slapp analysis in Colorado

2026Trump for President, Inc., 2024 COA 35 , ¶ 68 (to defeat an anti-SLAPP motion, the plaintiff must generally present evidence establishing a reasonable likelihood of success, not mere allegations); cf. L.S.S., ¶ 47 (concluding father met his burden when he submitted affidavits stating he never abused his child, along with other evidence of actual malice by mother). 4 We recognize that Christiansen attempted to verify his amended complaint “[u]pon oath and affirmation.” See People v. Anderson, 828 P.2d 228, 231 (Colo. 1992) (explaining a court may treat a verified pleading as an affidavit “if th

2026See § 14-10-127(1)(a)(I)(A), C.R.S. 2025 (explaining that the purpose of a parental responsibilities evaluation is “to assist [the court] in 5 We recognize that Beau attempted to verify his amended complaint “[u]pon oath and affirmation.” See People v. Anderson, 828 P.2d 228, 231 (Colo. 1992) (explaining that a court may treat a verified pleading as an affidavit “if the document otherwise meets the legal requirements of an affidavit”).

2026II, LLC v. City of Wheat Ridge, 183 P.3d 714, 717-18 (Colo. App. 2008) (when a lower tribunal gives more than one reason for a decision, an appellant must challenge each of those reasons on appeal). 7 ¶ 14 But even if we looked to the merits of Caplan’s arguments supporting dismissal, we would find no error because Christiansen didn’t carry his burden under the anti-SLAPP statute. ¶ 15 Under the first step of anti-SLAPP analysis, Caplan’s statements were made either (1) to prompt action by law enforcement (the emails to the district attorney) or (2) as part of a judicial proceeding (the statem

2026II, LLC v. City of Wheat Ridge, 183 P.3d 714, 717-18 (Colo. App. 2008) (when a lower tribunal gives more than one reason for a decision, an appellant must challenge each of those reasons on appeal). ¶ 18 But even if we looked to the merits of Kassidy’s arguments supporting dismissal, we would find no error because Beau didn’t carry his burden under the anti-SLAPP statute. 8 ¶ 19 Under the first step of anti-SLAPP analysis, Kassidy’s statements were made either (1) to prompt action by law enforcement or a child welfare agency (the statements to the police department, sheriff’s office, and human

2025Paterno v. Superior Ct., 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 244, 254 (Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted).3 “Reporting the news is speech subject to the protections of the First Amendment and subject to a motion 3 Because Colorado’s anti-SLAPP statute closely resembles California’s anti-SLAPP statute, California case law offers guidance for considering standards under the statute.

2025Paterno v. Superior Ct., 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 244, 254 (Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted).3 “Reporting the news is speech subject to the protections of the First Amendment and subject to a motion 3 Because Colorado’s anti-SLAPP statute closely resembles California’s anti-SLAPP statute, California case law offers guidance for considering standards under the statute.

2026See DiMarco v. Dep’t of Revenue, 857 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Colo. App. 1993) (“[A]ppellate courts have generally construed time limitations imposed on public bodies as being directory rather than mandatory, unless the General Assembly has clearly evidenced a contrary intent.”). ¶ 13 Therefore, we conclude that the district court erred by not holding the requisite hearing on mother’s anti-SLAPP motion under section 13-20-1101(5).

2025See § 13-20-1101(3)(b) (stating that a “court shall consider the pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits” in its resolution of a special motion to dismiss); §§ 13-27-101 to -108, C.R.S. 2025 (the Uniform Unsworn Declarations Act); see also Spiremedia Inc. v. Wozniak, 2020 COA 10, ¶ 27 (noting that an unsworn declaration that complies with article 27 of title 13 satisfies sworn affidavit 15 requirement).8 In it, he acknowledges trying to take Tarah’s phone from her but asserts that she falsely told the deputies that he “slapped the phone out of her hand.” Luis claims that he was uncomf