14 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Andersongreen2 sentences1999See Anderson, 637 P.2d at 356 (describing polygraph technique and procedure); Fishback, 851 P.2d at 885 (describing DNA theory and scientific background for restriction fragment length polymorphism “RFLP” analysis, gel electrophoresis, etc.); Lindsey, 892 P.2d at 285 (discussing RFLP analysis and frequency calculations). 1985A. Although the defendant concedes that the results of a polygraph test are inadmissible in a criminal trial, People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354 (Colo.1981), he nonetheless insists that evidence establishing that the investigating detective arranged for James Ross to take a polygraph test should have been admitted in order to rebut that part of the detective’s testimony which clearly indicated that he believed the reports given to him by Ross. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Algiengreen2 sentences2012Citing People v. Algien, 180 Colo. 1, 7 , 501 P.2d 468, 471 (1972), the trial court concluded that Pittman was in custody after the polygraph test because a reasonable person in her position would conclude that she was not free to leave when the administering officer told her that she had failed the polygraph test and that she was not telling the truth. 15 The People filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2011), and C.A.R. 4.1. 2012Citing People v. Algien, 180 Colo. 1, 7 , 501 P.2d 468, 471 (1972), the trial court concluded that Pittman was in custody after the polygraph test because a reasonable person in her position would conclude that she was not free to leave when the administering officer told her that she had failed the polygraph test and that she was not telling the truth. 15 The People filed this interlocutory appeal pursuant to section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2011), and C.A.R. 4.1. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Shomberggreen2 sentences2008The Wisconsin appellate courts have gone farther, holding that evidence of a defendant's offer to take a polygraph test is admissible if there is evidence the defendant believed at the time he made the offer that the test is "possible, accurate, and admissible." State v. Shomberg, 288 Wis.2d 1 , 709 N.W.2d 370, 384 (2006); accord State v. Pfaff, 269 Wis.2d 786 , 676 N.W.2d 562, 568 (2004). 2008The Wisconsin appellate courts have gone farther, holding that evidence of a defendant's offer to take a polygraph test is admissible if there is evidence the defendant believed at the time he made the offer that the test is "possible, accurate, and admissible." State v. Shomberg, 288 Wis.2d 1 , 709 N.W.2d 370, 384 (2006); accord State v. Pfaff, 269 Wis.2d 786 , 676 N.W.2d 562, 568 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pfaffgreen2 sentences2008The Wisconsin appellate courts have gone farther, holding that evidence of a defendant's offer to take a polygraph test is admissible if there is evidence the defendant believed at the time he made the offer that the test is "possible, accurate, and admissible." State v. Shomberg, 288 Wis.2d 1 , 709 N.W.2d 370, 384 (2006); accord State v. Pfaff, 269 Wis.2d 786 , 676 N.W.2d 562, 568 (2004). 2008The Wisconsin appellate courts have gone farther, holding that evidence of a defendant's offer to take a polygraph test is admissible if there is evidence the defendant believed at the time he made the offer that the test is "possible, accurate, and admissible." State v. Shomberg, 288 Wis.2d 1 , 709 N.W.2d 370, 384 (2006); accord State v. Pfaff, 269 Wis.2d 786 , 676 N.W.2d 562, 568 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dracongreen2 sentences2008Similarly, in Dra-con we found the suspect was in custody where she agreed to accompany officers to the police station, riding in the front seat of the police car, and was taken through a nonpublic area to an office and questioned for almost three hours; she was never told she was free to leave or not under arrest, and was made to wait for another three hours in the police station before being interviewed yet again. 884 P.2d at 714-15, 717 . 2008Similarly, in Dracon we found the suspect was in custody where she agreed to accompany officers to the police station, riding in the front seat of the police car, and was taken through a non-public area to an office and questioned for almost three hours; she was never told she was free to leave or not under arrest, and was made to wait for another three hours in the police station before being interviewed yet again. 884 P.2d at 714-15, 717 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Trujillogreen2 sentences2008In People v. Trujillo, however, we found that a suspect was in custody where he was asked to come to the police station for an interview and drove himself to the station; upon arrival, he was never told he was free to leave or not under arrest, was asked aceu-satory questions for over an hour and a half, was asked to submit to a mug shot and a polygraph test, and was asked to produce certain evidence to the police. 784 P.2d 788, 789-90, 792 (Colo.1990). 2008In People v. Trujillo , however, we found that a suspect was in custody where he was asked to come to the police station for an interview and drove himself to the station; upon arrival, he was never told he was free to leave or not under arrest, was asked accusatory questions for over an hour and a half, was asked to submit to a mug shot and a polygraph test, and was asked to produce certain evidence to the police. 784 P.2d 788, 789-90, 792 (Colo.1990). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gurulegreen1 sentence2007See People v. Fanger, supra, 748 P.2d at 1333 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Fishgreen2 sentences2005See Romero, 953 P.2d at 552-53 (“Cause I, ya know, I’m not gunna lie man, ya know, I mean I should wait, and I should talk to a lawyer and this and that and ya know_”); Kleber, 859 P.2d at 1362 (during custodial interrogation, defendant remarked that he wished to discuss a prior polygraph test with an attorney); Fish, 660 P.2d at 507 (defendant asked the officers “if he needed an attorney”); People v. Cerezo, 635 P.2d 197, 198 (Colo.1981) (“I think I better have a lawyer.”); People v. Traubert, 199 Colo. 322, 325 , 608 P.2d 342, 344 (Colo.1980) (“I think I need to see a lawyer.”); Harris, 191 2005See Romero, 953 P.2d at 552-53 ("Cause I, ya know, I'm not gunna lie man, ya know, I mean I should wait, and I should talk to a lawyer and this and that and ya know ...."); Kleber, 859 P.2d at 1362 (during custodial interrogation, defendant remarked that he wished to discuss a prior polygraph test with an attorney); Fish, 660 P.2d at 507 (defendant asked the officers "if he needed an attorney"); People v. Cerezo, 635 P.2d 197, 198 (Colo.1981) ("I think I better have a lawyer."); People v. Traubert, 199 Colo. 322, 325 , 608 P.2d 342, 344 (Colo. 1980) ("I think I need to see a lawyer."); Harris, | 1 | 1 |
People v. Romerogreen2 sentences2005See Romero, 953 P.2d at 552-53 (“Cause I, ya know, I’m not gunna lie man, ya know, I mean I should wait, and I should talk to a lawyer and this and that and ya know_”); Kleber, 859 P.2d at 1362 (during custodial interrogation, defendant remarked that he wished to discuss a prior polygraph test with an attorney); Fish, 660 P.2d at 507 (defendant asked the officers “if he needed an attorney”); People v. Cerezo, 635 P.2d 197, 198 (Colo.1981) (“I think I better have a lawyer.”); People v. Traubert, 199 Colo. 322, 325 , 608 P.2d 342, 344 (Colo.1980) (“I think I need to see a lawyer.”); Harris, 191 2005See Romero, 953 P.2d at 552-53 ("Cause I, ya know, I'm not gunna lie man, ya know, I mean I should wait, and I should talk to a lawyer and this and that and ya know ...."); Kleber, 859 P.2d at 1362 (during custodial interrogation, defendant remarked that he wished to discuss a prior polygraph test with an attorney); Fish, 660 P.2d at 507 (defendant asked the officers "if he needed an attorney"); People v. Cerezo, 635 P.2d 197, 198 (Colo.1981) ("I think I better have a lawyer."); People v. Traubert, 199 Colo. 322, 325 , 608 P.2d 342, 344 (Colo. 1980) ("I think I need to see a lawyer."); Harris, | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cerezogreen2 sentences2005See Romero, 953 P.2d at 552-53 (“Cause I, ya know, I’m not gunna lie man, ya know, I mean I should wait, and I should talk to a lawyer and this and that and ya know_”); Kleber, 859 P.2d at 1362 (during custodial interrogation, defendant remarked that he wished to discuss a prior polygraph test with an attorney); Fish, 660 P.2d at 507 (defendant asked the officers “if he needed an attorney”); People v. Cerezo, 635 P.2d 197, 198 (Colo.1981) (“I think I better have a lawyer.”); People v. Traubert, 199 Colo. 322, 325 , 608 P.2d 342, 344 (Colo.1980) (“I think I need to see a lawyer.”); Harris, 191 2005See Romero, 953 P.2d at 552-53 ("Cause I, ya know, I'm not gunna lie man, ya know, I mean I should wait, and I should talk to a lawyer and this and that and ya know ...."); Kleber, 859 P.2d at 1362 (during custodial interrogation, defendant remarked that he wished to discuss a prior polygraph test with an attorney); Fish, 660 P.2d at 507 (defendant asked the officers "if he needed an attorney"); People v. Cerezo, 635 P.2d 197, 198 (Colo.1981) ("I think I better have a lawyer."); People v. Traubert, 199 Colo. 322, 325 , 608 P.2d 342, 344 (Colo. 1980) ("I think I need to see a lawyer."); Harris, | 1 | 1 |
People v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2005See Romero, 953 P.2d at 552-53 ("Cause I, ya know, I'm not gunna lie man, ya know, I mean I should wait, and I should talk to a lawyer and this and that and ya know ...."); Kleber, 859 P.2d at 1362 (during custodial interrogation, defendant remarked that he wished to discuss a prior polygraph test with an attorney); Fish, 660 P.2d at 507 (defendant asked the officers "if he needed an attorney"); People v. Cerezo, 635 P.2d 197, 198 (Colo.1981) ("I think I better have a lawyer."); People v. Traubert, 199 Colo. 322, 325 , 608 P.2d 342, 344 (Colo. 1980) ("I think I need to see a lawyer."); Harris, 2005See Romero, 953 P.2d at 552-53 ("Cause I, ya know, I'm not gunna lie man, ya know, I mean I should wait, and I should talk to a lawyer and this and that and ya know ...."); Kleber, 859 P.2d at 1362 (during custodial interrogation, defendant remarked that he wished to discuss a prior polygraph test with an attorney); Fish, 660 P.2d at 507 (defendant asked the officers "if he needed an attorney"); People v. Cerezo, 635 P.2d 197, 198 (Colo.1981) ("I think I better have a lawyer."); People v. Traubert, 199 Colo. 322, 325 , 608 P.2d 342, 344 (Colo. 1980) ("I think I need to see a lawyer."); Harris, | 1 | 1 |
People v. Traubertgreen2 sentences2005See Romero, 953 P.2d at 552-53 ("Cause I, ya know, I'm not gunna lie man, ya know, I mean I should wait, and I should talk to a lawyer and this and that and ya know ...."); Kleber, 859 P.2d at 1362 (during custodial interrogation, defendant remarked that he wished to discuss a prior polygraph test with an attorney); Fish, 660 P.2d at 507 (defendant asked the officers "if he needed an attorney"); People v. Cerezo, 635 P.2d 197, 198 (Colo.1981) ("I think I better have a lawyer."); People v. Traubert, 199 Colo. 322, 325 , 608 P.2d 342, 344 (Colo. 1980) ("I think I need to see a lawyer."); Harris, 2005See Romero, 953 P.2d at 552-53 ("Cause I, ya know, I'm not gunna lie man, ya know, I mean I should wait, and I should talk to a lawyer and this and that and ya know ...."); Kleber, 859 P.2d at 1362 (during custodial interrogation, defendant remarked that he wished to discuss a prior polygraph test with an attorney); Fish, 660 P.2d at 507 (defendant asked the officers "if he needed an attorney"); People v. Cerezo, 635 P.2d 197, 198 (Colo.1981) ("I think I better have a lawyer."); People v. Traubert, 199 Colo. 322, 325 , 608 P.2d 342, 344 (Colo. 1980) ("I think I need to see a lawyer."); Harris, | 1 | 1 |
People v. Klebergreen2 sentences2005See Romero, 953 P.2d at 552-53 (“Cause I, ya know, I’m not gunna lie man, ya know, I mean I should wait, and I should talk to a lawyer and this and that and ya know_”); Kleber, 859 P.2d at 1362 (during custodial interrogation, defendant remarked that he wished to discuss a prior polygraph test with an attorney); Fish, 660 P.2d at 507 (defendant asked the officers “if he needed an attorney”); People v. Cerezo, 635 P.2d 197, 198 (Colo.1981) (“I think I better have a lawyer.”); People v. Traubert, 199 Colo. 322, 325 , 608 P.2d 342, 344 (Colo.1980) (“I think I need to see a lawyer.”); Harris, 191 2005See Romero, 953 P.2d at 552-53 ("Cause I, ya know, I'm not gunna lie man, ya know, I mean I should wait, and I should talk to a lawyer and this and that and ya know ...."); Kleber, 859 P.2d at 1362 (during custodial interrogation, defendant remarked that he wished to discuss a prior polygraph test with an attorney); Fish, 660 P.2d at 507 (defendant asked the officers "if he needed an attorney"); People v. Cerezo, 635 P.2d 197, 198 (Colo.1981) ("I think I better have a lawyer."); People v. Traubert, 199 Colo. 322, 325 , 608 P.2d 342, 344 (Colo. 1980) ("I think I need to see a lawyer."); Harris, | 1 | 1 |
Lindsey v. Peoplegreen1 sentence1999See Anderson, 637 P.2d at 356 (describing polygraph technique and procedure); Fishback, 851 P.2d at 885 (describing DNA theory and scientific background for restriction fragment length polymorphism “RFLP” analysis, gel electrophoresis, etc.); Lindsey, 892 P.2d at 285 (discussing RFLP analysis and frequency calculations). | 1 | 1 |
Brady v. Marylandgreen2 sentences1999See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment Due Process requires the prosecution to disclose to the defendant all material evidence relevant to guilt or punishment). 1999See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment Due Process requires the prosecution to disclose to the defendant all material evidence relevant to guilt or punishment). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hallgreen1 sentence1999See, e.g., State v. Hall, 955 S.W.2d 198, 207 (Mo.1997) (holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence during the capital sentencing phase that the defendant denied involvement in the crime without failing a polygraph test), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 1375 , 140 L.Ed.2d 523 (1998); Downs v. State, 572 So.2d 895, 900 (Fla.1990) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence showing that defendant’s co-conspirator, whose testimony formed the primary basis of the state’s death penalty case, had difficulty passing a polygraph test). | 1 | 1 |
Pitt v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1999See, e.g., State v. Hall, 955 S.W.2d 198, 207 (Mo.1997) (holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence during the capital sentencing phase that the defendant denied involvement in the crime without failing a polygraph test), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 1375 , 140 L.Ed.2d 523 (1998); Downs v. State, 572 So.2d 895, 900 (Fla.1990) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence showing that defendant’s co-conspirator, whose testimony formed the primary basis of the state’s death penalty case, had difficulty passing a polygraph test). | 1 | 1 |
Fishback v. Peoplegreen1 sentence1999See Anderson, 637 P.2d at 356 (describing polygraph technique and procedure); Fishback, 851 P.2d at 885 (describing DNA theory and scientific background for restriction fragment length polymorphism “RFLP” analysis, gel electrophoresis, etc.); Lindsey, 892 P.2d at 285 (discussing RFLP analysis and frequency calculations). | 1 | 1 |
Downs v. Stategreen1 sentence1999See, e.g., State v. Hall, 955 S.W.2d 198, 207 (Mo.1997) (holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence during the capital sentencing phase that the defendant denied involvement in the crime without failing a polygraph test), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 1375 , 140 L.Ed.2d 523 (1998); Downs v. State, 572 So.2d 895, 900 (Fla.1990) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence showing that defendant’s co-conspirator, whose testimony formed the primary basis of the state’s death penalty case, had difficulty passing a polygraph test). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Polander
green
2 sentences2008The custodial atmosphere continued after Elmarr requested an attorney-even then, he was kept in the closed-door 4 interview room and was asked about his willingness to submit to a polygraph test, and then was directed to disrobe for photographs, about which he was told, "You really don't have a choice." All of these factors combined to prompt Elmarr to ask the reasonable question, "When do I get to go home?" All of these facts lead to the conclusion that Elmarr's freedom of action was curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest, and a reasonable person under those circumstances would f 2008The custodial atmosphere continued after Elmarr requested an attorneyeven then, he was kept in the closed-door [4] interview room and was asked about his willingness to submit to a polygraph test, and then was directed to disrobe for photographs, about which he was told, "You really don't have a choice." All of these factors combined to prompt Elmarr to ask the reasonable question, "When do I get to go home?" All of these facts lead to the conclusion that Elmarr's freedom of action was curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest, and a reasonable person under those circumstances would | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Wyrick v. Fields
green
2 sentences2006In Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 , 103 S.Ct. 394 , 74 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982), the defendant was given Miranda warnings before undergoing a polygraph test and agreed to take the test without counsel present. 2006In Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 , 103 S.Ct. 394 , 74 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982), the defendant was given Miranda warnings before undergoing a polygraph test and agreed to take the test without counsel present. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1993The trial court is the finder of fact, and we defer to its findings when supported by the evidence. [4] Although there was some dispute in the record as to whether the defendant's remark about the prior incident involving the polygraph test was tied to his initial request for an attorney, it is undisputed that the request for an attorney preceded the reference to the prior incident. [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] This characterization of defendant's request is used simply in the interest of clarity and should not be regarded as a conclusion as 1993The trial court is the finder of fact, and we defer to its findings when supported by the evidence. [4] Although there was some dispute in the record as to whether the defendant's remark about the prior incident involving the polygraph test was tied to his initial request for an attorney, it is undisputed that the request for an attorney preceded the reference to the prior incident. [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] This characterization of defendant's request is used simply in the interest of clarity and should not be regarded as a conclusion as | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Jeffrey v. District Court In & For the Eighth Judicial District
green
2 sentences1992Under these circumstances, particularly in light of defendant’s waiver of important constitutional rights and his serious detrimental reliance on the agreement, see People v. Jeffrey, supra; People v. Fisher, supra, we determine that defendant need only have substantially performed his part of the bargain in order to obtain its benefits. 1992Under these circumstances, particularly in light of defendant's waiver of important constitutional rights and his serious detrimental reliance on the agreement, see People v. Jeffrey, supra; People v. Fisher, supra , we determine that defendant need only have substantially performed his part of the bargain in order to obtain its benefits. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Fisher
green
2 sentences1992Under these circumstances, particularly in light of defendant’s waiver of important constitutional rights and his serious detrimental reliance on the agreement, see People v. Jeffrey, supra; People v. Fisher, supra, we determine that defendant need only have substantially performed his part of the bargain in order to obtain its benefits. 1992Under these circumstances, particularly in light of defendant's waiver of important constitutional rights and his serious detrimental reliance on the agreement, see People v. Jeffrey, supra; People v. Fisher, supra , we determine that defendant need only have substantially performed his part of the bargain in order to obtain its benefits. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Workman v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1983Cf. Workman v. Commonwealth, 580 S.W.2d 206 (Ky.1979) (governmental promise to drop charges if defendant passed polygraph examination requires reversal of conviction where defendant submitted to and successfully passed the polygraph test). 1983Cf. Workman v. Commonwealth, 580 S.W.2d 206 (Ky.1979) (governmental promise to drop charges if defendant passed polygraph examination requires reversal of conviction where defendant submitted to and successfully passed the polygraph test). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Rhode Island v. Innis
green
2 sentences1983The majority characterizes this inquiry as "express questioning or its functional equivalent which was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating statement from the defendant" and cites Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), in support of its conclusion: Maj. op. at 962. 1983The majority characterizes this inquiry as "express questioning or its functional equivalent which was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating statement from the defendant" and cites Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), in support of its conclusion: Maj. op. at 962. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
United States v. Zeiger
green
1 sentence1981Reid & F. Inbau, Truth and Deception: The Polygraph ("Lie-Detector") Technique 304 (2d ed. 1977). [12] For example, "while in truly expert hands, the pretest interview is carried out in a manner which assures optimal conditions for the polygraph test, one can readily conceive of situations where inappropriate handling of the pretest situation can produce charts leading to false [results]." Orne, Implications of Laboratory Research for the Detection of Deception, in Legal Admissibility of the Polygraph 99 (N. Ansley ed. 1975), at 113-114. [13] See, e.g., United States v. Zeiger, 350 F.Supp. 685 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Rafael E. Bennett v. The Panama Canal Company
green
1 sentence1981Reid & F. Inbau, Truth and Deception: The Polygraph ("Lie-Detector") Technique 304 (2d ed. 1977). [12] For example, "while in truly expert hands, the pretest interview is carried out in a manner which assures optimal conditions for the polygraph test, one can readily conceive of situations where inappropriate handling of the pretest situation can produce charts leading to false [results]." Orne, Implications of Laboratory Research for the Detection of Deception, in Legal Admissibility of the Polygraph 99 (N. Ansley ed. 1975), at 113-114. [13] See, e.g., United States v. Zeiger, 350 F.Supp. 685 | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.