8 New Hampshire opinions name it 1 courts 1965–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Hampshire courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Obergreen2 sentences2023Ober, 126 N.H. at 472 . 2023Given that we had previously held that the results of a polygraph test are not admissible as evidence of guilt or innocence in a criminal trial, we explained that a “question asking whether a victim has been asked to take a polygraph test cannot produce admissible evidence.” Id. at 471-72 . | 2 | 3 |
State v. Hallgreen1 sentence2015Even assuming the officers misled the defendant regarding the polygraph results, “the police are not prohibited from misleading a suspect.” Hernandez, 162 N.H. at 706 ; see also State v. Hall, 148 N.H. 671, 673 (2002) (“Although the officers may have misled the defendant into believing they had incriminating evidence, their comments were not so deceptive as to render the confession involuntary.”). | 1 | 1 |
Miranda v. Arizonagreen1 sentence2015See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). | 1 | 1 |
Ross v. Stategreen1 sentence2014App. 2012) (after appellant was administered a polygraph test, he was interrogated in windowless interview room at police station where officers confronted him repeatedly and persistently with the fact that he failed the polygraph, accused him of lying, and threatened to inform his wife about the negative test results); Ross v. State, 45 So. 3d 403, 415-17 (Fla. 2010) (defendant came to station voluntarily and was questioned in small room; never told he was free to leave; after initial general questioning, interrogation became confrontational and accusatorial and lasted for hours, during which | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Martinezgreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., People v. Muniz, 190 P.Bd 774, 785 (Colo. App. 2008); Rowland v. United States, 840 A.2d 664 , 674 n.11 (D.C. 2004); State v. Hilton, 431 A.2d 1296, 1301 (Me. 1981); Kosmas v. State, 560 A.2d 1137, 1140 (Md. 1989); Com. v. Martinez, 769 N.E.2d 273, 278-79 (Mass. 2002). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dedrickgreen1 sentence2014App. 2012) (after appellant was administered a polygraph test, he was interrogated in windowless interview room at police station where officers confronted him repeatedly and persistently with the fact that he failed the polygraph, accused him of lying, and threatened to inform his wife about the negative test results); Ross v. State, 45 So. 3d 403, 415-17 (Fla. 2010) (defendant came to station voluntarily and was questioned in small room; never told he was free to leave; after initial general questioning, interrogation became confrontational and accusatorial and lasted for hours, during which | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hiltongreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., People v. Muniz, 190 P.Bd 774, 785 (Colo. App. 2008); Rowland v. United States, 840 A.2d 664 , 674 n.11 (D.C. 2004); State v. Hilton, 431 A.2d 1296, 1301 (Me. 1981); Kosmas v. State, 560 A.2d 1137, 1140 (Md. 1989); Com. v. Martinez, 769 N.E.2d 273, 278-79 (Mass. 2002). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jenningsgreen1 sentence2014App. 2012) (after appellant was administered a polygraph test, he was interrogated in windowless interview room at police station where officers confronted him repeatedly and persistently with the fact that he failed the polygraph, accused him of lying, and threatened to inform his wife about the negative test results); Ross v. State, 45 So. 3d 403, 415-17 (Fla. 2010) (defendant came to station voluntarily and was questioned in small room; never told he was free to leave; after initial general questioning, interrogation became confrontational and accusatorial and lasted for hours, during which | 1 | 1 |
State v. LaForestgreen2 sentences2014The trial court later expanded upon its ruling, citing State v. LaForest, 106 N.H. 159, 161 (1965), as well as out-of-state authority, for the general premise that an accused’s willingness or refusal to take a polygraph is inadmissible. 2014LaForest, 106 N.H. at 161 ; see also State v. Ober, 126 N.H. 471,471-72 (1985) (stating that we have “consistently held that the results of polygraph tests are not admissible as evidence of guilt or innocence in criminal trials”). | 1 | 1 |
Kosmas v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., People v. Muniz, 190 P.Bd 774, 785 (Colo. App. 2008); Rowland v. United States, 840 A.2d 664 , 674 n.11 (D.C. 2004); State v. Hilton, 431 A.2d 1296, 1301 (Me. 1981); Kosmas v. State, 560 A.2d 1137, 1140 (Md. 1989); Com. v. Martinez, 769 N.E.2d 273, 278-79 (Mass. 2002). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hieu Trangreen2 sentences2014App. 2012) (after appellant was administered a polygraph test, he was interrogated in windowless interview room at police station where officers confronted him 8 Even State v. Hieu Tran, 71 A.3d 1201 (Vt. 2012), the case cited by the majority that arguably presents the factual scenario most nearly analogous to that involved here, is distinguishable in important respects, in that the questioning in that case took place within the confines of a police vehicle, the officers did not inform the defendant either that he was free to leave or that he was not under arrest, and one of the officers told 2014App. 2012) (after appellant was administered a polygraph test, he was interrogated in windowless interview room at police station where officers confronted him repeatedly and persistently with the fact that he failed the polygraph, accused him of lying, and threatened to inform his wife about the negative test results); Ross v. State, 45 So. 3d 403, 415-17 (Fla. 2010) (defendant came to station voluntarily and was questioned in small room; never told he was free to leave; after initial general questioning, interrogation became confrontational and accusatorial and lasted for hours, during which | 1 | 1 |
State v. Munteangreen1 sentence2014App. 2012) (after appellant was administered a polygraph test, he was interrogated in windowless interview room at police station where officers confronted him repeatedly and persistently with the fact that he failed the polygraph, accused him of lying, and threatened to inform his wife about the negative test results); Ross v. State, 45 So. 3d 403, 415-17 (Fla. 2010) (defendant came to station voluntarily and was questioned in small room; never told he was free to leave; after initial general questioning, interrogation became confrontational and accusatorial and lasted for hours, during which | 1 | 1 |
Stateline Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Shieldsgreen1 sentence2006See Stateline Steel Erectors v. Shields, 150 N.H. 332, 334 (2003). “[CJourts have generally held that a public employer can require a policeman to submit to a polygraph test as part of an investigation of his conduct.” Nagle, The Polygraph in the Workplace, 18 U. RICH. | 1 | 1 |
Roux v. New Orleans Police Departmentgreen1 sentence2006Eshelman, 560 P.2d at 1285-86 ; see also Roux v. New Orleans Police Department, 223 So. 2d 905, 912 (La. | 1 | 1 |
Kaske v. City of Rockfordgreen1 sentence2006But see Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 427 So. 2d 187, 190 (Fla.) (“LT]he possible investigative benefit of building a case upon the foundation of the results of a polygraph examination is too thin a reed to support a denial of a police officer’s right to be subjected only to lawful and reasonable orders.”), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); Kaske v. City of Rockford, 450 N.E.2d 314, 320 (Ill.) (recognizing that “a polygraph examination is ... of some investigatory utility and value,” but concluding that refusing to submit to polygraph test cannot be basis for disciplinary action against | 1 | 1 |
Molino v. Board of Public Safetygreen2 sentences2006In the case upon which the petitioner relies, Stape v. Civil Service Commission of City of Philadelphia, 172 A.2d 161 , 164 (Penn. 1961), “nowhere in the City Charter, the City Ordinances, the Civil Service Regulations, or the Police Department regulations [was] there a provision which authorize^] the Police Commissioner or the Civil Service Commission, expressly or by implication, to force a city employee to submit to a polygraph test.” There was also no regulatory authority to require the police officers at issue in Molino v. Board of Public Safety of City of Torrington, 225 A.2d 805, 809 (C 2006In the case upon which the petitioner relies, Stape v. Civil Service Commission of City of Philadelphia, 172 A.2d 161 , 164 (Penn. 1961), “nowhere in the City Charter, the City Ordinances, the Civil Service Regulations, or the Police Department regulations [was] there a provision which authorize^] the Police Commissioner or the Civil Service Commission, expressly or by implication, to force a city employee to submit to a polygraph test.” There was also no regulatory authority to require the police officers at issue in Molino v. Board of Public Safety of City of Torrington, 225 A.2d 805, 809 (C | 1 | 1 |
Eshelman v. Blubaumgreen2 sentences2006Thus, in Eshelman v. Blubaum, 560 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977), for instance, the court reasoned, “[T]he compulsory use of the polygraph during departmental investigations is consistent with the maintenance of a police or sheriffs department that is of the highest integrity and beyond suspicion.” Therefore, the court ruled that a police officer may be ordered to submit to a polygraph test upon penalty of dismissal provided that there are reasonable grounds for demanding such a test, the answers are not used in any subsequent criminal prosecution, and the questions relate specifically 2006Eshelman, 560 P.2d at 1285-86 ; see also Roux v. New Orleans Police Department, 223 So. 2d 905, 912 (La. | 1 | 1 |
Fichera v. State Personnel Boardgreen1 sentence2006Id. at 492 ; see also Fichera v. State Personnel Board, 32 Cal. Rptr. 159, 164 (Ct. App. 1963) (observing in case involving investigation of officer misconduct, that a polygraph test “might have proved useful in limiting and channeling the investigation in this case”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ruelkegreen2 sentences1985Because the prosecutor’s attempt to bolster the State’s witness by a reference to a polygraph test was, therefore, not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694 , 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976), we must reverse and remand for a new trial. 1985Because the prosecutor’s attempt to bolster the State’s witness by a reference to a polygraph test was, therefore, not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Ruelke, 116 N.H. 692, 694 , 366 A.2d 497, 498 (1976), we must reverse and remand for a new trial. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Chaissongreen2 sentences1983See State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 28 , 458 A.2d 95, 101 (1983). 1983See State v. Chaisson, 123 N.H. 17, 28 , 458 A.2d 95, 101 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdalegreen1 sentence2006But see Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 427 So. 2d 187, 190 (Fla.) (“LT]he possible investigative benefit of building a case upon the foundation of the results of a polygraph examination is too thin a reed to support a denial of a police officer’s right to be subjected only to lawful and reasonable orders.”), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); Kaske v. City of Rockford, 450 N.E.2d 314, 320 (Ill.) (recognizing that “a polygraph examination is ... of some investigatory utility and value,” but concluding that refusing to submit to polygraph test cannot be basis for disciplinary action against | 1 | 1 |
Alabama Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commissiongreen1 sentence2006But see Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 427 So. 2d 187, 190 (Fla.) (“LT]he possible investigative benefit of building a case upon the foundation of the results of a polygraph examination is too thin a reed to support a denial of a police officer’s right to be subjected only to lawful and reasonable orders.”), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); Kaske v. City of Rockford, 450 N.E.2d 314, 320 (Ill.) (recognizing that “a polygraph examination is ... of some investigatory utility and value,” but concluding that refusing to submit to polygraph test cannot be basis for disciplinary action against | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hernandez
green
1 sentence2015Even assuming the officers misled the defendant regarding the polygraph results, “the police are not prohibited from misleading a suspect.” Hernandez, 162 N.H. at 706 ; see also State v. Hall, 148 N.H. 671, 673 (2002) (“Although the officers may have misled the defendant into believing they had incriminating evidence, their comments were not so deceptive as to render the confession involuntary.”). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Monroe
green
1 sentence2015Here, the defendant voluntarily consented to the polygraph test and “cannot, therefore, persuasively argue that [her] confession was coerced by a test that [she] voluntarily took.” Id. (quotation omitted). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Rowland v. United States
green
1 sentence2014See, e.g., People v. Muniz, 190 P.Bd 774, 785 (Colo. App. 2008); Rowland v. United States, 840 A.2d 664 , 674 n.11 (D.C. 2004); State v. Hilton, 431 A.2d 1296, 1301 (Me. 1981); Kosmas v. State, 560 A.2d 1137, 1140 (Md. 1989); Com. v. Martinez, 769 N.E.2d 273, 278-79 (Mass. 2002). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Mason v. Mississippi
green
1 sentence2006But see Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 427 So. 2d 187, 190 (Fla.) (“LT]he possible investigative benefit of building a case upon the foundation of the results of a polygraph examination is too thin a reed to support a denial of a police officer’s right to be subjected only to lawful and reasonable orders.”), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); Kaske v. City of Rockford, 450 N.E.2d 314, 320 (Ill.) (recognizing that “a polygraph examination is ... of some investigatory utility and value,” but concluding that refusing to submit to polygraph test cannot be basis for disciplinary action against | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Carrollton, Ohio Aerie 2185 Fraternal Order of Eagles, Inc. v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission
green
1 sentence2006Id. at 492 ; see also Fichera v. State Personnel Board, 32 Cal. Rptr. 159, 164 (Ct. App. 1963) (observing in case involving investigation of officer misconduct, that a polygraph test “might have proved useful in limiting and channeling the investigation in this case”). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Bishop v. United States
green
1 sentence2006Ct. App. 1969) (‘While appellant’s refusal to obey the order is not evidence of guilt or of knowledge of the identity of the guilty party, he may not be permitted to refuse to take the polygraph test in view of his sworn duty to cooperate in the investigation of crime.”), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1008 (1970). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Wyrick v. Fields
green
2 sentences1983The State relies on Wyrick v. Fields, 103 S. Ct. 394 (1982) (per curiam) for the propositions that questioning of this sort “effectuate[s] no significant change in the character of the interrogation,” and that mentioning and then asking a defendant about an unfavorable result of a polygraph test is not significantly “coercive.” Id. at 396 . 1983The State relies on Wyrick v. Fields, 103 S. Ct. 394 (1982) (per curiam) for the propositions that questioning of this sort “effectuate[s] no significant change in the character of the interrogation,” and that mentioning and then asking a defendant about an unfavorable result of a polygraph test is not significantly “coercive.” Id. at 396 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| State v. Valdez green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
State v. Mottram
green
1 sentence1965Annot. 95 A.L.R. 2d 819 ; State v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325 . | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Commonwealth v. Fatalo green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.