Tbe rule in Texas

1934Lumbermen’s Recip Ass’n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103 , 246 S. W. 72 , 28 A. L.

1934Lumbermen’s Recip Ass’n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103 , 246 S. W. 72 , 28 A. L.

1932Tbe motion for rehearing is overruled.’ FUNDERBURK, J„ dissenting, see 57 S.W. (2d) 1120 ..

1930App. 187 , 84 S. W. 1070, 1071 , is apropos: “A rigid enforcement of tbe rules in reference to the preparation of briefs would deprive tbe appellants of consideration of most of tbe assignments of error relied on for reversal ; but as tbe record shows that they are so poor as to be compelled to resort to a pauper’s oath in order to prosecute their appeal, this court has, in tbe exercise of its discretion, considered tbe questions presented. # * * » Tbe motion for rehearing is overruled.

1929App.) 136 S. W. 510 ; Farmers’ State Bank of Newlin v. Bell (Tex. Civ.

1929Tbe rule that has always prevailed as to real estate brokers in Texas is: “A broker employed to sell real estate has discharged bis duty when be produces a purchaser able and willing to buy upon tbe terms and at tbe price fixed by tbe seller, and is thereupon entitled to bis commissions, regardless of whether tbe sale is ever actually consummated or not: provided, of course, that tbe failure to consummate it is not due to some fault of the broker.” Gibson v. Gray, 17 Tex. Civ.

1929App. 646 , 43 S. W. 922, 925 ; Smye v. Groesbeck (Tex. Civ.

1926Tbe rule so announced by tbe Supreme Court has been followed and applied by tbe Courts of Civil Appeals in such cases.- Brooks v. Davis, 148 S. W. 1107, 1108 ; Smith v. Milam, 143 S. W. 293 ; Bost v. McCrea, 172 S. W. 561, 564 ; Brincefield v. Allen, 60 S. W. 1010 , 25 Tex. Civ.

1926Tbe rule so announced by tbe Supreme Court has been followed and applied by tbe Courts of Civil Appeals in such cases.- Brooks v. Davis, 148 S. W. 1107, 1108 ; Smith v. Milam, 143 S. W. 293 ; Bost v. McCrea, 172 S. W. 561, 564 ; Brincefield v. Allen, 60 S. W. 1010 , 25 Tex. Civ.

1926Tbe rule so announced by tbe Supreme Court has been followed and applied by tbe Courts of Civil Appeals in such cases.- Brooks v. Davis, 148 S. W. 1107, 1108 ; Smith v. Milam, 143 S. W. 293 ; Bost v. McCrea, 172 S. W. 561, 564 ; Brincefield v. Allen, 60 S. W. 1010 , 25 Tex. Civ.

1926Gildart v. Grumbles, 22 Tex. 15 . , Tbis being tbe case, tbe question of whether tbe trial court erred in overruling other grounds of tbe plea became academic, and there is no occasion for this court to review sucb action of tbe trial court.

1926Tbe rule so announced by tbe Supreme Court has been followed and applied by tbe Courts of Civil Appeals in such cases.- Brooks v. Davis, 148 S. W. 1107, 1108 ; Smith v. Milam, 143 S. W. 293 ; Bost v. McCrea, 172 S. W. 561, 564 ; Brincefield v. Allen, 60 S. W. 1010 , 25 Tex. Civ.

1926Tbe rule so announced by tbe Supreme Court has been followed and applied by tbe Courts of Civil Appeals in such cases.- Brooks v. Davis, 148 S. W. 1107, 1108 ; Smith v. Milam, 143 S. W. 293 ; Bost v. McCrea, 172 S. W. 561, 564 ; Brincefield v. Allen, 60 S. W. 1010 , 25 Tex. Civ.

1926App.), 199 S. W. 1148 , wherein tbe court used tbe following language: “Subdivision 4 of article 1830, Rev.

1925Harness v. Cravens, 126 Mo. 233 , 28 S. W. 971 ; Scroggin v. Ridling, 92 Ark. 630 , 121 S. W. 1053 ; Haywood v. O’Conner, 145 Mich. 52 , 108 N. W. 366 .

1925Harness v. Cravens, 126 Mo. 233 , 28 S. W. 971 ; Scroggin v. Ridling, 92 Ark. 630 , 121 S. W. 1053 ; Haywood v. O’Conner, 145 Mich. 52 , 108 N. W. 366 .

1925Harness v. Cravens, 126 Mo. 233 , 28 S. W. 971 ; Scroggin v. Ridling, 92 Ark. 630 , 121 S. W. 1053 ; Haywood v. O’Conner, 145 Mich. 52 , 108 N. W. 366 .

1925Harness v. Cravens, 126 Mo. 233 , 28 S. W. 971 ; Scroggin v. Ridling, 92 Ark. 630 , 121 S. W. 1053 ; Haywood v. O’Conner, 145 Mich. 52 , 108 N. W. 366 .

1925Harness v. Cravens, 126 Mo. 233 , 28 S. W. 971 ; Scroggin v. Ridling, 92 Ark. 630 , 121 S. W. 1053 ; Haywood v. O’Conner, 145 Mich. 52 , 108 N. W. 366 .

1925Harness v. Cravens, 126 Mo. 233 , 28 S. W. 971 ; Scroggin v. Ridling, 92 Ark. 630 , 121 S. W. 1053 ; Haywood v. O’Conner, 145 Mich. 52 , 108 N. W. 366 .

1924C.) 63 F. 68 , it was said: “Tbe defendant company'is in the city, with its poles and wires on the streets, under the paramount authority of an act of the federal Congress.

1924City of San Antonio v. Smith et al., 94 Tex. 266 , 59 S. W. 1109 .

1924City of San Antonio v. Smith et al., 94 Tex. 266 , 59 S. W. 1109 .

1923Tbe doctrine laid down in tbe case of Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. 489 , 51 Am.

1922Hamby v. State, 36 Tex. 523 ; Dougherty v. State, 59 Tex. Cr.

1922Hamby v. State, 36 Tex. 523 ; Dougherty v. State, 59 Tex. Cr.

1918Tbe objection that tbe deeds were not admissible as certified copies of records of tbe state of Louisiana cannot be sustained, because they were not only certified, but examined, copies of tbe record, shown by the testimony of tbe keeper of the records to be true and correct copies. [3] The contention that tbe recitals, in these instruments were inadmissible because they were self-serving declarations, hearsay, and immaterial is answered by a number of tbe decisions of our courts, among wbicb we cite tbe following: Cope v. Blount, 38 Tex. Civ.

1918App. 516 , 91 S. W. 615 ; Brewer v. Cochran, 45 Tex. Civ.

1918App. 516 , 91 S. W. 615 ; Brewer v. Cochran, 45 Tex. Civ.

1916National Bank v. Diefendorf, 123 N. Y. 191 , 25 N. E. 402 , 10 L.

1916National Bank v. Diefendorf, 123 N. Y. 191 , 25 N. E. 402 , 10 L.

1916The message considered in Johnston v. Telegraph Company, 167 S. W. 272 , was of a precisely similar nature to tbis one.

1913The New York Oourt of Appeals, in tbe case of Britton v. Lorenz, reported in 45 N. Y. 51 , announces this exception to tbe rule applicable to an attorney’s testimony of¡ this character: “Tbe rule deducible from* the authorities is that all communications made by a client to bis counsel, for tbe purposes of professional advice or assistance, are privileged, whether such advice relates to a suit pending, one contemplated, or to any other matter proper for such advice or aid; that where tbe communications are made in tbe presence of all tbe parties to tbe controversy, they are not privileged, but

1913Tbe rule is settled by all tbe authorities that in litigation between tbe client and bis attorney, tbe attorney, of course, has tbe right to make a full disclosure bearing upon the litigation, for tbe purpose of defending bis property rights; a defense of character, where publicly attacked is just as important, and to some more so, than property rights; it would violate a principle of natural justice and inherent equity to say that tbe right of tbe attorney’s defense is merged in a privileged communication when tbe client himself makes a public accusation (tbe relationship between client and a

1913The New York Oourt of Appeals, in tbe case of Britton v. Lorenz, reported in 45 N. Y. 51 , announces this exception to tbe rule applicable to an attorney’s testimony of¡ this character: “Tbe rule deducible from* the authorities is that all communications made by a client to bis counsel, for tbe purposes of professional advice or assistance, are privileged, whether such advice relates to a suit pending, one contemplated, or to any other matter proper for such advice or aid; that where tbe communications are made in tbe presence of all tbe parties to tbe controversy, they are not privileged, but

1913The New York Oourt of Appeals, in tbe case of Britton v. Lorenz, reported in 45 N. Y. 51 , announces this exception to tbe rule applicable to an attorney’s testimony of¡ this character: “Tbe rule deducible from* the authorities is that all communications made by a client to bis counsel, for tbe purposes of professional advice or assistance, are privileged, whether such advice relates to a suit pending, one contemplated, or to any other matter proper for such advice or aid; that where tbe communications are made in tbe presence of all tbe parties to tbe controversy, they are not privileged, but

1913House v. Stone, 64 Tex. 684 ; McDaniel v. Needham, 61 Tex. 274 ; French v. Grenet, 57 Tex. 279 ; Van Zandt v. Brantley, 16 Tex. Civ.

1911In tbe case of Williams v. Bailes, 9 Tex. 61 , it was held: “Tbe defendant could not be permitted to throw upon tbe plaintiff the bur-then of proving tbe execution of the instrument or tbe cause of action, although under such defective plea, if not objected to in time, he might adduce evidence to support bis own defense.” That decision is cited with approval in Insurance Co. v. Wicker, 93 Tex. 390 , 55 S. W. 740 .

1911In tbe case of Williams v. Bailes, 9 Tex. 61 , it was held: “Tbe defendant could not be permitted to throw upon tbe plaintiff the bur-then of proving tbe execution of the instrument or tbe cause of action, although under such defective plea, if not objected to in time, he might adduce evidence to support bis own defense.” That decision is cited with approval in Insurance Co. v. Wicker, 93 Tex. 390 , 55 S. W. 740 .

1911In tbe case of Williams v. Bailes, 9 Tex. 61 , it was held: “Tbe defendant could not be permitted to throw upon tbe plaintiff the bur-then of proving tbe execution of the instrument or tbe cause of action, although under such defective plea, if not objected to in time, he might adduce evidence to support bis own defense.” That decision is cited with approval in Insurance Co. v. Wicker, 93 Tex. 390 , 55 S. W. 740 .

1894Linn v. Le Compte, 47 Texas, 440 ; Bryorly v. Clark, 48 Texas, 353 .