Tbe defendant in Tennessee

1966Tbe trial judge, in sustaining tbe plea in abatement, relied upon tbe cases of Chambers v. Sanford and Treadway, 154 Tenn. 134 , 289 S.W. 533 (1926) and Flowers v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 189 Tenn. 603 , 212 S.W.2d 595 (1948).

1966Tbe trial judge, in sustaining tbe plea in abatement, relied upon tbe cases of Chambers v. Sanford and Treadway, 154 Tenn. 134 , 289 S.W. 533 (1926) and Flowers v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 189 Tenn. 603 , 212 S.W.2d 595 (1948).

1966Tbe trial judge, in sustaining tbe plea in abatement, relied upon tbe cases of Chambers v. Sanford and Treadway, 154 Tenn. 134 , 289 S.W. 533 (1926) and Flowers v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 189 Tenn. 603 , 212 S.W.2d 595 (1948).

1960Tbe brief of defendant-in-error quotes from tbe Utah case of Johnson v. Utah-Idaho Central Railway Company, 68 Utah 309 , 249 P. 1036, 1038 .

1960Tbe brief of defendant-in-error quotes from tbe Utah case of Johnson v. Utah-Idaho Central Railway Company, 68 Utah 309 , 249 P. 1036, 1038 .

1959Morris v. Bolling, 31 Tenn. App. 577 , 218 S. W. (2d) 754 .

1959Morris v. Bolling, 31 Tenn. App. 577 , 218 S. W. (2d) 754 .

1958Wilcox v. State, 94 Tenn. 106 , 28 S.W. 312 ; Johnson v. State, 100 Tenn. 254 , 45 S.W. 436 , and McElroy v. State, 146 Tenn. 442 , 242 S.W. 883 .

1958Wilcox v. State, 94 Tenn. 106 , 28 S.W. 312 ; Johnson v. State, 100 Tenn. 254 , 45 S.W. 436 , and McElroy v. State, 146 Tenn. 442 , 242 S.W. 883 .

1958Wilcox v. State, 94 Tenn. 106 , 28 S.W. 312 ; Johnson v. State, 100 Tenn. 254 , 45 S.W. 436 , and McElroy v. State, 146 Tenn. 442 , 242 S.W. 883 .

1958Wilcox v. State, 94 Tenn. 106 , 28 S.W. 312 ; Johnson v. State, 100 Tenn. 254 , 45 S.W. 436 , and McElroy v. State, 146 Tenn. 442 , 242 S.W. 883 .

1958Wilcox v. State, 94 Tenn. 106 , 28 S.W. 312 ; Johnson v. State, 100 Tenn. 254 , 45 S.W. 436 , and McElroy v. State, 146 Tenn. 442 , 242 S.W. 883 .

1957Tbe brief of tbe State states that if tbe killing bad been an accident tbe rule in Rogers v. State, 196 Tenn. 263 , at pages 266 and 267, 265 S.W.2d 559 would apply; tbe crime there charged was second degree murder by reason of an accidental killing by an automobile driven by one who was wilfully intoxicated and knowingly driving an automobile at a dangerous rate of speed on tbe highways with knowledge tbat bis so doing was perilous to every person on tbe highway.

1957Tbe brief of tbe State states that if tbe killing bad been an accident tbe rule in Rogers v. State, 196 Tenn. 263 , at pages 266 and 267, 265 S.W.2d 559 would apply; tbe crime there charged was second degree murder by reason of an accidental killing by an automobile driven by one who was wilfully intoxicated and knowingly driving an automobile at a dangerous rate of speed on tbe highways with knowledge tbat bis so doing was perilous to every person on tbe highway.

1954Borches & Co. v. Arbuckle Brothers, 111 Tenn. 498 , 78 S. W. 266 ; Balderacchi v. Ruth, 36 Tenn. App. 421 , 256 S. W. (2d) 390 ; Gibson’s Suits in Chancery, Fourth Edition, Sections 441, 443, and 470.

1954Borches & Co. v. Arbuckle Brothers, 111 Tenn. 498 , 78 S. W. 266 ; Balderacchi v. Ruth, 36 Tenn. App. 421 , 256 S. W. (2d) 390 ; Gibson’s Suits in Chancery, Fourth Edition, Sections 441, 443, and 470.

1954Borches & Co. v. Arbuckle Brothers, 111 Tenn. 498 , 78 S. W. 266 ; Balderacchi v. Ruth, 36 Tenn. App. 421 , 256 S. W. (2d) 390 ; Gibson’s Suits in Chancery, Fourth Edition, Sections 441, 443, and 470.

1953Tbe defendant contends that tbe matter of tbe *645 damages is primarily for the jury to determine and that a verdict of the jury concurred in by the Trial Judge should not be overturned, citing Lunn v. Ealy, 176 Tenn. 374 , 141 S. W. (2d) 893 and other cases of similar holding.

1953Tbe defendant contends that tbe matter of tbe *645 damages is primarily for the jury to determine and that a verdict of the jury concurred in by the Trial Judge should not be overturned, citing Lunn v. Ealy, 176 Tenn. 374 , 141 S. W. (2d) 893 and other cases of similar holding.

1950On appeal tbis was reversed, tbe Court saying: “Tbe doctrine of estoppel cannot operate as a bar to tbe right of plaintiff in error to maintain tbis action. ’ ’ In Blatt v. Blatt, 79 Colo. 57 , 243 P. 1099, 1103 , 57 A. L.

1950On appeal tbis was reversed, tbe Court saying: “Tbe doctrine of estoppel cannot operate as a bar to tbe right of plaintiff in error to maintain tbis action. ’ ’ In Blatt v. Blatt, 79 Colo. 57 , 243 P. 1099, 1103 , 57 A. L.

1948In the record here, we find no evidence of matters that would induce us to modify the rule made in Cannon v. Apperson, supra. However, since the cause of action accrued when the receiver was appointed on March 27, 1940, and suit was not brought until July 30,1941, we think that interest at 6% per annum *93 sliould.be allowed on tbe judgment from-and after tbe date on wliicb tbe original bill was filed. (6) Tbe defendants will pay tbe costs of tbe cause.

1945Corp., 147 Tenn., 130 , 245 S. W. 837 , furnish application by this Court of tbe test stated in Barragar v. Industrial Commission, supra. In tbe Norwood Case tbe employee was injured while returning on tbe employer’s train from a visit to his fatber-in-law.

1945Her case mnst be reversed on authority of Lea v. State, 181 Tenn. 378 , 181 S. W. (2d) 351 .

1945Her case mnst be reversed on authority of Lea v. State, 181 Tenn. 378 , 181 S. W. (2d) 351 .

1944"While counsel for complainant insist that under Taylor v. Sledge, 110 Tenn., 263 , 75 S. W., 1074 , tbe filing of tbe record for writ of error amounted to an appearance in tbe cause, tbe court pointing out in tbe latter case that tbe aggrieved defendant bad bis remedy by a suit in chancery to enjoin tbe proceedings.

1944Tbe defendants contend that Blanton v. Hall, 49 Tenn., 423 , is authority for tbeir right to file tbe record for writ of error without entering tbeir appearance.

1944Tbe defendants contend that Blanton v. Hall, 49 Tenn., 423 , is authority for tbeir right to file tbe record for writ of error without entering tbeir appearance.

1943Barnes v. Noel, 131 Tenn., 126 , 174 S. W., 276 .

1938J., 451, sec. 27; Achy v. Holland, 76 Tenn., 510, 512 , 8 Lea, 510 , 512; Western Automobile Cas.

1935Tennessee Central Railway Co. v. Zearing, 2 Tenn. App., 451, 454 , and-authorities there cited.

1935Bell v. Bowers Stores, 3 Tenn. App., 590 .

1935Nashville Railway & Light Co. v. Harrison, 5 Tenn. App., 22 , and eases there cited. *675 Tbe motion for directed verdict should have been sustained.

1935Tbe rule is further illustrated in Schwartz v. Johnson, 152 Tenn. 586 , 280 S. W. 32 , 47 A. L.

1935Tbe rule is further illustrated in Schwartz v. Johnson, 152 Tenn. 586 , 280 S. W. 32 , 47 A. L.

1926Fort v. Orndoff, 7 Heisk., 167 ; Phoenix Iron Works Co. v. Rhea, 98 Tenn., 461 , 40 S. W., 482 ; East Tenn., Va. & Ga. Railroad v. Branner, 2 Shan.

1926Richmond, etc., Foundry v. Carter, 133 Tenn., 489, 493 ; Sherman v. State, 125 Tenn., 19, 49 .

1926Richmond, etc., Foundry v. Carter, 133 Tenn., 489, 493 ; Sherman v. State, 125 Tenn., 19, 49 .

1926Fort v. Orndoff, 7 Heisk., 167 ; Phoenix Iron Works Co. v. Rhea, 98 Tenn., 461 , 40 S. W., 482 ; East Tenn., Va. & Ga. Railroad v. Branner, 2 Shan.

1925In Stunder v. Plumlee, 130 Tenn., 517 , it is said: “Tbe rule that one about to cross a railroad track,'in tbe use of a highway must stop, look and listen, does not apply to a traveller thus coming out of an intersecting street into a street upon which automobiles are customarily run, which machines are capable of safe operation and are not inherently dangerous instrumentalities. ’ ’ “Where the measure of care is ordinary or reasonable care, and the degree of that care thus varies with the circumstances, the question of contributory negligence is one for the jury.” Railroad v. Riddick, 110 Ten