89 Ohio opinions name it 4 courts 1973–2025 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hegelgreen2 sentences2003App.3d 113 ; State v. Harris (Oct. 3, 1984), Hamilton App. No. C-830927. {¶ 83} In addressing this prejudicial effect of the admission of testimony regarding a polygraph examination, the court, in Rowe , stated as follows: {¶ 84} "In determining whether a defendant was prejudiced by the admission of testimony regarding a polygraph test, `[t]he effect of inadmissible testimony upon the final outcome of any case cannot, of course, be gauged with mathematical certainty, but the manifest weight of the type of testimony erroneously admitted in the present case cannot conscientiously be ignored * * 1990State v. Hegel (1964), 9 Ohio App. 2d 12 ; Lascola, supra. For example, in Lascola, supra, at 4531, the court admonished the fact that "*** the instructions to the jury did not include a special charge regarding how the jury should consider the results of the polygraph test." Therefore, it is clear that it was error for the state's witness' polygraph test and results thereof to have been admitted at trial. | 3 | 8 |
State v. Souelgreen2 sentences2016Souel, supra. State v. Davis, 62 Ohio St. 3d 326, 341 , 581 N.E.2d 1362 (1991). {¶36} Given that a polygraph test is not viewed as scientifically reliable, the state, in this case, could not have put forth evidence of the general scientific reliability of a polygraph test as appellant asserts it should have done in order to comply with Evid.R. 702(C). 2016Moreover, appellant argues this failure impacted his counsel’s ability to cross-examine relative to the conditions under which the test was administered and possibilities for error as required by Souel, supra. Appellant also argues that his polygraph test was unreliable because he answered “yes” to a control question of whether he lived in Canada, when in fact he lives in the United States, and the polygraph test showed his “yes” answer was non-deceptive. {¶24} In addition to the condition discussed in appellant’s first assignment of error regarding the jury instructions, Souel set out three o | 2 | 31 |
State v. Lascolagreen2 sentences2024In fact, this court seemed to acknowledge as much in State v. Lascola, 61 Ohio App.3d 228, 234 (10th Dist.1988), when we stated, “[T]he guidelines of Souel specifically addressed the admissibility of a defendant’s polygraph test results, not those of the complaining witness.” So, too, did the Seventh District, when it noted that “ ‘appellate courts have not specifically ruled that a witness’s polygraph test is admissible under the same conditions as a defendant’s polygraph test.’ ” State v. Beshara, 7th Dist. 2017“When a defendant agrees to undergo a polygraph test, presumably he knows whether he is telling the truth and is willing to assume the risk of error.” State v. Lascola, 61 Ohio App.3d 228, 234 , 572 N.E.2d 717 (10th Dist.1988). {¶ 52} Further, these results were not admitted into evidence and we presume, unless shown otherwise, that the trial court did not rely on them in making its decision. | 2 | 8 |
State v. Banks, 08ap-722 (4-7-2009)green2 sentences2025Compare State v. Doren, 2009-Ohio-1667, ¶ 134 (6th Dist.) (reversing a conviction where the jury "demonstrated sustained curiosity" and submitted seven written questions regarding a polygraph test despite being instructed to disregard any mention of polygraph tests). {¶ 32} The State asked Wood where she met Davis, and she answered that she met him while he was in prison with her brother. 2020Wood No. WD- 06-064, 2009-Ohio-1667, ¶134 (“While a jury is presumed to follow instructions * * * this jury demonstrated sustained curiosity about a polygraph test by submitting seven written questions despite the first curative instructions. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2024Id., citing State v. Davis, 62 Ohio St.3d 326, 341 , 581 N.E.2d 1362 (1991). {¶9} The Grate opinion did not involve a polygraph test. 2024Id., citing State v. Davis, 62 Ohio St.3d 326, 341 , 581 N.E.2d 1362 (1991). {¶9} The Grate opinion did not involve a polygraph test. | 1 | 5 |
State v. Bradleygreen2 sentences2016Id. at 694 ; see also State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). {¶ 15} Here, appellant asserts that, but for trial counsel allowing her to submit to a polygraph test, she would not have entered a no contest plea. 2016Id. at 694 ; see also State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). {¶ 15} Here, appellant asserts that, but for trial counsel allowing her to submit to a polygraph test, she would not have entered a no contest plea. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Jamisongreen2 sentences2003See State v. Jamison (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 182 , 190 . {¶ 23} In opening statements, the State referred to the fact that Defendant sought Isaac Gilkerson's ("Gilkerson") advice regarding the possibility of taking a polygraph test. 1999It is clear after a review of the holding in Souel that, "the trial court cannot admit the results of polygraph tests into evidence simply at an accused's request . . . such results are admissible only if both the prosecution and defense jointly stipulate that an accused will take a polygraph test and that the results will be admissible. " State v. Jamison (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 182 , 190 (emphasis added). | 1 | 4 |
State v. Rowegreen2 sentences2003App.3d 113 ; State v. Harris (Oct. 3, 1984), Hamilton App. No. C-830927. {¶ 83} In addressing this prejudicial effect of the admission of testimony regarding a polygraph examination, the court, in Rowe , stated as follows: {¶ 84} "In determining whether a defendant was prejudiced by the admission of testimony regarding a polygraph test, `[t]he effect of inadmissible testimony upon the final outcome of any case cannot, of course, be gauged with mathematical certainty, but the manifest weight of the type of testimony erroneously admitted in the present case cannot conscientiously be ignored * * 2003App.3d 113 ; State v. Harris (Oct. 3, 1984), Hamilton App. No. C-830927. {¶ 83} In addressing this prejudicial effect of the admission of testimony regarding a polygraph examination, the court, in Rowe , stated as follows: {¶ 84} "In determining whether a defendant was prejudiced by the admission of testimony regarding a polygraph test, `[t]he effect of inadmissible testimony upon the final outcome of any case cannot, of course, be gauged with mathematical certainty, but the manifest weight of the type of testimony erroneously admitted in the present case cannot conscientiously be ignored * * | 1 | 3 |
State v. Blasdellgreen2 sentences2022Lorain No. 03CA008230, 2003-Ohio- 7168, ¶ 33 (“[a]ssuming without deciding that this instance would favor inclusion, this Court concludes that the decision of the trial court to exclude Appellant’s statements regarding his willingness to take a polygraph examination as a means of proving his innocence does not rise to the level of an abuse of discretion”); State v. Blasdell, 155 Ohio App.3d 423 , 2003-Ohio-6392 , 801 N.E.2d 853, ¶ 31 (7th Dist.) (“the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of appellant’s willingness to take a polygraph test”); State v. Kennedy, 2022Lorain No. 03CA008230, 2003-Ohio- 7168, ¶ 33 (“[a]ssuming without deciding that this instance would favor inclusion, this Court concludes that the decision of the trial court to exclude Appellant’s statements regarding his willingness to take a polygraph examination as a means of proving his innocence does not rise to the level of an abuse of discretion”); State v. Blasdell, 155 Ohio App.3d 423 , 2003-Ohio-6392 , 801 N.E.2d 853, ¶ 31 (7th Dist.) (“the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of appellant’s willingness to take a polygraph test”); State v. Kennedy, | 1 | 2 |
State v. Underwoodgreen2 sentences2015See State v. Underwood, 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 13 , 444 N.E.2d 1332 (1983); Thomas at ¶ 38. {¶21} The record shows that in the recording of Collier’s interview with police, McGuffey asked him to take a polygraph test and Collier refused. 2015See State v. Underwood, 3 Ohio St.3d 12, 13 , 444 N.E.2d 1332 (1983); Thomas at ¶ 38. {¶21} The record shows that in the recording of Collier’s interview with police, McGuffey asked him to take a polygraph test and Collier refused. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Postgreen2 sentences2014To show that a defendant has been prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, the defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different. {¶14} We note this court must accord deference to defense counsel's strategic choices made during trial and "requires us to eliminate the distorting effect of hindsight." State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 388 (1987). {¶15} Appellant's wife, Laura Fender, testified appellant was willing to take a polygraph test, but did not take one on the advice of counsel. 1999Based on the evidence in the record, Appellant has failed to overcome the presumption that "in a bench trial in a criminal case the court considered only the relevant material and competent evidence in arriving at its judgment unless it affirmatively appears to the contrary." State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380 , 384 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2009Defendant argues that his counsel's failure to object to this improper vouching evidence prejudiced him because his credibility in this case was a key issue as the case came down to his word against that of Pendergrass and Smith. {¶ 30} In State v. Russell , Montgomery App. No. 21458, 2008-Ohio-774 , this court stated that because an attorney may not express a personal belief or opinion as to the credibility of a witness, citing State v. Smith (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 13 , it was improper for the State to elicit from its own witness that she had agreed to take a polygraph test and that her plea a 2006Specifically, Wickard asserts that the trial court erred in allowing Officer Graydon, one of the State's witnesses, to bring whips into the courtroom; that the trial court erred by not admonishing the jury that Wickard was not required to take a polygraph test; and, that the trial court erred in failing to admonish the jury about possible nods or prompts from the audience during the victim's testimony. {¶ 30} "The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether the remarks were improper and, if so, whether the remarks prejudicially affected the accused's substantial rights." State v. Twyford, 94 | 1 | 2 |
State v. Masongreen2 sentences2008See State v. Mason (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 153 , 694 N.E.2d 932 (“[o]nly a custodial interrogation triggers the need for a Miranda rights warning”). 2008See State v. Mason (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 153 , 694 N.E.2d 932 (“[o]nly a custodial interrogation triggers the need for a Miranda rights warning”). | 1 | 2 |
Connecticut v. Portergreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 93 (1997) (“After reviewing the case law and the current, extensive literature on the polygraph test, * * * we are convinced that the prejudicial impact of polygraph evidence greatly exceeds its probative value.”). | 1 | 1 |
Henley v. Casongreen2 sentences2024In Henley v. Cason, 154 Fed.Appx. 445 (6th Cir.2005), a prosecutor repeatedly referred to “testing” and “investigative procedures,” and on appeal, the defendant argued that these references were “thinly veiled references to a polygraph test.” Id. at 446. 2024In Henley v. Cason, 154 Fed.Appx. 445 (6th Cir.2005), a prosecutor repeatedly referred to “testing” and “investigative procedures,” and on appeal, the defendant argued that these references were “thinly veiled references to a polygraph test.” Id. at 446. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kennedygreen1 sentence2022Logan No. 8-18-01, 2018-Ohio-4172, ¶ 54 (defendant argued “that the trial court erred by redacting a portion of her interview at the jail wherein she stated she would potentially be willing to take a polygraph examination”); compare State v. Fender, 5th Dist. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Boggsgreen2 sentences2022See State v. Boggs, 63 Ohio St.3d 418, 421 , 588 N.E.2d 813 (1992) (“False accusations, where no sexual activity is involved, do not fall 2 At the time of the hearing, no charges had been filed against A.B.’s oldest brother. 23. within the rape shield statute.”). 2022See State v. Boggs, 63 Ohio St.3d 418, 421 , 588 N.E.2d 813 (1992) (“False accusations, where no sexual activity is involved, do not fall 2 At the time of the hearing, no charges had been filed against A.B.’s oldest brother. 23. within the rape shield statute.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fendergreen1 sentence2022Tuscarawas No. 2013 AP 12 0072, 2014-Ohio-19, ¶ 15, ¶ 17 (trial counsel was not ineffective for allowing the defendant’s wife to testify that 19 Case No. 2021-T-0014 he “was willing to take a polygraph test, but did not take one on the advice of counsel”; “[b]y using that which cannot be used and proclaiming one’s innocence with a plea for a polygraph test, the defense attempted to bolster [defendant’s] credibility and innocence”). {¶62} In the present case, we cannot discern any prejudice resulting from trial counsel’s failure to object to evidence of Wymer’s willingness to take a polygraph e | 1 | 1 |
State v. Murphygreen1 sentence2021See Murphy at ¶ 4, 82 . | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Glovergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Samuelsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Mottramgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Byrd, Unpublished Decision (12-31-2003)green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2009See State v. Hegel (1964), 9 Ohio App.2d 12 , 13 (admission of testimony of defendant's refusal to submit to a lie detector test constitutes prejudicial error); State v. Smith (1960), 113 Ohio App. 461 (admission of testimony relating to submission of accused to a lie detector test, even though results thereof are not disclosed, constitutes prejudicial error where no curative instructions were given); State v. Miller (Apr. 20, 1987), 5th Dist. 2003In finding that plain error did not exist in that case, this court noted, “ ‘[Sjince it is uniformly held that such a [polygraph] test is not judicially acceptable, it reasonably follows that neither a professed willingness nor a refusal to submit to such a test should be admitted.’ State v. Hegel (1964), 9 Ohio App.2d 12, 13 [ 38 O.O.2d 25 ], 222 N.E.2d 666 , citing State v. Smith (1960), 113 Ohio App. 461 [ 18 O.O.2d 19 ], 178 N.E.2d 605 .” Id. | 3 | 1983–2009 |
State v. Valdez
green
2 sentences2006Richmond contends that the trial court failed to instruct the jury in accordance with the following guideline set forth in State v. Valdez (1962), 91 Ariz. 274 , 283-284 , 371 P.2d 894 , 900 , and adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Souel (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 123 , 132 , 7 O.O.3d 207 , 372 N.E.2d 1318 , that where a polygraph test is admitted "`the trial judge should instruct the jury that the examiner's testimony does not tend to prove or disprove any element of the crime with which a defendant is charged but at most tends only to indicate that at the time of the examination def 2006Richmond contends that the trial court failed to instruct the jury in accordance with the following guideline set forth in State v. Valdez (1962), 91 Ariz. 274 , 283-284 , 371 P.2d 894 , 900 , and adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Souel (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 123 , 132 , 7 O.O.3d 207 , 372 N.E.2d 1318 , that where a polygraph test is admitted "`the trial judge should instruct the jury that the examiner's testimony does not tend to prove or disprove any element of the crime with which a defendant is charged but at most tends only to indicate that at the time of the examination def | 3 | 1991–2007 |
State ex rel. Leis v. Kraft
green
2 sentences1991The court emphasized that should the prosecution be required to proceed with trial, the “state would be helpless to prevent this miscarriage of justice.” Id. 1984Leis, supra, the Supreme Court recognized that the conservation of judicial assets outweighed the prompt disposal of a criminal trial, on the facts presented, and allowed an appeal pursuant to R.C. 2505.02 from the trial court’s order that the accused be provided with a polygraph test at the state's expense. | 3 | 1984–1991 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2020State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 141 , 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-689 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 2016Id. at 694 ; see also State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). {¶ 15} Here, appellant asserts that, but for trial counsel allowing her to submit to a polygraph test, she would not have entered a no contest plea. | 2 | 2016–2020 |
State v. Ahmed
green
2 sentences2015State v. Ahmed, 103 Ohio St.3d 27 , 2004-Ohio-4190 , 813 N.E.2d 637 , ¶ 91; State v. Combs, 62 Ohio St.3d 278, 280-281 , 581 N.E.2d 1071 (1991). 2007State v. Ahmed , 103 Ohio St.3d 27 , 2004-Ohio-4190 , ¶ 92 . | 2 | 2007–2015 |
State v. Spirko
green
2 sentences2008Ballard , supra. {¶ 110} But in Ballard we also opined that the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Spirko (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 1 , 570 N.E.2d 229 , implicitly rejected the "notion that testimony regarding the willingness or refusal to take a polygraph examination should not be admitted into evidence." In Spirko , the Supreme Court held that any error in admitting the testimony of a State's witness that the defendant had told the witness that he had failed a polygraph test and that the witness had taken a polygraph test were not grounds for reversal where defense counsel made no objection when the 2008Ballard , supra. {¶ 110} But in Ballard we also opined that the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Spirko (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 1 , 570 N.E.2d 229 , implicitly rejected the "notion that testimony regarding the willingness or refusal to take a polygraph examination should not be admitted into evidence." In Spirko , the Supreme Court held that any error in admitting the testimony of a State's witness that the defendant had told the witness that he had failed a polygraph test and that the witness had taken a polygraph test were not grounds for reversal where defense counsel made no objection when the | 2 | 2003–2008 |
People v. Rocha
green
2 sentences2003App.3d 113 ; State v. Harris (Oct. 3, 1984), Hamilton App. No. C-830927. {¶ 83} In addressing this prejudicial effect of the admission of testimony regarding a polygraph examination, the court, in Rowe , stated as follows: {¶ 84} "In determining whether a defendant was prejudiced by the admission of testimony regarding a polygraph test, `[t]he effect of inadmissible testimony upon the final outcome of any case cannot, of course, be gauged with mathematical certainty, but the manifest weight of the type of testimony erroneously admitted in the present case cannot conscientiously be ignored * * 1990As recently stated by this court in Lascola, supra, at 4537: "*** There is no way for this court to determine precisely the total impact of the polygraph test results upon the jury. *** " The court went on to state, at 4537, that: "*** There is at least a reasonable probability that without the results of the polygraph tests *253 the outcome of the trial would have been different." The court, in People v. Rocha (Mich. App. 1981), 110 Mich. App. 1 , 312 N.W. 2d 657, at 661 , set forth the following factors to determine whether a reversal is warranted: "*** (1) [Wlhether defendant objected and/o | 2 | 1990–2003 |
State v. Reese
green
1 sentence2024Reese, 2016-Ohio-557, at ¶ 23 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Cleavenger
green
1 sentence2024Portage No. 2019-P-0031, 2020-Ohio- 1325, 153 N.E.3d 496 .” 5 Case No. 2023-T-0025 {¶14} Defense counsel made no objection to the failure to state a jury instruction on polygraph evidence. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Hubbard
green
1 sentence2024No. 07 MA No. 22AP-532 61 37, 2009-Ohio-6529 , ¶ 65, quoting State v. Hubbard, 150 Ohio App.3d 623 , 2002-Ohio- 6904, ¶ 39 (7th Dist.), citing Lascola at 236 . {¶ 216} And so, our court and many of our sister districts have continued to extrapolate from the Souel decision in circumstances like those presented here without explicit guidance from our Supreme Court. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Murphy
green
1 sentence2022Cuyahoga No. 107836, 2019-Ohio-4347, ¶ 76 , quoting State v. Graves, 1st Dist. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| United States v. Bellomo green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Johnson (Slip Opinion) green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Eaton green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. McKelton (Slip Opinion) green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Campbell green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. McDowell green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Hand green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Diar green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Cepec (Slip Opinion) green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Commonwealth v. Young green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Smith v. Phillips green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| In re S.H.W. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Combs green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Pang v. Minch green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Petro green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Sharma green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Dehass green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Henderson green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Terry, 1730 (12-19-2008) neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Parker v. Randolph red | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| In Re A v. 08ca31 (2-20-2009) neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Russell, 21458 (2-22-2008) green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Jones green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Hairston, Unpublished Decision (9-25-2006) green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Schlosser green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Jones green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Manning green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Lefkowitz v. Turley green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.