10 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Matter of Rogersgreen2 sentences2016“The general rule is that no mention of a polygraph test should be placed before the jury.” State v. Johnson, 376 S.C. 8, 11 , 654 S.E.2d 835, 836 (2007). 2013We hold this concern was justified.' Here, the State’s decision not to exercise this right would have had the effect of bolstering Collins’s credibility. 1 See State v. Johnson, 376 S.C. 8, 11 , 654 S.E.2d 835, 836 (2007) (citing the “general rule” “that no mention of a polygraph test should be placed before the jury” and'holding the trial 'court-did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial based on a reference by a state’s witness to a polygraph test that she had taken); State v. McGuire, 272 S.C. 547, 551 , 253 S.E.2d 103, 105 (1979) (“Mention of a polygraph test might arise in any o | 3 | 3 |
State v. McGuiregreen2 sentences2013We hold this concern was justified.' Here, the State’s decision not to exercise this right would have had the effect of bolstering Collins’s credibility. 1 See State v. Johnson, 376 S.C. 8, 11 , 654 S.E.2d 835, 836 (2007) (citing the “general rule” “that no mention of a polygraph test should be placed before the jury” and'holding the trial 'court-did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial based on a reference by a state’s witness to a polygraph test that she had taken); State v. McGuire, 272 S.C. 547, 551 , 253 S.E.2d 103, 105 (1979) (“Mention of a polygraph test might arise in any o 2013We hold this concern was justified.' Here, the State’s decision not to exercise this right would have had the effect of bolstering Collins’s credibility. 1 See State v. Johnson, 376 S.C. 8, 11 , 654 S.E.2d 835, 836 (2007) (citing the “general rule” “that no mention of a polygraph test should be placed before the jury” and'holding the trial 'court-did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial based on a reference by a state’s witness to a polygraph test that she had taken); State v. McGuire, 272 S.C. 547, 551 , 253 S.E.2d 103, 105 (1979) (“Mention of a polygraph test might arise in any o | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of Haleygreen2 sentences2007Our supreme court held defense counsel's mention of the polygraph test was "a reasonable way to cast doubt on [the accomplice's] testimony implicating [Ellenburg]." Id. at 69 , 625 S.E.2d at 226. 2007Our supreme court held defense counsel’s mention of the polygraph test was “a reasonable way to cast doubt on [the accomplice’s] testimony implicating [Ellenburg].” Id. at 69 , 625 S.E.2d at 226. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. David L. Tedder, United States of America v. David Lee Roberts, United States of America v. Ronald Benson Roberts, A/K/A \Bb\""green1 sentence2005See United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437, 1444 (4th Cir.1986). | 1 | 1 |
Hullum v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2001See generally United States v. Spriggs, 996 F.2d 320 (D.C.Cir.1993) (permitting the prosecution on direct examination to introduce the witness’ cooperation agreement in its entirety, and adopting majority rule that admission of plea agreements containing "truthtelling” and perjury provisions did not result in improper bolstering); Massachusetts v. Rivera, 430 Mass. 91 , 712 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (1999) ("On direct examination the prosecution may, of course, properly bring out the fact that the witness has entered into a plea agreement and the witness generally understands his obligations under it. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Terrance Kevin Spriggs, A/K/A Bobgreen1 sentence2001See generally United States v. Spriggs, 996 F.2d 320 (D.C.Cir.1993) (permitting the prosecution on direct examination to introduce the witness’ cooperation agreement in its entirety, and adopting majority rule that admission of plea agreements containing "truthtelling” and perjury provisions did not result in improper bolstering); Massachusetts v. Rivera, 430 Mass. 91 , 712 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (1999) ("On direct examination the prosecution may, of course, properly bring out the fact that the witness has entered into a plea agreement and the witness generally understands his obligations under it. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2016“The general rule is that no mention of a polygraph test should be placed before the jury.” State v. Johnson, 376 S.C. 8, 11 , 654 S.E.2d 835, 836 (2007). 2013We hold this concern was justified.' Here, the State’s decision not to exercise this right would have had the effect of bolstering Collins’s credibility. 1 See State v. Johnson, 376 S.C. 8, 11 , 654 S.E.2d 835, 836 (2007) (citing the “general rule” “that no mention of a polygraph test should be placed before the jury” and'holding the trial 'court-did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial based on a reference by a state’s witness to a polygraph test that she had taken); State v. McGuire, 272 S.C. 547, 551 , 253 S.E.2d 103, 105 (1979) (“Mention of a polygraph test might arise in any o | 3 | 2013–2016 |
State v. BRITT
green
2 sentences1976He argues that such testimony was prejudicial and requires reversal under State v. Britt, supra. In Britt , the court reversed a death sentence because evidence of a defendant’s refusal to take a polygraph test was allowed. 1973We recognize in State v. Britt , 235 S.C. 395 , 111 S.E. (2) 669 (1959), that the exclusion of evidence concerning a polygraph test was based on the fact that the polygraph had not attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and acurate means of ascertaining truth or deception. | 2 | 1973–1976 |
Ellenburg v. State
green
2 sentences2007Our supreme court held defense counsel's mention of the polygraph test was "a reasonable way to cast doubt on [the accomplice's] testimony implicating [Ellenburg]." Id. at 69 , 625 S.E.2d at 226. 2007Our supreme court held defense counsel’s mention of the polygraph test was “a reasonable way to cast doubt on [the accomplice’s] testimony implicating [Ellenburg].” Id. at 69 , 625 S.E.2d at 226. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Merriman
green
1 sentence2005Id. at 87-88, 337 S.E.2d at 226-27 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Commonwealth v. Rivera
green
1 sentence2001See generally United States v. Spriggs, 996 F.2d 320 (D.C.Cir.1993) (permitting the prosecution on direct examination to introduce the witness’ cooperation agreement in its entirety, and adopting majority rule that admission of plea agreements containing "truthtelling” and perjury provisions did not result in improper bolstering); Massachusetts v. Rivera, 430 Mass. 91 , 712 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (1999) ("On direct examination the prosecution may, of course, properly bring out the fact that the witness has entered into a plea agreement and the witness generally understands his obligations under it. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
United States v. A & S Council Oil Company Artice L. Council
green
1 sentence1999Id. at 1134 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.