polygraph test in Maryland

2002It is well settled that neither evidence that a polygraph test was taken nor the results of the test are admissible in a criminal proceeding. 5 Guesfeird v. State, 300 Md. 653, 658-59 , 480 A.2d 800 (1984).

2002It is well settled that neither evidence that a polygraph test was taken nor the results of the test are admissible in a criminal proceeding. 5 Guesfeird v. State, 300 Md. 653, 658-59 , 480 A.2d 800 (1984).

2001Both Kosmas and Guesfeird involved prejudice worked by testimonial references to polygraph testing (in the case of Kosmas , a reference to the refusal to take a polygraph test) ( Kosmas, 316 Md. at 594 , 560 A.2d at 1141 ).

2001Both Kosmas and Guesfeird involved prejudice worked by testimonial references to polygraph testing (in the case of Kosmas , a reference to the refusal to take a polygraph test) ( Kosmas, 316 Md. at 594 , 560 A.2d at 1141 ).

2012Id. at 5 , 501 P.2d 468 .

2012As in Algien , when a suspect, in an interrogation, is pressed persistently with the polygraph test results indicating that he is “lying,” “a reasonable person would with logic conclude that he could not leave the [police station] of his own free will but would be detained for formal arrest.” Id. 16 Another case of interest is State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah Ct.App.1990).

2006When Allgood subsequently took the polygraph test and failed, the State, deeming the plea agreement to have been breached by Allgood, 309 Md. at 64 , 522 A.2d at 920 , wrote a letter to Allgood’s attorney “to officially notify you that there is no plea agreement concerning this murder case between the State and your client, George Allgood.” (Emphasis in original).

2006When Allgood subsequently took the polygraph test and failed, the State, deeming the plea agreement to have been breached by Allgood, 309 Md. at 64 , 522 A.2d at 920 , wrote a letter to Allgood’s attorney “to officially notify you that there is no plea agreement concerning this murder case between the State and your client, George Allgood.” (Emphasis in original).

1995Id., at 69-70 , 494 A.2d 239 .

1995Cf. Townsend, 64 Md.App. at 69-70, 494 A.2d 239 (discharge was due to the fact that employer believed employee had stolen, not because employee had refused to take a polygraph test).

2015It is well established that “[w]hatever latitude the statutes repose in the trial judge [to determine appropriate probationary conditions], it remains, of course, fundamental that conditions of probation must be reasonable and have a rational basis.” Watson v. State, 17 Md.App. 263, 274 , 301 A.2d 26 (1973).

2015It is well established that “[w]hatever latitude the statutes repose in the trial judge [to determine appropriate probationary conditions], it remains, of course, fundamental that conditions of probation must be reasonable and have a rational basis.” Watson v. State, 17 Md.App. 263, 274 , 301 A.2d 26 (1973).

2015A. Rational Basis Russell contends that under Brown v. State, 80 Md.App. 187 , 560 A.2d 605 (1989), the polygraph requirement of his probation lacks a rational basis.

2015A. Rational Basis Russell contends that under Brown v. State, 80 Md.App. 187 , 560 A.2d 605 (1989), the polygraph requirement of his probation lacks a rational basis.

2013Nonetheless, given the clear distinction between mandatory supervision release and probation, we hold that the court erred in revoking Callahan’s probation for failing to follow the agent’s instruction to report for a polygraph test as that directive was a “new, more onerous condition” that was “not fairly within the ambit of those laid down by the court.” Edwards, supra, 67 Md.App. at 281 , 507 A.2d 212 .

2013Nonetheless, given the clear distinction between mandatory supervision release and probation, we hold that the court erred in revoking Callahan’s probation for failing to follow the agent’s instruction to report for a polygraph test as that directive was a “new, more onerous condition” that was “not fairly within the ambit of those laid down by the court.” Edwards, supra, 67 Md.App. at 281 , 507 A.2d 212 .

2013McFadden v. State, 540 So.2d 844 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1989), is factually similar to the instant case.

2012Although the Pittman Court reversed the lower court’s grant of the suppression motion, it reached that conclusion because the lower court had “relied upon only one circumstance, not the totality of the circumstances, in determining that Pittman was in custody after the polygraph test.” Id. at 61-62 .

2012The Pittman Court reaffirmed its previous holding in Algien , cautioning, however, that that decision had “analyzed multiple factors in determining that the suspect in that case was in custody,” Pittman, 284 P.3d at 62 , so too in the instant case, where we have considered the totality of the circumstances and not merely the one circumstance, to wit, the coercive use of the failed polygraph test results.

2012As in Algien , when a suspect, in an interrogation, is pressed persistently with the polygraph test results indicating that he is “lying,” “a reasonable person would with logic conclude that he could not leave the [police station] of his own free will but would be detained for formal arrest.” Id. 16 Another case of interest is State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah Ct.App.1990).

2005In Finke v. State, 56 Md.App. 450, 489-90 , 468 A.2d 353 (1983), we held that the defendant’s confession to murder was voluntary even though the interrogating officer told him numerous lies about the state of the evidence against him: that he had failed a polygraph test; that his three-year-old cousin could identify him as the killer; that his fingerprints were recovered from the crime scene; that two eyewitnesses had seen him enter the house where the murder was committed and two eyewitnesses had seen him leave; and that “according to an expert he would be unable to remember the incident[.]”

2005In Finke v. State, 56 Md.App. 450, 489-90 , 468 A.2d 353 (1983), we held that the defendant’s confession to murder was voluntary even though the interrogating officer told him numerous lies about the state of the evidence against him: that he had failed a polygraph test; that his three-year-old cousin could identify him as the killer; that his fingerprints were recovered from the crime scene; that two eyewitnesses had seen him enter the house where the murder was committed and two eyewitnesses had seen him leave; and that “according to an expert he would be unable to remember the incident[.]”

2005In Finke v. State, 56 Md.App. 450, 489-90 , 468 A.2d 353 (1983), we held that the defendant’s confession to murder was voluntary even though the interrogating officer told him numerous lies about the state of the evidence against him: that he had failed a polygraph test; that his three-year-old cousin could identify him as the killer; that his fingerprints were recovered from the crime scene; that two eyewitnesses had seen him enter the house where the murder was committed and two eyewitnesses had seen him leave; and that “according to an expert he would be unable to remember the incident[.]”

2005In Finke v. State, 56 Md.App. 450, 489-90 , 468 A.2d 353 (1983), we held that the defendant’s confession to murder was voluntary even though the interrogating officer told him numerous lies about the state of the evidence against him: that he had failed a polygraph test; that his three-year-old cousin could identify him as the killer; that his fingerprints were recovered from the crime scene; that two eyewitnesses had seen him enter the house where the murder was committed and two eyewitnesses had seen him leave; and that “according to an expert he would be unable to remember the incident[.]”

2004Wyrick, 459 U.S. at 48-49 , 103 S.Ct. at 396-97 , 74 L.Ed.2d at 219 .

2004Wyrick, 459 U.S. at 48-49 , 103 S.Ct. at 396-97 , 74 L.Ed.2d at 219 .

2002In this regard, a polygraph test is considered “no different than any ‘other potentially coercive condition, person or device present during interrogation.’ ” Murphy, 105 Md.App. at 311 , 659 A.2d 384 (quoting Johnson v. State, 31 Md.App. 303, 309 , 355 A.2d 504 (1976)).

1996After a police officer testified that an alternative suspect had taken a polygraph test, did the trial court err in 1) failing to grant a mistrial, or 2) refusing to admit the results of the test? [2] John Staubitz, Jr. had been a state official before his convictions for conspiracy to commit misconduct in office, as well as several other offenses. [3] See, e.g., Brooke v. United States, 385 F.2d 279, 284 (D.C.Cir.1967); United States v. Wilson, 798 F.2d 509, 518-19 (1st Cir.1986); United States v. Bryser, 954 F.2d 79, 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 972 , 112 S.Ct. 2939 , 119 L.Ed.2d 564

1996After a police officer testified that an alternative suspect had taken a polygraph test, did the trial court err in 1) failing to grant a mistrial, or 2) refusing to admit the results of the test? [2] John Staubitz, Jr. had been a state official before his convictions for conspiracy to commit misconduct in office, as well as several other offenses. [3] See, e.g., Brooke v. United States, 385 F.2d 279, 284 (D.C.Cir.1967); United States v. Wilson, 798 F.2d 509, 518-19 (1st Cir.1986); United States v. Bryser, 954 F.2d 79, 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 972 , 112 S.Ct. 2939 , 119 L.Ed.2d 564

1996After a police officer testified that an alternative suspect had taken a polygraph test, did the trial court err in 1) failing to grant a mistrial, or 2) refusing to admit the results of the test? [2] John Staubitz, Jr. had been a state official before his convictions for conspiracy to commit misconduct in office, as well as several other offenses. [3] See, e.g., Brooke v. United States, 385 F.2d 279, 284 (D.C.Cir.1967); United States v. Wilson, 798 F.2d 509, 518-19 (1st Cir.1986); United States v. Bryser, 954 F.2d 79, 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 972 , 112 S.Ct. 2939 , 119 L.Ed.2d 564

1996After a police officer testified that an alternative suspect had taken a polygraph test, did the trial court err in 1) failing to grant a mistrial, or 2) refusing to admit the results of the test? [2] John Staubitz, Jr. had been a state official before his convictions for conspiracy to commit misconduct in office, as well as several other offenses. [3] See, e.g., Brooke v. United States, 385 F.2d 279, 284 (D.C.Cir.1967); United States v. Wilson, 798 F.2d 509, 518-19 (1st Cir.1986); United States v. Bryser, 954 F.2d 79, 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 972 , 112 S.Ct. 2939 , 119 L.Ed.2d 564