Dept 1992]; Ferrara v. South Shore Orthopedic Associates, 178 AD 2d 364 [ I st Dept 1991]).

2015There is a "fundamental unfairness of holding citizens to 'the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse,' while allowing those 'entrusted to enforce' the law to be ignorant of it" (United States v Chanthasouxat, 342 F3d 1271, 1280 [11th Cir 2003], citing Bryan v United States, 524 US 184, 196 [1998]).

2015There is a “fundamental unfairness of holding citizens to ‘the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse,’ while allowing those ‘entrusted to enforce’ the law to be ignorant of it” (United States v Chanthasouxat, 342 F3d 1271, 1280 [11th Cir 2003] [citation omitted], citing Bryan v United States, 524 US 184, 196 [1998]).

2015There is a "fundamental unfairness of holding citizens to 'the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse,' while allowing those 'entrusted to enforce' the law to be ignorant of it" (United States v Chanthasouxat, 342 F3d 1271, 1280 [11th Cir 2003], citing Bryan v United States, 524 US 184, 196 [1998]).

2015There is a “fundamental unfairness of holding citizens to ‘the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse,’ while allowing those ‘entrusted to enforce’ the law to be ignorant of it” (United States v Chanthasouxat, 342 F3d 1271, 1280 [11th Cir 2003] [citation omitted], citing Bryan v United States, 524 US 184, 196 [1998]).

2009People v Wheeler, 59 AD3d 1007, 1008 [2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 711 [2009]), there is no requirement that it do so and, in any event, the record is clear that the court was taking into consideration all information relevant to his risk level — including his subsequent crimes — regardless of whether it fit within one of the RAI’s defined factors.

2008Additionally, an issue of fact can be raised by a party opposing summary judgment if evidence is tendered that a defined exception to the recreational use statute applies (see Farnham v Kittinger, 83 NY2d 520, 528-529 [1994]; Sega v State of New York, 60 NY2d 183, 192 [1983]; Blair v Newstead Snowseekers, 2 AD3d 1286, 1288 [2003]; Scuderi v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 243 AD2d 1049 [1997]).

2008Additionally, an issue of fact can be raised by a party opposing summary judgment if evidence is tendered that a defined exception to the recreational use statute applies (see Farnham v Kittinger, 83 NY2d 520, 528-529 [1994]; Sega v State of New York, 60 NY2d 183, 192 [1983]; Blair v Newstead Snowseekers, 2 AD3d 1286, 1288 [2003]; Scuderi v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 243 AD2d 1049 [1997]).

2008The three statutory exceptions are available when a property owner willfully or maliciously fails to guard or warn against a dangerous condition (see General Obligations Law § 9-103 [2] [a]; McCleary v City of Glens Falls, 32 AD3d 605, 608 [2006]; Hillman v Penn Cent.

2008Additionally, an issue of fact can be raised by a party opposing summary judgment if evidence is tendered that a defined exception to the recreational use statute applies (see Farnham v Kittinger, 83 NY2d 520, 528-529 [1994]; Sega v State of New York, 60 NY2d 183, 192 [1983]; Blair v Newstead Snowseekers, 2 AD3d 1286, 1288 [2003]; Scuderi v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 243 AD2d 1049 [1997]).

2003(People v Galak, 81 NY2d 463 [1993]; Mincey v Arizona, 437 US 385, 390 [1978]; Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 357 [1967].) As the Court of Appeals has stated: “[T]he privacy interest of our citizens is far too cherished a right to be entrusted to the discretion of the officer in the field.” (People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 588 [1980].) Accordingly, the police are not permitted to make a warrantless search of an individual’s premises unless the circumstances fall within a clearly defined exception to this rule.

2003(People v Galak, 81 NY2d 463 [1993]; Mincey v Arizona, 437 US 385, 390 [1978]; Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 357 [1967].) As the Court of Appeals has stated: “[T]he privacy interest of our citizens is far too cherished a right to be entrusted to the discretion of the officer in the field.” (People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 588 [1980].) Accordingly, the police are not permitted to make a warrantless search of an individual’s premises unless the circumstances fall within a clearly defined exception to this rule.

2003(People v Galak, 81 NY2d 463 [1993]; Mincey v Arizona, 437 US 385, 390 [1978]; Katz v United States, 389 US 347, 357 [1967].) As the Court of Appeals has stated: “[T]he privacy interest of our citizens is far too cherished a right to be entrusted to the discretion of the officer in the field.” (People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583, 588 [1980].) Accordingly, the police are not permitted to make a warrantless search of an individual’s premises unless the circumstances fall within a clearly defined exception to this rule.

1994The Court stated that since compulsory arbitration is involved, that judicial review is "broad, requiring that the award be in accord with due process and supported by adequate evidence in the record * * * The award must also be rational and satisfy the arbitrary and capricious standards of CPLR article 78” ( 75 NY2d, at 186 ; accord, Matter of General Motors Corp. v Lee, 193 AD2d 741 ).

1993Eligibility for public assistance is determined by measuring the countable income and resources of an individual or family against the State’s defined standard of need which is its view of the amount necessary to provide for the essential needs of a hypothetical family having the same composition as the family in question (see, Lovelace v Gross, supra, at 422).