7 Wyoming opinions name it 1 courts 1987–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wyoming courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Districtgreen2 sentences2014Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 , 1 N.E.3d 270, 278 (Mass.2018) (citations omitted) ("Our desire for a clearly defined standard for assessing the retroactivity of a particular rule, coupled with 'our concern that the finality of convictions not be unduly disturbed," * * * led to our adoption of the Teague retroactivity framework[.]"). [¶40] In adopting the Teague analysis, the Idaho court acknowledged the criticisms that had been leveled at the Teague approach and responded to those concerns: The Nevada Supreme Court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has applied Teague so strictly "t 2014Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 , 1 N.E.3d 270, 278 (Mass.2018) (citations omitted) ("Our desire for a clearly defined standard for assessing the retroactivity of a particular rule, coupled with 'our concern that the finality of convictions not be unduly disturbed," * * * led to our adoption of the Teague retroactivity framework[.]"). [¶40] In adopting the Teague analysis, the Idaho court acknowledged the criticisms that had been leveled at the Teague approach and responded to those concerns: The Nevada Supreme Court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has applied Teague so strictly "t | 2 | 2 |
Colwell v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 , 1 N.E.3d 270, 278 (Mass.2018) (citations omitted) ("Our desire for a clearly defined standard for assessing the retroactivity of a particular rule, coupled with 'our concern that the finality of convictions not be unduly disturbed," * * * led to our adoption of the Teague retroactivity framework[.]"). [¶40] In adopting the Teague analysis, the Idaho court acknowledged the criticisms that had been leveled at the Teague approach and responded to those concerns: The Nevada Supreme Court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has applied Teague so strictly "t 2014Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 , 1 N.E.3d 270, 278 (Mass.2018) (citations omitted) ("Our desire for a clearly defined standard for assessing the retroactivity of a particular rule, coupled with 'our concern that the finality of convictions not be unduly disturbed," * * * led to our adoption of the Teague retroactivity framework[.]"). [¶40] In adopting the Teague analysis, the Idaho court acknowledged the criticisms that had been leveled at the Teague approach and responded to those concerns: The Nevada Supreme Court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has applied Teague so strictly "t | 2 | 2 |
State v. McDermottgreen2 sentences2004The well defined standard for determining whether a plea was knowing and voluntary provides: “[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their ñatee improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g.bribes).” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 7 2002The well defined standard for determining whether a plea was knowing and voluntary provides: "[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g.bribes)." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, | 2 | 2 |
Schade v. Stategreen2 sentences2004The well defined standard for determining whether a plea was knowing and voluntary provides: “[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their ñatee improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g.bribes).” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 7 2004The well defined standard for determining whether a plea was knowing and voluntary provides: “[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their ñatee improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g.bribes).” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 7 | 1 | 1 |
Frame v. Stategreen2 sentences2004Frame v. State, 2001 WY 72, ¶ 7 , 29 P.3d 86, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2001). 2004Frame v. State, 2001 WY 72, ¶ 7 , 29 P.3d 86, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2001). | 1 | 1 |
Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc.green2 sentences1987C.P., the trial court accepts the pleadings as true, except for facts or records properly subject to judicial notice. “ * * * Although normally a motion to dismiss admits all well-pleaded facts, it does not admit facts which the court can judicially notice as not being corréct * * (Emphasis added.) Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., Wyo., 540 P.2d 535, 538 (1975), and we now include facts which the court can judicially notice as determined or true. 1987We recognized the validity of the defined standard that upon entry of an order dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P., the trial court accepts the pleadings as true, except for facts or records properly subject to judicial notice. "* * * Although normally a motion to dismiss admits all well-pleaded facts, it does not admit facts which the court can judicially notice as not being correct * * *." (Emphasis added.) Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., Wyo., 540 P.2d 535, 538 (1975), and we now include facts which the court can judicially notice as determined or true. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wyoming. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
J. Paul Shelton v. United States
green
2 sentences2004The well defined standard for determining whether a plea was knowing and voluntary provides: “[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their ñatee improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g.bribes).” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 7 2002The well defined standard for determining whether a plea was knowing and voluntary provides: "[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g.bribes)." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, | 2 | 2002–2004 |
Shelton v. United States
green
2 sentences2004The well defined standard for determining whether a plea was knowing and voluntary provides: “[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their ñatee improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g.bribes).” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 7 2004The well defined standard for determining whether a plea was knowing and voluntary provides: “[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their ñatee improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g.bribes).” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 7 | 2 | 2002–2004 |
Manuel Rodriguez Trading Corp. v. United States
green
2 sentences2004The well defined standard for determining whether a plea was knowing and voluntary provides: “[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their ñatee improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g.bribes).” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 7 2002The well defined standard for determining whether a plea was knowing and voluntary provides: "[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g.bribes)." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, | 2 | 2002–2004 |
Brady v. United States
green
2 sentences2004The well defined standard for determining whether a plea was knowing and voluntary provides: “[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their ñatee improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g.bribes).” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 7 2004The well defined standard for determining whether a plea was knowing and voluntary provides: “[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their ñatee improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g.bribes).” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 7 | 2 | 2002–2004 |
People v. Fremont Energy Corp.
green
1 sentence1993The purpose of the doctrine then is to avoid premature interruption of the administrative process where the agency has been created to apply a statute in the first instance. 651 P.2d at 811 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Miller v. State
green
2 sentences1993For the first time in this line of cases, the court defined a standard of appellate review in Miller v. State, 755 P.2d 855 (Wyo.1988). 1993For the first time in this line of cases, the court defined a standard of appellate review in Miller v. State, 755 P.2d 855 (Wyo.1988). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.