polygraph test in Maine

1978Even more recently when in State v. Mower, Me., 314 A.2d 840, 841 (1974) our Court ruled that evidence of the defendant’s willingness to take a polygraph test was properly excluded, it reiterated the language of Mottram . 1 Such was the state of the law in this jurisdiction when in 1976 the Maine Rules of Evidence, modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence, were promulgated.

1978When eight years later our Court in State v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325, 329 , 184 A.2d 225 (1962) reaffirmed that evidence of the results of "lie detector tests" was inadmissible, the lack of general acceptance of the results of such tests was again the determinative factor. *506 Even more recently when in State v. Mower, Me., 314 A.2d 840, 841 (1974) our Court ruled that evidence of the defendant's willingness to take a polygraph test was properly excluded, it reiterated the language of Mottram . [1] Such was the state of the law in this jurisdiction when in 1976 the Maine Rules of Evidence, model

2012(A.R. 183-85.) In Lavoie, the Law Court reiterated a "long-standing, fundamental concern regarding polygraph machines due to their non-existent value when it comes to determining credibility" in both criminal and civil cases. 2010 ME 76 , ~ 14, 1 A.sd at 412; accord Heselton v. Wilder, 496 A.2d 1063, 1066-67 (Me. 1985) (holding in a civil case that "the results of a polygraph IS examination are entitled to no weight" and an individual's willingness to take a polygraph test is inadmissible).

2010Heselton v. Wilder, 496 A.2d 1063, 1066-67 (Me. 1985). [3] See Comm. to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph, Nat'l Research Council, The Polygraph and Lie Detection 1-5, 126-46, 212-16 (2003), available at http://books. nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10420& page=R1 (describing numerous variables that undermine polygraph tests' efficacy); see also Thomas L.

2010Harnish, 560 A.2d at 8 ; State v. Trafton, 425 A.2d 1320, 1322 (Me. 1981); State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 320 , 110 A.2d 588, 592-93 (1954). [¶ 15] The scientific evidence simply does not support the reliability or validity of polygraph examinations. 3 Accordingly, nearly every state either “bar[s] the admission of polygraph evidence outright ... [or] limitfs] the admission of polygraph evidence to cases where both parties stipulate to its use.” State v. A.O., 198 N.J. 69 , 965 A.2d 152, 161-62 (2009) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 , 309-12 & nn. 6-8, 118 S

2010Harnish, 560 A.2d at 8 ; State v. Trafton, 425 A.2d 1320, 1322 (Me.1981); State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 320 , 110 A.2d 588, 592-93 (1954). [¶ 15] The scientific evidence simply does not support the reliability or validity of polygraph examinations. [3] Accordingly, nearly every state either "bar[s] the admission of polygraph evidence outright ... [or] limit[s] the admission of polygraph evidence to cases where both parties stipulate to its use." State v. A.O., 198 N.J. 69 , 965 A.2d 152, 161-62 (2009) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 , 309-12 & nn. 6-8, 118

2017Due to this concern, "polygraph test results and 11 defendant's willingness, or unwillingness, to take a polygraph test are inadmissible." Id.

2012Police trickery may, however, rise to a level where it calls into question the voluntariness of a confession, as where police “mislead the individual during an interrogation as to that individual’s constitutionally protected right against self-incrimination.” Dodge, 2011 ME 47, ¶¶ 14, 16 , 17 A.3d 128 (addressing false police assurances of confidentiality); see also Lavoie, 2010 ME 76, ¶ 26 , 1 A.3d 408 (Levy, J., concurring) (“A deception that actually compromises a suspect’s ability to make a free choice of a rational mind, is inherently coercive and fundamentally unfair.” (citation and quot

1978When our Court had occasion to reject evidence of a polygraph test in State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 320 , 110 A.2d 588 (1954), it quoted from the opinion of the Nebraska court in Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368 , 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949).

1978When our Court had occasion to reject evidence of a polygraph test in State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 320 , 110 A.2d 588 (1954), it quoted from the opinion of the Nebraska court in Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368 , 37 N.W.2d 593 (1949).

1981Citing certain language in State v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325 , 184 A.2d 225 (1962), Hilton argues that the trial justice was required to allow a voir dire of Henry Routhier to determine his reasons for declining to take the polygraph test.

1981Citing certain language in State v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325 , 184 A.2d 225 (1962), Hilton argues that the trial justice was required to allow a voir dire of Henry Routhier to determine his reasons for declining to take the polygraph test.

1994To the contrary, in State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281, 285 (Me.1975), we held that although polygraph test results are inadmissible, “admissions made by an accused after the polygraph testing ... are admissible if such admissions are found to be voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.” Since Patterson does not dispute the issue of voluntariness, precedent is on the State’s side.

1981See, e. g., State v. Edwards, Me., 412 A.2d 983 (1980); State v. McDonough, Me., 350 A.2d 556 (1976); State v. Gagne, Me., 343 A.2d 186 (1975); State v. Bowden, Me., 342 A.2d 281 (1975); State v. Mower, Me., 314 A.2d 840 (1974).

1992See State v. Glidden, 489 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Me.1985) (fact of victim’s pregnancy, despite in li-mine ruling of inadmissibility, was properly referred to by prosecutor in closing argument when defendant had introduced it himself); State v. McDonough, 350 A.2d 556, 562-63 (Me.1976) (defendant not permitted to complain that reference to witness’s polygraph test on redirect by State was prejudicial when defendant elicited testimony about the polygraph test on cross-examination).

1981See, e. g., State v. Edwards, Me., 412 A.2d 983 (1980); State v. McDonough, Me., 350 A.2d 556 (1976); State v. Gagne, Me., 343 A.2d 186 (1975); State v. Bowden, Me., 342 A.2d 281 (1975); State v. Mower, Me., 314 A.2d 840 (1974).

2013Similarly, an individual has a right to an attorney after the initiation of formal charges, McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991).

2012Police trickery may, however, rise to a level where it calls into question the voluntariness of a confession, as where police “mislead the individual during an interrogation as to that individual’s constitutionally protected right against self-incrimination.” Dodge, 2011 ME 47, ¶¶ 14, 16 , 17 A.3d 128 (addressing false police assurances of confidentiality); see also Lavoie, 2010 ME 76, ¶ 26 , 1 A.3d 408 (Levy, J., concurring) (“A deception that actually compromises a suspect’s ability to make a free choice of a rational mind, is inherently coercive and fundamentally unfair.” (citation and quot

2012Police trickery may, however, rise to a level where it calls into question the voluntariness of a confession, as where police “mislead the individual during an interrogation as to that individual’s constitutionally protected right against self-incrimination.” Dodge, 2011 ME 47, ¶¶ 14, 16 , 17 A.3d 128 (addressing false police assurances of confidentiality); see also Lavoie, 2010 ME 76, ¶ 26 , 1 A.3d 408 (Levy, J., concurring) (“A deception that actually compromises a suspect’s ability to make a free choice of a rational mind, is inherently coercive and fundamentally unfair.” (citation and quot

2010Harnish, 560 A.2d at 8 ; State v. Trafton, 425 A.2d 1320, 1322 (Me.1981); State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 320 , 110 A.2d 588, 592-93 (1954). [¶ 15] The scientific evidence simply does not support the reliability or validity of polygraph examinations. [3] Accordingly, nearly every state either "bar[s] the admission of polygraph evidence outright ... [or] limit[s] the admission of polygraph evidence to cases where both parties stipulate to its use." State v. A.O., 198 N.J. 69 , 965 A.2d 152, 161-62 (2009) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 , 309-12 & nn. 6-8, 118

2010Harnish, 560 A.2d at 8 ; State v. Trafton, 425 A.2d 1320, 1322 (Me.1981); State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 320 , 110 A.2d 588, 592-93 (1954). [¶ 15] The scientific evidence simply does not support the reliability or validity of polygraph examinations. [3] Accordingly, nearly every state either "bar[s] the admission of polygraph evidence outright ... [or] limit[s] the admission of polygraph evidence to cases where both parties stipulate to its use." State v. A.O., 198 N.J. 69 , 965 A.2d 152, 161-62 (2009) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 , 309-12 & nn. 6-8, 118

2010Harnish, 560 A.2d at 8 ; State v. Trafton, 425 A.2d 1320, 1322 (Me.1981); State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 320 , 110 A.2d 588, 592-93 (1954). [¶ 15] The scientific evidence simply does not support the reliability or validity of polygraph examinations. [3] Accordingly, nearly every state either "bar[s] the admission of polygraph evidence outright ... [or] limit[s] the admission of polygraph evidence to cases where both parties stipulate to its use." State v. A.O., 198 N.J. 69 , 965 A.2d 152, 161-62 (2009) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 , 309-12 & nn. 6-8, 118

2010Harnish, 560 A.2d at 8 ; State v. Trafton, 425 A.2d 1320, 1322 (Me.1981); State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 320 , 110 A.2d 588, 592-93 (1954). [¶ 15] The scientific evidence simply does not support the reliability or validity of polygraph examinations. [3] Accordingly, nearly every state either "bar[s] the admission of polygraph evidence outright ... [or] limit[s] the admission of polygraph evidence to cases where both parties stipulate to its use." State v. A.O., 198 N.J. 69 , 965 A.2d 152, 161-62 (2009) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 , 309-12 & nn. 6-8, 118

2010Harnish, 560 A.2d at 8 ; State v. Trafton, 425 A.2d 1320, 1322 (Me.1981); State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 320 , 110 A.2d 588, 592-93 (1954). [¶ 15] The scientific evidence simply does not support the reliability or validity of polygraph examinations. [3] Accordingly, nearly every state either "bar[s] the admission of polygraph evidence outright ... [or] limit[s] the admission of polygraph evidence to cases where both parties stipulate to its use." State v. A.O., 198 N.J. 69 , 965 A.2d 152, 161-62 (2009) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 , 309-12 & nn. 6-8, 118

2010Harnish, 560 A.2d at 8 ; State v. Trafton, 425 A.2d 1320, 1322 (Me.1981); State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 320 , 110 A.2d 588, 592-93 (1954). [¶ 15] The scientific evidence simply does not support the reliability or validity of polygraph examinations. [3] Accordingly, nearly every state either "bar[s] the admission of polygraph evidence outright ... [or] limit[s] the admission of polygraph evidence to cases where both parties stipulate to its use." State v. A.O., 198 N.J. 69 , 965 A.2d 152, 161-62 (2009) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 , 309-12 & nn. 6-8, 118

2003Additionally, the officers involved did not consider the Defendant a suspect until some time after the polygraph test.’ The Supreme Court has stated, “a police officer’s view that the individual under questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed, does not bear upon the question whether the individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 329 (1994).

1992See State v. Glidden, 489 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Me.1985) (fact of victim’s pregnancy, despite in li-mine ruling of inadmissibility, was properly referred to by prosecutor in closing argument when defendant had introduced it himself); State v. McDonough, 350 A.2d 556, 562-63 (Me.1976) (defendant not permitted to complain that reference to witness’s polygraph test on redirect by State was prejudicial when defendant elicited testimony about the polygraph test on cross-examination).

1981See, e. g., State v. Edwards, Me., 412 A.2d 983 (1980); State v. McDonough, Me., 350 A.2d 556 (1976); State v. Gagne, Me., 343 A.2d 186 (1975); State v. Bowden, Me., 342 A.2d 281 (1975); State v. Mower, Me., 314 A.2d 840 (1974).

1981See, e. g., State v. Edwards, Me., 412 A.2d 983 (1980); State v. McDonough, Me., 350 A.2d 556 (1976); State v. Gagne, Me., 343 A.2d 186 (1975); State v. Bowden, Me., 342 A.2d 281 (1975); State v. Mower, Me., 314 A.2d 840 (1974).

1981In State v. Williams, Me., 388 A.2d 500, 502-03 (1978), we stated that "admissibility of lie detector evidence . . . poses the serious danger that a mechanical device, rather than the judgment of the jury, will decide credibility." Similarly, evidence of a person's unwillingness to take a polygraph test, even where that person believed the test to be reliable, is apt to unduly narrow the jury's focus in determining credibility.

1981In State v. Williams, Me., 388 A.2d 500, 502-03 (1978), we stated that “admissibility of lie detector evidence .. . poses the serious danger that a mechanical device, rather than the judgment of the jury, will decide credibility.” Similarly, evidence of a person’s unwillingness to take a polygraph test, even where that person believed the test to be reliable, is apt to unduly narrow the jury’s focus in determining credibility.