polygraph test in Utah

2024See Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 48 (1982) (per curiam) (rejecting a lower court’s determination that the use of polygraph results in police questioning “is inherently coercive”).

2016See Malek v. Haun, 26 F.3d 1013, 1015 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Not only is there no constitutional or inherent right to receive parole prior to the expiration of a valid sentence, but, absent state standards for the granting of parole, decisions of a parole board do not automatically invoke due process protections.”). 40 .

2016Von Behren, 822 F.3d at 1150 (holding that the state threatened a sex offender with revocation of supervised release by conditioning the release on successful completion of a sex offender treatment program that required an offender to truthfully respond during a polygraph test); Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2005) *1028 (same); United States v. York, 357 F.3d 14, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that there was no threat of revocation of supervised release because the court construed a condition of the release as prohibiting revocation based on a valid assertion of the Fifth Amendment);

2016Von Behren, 822 F.3d at 1150 (holding that the state threatened a sex offender with revocation of supervised release by conditioning the release on successful completion of a sex offender treatment program that required an offender to truthfully respond during a polygraph test); Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2005) *1028 (same); United States v. York, 357 F.3d 14, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that there was no threat of revocation of supervised release because the court construed a condition of the release as prohibiting revocation based on a valid assertion of the Fifth Amendment);

2016Von Behren, 822 F.3d at 1150 (holding that the state threatened a sex offender with revocation of supervised release by conditioning the release on successful completion of a sex offender treatment program that required an offender to truthfully respond during a polygraph test); Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2005) *1028 (same); United States v. York, 357 F.3d 14, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that there was no threat of revocation of supervised release because the court construed a condition of the release as prohibiting revocation based on a valid assertion of the Fifth Amendment);

2016Von Behren, 822 F.3d at 1150 (holding that the state threatened a sex offender with revocation of supervised release by conditioning the release on successful completion of a sex offender treatment program that required an offender to truthfully respond during a polygraph test); Antelope, 395 F.3d at 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2005) *1028 (same); United States v. York, 357 F.3d 14, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that there was no threat of revocation of supervised release because the court construed a condition of the release as prohibiting revocation based on a valid assertion of the Fifth Amendment);

1991See, e.g., State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113 , 477 A.2d 1265, 1269 (1984) (“When defendants are not advised of their Miranda rights, or do not properly waive them, confessions elicited after a polygraph test are typically suppressed.”); People v. Harris, 128 A.D.2d 891 , 513 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (1987) (mem.) (confession admissible because defendant appeared voluntarily for polygraph test and fully advised of rights before post-polygraph confession).

1991See, e.g., State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113 , 477 *1107 A.2d 1265, 1269 (1984) ("When defendants are not advised of their Miranda rights, or do not properly waive them, confessions elicited after a polygraph test are typically suppressed."); People v. Harris, 128 A.D.2d 891 , 513 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (1987) (mem.) (confession admissible because defendant appeared voluntarily for polygraph test and fully advised of rights before post-polygraph confession).

1991See, e.g., State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113 , 477 *1107 A.2d 1265, 1269 (1984) ("When defendants are not advised of their Miranda rights, or do not properly waive them, confessions elicited after a polygraph test are typically suppressed."); People v. Harris, 128 A.D.2d 891 , 513 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (1987) (mem.) (confession admissible because defendant appeared voluntarily for polygraph test and fully advised of rights before post-polygraph confession).

1991See, e.g., State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113 , 477 *1107 A.2d 1265, 1269 (1984) ("When defendants are not advised of their Miranda rights, or do not properly waive them, confessions elicited after a polygraph test are typically suppressed."); People v. Harris, 128 A.D.2d 891 , 513 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (1987) (mem.) (confession admissible because defendant appeared voluntarily for polygraph test and fully advised of rights before post-polygraph confession).

1991But see, e.g., Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346, 1352 (Del.1980) (“appearance at the police station for the polygraph test demonstrates a waiver of his Miranda rights”), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 910 , 102 S.Ct. 1258 , 71 L.Ed.2d 449 (1982); People v. Bailey, 140 A.D.2d 356 , 527 N.Y.S.2d 845, 847-48 (1988) (willingness to aid in investigation demonstrated that polygraph not custodial). .

1991But see, e.g., Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346, 1352 (Del.1980) ("appearance at the police station for the polygraph test demonstrates a waiver of his Miranda rights"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 , 102 S.Ct. 1258 , 71 L.Ed.2d 449 (1982); People v. Bailey, 140 A.D.2d 356 , 527 N.Y.S.2d 845, 847-48 (1988) (willingness to aid in investigation demonstrated that polygraph not custodial). [11] The state cites testimony to the effect that defendant did not consider himself under arrest even after he was formally arrested, suggesting this demonstrates that defendant could not have believed he was in cu

1989As has been noted by one authority, “[ojpin-ions which are based in large measure on a subjective analysis may have less probative value because it may be difficult to evaluate the skill of the expert in extrapolating a judgment from the scientific data.” Weinstein, supra note 8, at 702-42 (citing United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir.1978) (spectrography is qualitatively different than polygraph evidence, because in polygraph analysis, the examiner must extrapolate from the data a judgment of something that is not directly measured by the polygraph test, whereas spectrography

1989As has been noted by one authority, "[o]pinions which are based in large measure on a subjective analysis may have less probative value because it may be difficult to evaluate the skill of the expert in extrapolating a judgment from the scientific data." Weinstein, supra note 8, at 702-42 (citing United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir.1978) (spectrography is qualitatively different than polygraph evidence, because in polygraph analysis, the examiner must extrapolate from the data a judgment of something that is not directly measured by the polygraph test, whereas spectrography

1987Nevertheless, for discussion of the subject, see generally Commonwealth v. Moore, 379 Mass. 106, 112-14 , 393 N.E.2d 904, 909-10 (1979) and cases cited therein. [34] We also note that during cross-examination outside the presence of the jury, the examiner admitted that he could not unequivocally state that Sagers' test results were not a product of fear, guilt, or other "things" unrelated to her actual involvement with this case. [35] Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (2)(g) (Supp. 1987). [36] Cf. State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386, 1389 (Utah 1977) ("Courts have found no prejudice where information that

1987Nevertheless, for discussion of the subject, see generally Commonwealth v. Moore, 379 Mass. 106, 112-14 , 393 N.E.2d 904, 909-10 (1979) and cases cited therein. [34] We also note that during cross-examination outside the presence of the jury, the examiner admitted that he could not unequivocally state that Sagers' test results were not a product of fear, guilt, or other "things" unrelated to her actual involvement with this case. [35] Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (2)(g) (Supp. 1987). [36] Cf. State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386, 1389 (Utah 1977) ("Courts have found no prejudice where information that

1987Nevertheless, for discussion of the subject, see generally Commonwealth v. Moore, 379 Mass. 106, 112-14 , 393 N.E.2d 904, 909-10 (1979) and cases cited therein. [34] We also note that during cross-examination outside the presence of the jury, the examiner admitted that he could not unequivocally state that Sagers' test results were not a product of fear, guilt, or other "things" unrelated to her actual involvement with this case. [35] Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (2)(g) (Supp. 1987). [36] Cf. State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386, 1389 (Utah 1977) ("Courts have found no prejudice where information that

1987Nevertheless, for discussion of the subject, see generally Commonwealth v. Moore, 379 Mass. 106, 112-14 , 393 N.E.2d 904, 909-10 (1979) and cases cited therein. [34] We also note that during cross-examination outside the presence of the jury, the examiner admitted that he could not unequivocally state that Sagers' test results were not a product of fear, guilt, or other "things" unrelated to her actual involvement with this case. [35] Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (2)(g) (Supp. 1987). [36] Cf. State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386, 1389 (Utah 1977) ("Courts have found no prejudice where information that

1985See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 , 103 S.Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983).

1985See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 , 103 S.Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983).