8 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1913–1933 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
W. K. Henderson Iron Works & Supply Co. v. Jeffriesgreen1 sentence1932See Henderson Iron Works & Supply Co. v. Jef-fries, 159 La. 623 , 105 So. 792 , 793 where the following appears: “Plaintiff, relator here, complains that tbe Court of Appeal erred in receiving (i. e., considering) parol evidence to show the true facts of tbe conveyance by Woodward to Jef-fries, thus contradicting tbe recital of tbe deed that tbe consideration thereof was cash, and to that end relies on Revised Civil Code, art. 2276 (formerly 2256), reading as •follows: “Article 2276 (2256): ‘Neither shall parol evidence be admitted against or beyond what is contained in tbe (written) acts. * * | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rawlings v. Schwartz
neutral
1 sentence1933In the case of Jacobs v. Weaver & Rivers et al., 167 La. 59 , 118 So. 692 , the Supreme Court, in considering tbe same motion as is here presented, said: “Tbe rule is settled beyond controversy tbat, where tbe appellant perfects bis appeal, and fails to file tbe transcript on or before tbe. return day, or within the three days of grace following tbe return day, be is conclusively presumed to have abandoned tbe appeal; and this conclusive presumption can only be avoided by timely (i. e., previous) application to the appellate court for an extension of tbe return day. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Jacobs v. Weaver Rivers
neutral
1 sentence1933In the case of Jacobs v. Weaver & Rivers et al., 167 La. 59 , 118 So. 692 , the Supreme Court, in considering tbe same motion as is here presented, said: “Tbe rule is settled beyond controversy tbat, where tbe appellant perfects bis appeal, and fails to file tbe transcript on or before tbe. return day, or within the three days of grace following tbe return day, be is conclusively presumed to have abandoned tbe appeal; and this conclusive presumption can only be avoided by timely (i. e., previous) application to the appellate court for an extension of tbe return day. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Hebert v. Champagne
neutral
2 sentences1933Ruling Case Law, vol. 10, verbo “Estoppel,” par. 21; Hebert v. Champagne, 144 La. 659 , 81 So. 217 ; Blunson v. Knighton (La. 1933Ruling Case Law, vol. 10, verbo “Estoppel,” par. 21; Hebert v. Champagne, 144 La. 659 , 81 So. 217 ; Blunson v. Knighton (La. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Ducre v. Milner
neutral
2 sentences1930Tbe plea of res judicata is founded upon tbe judgment rendered by tbe district court and affirmed by this court in Ducre v. Milner, 165 La. 433 , 115 So. 646 . 1930Tbe plea of res judicata is founded upon tbe judgment rendered by tbe district court and affirmed by this court in Ducre v. Milner, 165 La. 433 , 115 So. 646 . | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Young v. Louisiana Western R.
green
1 sentence1929Young v. Railroad Co., 153 La. 132 , 95 So. 511, 512 . | 1 | 1929–1929 |
St. Paul v. Louisiana Cypress Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences1925Cypress Co., 116 La. 585 , 40 So. 906 , this court said: “The defendant avers that the land in •question inured to the levee board under Act No. 97, p. 107. of 1890. * * * “Tbe defendant’s contention is that the grant by the state of these lands, sold at tax sale, was a grant in prsesenti, and that the provision for the making out of a list by the auditor and the register of the land office, was intended as descriptive, and that instead of being a condition precedent, it was a condition subsequent, and, as such, could only be taken advantage of by the grantor in the event of failure to make ou 1925Cypress Co., 116 La. 585 , 40 So. 906 , this court said: “The defendant avers that the land in •question inured to the levee board under Act No. 97, p. 107. of 1890. * * * “Tbe defendant’s contention is that the grant by the state of these lands, sold at tax sale, was a grant in prsesenti, and that the provision for the making out of a list by the auditor and the register of the land office, was intended as descriptive, and that instead of being a condition precedent, it was a condition subsequent, and, as such, could only be taken advantage of by the grantor in the event of failure to make ou | 1 | 1925–1925 |
State v. Romero
neutral
2 sentences1923State v. Romero, 117 La. 1003 , 42 South. 482 . 1923State v. Romero, 117 La. 1003 , 42 South. 482 . | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Carrere v. Aucoin
neutral
1 sentence1913Tbe defendant cannot gather comfort from Carrere v. Aucoin, 122 La. 258 , 47 South. 58 , nor s. c., 127 La. 62 , 53 South. 427 , neither of which is in point. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Carrere v. Aucoin
neutral
1 sentence1913Tbe defendant cannot gather comfort from Carrere v. Aucoin, 122 La. 258 , 47 South. 58 , nor s. c., 127 La. 62 , 53 South. 427 , neither of which is in point. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.