slapp motion in Minnesota

2016Pehrson’s request that the police take action against Lougee and his business was “genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action.” The second step in evaluating Pehrson’s anti-SLAPP motion is whether Lougee “produced clear and convincing evidence that the moving party is not entitled to immunity.” Leiendecker, 848 N.W.2d at 229 .

2016The anti-SLAPP statute is intended to shield “citizens and organizations from civil lawsuits for exercising their rights of public participation in government.” Id. at 839 (quotation omitted). “[T]he first step in evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion is to determine whether the party seeking dismissal under the anti-SLAPP statutes has made a threshold showing that the underlying claim materially relates to an act of the moving party that involves public participation.” Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minn., 848 N.W.2d 224, 229 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted), as modified by 855 N.W.2d 233 (Mi

2016The anti-SLAPP statute is intended to shield “citizens and organizations from civil lawsuits for exercising their rights of public participation in government.” Id. at 839 (quotation omitted). “[T]he first step in evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion is to determine whether the party seeking dismissal under the anti-SLAPP statutes has made a threshold showing that the underlying claim materially relates to an act of the moving party that involves public participation.” Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minn., 848 N.W.2d 224, 229 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted), as modified by 855 N.W.2d 233 (Mi

2015Id. at 838 (interpreting the anti-SLAPP statute). [T]he first step in evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion is to determine whether the party seeking dismissal under the anti- SLAPP statutes has made a threshold showing that the underlying claim materially relates to an act of the moving party that involves public participation . . . .

2014In this case, we did not grant review on the question of whether AWUM has made a threshold showing under the anti-SLAPP statutes, so, like the court of appeals, Leiendecker, 834 N.W.2d at 749 , we assume, but do not decide, that AWUM has done so.

2014See Nexus, 785 N.W.2d at 780-82 (addressing the right to a jury trial in the context of an anti-SLAPP motion); see also Leiendecker, 834 N.W.2d at 751 n. 2 (noting that, if the court of appeals were to change its interpretation of the anti-SLAPP statutes from Marchant and Nexus , the statutes would infringe on the “constitutional right to a jury trial”).

2017Allowing equitable immunities that are identical to a plaintiffs cause of action would permit the Legislature to erode the jury-trial right by sleight of hand. “[FJactual findings that are common to both claims at law and claims for equitable relief are binding upon the district court.” Onvoy, Inc. v. ALLETE, Inc., 736 N.W.2d 611, 617 (Minn. 2007).

2016The Washington Supreme Court followed this reasoning in Akrie v. Grant, 183 Wash.2d 665 , 355 P.3d 1087, 1088 (2015), reversing a lower court decision granting an anti-SLAPP motion.

2016The Washington Supreme Court followed this reasoning in Akrie v. Grant, 183 Wash.2d 665 , 355 P.3d 1087, 1088 (2015), reversing a lower court decision granting an anti-SLAPP motion.

2016Lougee could do this by showing that Pehrson’s statements to police were defamatory.3 “To establish a defamation claim, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) the defamatory statement is communicated to someone other than the plaintiff; (2) the statement is false; and (3) the statement tends to harm the plaintiff’s reputation and to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of the community.” Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910, 919-20 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted).

2014Nexus then declared that, if a party brings a motion for summary judgment asserting anti-SLAPP immunity, the responding party is only “required to produce clear and convincing evidence in light of the Rule 56 standard for granting summary judgment.” Id. at 782 (emphasis omitted).

2014See Nexus, 785 N.W.2d at 780-82 (addressing the right to a jury trial in the context of an anti-SLAPP motion); see also Leiendecker, 834 N.W.2d at 751 n. 2 (noting that, if the court of appeals were to change its interpretation of the anti-SLAPP statutes from Marchant and Nexus , the statutes would infringe on the “constitutional right to a jury trial”).

2010June 3, 2008) (dismissing the county’s malicious prosecution and abuse-of-process counterclaims against citizens pursuant to an anti-SLAPP motion, where the citizens challenged the county’s grant of permit applications of a bible-camp developer); Marchant, 694 N.W.2d at 97-98 (dismissing a developer's defamation claim against a neighborhood organization following the neighborhood organization’s anti-SLAPP motion).