defined exception in Minnesota

1984Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).

1984Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 , 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967).

1997South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 , 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3099 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); see also Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 , 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2608 , 77 L.Ed.2d 65 , (1983) (stating that inventory search is a well defined exception to the warrant requirement); Myles, 218 N.W.2d at 699 (stating that inventory searches are not constitutionally improper).

1997South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 373 , 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3099 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); see also Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 , 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2608 , 77 L.Ed.2d 65 , (1983) (stating that inventory search is a well defined exception to the warrant requirement); Myles, 218 N.W.2d at 699 (stating that inventory searches are not constitutionally improper).

1994The Commissioner’s representative also cited Schmidt v. City of Duluth, 346 N.W.2d 671 (Minn.App.1984), where this court defined the standard for determining whether an employee’s gross misconduct interferes with and adversely affects his employment “whether, by reason of his action, he can no longer effectively perform the services for which he was employed.” Id. at 674 .

1994The Commissioner’s representative also cited Schmidt v. City of Duluth, 346 N.W.2d 671 (Minn.App.1984), where this court defined the standard for determining whether an employee’s gross misconduct interferes with and adversely affects his employment “whether, by reason of his action, he can no longer effectively perform the services for which he was employed.” Id. at 674 .

1985The Court defined this standard further in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).

1985The Court defined this standard further in United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).

1984Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). *201 The plain view exception to the warrant requirement permits a police officer “to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband where the officer has a right to be.” State v. Griffin, 336 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn.1983) (quoting Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5-6 , 102 S.Ct. 812, 816 , 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982)).

1984Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). *201 The plain view exception to the warrant requirement permits a police officer “to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband where the officer has a right to be.” State v. Griffin, 336 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn.1983) (quoting Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5-6 , 102 S.Ct. 812, 816 , 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982)).

1977Royal Realty Co. v. Levin, 244 Minn. 288 , 69 N. W. 2d 667 (1955); Borchardt v. Kulick, 234 Minn. 308, 319 , 48 N. W. 2d 318, 325 (1951). 3 See, also, Radke v. Brenon, 271 Minn. 35, 40 , 134 N. W. 2d 887, 891 (1965). 4 In Conlan v. Grace, 36 Minn. 276, 281 , 30 N. W. 880, 883 (1886), this court defined the test of adequate “subscription” as whether the offeror intended to authenticate the document: “* * * If signed by the grantee’s authority, or adopted by him as his signature, although written toy another, it is a sufficient signing by the grantor.” Accord, Radke v. Brenon, 271 Minn. 35, 39 ,

1977Royal Realty Co. v. Levin, 244 Minn. 288 , 69 N. W. 2d 667 (1955); Borchardt v. Kulick, 234 Minn. 308, 319 , 48 N. W. 2d 318, 325 (1951). 3 See, also, Radke v. Brenon, 271 Minn. 35, 40 , 134 N. W. 2d 887, 891 (1965). 4 In Conlan v. Grace, 36 Minn. 276, 281 , 30 N. W. 880, 883 (1886), this court defined the test of adequate “subscription” as whether the offeror intended to authenticate the document: “* * * If signed by the grantee’s authority, or adopted by him as his signature, although written toy another, it is a sufficient signing by the grantor.” Accord, Radke v. Brenon, 271 Minn. 35, 39 ,

1959R. (2d) 1135, wherein this court defined waiver as a voluntary relinquishment of a known right; Dobie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 164 Va. 464 , 180 S. E. 289 , 107 A. L.

1959R. (2d) 1135, wherein this court defined waiver as a voluntary relinquishment of a known right; Dobie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 164 Va. 464 , 180 S. E. 289 , 107 A. L.

1933In the case of Michel v. Smith, 188 Cal. 199, 201 , 205 P. 113, 114 , the supreme court of California said: “There is a well defined exception to the general rule which renders one responsible in a civil action for the tortious acts of those employed by or under him.

1933In the case of Michel v. Smith, 188 Cal. 199, 201 , 205 P. 113, 114 , the supreme court of California said: “There is a well defined exception to the general rule which renders one responsible in a civil action for the tortious acts of those employed by or under him.

1918The contention of defendant is that the facts bring the case within the well defined exception to the rule as applied in Healy v. Young, 21 Minn. 389 , where it was held that parol evidence is admissible in such cases where it tends to establish a distinct and independent agreement not intended by the parties to be embraced in the written contract.