slapp motion in Vermont

2025Data Exch., Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 395 (Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that determination of whether speech involves public issue for purposes of anti-SLAPP motion requires “examination of the specific nature of the speech rather than the generalities that might be abstracted from it”)).

2025Data Exch., Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 395 (Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that determination of whether speech involves public issue for purposes of anti-SLAPP motion requires “examination of the specific nature of the speech rather than the generalities that might be abstracted from it”). ¶ 26.

2025Section 1041 does not define the term “public issue.” Because Vermont’s statute was based primarily on California’s anti-SLAPP statute, we look to how California courts have interpreted the public-issue requirement for guidance in interpreting the term.4 Felis, 2015 VT 129, ¶¶ 31, 38 .

2023See Felis, 2015 VT 129, ¶ 28 (opting to review anti-SLAPP motion on appeal “because the parties have briefed the applicability of the statute, we can decide the issue based on a question of law on which the standard of review is de novo, and we can avoid the accrual of even more attorney’s fees for the parties”). ¶ 20.

2025Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 181 (5th Cir. 2009) (concluding that order denying anti-SLAPP motion is immediately reviewable collateral final order), and Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding same), superseded by statute as stated in Breazeale v. Victim Services, Inc., 878 F.3d 759, 766-67 (9th Cir. 2017).

2025Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 181 (5th Cir. 2009) (concluding that order denying anti-SLAPP motion is immediately reviewable collateral final order), and Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding same), superseded by statute as stated in Breazeale v. Victim Services, Inc., 878 F.3d 759, 766-67 (9th Cir. 2017).

2025Polak v. Ramirez-Diaz, 2025 VT 9, ¶ 26 (quotation omitted). 5 The court finds good cause for Copley’s late filing of the anti-SLAPP motion based on Copley’s change in counsel and the novelty of plaintiff’s claims.

2025Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 181 (5th Cir. 2009) (concluding that order denying anti-SLAPP motion is immediately reviewable collateral final order), and Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding same), superseded by statute as stated in Breazeale v. Victim Services, Inc., 878 F.3d 759, 766-67 (9th Cir. 2017).

2025Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 181 (5th Cir. 2009) (concluding that order denying anti-SLAPP motion is immediately reviewable collateral final order), and Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding same), superseded by statute as stated in Breazeale v. Victim Services, Inc., 878 F.3d 759, 766-67 (9th Cir. 2017).

2025Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 181 (5th Cir. 2009) (concluding that order denying anti-SLAPP motion is immediately reviewable collateral final order), and Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding same), superseded by statute as stated in Breazeale v. Victim Services, Inc., 878 F.3d 759, 766-67 (9th Cir. 2017).

2025Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 181 (5th Cir. 2009) (concluding that order denying anti-SLAPP motion is immediately reviewable collateral final order), and Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding same), superseded by statute as stated in Breazeale v. Victim Services, Inc., 878 F.3d 759, 766-67 (9th Cir. 2017).

2025In general, an appeal from a final judgment confers this Court with “jurisdiction over the issues encompassed in the record leading up to final judgment.” State v. Kuhlmann, 2022 VT 28, ¶ 16 , 217 Vt. 78 , 282 A.3d 425 ; see V.R.A.P. 3(a) (“An appeal from a judgment preserves for review any claim of error in the record . . . .”); see also Hyan v. Hummer, 825 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that grant of anti-SLAPP motion is “fully reviewable on appeal from final judgment” because “[t]he erroneous grant of an anti-SLAPP motion to strike can be fully remedied on appeal by remanding the

2025Compare Ernst v. Carrigan, 814 F.3d 116, 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2016) (explaining that federal appellate jurisdiction is limited to final decisions, which includes those that terminate an action and collateral final orders, and concluding that “orders passing on the merits of an anti-SLAPP motion do not fall within the collateral order doctrine”), with Henry v. 6 Lake Charles Am.

2025Compare Ernst v. Carrigan, 814 F.3d 116, 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2016) (explaining that federal appellate jurisdiction is limited to final decisions, which includes those that terminate an action and collateral final orders, and concluding that “orders passing on the merits of an anti-SLAPP motion do not fall within the collateral order doctrine”), with Henry v. 6 Lake Charles Am.

2019See Garretson v. Post , 156 Cal.App.4th 1508 , 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 230 , 235 (2007) (explaining that trial court's ruling on SLAPP motion is reviewed under de novo standard of review); Baseball Club of Tacoma v. SDL Baseball Partners, LLC , 187 Wash.App. 519 , 348 P.3d 1283 , 1286 (2015) (stating that trial court's ruling on special motion to strike is reviewed de novo). ¶ 9.

2019See Garretson v. Post , 156 Cal.App.4th 1508 , 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 230 , 235 (2007) (explaining that trial court's ruling on SLAPP motion is reviewed under de novo standard of review); Baseball Club of Tacoma v. SDL Baseball Partners, LLC , 187 Wash.App. 519 , 348 P.3d 1283 , 1286 (2015) (stating that trial court's ruling on special motion to strike is reviewed de novo). ¶ 9.

2019See, e.g., Macias v. Hartwell , 55 Cal.App.4th 669 , 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 222 , 226 (1997) ("Appellant cites no authority, and we have found none, that a defendant who successfully brings an anti-SLAPP motion is barred from recovering fees if the fees were paid by a third party."). ¶ 23.

2019See, e.g., Macias v. Hartwell , 55 Cal.App.4th 669 , 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 222 , 226 (1997) ("Appellant cites no authority, and we have found none, that a defendant who successfully brings an anti-SLAPP motion is barred from recovering fees if the fees were paid by a third party."). ¶ 23.