slapp motion in Georgia

2026To avoid a complaint being stricken by an anti-SLAPP motion, “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” Wilkes & McHugh, 306 Ga. at 262 (2)(b) (punctuation omitted).

2025“The text of OCGA § 9-11-11.1 (b) (1) makes clear that the analysis of an anti- SLAPP motion involves two steps.” Wilkes & McHugh, P.A. v. LTC Consulting, L.P., 306 Ga. 252, 261 (2) (b) ( 830 SE2d 119 ) (2019).

2025First, the court must determine whether the party filing the anti-SLAPP motion (here, Matthews) “has made a threshold showing that the challenged claim is one arising from protected activity.” Zeh, 312 Ga. at 650 (citations and punctuation omitted).

2024Background “We generally review a trial court’s ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion to strike de novo, viewing the pleadings and affidavits submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the plaintiff (as the non-moving party).” ACLU v. Zeh, 312 Ga. 647 , 652 2 (1) (c) ( 864 SE2d 422 ) (2021) (citation omitted).

2022See RCO Legal, P.S., Inc. v. Johnson, 347 Ga. App. 661, 672 (2) (c) (ii) ( 820 SE2d 491 ) (2018) (recognizing that questions of conditional privilege are generally reserved for a jury); Bryant v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., 311 Ga. App. 230, 235 (III) ( 715 SE2d 458 ) (2011) (noting that whether a statement is one of pure opinion is decided by a court only where it “is so unambiguous so as to bear only one reasonable interpretation”) (citation and quotation omitted). 6 This analysis also requires the trial court to resolve EPM’s “status as a ‘private’ or ‘public’ figure [to] determine[] the level o

2022See RCO Legal, P.S., Inc. v. Johnson, 347 Ga. App. 661, 672 (2) (c) (ii) ( 820 SE2d 491 ) (2018) (recognizing that questions of conditional privilege are generally reserved for a jury); Bryant v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., 311 Ga. App. 230, 235 (III) ( 715 SE2d 458 ) (2011) (noting that whether a statement is one of pure opinion is decided by a court only where it “is so unambiguous so as to bear only one reasonable interpretation”) (citation and quotation omitted). 6 This analysis also requires the trial court to resolve EPM’s “status as a ‘private’ or ‘public’ figure [to] determine[] the level o

2025See Jefferson v. Stripling, 316 Ga. App. 197, 201 (3) ( 728 SE2d 826 ) (2012); see also Metzler v. Rowell, 248 Ga. App. 596, 598 (1) ( 547 SE2d 311 ) (2001) (OCGA § 9-11-11.1 “provides for a motion to dismiss and hearing on this issue”).

2025See Jefferson v. Stripling, 316 Ga. App. 197, 201 (3) ( 728 SE2d 826 ) (2012); see also Metzler v. Rowell, 248 Ga. App. 596, 598 (1) ( 547 SE2d 311 ) (2001) (OCGA § 9-11-11.1 “provides for a motion to dismiss and hearing on this issue”).

2021See also Rosser v. Clyatt, 348 Ga. App. 40, 50 (821 SE2d 140) (2018) (applying the “clear and convincing” standard of proof to an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the public-figure plaintiff’s defamation lawsuit); Terrell v. Georgia Television Co., 215 Ga. App. 150, 152 (449 SE2d 897) (1994) (“A public official in a defamation action must show actual malice with convincing clarity, even on motion for summary judgment.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2021See also Rosser v. Clyatt, 348 Ga. App. 40, 50 (821 SE2d 140) (2018) (applying the “clear and convincing” standard of proof to an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the public-figure plaintiff’s defamation lawsuit); Terrell v. Georgia Television Co., 215 Ga. App. 150, 152 (449 SE2d 897) (1994) (“A public official in a defamation action must show actual malice with convincing clarity, even on motion for summary judgment.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

2025For this reason, Haymond’s inclusion of the wrong property address in her petition “should be considered in the second part of the [anti-SLAPP] analysis; whether there is a probability plaintiffs will prevail.” DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 566 (2000).

2025For this reason, Haymond’s inclusion of the wrong property address in her petition “should be considered in the second part of the [anti-SLAPP] analysis; whether there is a probability plaintiffs will prevail.” DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 566 (2000).

2025See Jefferson v. Stripling, 316 Ga. App. 197, 201 (3) ( 728 SE2d 826 ) (2012); see also Metzler v. Rowell, 248 Ga. App. 596, 598 (1) ( 547 SE2d 311 ) (2001) (OCGA § 9-11-11.1 “provides for a motion to dismiss and hearing on this issue”).

2025See Jefferson v. Stripling, 316 Ga. App. 197, 201 (3) ( 728 SE2d 826 ) (2012); see also Metzler v. Rowell, 248 Ga. App. 596, 598 (1) ( 547 SE2d 311 ) (2001) (OCGA § 9-11-11.1 “provides for a motion to dismiss and hearing on this issue”).

2019See, e.g., Gramiak v. Beasley , 304 Ga. 512 , 522-523, 820 S.E.2d 50 (2018) ; Clayton County v. City of College Park , 301 Ga. 653 , 656-657, 803 S.E.2d 63 (2017) ; Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie , 294 Ga. 657 , 667-669, 755 S.E.2d 683 (2014).

2019See, e.g., Gramiak v. Beasley , 304 Ga. 512 , 522-523, 820 S.E.2d 50 (2018) ; Clayton County v. City of College Park , 301 Ga. 653 , 656-657, 803 S.E.2d 63 (2017) ; Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie , 294 Ga. 657 , 667-669, 755 S.E.2d 683 (2014).

2019See also RCO Legal, P.S., Inc. v. Johnson , 347 Ga. App. 661 , 667 n.10, 820 S.E.2d 491 (2018) (holding, in case decided under current version of Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute, that " '[t]o satisfy the second prong, a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim' " (quoting Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman , 51 Cal.4th 811 , 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 256 , 250 P.3d 1115 , 1120 (2011) ).

2019See also RCO Legal, P.S., Inc. v. Johnson , 347 Ga. App. 661 , 667 n.10, 820 S.E.2d 491 (2018) (holding, in case decided under current version of Georgia's anti-SLAPP statute, that " '[t]o satisfy the second prong, a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim' " (quoting Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman , 51 Cal.4th 811 , 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 256 , 250 P.3d 1115 , 1120 (2011) ).

2018In the first step, the defendant bringing an anti-SLAPP motion to [strike] must make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff's suit is subject to OCGA § 9-11-11.1...." Neff , 346 Ga. App. at 524 -525 , 816 S.E.2d 486 .

2018In the first step, the defendant bringing an anti-SLAPP motion to [strike] must make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff's suit is subject to OCGA § 9-11-11.1...." Neff , 346 Ga. App. at 524 -525 , 816 S.E.2d 486 .

2019OCGA § 9-11-11.1 (e). 12 See Grogan v. City of Dawsonville , 305 Ga. 79 , 83-84, 823 S.E.2d 763 (2019).

2019OCGA § 9-11-11.1 (e). 12 See Grogan v. City of Dawsonville , 305 Ga. 79 , 83-84, 823 S.E.2d 763 (2019).

2019See, e.g., Gramiak v. Beasley , 304 Ga. 512 , 522-523, 820 S.E.2d 50 (2018) ; Clayton County v. City of College Park , 301 Ga. 653 , 656-657, 803 S.E.2d 63 (2017) ; Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie , 294 Ga. 657 , 667-669, 755 S.E.2d 683 (2014).

2019See, e.g., Gramiak v. Beasley, 304 Ga. 512, 522-523 ( 820 SE2d 50 ) (2018); Clayton County v. City of College Park, 301 Ga. 653, 656-657 ( 803 SE2d 63 ) (2017); Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie, 294 Ga. 657, 667-669 ( 755 SE2d 683 ) (2014).

2019"The plaintiff's evidence is accepted as true; the defendant's evidence is evaluated to determine if it defeats the plaintiff's showing as a matter of law." City of Montebello v. Vasquez , 1 Cal.5th 409 , 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 , 376 P.3d 624 , 631 (2016).

2019"The plaintiff's evidence is accepted as true; the defendant's evidence is evaluated to determine if it defeats the plaintiff's showing as a matter of law." City of Montebello v. Vasquez , 1 Cal.5th 409 , 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 , 376 P.3d 624 , 631 (2016).

2019See, e.g., Gramiak v. Beasley , 304 Ga. 512 , 522-523, 820 S.E.2d 50 (2018) ; Clayton County v. City of College Park , 301 Ga. 653 , 656-657, 803 S.E.2d 63 (2017) ; Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie , 294 Ga. 657 , 667-669, 755 S.E.2d 683 (2014).

2019See, e.g., Gramiak v. Beasley , 304 Ga. 512 , 522-523, 820 S.E.2d 50 (2018) ; Clayton County v. City of College Park , 301 Ga. 653 , 656-657, 803 S.E.2d 63 (2017) ; Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie , 294 Ga. 657 , 667-669, 755 S.E.2d 683 (2014).

2026The elements of tortious interference with contractual relations, business relations, or potential business relations are: (1) improper action or wrongful conduct by the defendant without privilege; (2) the defendant acted purposely and with malice with the intent to injure;[27] (3) the defendant induced a breach of contractual obligations or caused a party or third parties to discontinue or fail to enter into an anticipated business relationship with the plaintiff; and (4) the defendant’s tortious conduct proximately caused damage to the plaintiff.28 The defendants insist that Dr. Harms has f

2026The elements of tortious interference with contractual relations, business relations, or potential business relations are: (1) improper action or wrongful conduct by the defendant without privilege; (2) the defendant acted purposely and with malice with the intent to injure;[27] (3) the defendant induced a breach of contractual obligations or caused a party or third parties to discontinue or fail to enter into an anticipated business relationship with the plaintiff; and (4) the defendant’s tortious conduct proximately caused damage to the plaintiff.28 The defendants insist that Dr. Harms has f

2025Its essential elements are: “(1) the defendant’s negligent supply of false information to forseeable persons, known or unknown; (2) such person’s reasonable reliance upon that false information; and (3) economic injury proximately resulting from such reliance.” (Footnote omitted.) Hardaway Co. v. Parsons, Brnckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, 267 Ga. 424, 426 (1) ( 479 SE2d 727 ) (1997).

2025Its essential elements are: “(1) the defendant’s negligent supply of false information to forseeable persons, known or unknown; (2) such person’s reasonable reliance upon that false information; and (3) economic injury proximately resulting from such reliance.” (Footnote omitted.) Hardaway Co. v. Parsons, Brnckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, 267 Ga. 424, 426 (1) ( 479 SE2d 727 ) (1997).

2025And, to determine whether a defendant is the prevailing party, the trial court must engage in the two-part analysis of the anti-SLAPP motion.4 Moore v. Liu, 69 Cal. App. 4th 745, 752 (2) (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (“the trial court’s adjudication of 4 Compare Coltrain v. Shewalter, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 600, 608 (IV) (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that court has discretion to determine if defendant is prevailing party based on an analysis of “which party realized its objectives in the litigation.”). 8 the merits of a defendant’s motion to strike is an essential predicate to ruling on the defendant’s re

2025Giraldi’s Facebook message was privileged because it was sent to encourage the recipient to “be careful” regarding the possibility of staph infections, and thus was a privileged statement “made in good faith in the performance of a public duty” or a “legal or moral private duty.” OCGA § 51-5-7 (1)-(2); Mathis v. Cannon, 276 Ga. 16, 20-21 (2) (2002) (a defamation cause of action requires an unprivileged communication to a third party).

2025And, to determine whether a defendant is the prevailing party, the trial court must engage in the two-part analysis of the anti-SLAPP motion.4 Moore v. Liu, 69 Cal. App. 4th 745, 752 (2) (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (“the trial court’s adjudication of 4 Compare Coltrain v. Shewalter, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 600, 608 (IV) (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that court has discretion to determine if defendant is prevailing party based on an analysis of “which party realized its objectives in the litigation.”). 8 the merits of a defendant’s motion to strike is an essential predicate to ruling on the defendant’s re

2025I also agree that the first step in the analysis of whether a plaintiff may prevail on his defamation claims is to determine whether Georgia’s defamation law or federal constitutional defamation law, as established under New York Times, applies to his claims.28 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (III), 349-350 (IV) ( 94 SCt 2997 , 41 LE2d 789) (1974) (acknowledging “actual malice” standard applies to a private-figure plaintiff when the defamatory statement is about a matter of public concern while recognizing that states may, without imposing strict liability, separately define

2025I also agree that the first step in the analysis of whether a plaintiff may prevail on his defamation claims is to determine whether Georgia’s defamation law or federal constitutional defamation law, as established under New York Times, applies to his claims.28 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (III), 349-350 (IV) ( 94 SCt 2997 , 41 LE2d 789) (1974) (acknowledging “actual malice” standard applies to a private-figure plaintiff when the defamatory statement is about a matter of public concern while recognizing that states may, without imposing strict liability, separately define

2025If so, the court must decide whether the plaintiff “has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Citation and footnote omitted.) Lambert, 370 Ga. App. at 106 (1); OCGA § 9-11-11.1 (b) (1). 5 often described as standing to bring the suit,” and “subsection (b) of the Act broadens the scope of the Declaratory Judgment Act beyond actual controversies to include justiciable controversies.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) U-Haul Co. of Arizona v. Rutland, 348 Ga. App. 738, 743 (1), 747(1) ( 824 SE2d 644 ) (2019); see also VoterGa, 368 Ga. App. at 1

2025If so, the court must decide whether the plaintiff “has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Citation and footnote omitted.) Lambert, 370 Ga. App. at 106 (1); OCGA § 9-11-11.1 (b) (1). 5 often described as standing to bring the suit,” and “subsection (b) of the Act broadens the scope of the Declaratory Judgment Act beyond actual controversies to include justiciable controversies.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) U-Haul Co. of Arizona v. Rutland, 348 Ga. App. 738, 743 (1), 747(1) ( 824 SE2d 644 ) (2019); see also VoterGa, 368 Ga. App. at 1

2025“In order for this Court to correct errors of law, it is the duty of the appellant to show the existence of error, and in order to obtain reversal, he must show the error was harmful.” Ball v. Police Committee of City of Atlanta, 136 Ga. App. 144, 145 (2) ( 220 SE2d 479 ) (1975).

2025“In order for this Court to correct errors of law, it is the duty of the appellant to show the existence of error, and in order to obtain reversal, he must show the error was harmful.” Ball v. Police Committee of City of Atlanta, 136 Ga. App. 144, 145 (2) ( 220 SE2d 479 ) (1975).

2025See Pinnacle Benning LLC, 314 Ga. App. at 614 (1). (c) Because Publix’s claims for declaratory judgment were nonjusticiable, we do not reach its arguments regarding the merits of the County’s anti-SLAPP motion.

2023In his complaint, Morgan asserted a claim of libel per se against Mainstreet, which generally “consists of a charge that one is guilty of a crime, dishonesty or immorality.” Zarach v. Atlanta Claims Assn., 231 Ga. App. 685, 688 (2) ( 500 SE2d 1 ) (1998).

2023In his complaint, Morgan asserted a claim of libel per se against Mainstreet, which generally “consists of a charge that one is guilty of a crime, dishonesty or immorality.” Zarach v. Atlanta Claims Assn., 231 Ga. App. 685, 688 (2) ( 500 SE2d 1 ) (1998).

2022In light of the circumstances of this case, and keeping in mind that the heart of the anti-SLAPP statute is the First Amendment, Royalty Network, Inc. 14 v. Harris, 756 F3d 1351, 1356 (III) (A) (11th Cir. 2014), we agree with the trial court that Greene made a showing that the speech underlying EPM’s cause of action could reasonably be construed as fitting within one of the categories spelled out in OCGA § 9- 11-11.1 (c). (b) We turn now to the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

2022See RCO Legal, P.S., Inc. v. Johnson, 347 Ga. App. 661, 672 (2) (c) (ii) ( 820 SE2d 491 ) (2018) (recognizing that questions of conditional privilege are generally reserved for a jury); Bryant v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., 311 Ga. App. 230, 235 (III) ( 715 SE2d 458 ) (2011) (noting that whether a statement is one of pure opinion is decided by a court only where it “is so unambiguous so as to bear only one reasonable interpretation”) (citation and quotation omitted). 6 This analysis also requires the trial court to resolve EPM’s “status as a ‘private’ or ‘public’ figure [to] determine[] the level o

2022See RCO Legal, P.S., Inc. v. Johnson, 347 Ga. App. 661, 672 (2) (c) (ii) ( 820 SE2d 491 ) (2018) (recognizing that questions of conditional privilege are generally reserved for a jury); Bryant v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., 311 Ga. App. 230, 235 (III) ( 715 SE2d 458 ) (2011) (noting that whether a statement is one of pure opinion is decided by a court only where it “is so unambiguous so as to bear only one reasonable interpretation”) (citation and quotation omitted). 6 This analysis also requires the trial court to resolve EPM’s “status as a ‘private’ or ‘public’ figure [to] determine[] the level o