polygraph test in New Jersey

2009The panel distinguished State v. McDavitt, 62 N.J. 36 , 297 A. 2d 849 (1972), which upheld the admission of polygraph results where a defendant told the jury mid-trial that he would take a polygraph test and, after consulting with his attorney, agreed to do so.

2009The panel distinguished State v. McDavitt, 62 N.J. 36 , 297 A. 2d 849 (1972), which upheld the admission of polygraph results where a defendant told the jury mid-trial that he would take a polygraph test and, after consulting with his attorney, agreed to do so.

1986See State v. Cavallo, supra, 88 N.J. 508 see also State v. Melvin, 65 N.J. 1 (1974) (even though a polygraph test may be effective in individual cases, it is not generally accepted in scientific community as reliable and its results are therefore generally inadmissible in evidence); State v. Andretta, 61 N.J. 544 (1972) (regardless of its accuracy in an individual case, voice print not shown to be scientifically acceptable and therefore inadmissible in evidence).

1986See State v. Cavallo, supra, 88 N.J. 508 see also State v. Melvin, 65 N.J. 1 (1974) (even though a polygraph test may be effective in individual cases, it is not generally accepted in scientific community as reliable and its results are therefore generally inadmissible in evidence); State v. Andretta, 61 N.J. 544 (1972) (regardless of its accuracy in an individual case, voice print not shown to be scientifically acceptable and therefore inadmissible in evidence).

2026See State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 110 (1982) (recognizing that even though "a new trial [was] not warranted under either Brady or the newly discovered evidence test," the "oral report of the polygraph test should have been revealed to the defense").

2005Ten years later, in State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 116 , 449 A. 2d 1280, 1296 (1982), the Court reaffirmed this threshold admissibility requirement.

2021Super. 79, 83 (App. Div. 1997) (citing N.J.A.C. 10A:3-7.1(c)) (concluding the appellant did not "have the right to a polygraph test"). "[A]n inmate's right to a polygraph is conditional and the request should be granted when there is a serious question of credibility and the denial of the examination would A-2567-19 7 compromise the fundamental fairness of the disciplinary process." Ramirez, 382 N.J.

2020Super. 79, 83 (App. Div. 1997) (concluding the appellant did not "have the right to a polygraph test," citing N.J.A.C 10A:3-7.1(c)). "[A]n inmate's right to a polygraph is conditional and the request should be granted when there is a serious question of credibility and the denial of the examination would compromise the fundamental fairness of the disciplinary process." Ramirez, 382 N.J.

1974State v. Driver, 38 N.J. 255, 261 (1962).

1972Nevertheless, the adjudicated inadmissibility of such tests because of unproven reliability and the "horrendous capacity for prejudice" of even a reference to a defendant's attitude toward taking one, State v. Driver, 38 N.J. 255, 261, 262 (1962), satisfy us that error occurred in the admission of the test results despite the prior acquiescence of plaintiff, later recanted.

2007R. 2:11-3(e)(2). [1] The most recent assessment of polygraph accuracy and probative value appears to be in State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 698 A. 2d 739, 759-68 (1997) (adhering to a per se rule of non-admissibility in light of "the subjective nature and highly questionable predictive value of the polygraph test"). [2] Subsequent to Dean , Wisconsin enacted a statute permitting its corrections department to administer polygraph tests to convicted sex offenders as part of a treatment program or as a condition of the offender's probation, parole or extended supervision.

2007R. 2:11-3(e)(2). [1] The most recent assessment of polygraph accuracy and probative value appears to be in State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 698 A. 2d 739, 759-68 (1997) (adhering to a per se rule of non-admissibility in light of "the subjective nature and highly questionable predictive value of the polygraph test"). [2] Subsequent to Dean , Wisconsin enacted a statute permitting its corrections department to administer polygraph tests to convicted sex offenders as part of a treatment program or as a condition of the offender's probation, parole or extended supervision.

1976See e. g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 487-488 , 83 S. Ct. 407 , 9 L.

1976See e. g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 487-488 , 83 S. Ct. 407 , 9 L.

2005In Johnson v. New Jersey Department of Corrections, 298 N.J.Super. 79, 83 , 688 A.2d 1123 (App.Div.1997), we determined that an inmate does not have an unqualified right to a polygraph test.

2005In Johnson v. New Jersey Department of Corrections, 298 N.J.Super. 79, 83 , 688 A.2d 1123 (App.Div.1997), we determined that an inmate does not have an unqualified right to a polygraph test.

2020Id. at 178, 180-81 .

2005Id. at 180 , 636 A.2d 1058 .

2006We will disregard “[a]ny error or omission [by the trial court] ... unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” R. 2:10-2. “[T]he same ultimate standard applies whether the error was objected to below or whether the error was first claimed upon appeal.” State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 387-38 , 273 A.2d 1 (1971). “[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-11

1982The possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached. [ Id. at 335-36] [5] The Assistant Prosecutor stated at oral argument that the State would not have opposed the use of the polygraph test. [1] Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed. 2d 215 (1963). [2] The trial court on remand adopted the same position to the extent that it determined that "the State was justified in its impression that Harrelson's oral report was preliminary or tentative and subject for further review

2026See State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 609, 617-18 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 868 (2011)(determining a defendant's statements were voluntary notwithstanding the fact that police confronted him with polygraph results showing he failed the test).

2026See State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 609, 617-18 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 868 (2011)(determining a defendant's statements were voluntary notwithstanding the fact that police confronted him with polygraph results showing he failed the test).

2014In State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 139 , 590 A.2d 624 (1991), the defendant failed to keep an appointment with police to take a polygraph test because, according to his co-defendant, Miller, he “would not come to the station until after he had purchased and used drugs.” The police looked for the defendant at several drug-dealing locations, without success, and drove by Miller’s address.

2014In State v. Perry, 124 N.J. 128, 139 (1991), the defendant failed to keep an appointment with police to take a polygraph test because, according to his co-defendant, Miller, he “would not come to the station until after he had purchased and used drugs.” The police looked for the defendant at several drug- dealing locations, without success, and drove by Miller’s address.

2012See id. at 555 , 878 A.2d 772 (holding that in applying for a warrant, the police “must give the court an opportunity to make an independent evaluation of the informant’s present veracity”).

2012See id. at 555 , 878 A.2d 772 (holding that in applying for a warrant, the police “must give the court an opportunity to make an independent evaluation of the informant’s present veracity”).

2006The warrantless thermal scan of defendant's home in this case occurred more than one year before the United States Supreme Court in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 , 121 S.Ct. 2038, 2046 , 150 L.Ed. 2d 94, 106 (2001), ruled that the Fourth Amendment required law enforcement officers to secure a warrant to conduct such a "search." Domicz, supra, 377 N.J.Super. at 530-31 , 873 A. 2d 630 .

2006The warrantless thermal scan of defendant's home in this case occurred more than one year before the United States Supreme Court in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 , 121 S.Ct. 2038, 2046 , 150 L.Ed. 2d 94, 106 (2001), ruled that the Fourth Amendment required law enforcement officers to secure a warrant to conduct such a "search." Domicz, supra, 377 N.J.Super. at 530-31 , 873 A. 2d 630 .

2006We will disregard “[a]ny error or omission [by the trial court] ... unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” R. 2:10-2. “[T]he same ultimate standard applies whether the error was objected to below or whether the error was first claimed upon appeal.” State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 387-38 , 273 A.2d 1 (1971). “[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-11

2006We will disregard “[a]ny error or omission [by the trial court] ... unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” R. 2:10-2. “[T]he same ultimate standard applies whether the error was objected to below or whether the error was first claimed upon appeal.” State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 387-38 , 273 A.2d 1 (1971). “[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-11

2005Ibid.

2005Ibid.

2004Finally, defendant was given a polygraph test apparently "designed more to extract a confession than to discern if [defendant] was truthful or deceptive." Id. at 208, 798 A. 2d 83 .

2004Finally, defendant was given a polygraph test apparently "designed more to extract a confession than to discern if [defendant] was truthful or deceptive." Id. at 208, 798 A. 2d 83 .

1998See Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 120-21, 549 A.2d 792 (holding that a confession was voluntary although it was given after the defendant was informed that he failed a polygraph test).

1998See Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 120-21, 549 A.2d 792 (holding that a confession was voluntary although it was given after the defendant was informed that he failed a polygraph test).