Tbe rule in Oklahoma

1937Tbe reason for tbe admission of this evidence is well expressed in tbe case of Jeffries v. U. S., 7 Ind. T. 47 , 103 S. W. 761 , where tbe court says: “We think this question too well settled to need anything more than the citation of authorities.

1937Tbe reason for tbe admission of this evidence is well expressed in tbe case of Jeffries v. U. S., 7 Ind. T. 47 , 103 S. W. 761 , where tbe court says: “We think this question too well settled to need anything more than the citation of authorities.

1937That goes to the weight and value to be given the evidence after being 'admitted.” The opinion then cites Navarre v. Honea, 41 Okla. 480 , 139 P. 310 , and quotes from that case as follows: “ ‘A book of account, when admissible in evidence, even though free from inherent *395 improbability, is only presumptive and disputable evidence of the correctness of the entries therein appearing.’ ” Tbe objection of the defendant that the exhibits, in the form of the tickets made at the time of each transaction, were improperly admitted in evidence cannot be sustained.

1937That goes to the weight and value to be given the evidence after being 'admitted.” The opinion then cites Navarre v. Honea, 41 Okla. 480 , 139 P. 310 , and quotes from that case as follows: “ ‘A book of account, when admissible in evidence, even though free from inherent *395 improbability, is only presumptive and disputable evidence of the correctness of the entries therein appearing.’ ” Tbe objection of the defendant that the exhibits, in the form of the tickets made at the time of each transaction, were improperly admitted in evidence cannot be sustained.

1937In tbe body of tbe opinion, in Brooks v. State, 33 Okla.

1937“Tbe defendants overlooked the fact that the contract under consideration is an executed contract and not an executory one.” To the effect that materials furnished at different times but as complements of a whole purpose are to be treated as parts of the same account, we held as follows in the case of Mid-Co. Pipe & Supply Co. v. Central Torpedo Co., 127 Okla. 273 , 260 P. 753 : “The rule is settled in this jurisdiction that where, as in this case, material is furnished to be used for the same general purpose, as for the development of an oil and gas lease, though tbe material be ordered at di

1937“Tbe defendants overlooked the fact that the contract under consideration is an executed contract and not an executory one.” To the effect that materials furnished at different times but as complements of a whole purpose are to be treated as parts of the same account, we held as follows in the case of Mid-Co. Pipe & Supply Co. v. Central Torpedo Co., 127 Okla. 273 , 260 P. 753 : “The rule is settled in this jurisdiction that where, as in this case, material is furnished to be used for the same general purpose, as for the development of an oil and gas lease, though tbe material be ordered at di

1936Gay v. Thomas, 5 Okla. 1 , 46 P. 578 ; Patterson v. Rousney, 58 Okla. 185 , 159 P. 636 .” And as said in Bishop v. Tulsa, 21 Okla.

1936Gay v. Thomas, 5 Okla. 1 , 46 P. 578 ; Patterson v. Rousney, 58 Okla. 185 , 159 P. 636 .” And as said in Bishop v. Tulsa, 21 Okla.

1936Gay v. Thomas, 5 Okla. 1 , 46 P. 578 ; Patterson v. Rousney, 58 Okla. 185 , 159 P. 636 .” And as said in Bishop v. Tulsa, 21 Okla.

1936Gay v. Thomas, 5 Okla. 1 , 46 P. 578 ; Patterson v. Rousney, 58 Okla. 185 , 159 P. 636 .” And as said in Bishop v. Tulsa, 21 Okla.

1936Gay v. Thomas, 5 Okla. 1 , 46 P. 578 ; Patterson v. Rousney, 58 Okla. 185 , 159 P. 636 .” And as said in Bishop v. Tulsa, 21 Okla.

1934Or. 287, 211 Pac. 433 , in the third paragraph of the syllabus, this court said: “The trial court committed no error in the exclusion of evidence, as recited in the opinion, where no sufficient showing was made as to what the defendant expected to prove by the testimony of the witness.” *260 Tbe defendant next urges that the court erred in overruling his demurrer to- the evidence and refusing to give an instruction directing the jury to render a verdict of not guilty.

1933This contention is based upon Tate v. Gaines, 25 Okla. 141 , 105 P. 193 , and other cases.

1933This contention is based upon Tate v. Gaines, 25 Okla. 141 , 105 P. 193 , and other cases.

1932In Ellis & Lewis, Inc., v. Lane, 152 Okla. 273 , 4 P. (2d) 104 , this court said: “Mere evidence of existing disability is not sufficient to support an taward for compensation, and the claimant must show that tbe existing disability did not exist prior to the injury complained of.

1932In Ellis & Lewis, Inc., v. Lane, 152 Okla. 273 , 4 P. (2d) 104 , this court said: “Mere evidence of existing disability is not sufficient to support an taward for compensation, and the claimant must show that tbe existing disability did not exist prior to the injury complained of.

1932A. Nichols, Inc., v. Bailey, 154 Okla. 214 , 7 P. (2d) 468 , has: no application.

1932A. Nichols, Inc., v. Bailey, 154 Okla. 214 , 7 P. (2d) 468 , has: no application.

1932Tbe rule stated in Parson-Gibson Buick Corp. v. Fox, 152 Okla. 196 , 4 P. (2d) 38 , is not applicable.

1932Tbe rule stated in Parson-Gibson Buick Corp. v. Fox, 152 Okla. 196 , 4 P. (2d) 38 , is not applicable.

1931Cr. 314 , 278 Pac. 663 . *152 Tbe defendant bad a fair trial.

1930In the case of Putnam v. State, 9 Okla.

1930Cr. 283 , 243 Pac. 986 , this court said: “Tbe phrase ‘prima facie evidence,’ as used in tbe statute, is such evidence as in tbe judgment of tbe law is sufficient to establish tbe fact, if it be credited by the jury, and, unless rebutted or tbe contrary proved, it remains sufficient for that purpose.” In tbe case of Stites v. State, 44 Okla.

1930Cr. 283 , 243 Pac. 986 , this court said: “Tbe phrase ‘prima facie evidence,’ as used in tbe statute, is such evidence as in tbe judgment of tbe law is sufficient to establish tbe fact, if it be credited by the jury, and, unless rebutted or tbe contrary proved, it remains sufficient for that purpose.” In tbe case of Stites v. State, 44 Okla.

1930Tbe defendant complains of instruction No-. 7, which is an attempt to define tbe term “prima facie evidence.” In tbe case of Hargis v. State, 33 Okla.

1929This court has recently passed upon this precise question in the case of Frank Ray v. State, 43 Okla.

1928In Liverpool, London & Globe Insurance Co. v. Tharel, 68 Okla. 307 , 174 Pac. 773 , this court held: “The statutory clause in a fire insurance policy providing that the policy may be canceled by the company by giving five days’ notice of cancellation, but that the unearned portion of the premium shall be returned upon surrender of tbe policy, is for tbe benefit of tbe assured, and may be waived by him.” Tbe rule announced in the Tliarel Case, *41 supra, was reaffirmed in Great American Insurance Co. v. Allen, 116 Okla. 56 , 243 Pac. 194 , wherein this court said: “The rule that a return of the

1928In Liverpool, London & Globe Insurance Co. v. Tharel, 68 Okla. 307 , 174 Pac. 773 , this court held: “The statutory clause in a fire insurance policy providing that the policy may be canceled by the company by giving five days’ notice of cancellation, but that the unearned portion of the premium shall be returned upon surrender of tbe policy, is for tbe benefit of tbe assured, and may be waived by him.” Tbe rule announced in the Tliarel Case, *41 supra, was reaffirmed in Great American Insurance Co. v. Allen, 116 Okla. 56 , 243 Pac. 194 , wherein this court said: “The rule that a return of the

1928Jones v. Fearnow, 47 Okla. 586 , 149 Pac. 1138 ; Garland v. Union Trust Co., 49 Okla. 654 , 154 Pac. 676 .

1928Jones v. Fearnow, 47 Okla. 586 , 149 Pac. 1138 ; Garland v. Union Trust Co., 49 Okla. 654 , 154 Pac. 676 .

1928Jones v. Fearnow, 47 Okla. 586 , 149 Pac. 1138 ; Garland v. Union Trust Co., 49 Okla. 654 , 154 Pac. 676 .

1928Jones v. Fearnow, 47 Okla. 586 , 149 Pac. 1138 ; Garland v. Union Trust Co., 49 Okla. 654 , 154 Pac. 676 .

1928In Liverpool, London & Globe Insurance Co. v. Tharel, 68 Okla. 307 , 174 Pac. 773 , this court held: “The statutory clause in a fire insurance policy providing that the policy may be canceled by the company by giving five days’ notice of cancellation, but that the unearned portion of the premium shall be returned upon surrender of tbe policy, is for tbe benefit of tbe assured, and may be waived by him.” Tbe rule announced in the Tliarel Case, *41 supra, was reaffirmed in Great American Insurance Co. v. Allen, 116 Okla. 56 , 243 Pac. 194 , wherein this court said: “The rule that a return of the

1928In Liverpool, London & Globe Insurance Co. v. Tharel, 68 Okla. 307 , 174 Pac. 773 , this court held: “The statutory clause in a fire insurance policy providing that the policy may be canceled by the company by giving five days’ notice of cancellation, but that the unearned portion of the premium shall be returned upon surrender of tbe policy, is for tbe benefit of tbe assured, and may be waived by him.” Tbe rule announced in the Tliarel Case, *41 supra, was reaffirmed in Great American Insurance Co. v. Allen, 116 Okla. 56 , 243 Pac. 194 , wherein this court said: “The rule that a return of the

1925Tbe defendants contend that tbe evidence on tbe part of tbe plaintiff wholly failed to show that the plaintiff was tbe owner of the note in question or that there was any thing due on tbe note, and that the plaintiff wholly failed to make out a case, but it is not necessary to pass on these questions under tbe «rule announced in tbe case of Smith v. Cornwell & Chowning Lumber Co., 101 Okla. 86 , 223 Pac. 154 , bolding that where the trial court overruled a demurrer to tbe plaintiff’s evidence, and thereafter both parties proceed with the trial and introduce evidence wbicb is sufficient to make

1925Tbe defendants contend that tbe evidence on tbe part of tbe plaintiff wholly failed to show that the plaintiff was tbe owner of the note in question or that there was any thing due on tbe note, and that the plaintiff wholly failed to make out a case, but it is not necessary to pass on these questions under tbe «rule announced in tbe case of Smith v. Cornwell & Chowning Lumber Co., 101 Okla. 86 , 223 Pac. 154 , bolding that where the trial court overruled a demurrer to tbe plaintiff’s evidence, and thereafter both parties proceed with the trial and introduce evidence wbicb is sufficient to make

1925Powers v. Rude, 14 Okla. 381 , 79 Pac. 89 .” It is uncontroverted that until September 26, 1913, there was no valid delivery of tbe deed ■ in question sufficient to pass title because of tbe incapacity of the grantors without tbe approval of tbe Secretary of the Interior. 8 R.

1925Powers v. Rude, 14 Okla. 381 , 79 Pac. 89 .” It is uncontroverted that until September 26, 1913, there was no valid delivery of tbe deed ■ in question sufficient to pass title because of tbe incapacity of the grantors without tbe approval of tbe Secretary of the Interior. 8 R.

1925L. 1013, it is said: “Primarily, a deed takes effect from its delivery, which, to most intents ana purposes, is merely tbe converse statement of tbe rule that a deed does not -become effective until delivery, and which is aptly illustrated by the bolding that a deed executed and acknowledged on Sunday is valid when delivered on a secular day. * * * Tbe rule is also stated that tbe presumption of contemporaneity of date and delivery arises when there are no indications of fraud or falsity, on the face of the deed. * * * In any event tbe presumption is indulged only in tbe absence of proof as to

1925L. 1013, it is said: “Primarily, a deed takes effect from its delivery, which, to most intents ana purposes, is merely tbe converse statement of tbe rule that a deed does not -become effective until delivery, and which is aptly illustrated by the bolding that a deed executed and acknowledged on Sunday is valid when delivered on a secular day. * * * Tbe rule is also stated that tbe presumption of contemporaneity of date and delivery arises when there are no indications of fraud or falsity, on the face of the deed. * * * In any event tbe presumption is indulged only in tbe absence of proof as to

1923Cr. 587 , 191 Pac. 1048 . *62 Tbe defense of irresponsibility, at best, presents a question of fact for tbe jury, and, wben tbey bave settled tbat question without passion or prejudice in accordance with tbe evidence, it is not tbe province of this court to disturb tbe verdict of tbe jury.

1921This case is controlled by a long line of decisions announcing the following principle: “When a jury is waived, and issues, -both of law and fact, are submitted to tbe trial court, its findings will not be reviewed by this court, if the evidence reasonably tends to support the same.” Scott v. Iman, 74 Oklahoma, 176 Pac. 81 .

1918In tb" case of Whitcomb v. Oiler, reported in 41 Okla. 331 , 137 Pac. 709 , the following rule is announced.

1918In tb" case of Whitcomb v. Oiler, reported in 41 Okla. 331 , 137 Pac. 709 , the following rule is announced.

1916“Tbe motion to dismiss is sustained.” The case of Minnetonka Oil Co. v. Cleveland Vitrified Brick Co., 48 Okla. 156 , 149 Pac. 1136 , is an authority to the same point.