Tbe rule in Arkansas

1965Tbe court said in Gillis v. Jurzyna, 1 NE 2d 763 : Tbe filing of tbe brief is held to be equivalent to a joinder in error, and by joinder in error, tbe right to move to dismiss tbe writ is waived. ’ ’ Tbe motion to dismiss is denied.

1959Tbe rule has been recognized in many cases that when tbe Legislature fixes a short time for appeal in a particular type of case, and such time so fixed is reasonable, then tbe short time so fixed must govern rather than tbe long time allowed by tbe general appeal statute. 3 Crandell v. City of Harrison, 105 Ark. 110 , 150 S. W. 560 ; McIlroy v. Baird, 157 Ark. 288 , 248 S. W. 1 ; Covington v. Shackleford, 222 Ark. 374 , 259 S. W. 2d 676 .

1959Tbe rule has been recognized in many cases that when tbe Legislature fixes a short time for appeal in a particular type of case, and such time so fixed is reasonable, then tbe short time so fixed must govern rather than tbe long time allowed by tbe general appeal statute. 3 Crandell v. City of Harrison, 105 Ark. 110 , 150 S. W. 560 ; McIlroy v. Baird, 157 Ark. 288 , 248 S. W. 1 ; Covington v. Shackleford, 222 Ark. 374 , 259 S. W. 2d 676 .

1959Tbe rule has been recognized in many cases that when tbe Legislature fixes a short time for appeal in a particular type of case, and such time so fixed is reasonable, then tbe short time so fixed must govern rather than tbe long time allowed by tbe general appeal statute. 3 Crandell v. City of Harrison, 105 Ark. 110 , 150 S. W. 560 ; McIlroy v. Baird, 157 Ark. 288 , 248 S. W. 1 ; Covington v. Shackleford, 222 Ark. 374 , 259 S. W. 2d 676 .

1959Tbe rule has been recognized in many cases that when tbe Legislature fixes a short time for appeal in a particular type of case, and such time so fixed is reasonable, then tbe short time so fixed must govern rather than tbe long time allowed by tbe general appeal statute. 3 Crandell v. City of Harrison, 105 Ark. 110 , 150 S. W. 560 ; McIlroy v. Baird, 157 Ark. 288 , 248 S. W. 1 ; Covington v. Shackleford, 222 Ark. 374 , 259 S. W. 2d 676 .

1959Tbe rule has been recognized in many cases that when tbe Legislature fixes a short time for appeal in a particular type of case, and such time so fixed is reasonable, then tbe short time so fixed must govern rather than tbe long time allowed by tbe general appeal statute. 3 Crandell v. City of Harrison, 105 Ark. 110 , 150 S. W. 560 ; McIlroy v. Baird, 157 Ark. 288 , 248 S. W. 1 ; Covington v. Shackleford, 222 Ark. 374 , 259 S. W. 2d 676 .

1959Tbe rule has been recognized in many cases that when tbe Legislature fixes a short time for appeal in a particular type of case, and such time so fixed is reasonable, then tbe short time so fixed must govern rather than tbe long time allowed by tbe general appeal statute. 3 Crandell v. City of Harrison, 105 Ark. 110 , 150 S. W. 560 ; McIlroy v. Baird, 157 Ark. 288 , 248 S. W. 1 ; Covington v. Shackleford, 222 Ark. 374 , 259 S. W. 2d 676 .

1946Edmonson v. State, 51 Ark. 115 , 10 S. W. 21 ; Melton v. State, 43 Ark. 367 ; Norris v. State, 168 Ark. 151 , 269 S. W. 46 .

1946Edmonson v. State, 51 Ark. 115 , 10 S. W. 21 ; Melton v. State, 43 Ark. 367 ; Norris v. State, 168 Ark. 151 , 269 S. W. 46 .

1946Edmonson v. State, 51 Ark. 115 , 10 S. W. 21 ; Melton v. State, 43 Ark. 367 ; Norris v. State, 168 Ark. 151 , 269 S. W. 46 .

1946Edmonson v. State, 51 Ark. 115 , 10 S. W. 21 ; Melton v. State, 43 Ark. 367 ; Norris v. State, 168 Ark. 151 , 269 S. W. 46 .

1926Tbe motion for a new trial addressed itself to tbe sound discretion of tbe trial court, and, under tbe ruling in Arkadelphia Lumber Co. v. Posey, 74 Ark. 377 , it can not be said that tbe circuit -court erred in refusing to grant -a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

1923Counsel for appellees rely on the decision in Means v. Terral, 145 Ark. 443 , as supporting their contention that there were actual vacancies which the electors were authorized to fill.

1923This is tbe principle which governed tbe case of School District v. Garrison, 90 Ark. 335 , though the application of the principle was somewhat different than in this case.

1920Tbe rule is aptly stated by Mr. Cooley in bis work on Taxation, volume 2, page 1382, in tbe following language: ‘ ‘ Tbe courts either of common law or of equity are powerless to give relief against tbe erro^ neous judgments of assessing bodies, except as they may be specially empowered by law to do so.” See also Desty on Taxation, vol. 1, p. 605; Wells Fargo & Co. Express v. Crawford County, 63 Ark. 576 ; State ex rel.

1915Co. v. Thompson, 82 Ark. 11 .

1914She later made a codicil to tbe will revoking a certain devise to a nephew and devising some of tbe property, tbat bad been devised to him in tbe clause revoked, to tbe same niece, Elizabeth Darby and ber beirs and assigns in fee simple. 'This devisee died during tbe life of tbe testatrix and it was contended there, as here, tbat it was tbe intention of tbe testatrix to substitute tbe • children and heirs of the devisee in her place in the event of her death before that of the testatrix, bnt the court held otherwise and construing the word “heirs” said, “But words used in a will must he constr

1854Tunstall et al., ( 3 Ark. 119 .) In that case, each separate writ was issued, and liable to be served upon all of tbe defendants, if found by tbe sheriff to whom directed.