Tbe defendant in Pennsylvania

1983Carpenters Pension Trust, Etc. v. Kronsehnabel, 400 F. Supp. 978 (C.D.

1983Commonwealth v. Yorktowne Paper Mills, Inc., 419 Pa. 363 , 214 A.2d 203 (1965).

1983Commonwealth v. Yorktowne Paper Mills, Inc., 419 Pa. 363 , 214 A.2d 203 (1965).

1979Jones, speaking for tbe Court, stated, ‘ ‘ Tbe test of jurisdiction is whether tbe court has power to enter upon tbe inquiry.” Id. at 77 , 209 A.2d at 804 .

1979Jones, speaking for tbe Court, stated, ‘ ‘ Tbe test of jurisdiction is whether tbe court has power to enter upon tbe inquiry.” Id. at 77 , 209 A.2d at 804 .

1974Since tbe claim was not timely raised, it may not be considered here. 4 Commonwealth v. Scoggins, 451 Pa. 472, 477 , 304 A.2d 102, 105 (1973); Commonwealth v. Agie, 449 Pa. 187, 189 , 296 A.2d 741 (1972).

1974Since tbe claim was not timely raised, it may not be considered here. 4 Commonwealth v. Scoggins, 451 Pa. 472, 477 , 304 A.2d 102, 105 (1973); Commonwealth v. Agie, 449 Pa. 187, 189 , 296 A.2d 741 (1972).

1970Lear v. Shirk’s Motor Express Corp., 397 Pa. 144 , 152 A. 2d 883 (1959). “[T]he evidence presented must be such that by reasoning from it, without resort to prejudice or guess, a jury can reach the conclusion sought by plaintiff, and not that that conclusion must be the only one which logically can be reached ....

1970Lear v. Shirk’s Motor Express Corp., 397 Pa. 144 , 152 A. 2d 883 (1959). “[T]he evidence presented must be such that by reasoning from it, without resort to prejudice or guess, a jury can reach the conclusion sought by plaintiff, and not that that conclusion must be the only one which logically can be reached ....

1970Kaplan v. Kaplan, 404 Pa. 147 , 171 A. 2d 166 (1961). 2 Tbe issue is whether a fact-finder might have found, on the basis of such evidence, that TJGI had breached a duty owed to the plaintiffs and that such breach proximately caused the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs.

1970Kaplan v. Kaplan, 404 Pa. 147 , 171 A. 2d 166 (1961). 2 Tbe issue is whether a fact-finder might have found, on the basis of such evidence, that TJGI had breached a duty owed to the plaintiffs and that such breach proximately caused the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs.

1968Dillworth took an appeal to tbe Superior Court (October Term, 1964, No. 270), where tbe Order of tbe County Court of Philadelphia was affirmed. ( 204 Pa. Superior Ct. 420 ).

1967On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, 365 U.S. 299 , tbe Court banded down tbe following Opinion “Per Curiam”: “Tbe motion to dismiss is granted and tbe appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial Federal question.” It must ba remembered that appropriations can be made only from revenue obtained from taxes or borrowing.

1964Tbe plaintiff’s reliance upon Dillon v. William S. Scull Co., 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 365 , 64 A. 2d 525 (1949), is misplaced.

1964Tbe plaintiff’s reliance upon Dillon v. William S. Scull Co., 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 365 , 64 A. 2d 525 (1949), is misplaced.

1963Cf. Commonwealth v. Reed, 152 Pa. Superior Ct. 249 , 31 A. 2d 595 (1943); Commonwealth v. Maun, 68 Pa. D. & C. 288 (1949); Commonwealth v. Jiras, 4 Pa. D. & C. 2d 655 (1955) ; see also Act of April 29, 1959, P. L. 58, §1205, 75 P.S. §1205.

1963Cf. Commonwealth v. Reed, 152 Pa. Superior Ct. 249 , 31 A. 2d 595 (1943); Commonwealth v. Maun, 68 Pa. D. & C. 288 (1949); Commonwealth v. Jiras, 4 Pa. D. & C. 2d 655 (1955) ; see also Act of April 29, 1959, P. L. 58, §1205, 75 P.S. §1205.

1963Cf. Commonwealth v. Reed, 152 Pa. Superior Ct. 249 , 31 A. 2d 595 (1943); Commonwealth v. Maun, 68 Pa. D. & C. 288 (1949); Commonwealth v. Jiras, 4 Pa. D. & C. 2d 655 (1955) ; see also Act of April 29, 1959, P. L. 58, §1205, 75 P.S. §1205.

1963Cf. Commonwealth v. Reed, 152 Pa. Superior Ct. 249 , 31 A. 2d 595 (1943); Commonwealth v. Maun, 68 Pa. D. & C. 288 (1949); Commonwealth v. Jiras, 4 Pa. D. & C. 2d 655 (1955) ; see also Act of April 29, 1959, P. L. 58, §1205, 75 P.S. §1205.

1962In tbe case of Collins v. Wayne Iron Works, 227 Pa. 326 , even though tbe Court said that tbe noises of nearby trains should be considered as normally affecting tbe standard of comfort prevailing in tbe plaintiff’s locality, nevertheless “an important question is, Can tbe noise by any reasonable means be so moderated as to accord with tbe degree of quietness the plaintiff has a right to enjoy; and, if it can, by what means?” Thus, if tbe court is required to ask such a question where tbe plaintiff’s standard of comfort is affected by noises to which they must be reconciled, bow much more shoul

1962(Fitzpatrick v. Pralon, 129 Pa. Superior Ct. 437, 441 .) Tbe defendant emphasizes that tbe speed of tbe defendant’s automobile, at tbe time of tbe accident, did not exceed 3 to 5 miles per hour.

1960Evans v. Moffat, 388 Pa. 559 , 131 A. 2d 141 (1957).

1960Evans v. Moffat, 388 Pa. 559 , 131 A. 2d 141 (1957).

1959Workers, 158 Pa. Superior Ct. 291 , 44 A. 2d 776 , and the burden of proof rests on the employer to establish tMs defense by the clear preponderance of evidence approximating that required in a criminal case.

1959Workers, 158 Pa. Superior Ct. 291 , 44 A. 2d 776 , and the burden of proof rests on the employer to establish tMs defense by the clear preponderance of evidence approximating that required in a criminal case.

1958Tbe board having found in favor of tbe claimant, tbe evidence must be viewed in tbe light most favorable to him and be must be given tbe benefit of every inference reasonably deducible therefrom: Santillo v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 181 Pa. Superior Ct. 266 , 124 A. 2d 657 .

1958Tbe board having found in favor of tbe claimant, tbe evidence must be viewed in tbe light most favorable to him and be must be given tbe benefit of every inference reasonably deducible therefrom: Santillo v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 181 Pa. Superior Ct. 266 , 124 A. 2d 657 .

1956It was Heintz wbo determined when tbe electricity was turned on and off.” Tbe defendant also cites in its behalf, Engle v. Reider, 366 Pa. 411 , where the workman of an independent contractor, while installing a furnace in tbe defendant’s home, was asphyxiated by carbon monoxide gas which escaped because of tbe defendant’s failure to supply a vent in an already installed hot water heater on his premises.

1954Thouron’s Estate, 182 Pa. 126, 130 .

1951Tbe rule that tbe evidentiary criterion for adjudging the admissibility of an extra judicially obtained confession is its testimonial trustworthiness has been federally applied: see Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 622 ; and Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U. S. 1, 14 .

1951At tbe same time, it is also to be recognized that tbe circumstances attending tbe making of a confession may be such as to impeach its integrity, as a matter of law, even though its contents be otherwise proven credible and that, in such instance, its use as evidence will be stricken down as a denial of federal due process: cf. Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 236 .

1951To prevent judgment, appellant must bring itself witbin the exception and give satisfactory explanation for the inconsistencies.” Tbe exception there referred to, as tbe context otherwise shows in its quotation from Rosenfield v. Kline, 125 Pa. Superior Ct. 82, 86 , 189 A. 512 , is “. . . when tbe defendant is able to give a Satisfactory explanation for his previous error.” In Willis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 150 N. C. 318 , 64 S. E. 11, 13-14 , tbe Supreme Court of North Carolina, in dealing with a similar practice situation, said, — “In this case, there was a verified complaint contain

1951To prevent judgment, appellant must bring itself witbin the exception and give satisfactory explanation for the inconsistencies.” Tbe exception there referred to, as tbe context otherwise shows in its quotation from Rosenfield v. Kline, 125 Pa. Superior Ct. 82, 86 , 189 A. 512 , is “. . . when tbe defendant is able to give a Satisfactory explanation for his previous error.” In Willis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 150 N. C. 318 , 64 S. E. 11, 13-14 , tbe Supreme Court of North Carolina, in dealing with a similar practice situation, said, — “In this case, there was a verified complaint contain

1951To prevent judgment, appellant must bring itself witbin the exception and give satisfactory explanation for the inconsistencies.” Tbe exception there referred to, as tbe context otherwise shows in its quotation from Rosenfield v. Kline, 125 Pa. Superior Ct. 82, 86 , 189 A. 512 , is “. . . when tbe defendant is able to give a Satisfactory explanation for his previous error.” In Willis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 150 N. C. 318 , 64 S. E. 11, 13-14 , tbe Supreme Court of North Carolina, in dealing with a similar practice situation, said, — “In this case, there was a verified complaint contain

1951To prevent judgment, appellant must bring itself witbin the exception and give satisfactory explanation for the inconsistencies.” Tbe exception there referred to, as tbe context otherwise shows in its quotation from Rosenfield v. Kline, 125 Pa. Superior Ct. 82, 86 , 189 A. 512 , is “. . . when tbe defendant is able to give a Satisfactory explanation for his previous error.” In Willis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 150 N. C. 318 , 64 S. E. 11, 13-14 , tbe Supreme Court of North Carolina, in dealing with a similar practice situation, said, — “In this case, there was a verified complaint contain

1950Tbe objection which appears to be tbe most formidable is whether under Procedural Rule No. 2329(1) this application “is not in subordination to and in recognition of the propriety of the actionTbe general rule is that an intervenor must take tbe suit “as be finds it”: Northhampton Trust Company, Trustee, v. Northampton Traction Co. et al., 270 Pa. 199, 205 , 112 A. 871 .

1950Tbe objection which appears to be tbe most formidable is whether under Procedural Rule No. 2329(1) this application “is not in subordination to and in recognition of the propriety of the actionTbe general rule is that an intervenor must take tbe suit “as be finds it”: Northhampton Trust Company, Trustee, v. Northampton Traction Co. et al., 270 Pa. 199, 205 , 112 A. 871 .

1950Cf. Franklin National Bank et al. v. Kennerly Coal & Coke Co., 300 Pa. 479, 483 , 150 A. 902 .

1950Cf. Franklin National Bank et al. v. Kennerly Coal & Coke Co., 300 Pa. 479, 483 , 150 A. 902 .

1944Tbe rule in regard to tbe emergency employment of an assistant does not, however, apply to a case sucb as this where Stitt and tbe plaintiff who employed bim bad an interest of their own in having tbe hearse started as quickly as possible and tbe assistance which Stitt rendered, although at tbe request of Kiebl, was for their own benefit and not primarily to promote tbe interest of defendant; see Denton v. Morgan, 151 N.Y.S. 729 , aff. 223 N. Y. 591 , 119 N. E. 1038 ; Krull v. Triangle Dairy, Inc., 59 Ohio App. 107 , 17 N. E. 2d 291 ; 35 Am.

1944Tbe rule in regard to tbe emergency employment of an assistant does not, however, apply to a case sucb as this where Stitt and tbe plaintiff who employed bim bad an interest of their own in having tbe hearse started as quickly as possible and tbe assistance which Stitt rendered, although at tbe request of Kiebl, was for their own benefit and not primarily to promote tbe interest of defendant; see Denton v. Morgan, 151 N.Y.S. 729 , aff. 223 N. Y. 591 , 119 N. E. 1038 ; Krull v. Triangle Dairy, Inc., 59 Ohio App. 107 , 17 N. E. 2d 291 ; 35 Am.