slapp motion in Nevada

2022See Coker v. Sassone, 135 Nev. 8 , 10, 432 P.3d 746, 748-49 (2019) (reviewing a district court order resolving an anti-SLAPP motion de novo).

2022"We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion." Coker v. Sassone, 135 Nev. 8 , 11, 432 P.3d 746, 749 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2021Rosen v. Tarkanian, 135 Nev. 436, 441, 453 P.3d 1220, 1224 (2019) (observing that at step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis, a court should evaluate whether the "gist or stine of the at-issue statement is a protected communication).

2021Rosen v. Tarkanian, 135 Nev. 436 , 441, 453 P.3d 1220, 1224 (2019) (observing that at step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis, a court should evaluate whether the "gist or stine of the at-issue statement is a protected communication).

2018Id. at 549-50 (alteration in original) (quoting section 425.16(e)(2) ).

2018Id. at 549-50 (alteration in original) (quoting section 425.16(e)(2)).

2019Thus, the relevant inquiry in prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis is whether a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that "the gist of the story, or the portion of the story that carries the sting of the [statement], is true." Pegasus, 118 Nev. at 715 n.17, 57 P.3d at 88 n.17 (2002) (quoting Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991)).

2019Thus, the relevant inquiry in prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis is whether a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that "the gist of the story, or the portion of the story that carries the sting of the [statement], is true." Pegasus, 118 Nev. at 715 n.17, 57 P.3d at 88 n.17 (2002) (quoting Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991)).

2018Id. at 387 .

2018Id. at 387.

2024See, e.g., Padres L.P. v. Henderson, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 584, 594 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of facts that would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 9 (0) I947A under the applicable evidentiary standard."); Robertson v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 470 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that where an element of a claim must be proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial, the sufficiency of the plaintiff s prima facie showing on an anti-SLAPP motion is determined with the higher standard of proof in mind); Looney v. Superior Ct.,

2024See, e.g., Padres L.P. v. Henderson., 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 584, 594 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of facts that would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment under the applicable evidentiary standard."); Robertson v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 470 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that where an element of a claim must be proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial, the sufficiency of the plaintiff s prima facie showing on an anti-SLAPP motion is determined with the higher standard of proof in mind); Looney v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 192-93 (Ct.

2024See, e.g., Padres L.P. v. Henderson, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 584, 594 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of facts that would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 9 (0) I947A under the applicable evidentiary standard."); Robertson v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 470 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that where an element of a claim must be proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial, the sufficiency of the plaintiff s prima facie showing on an anti-SLAPP motion is determined with the higher standard of proof in mind); Looney v. Superior Ct.,

2024See, e.g., Padres L.P. v. Henderson., 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 584, 594 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of facts that would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment under the applicable evidentiary standard."); Robertson v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 470 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that where an element of a claim must be proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial, the sufficiency of the plaintiff s prima facie showing on an anti-SLAPP motion is determined with the higher standard of proof in mind); Looney v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 192-93 (Ct.

2024See, e.g., Padres L.P. v. Henderson, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 584, 594 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of facts that would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 9 (0) I947A under the applicable evidentiary standard."); Robertson v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 470 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that where an element of a claim must be proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial, the sufficiency of the plaintiff s prima facie showing on an anti-SLAPP motion is determined with the higher standard of proof in mind); Looney v. Superior Ct.,

2024See, e.g., Padres L.P. v. Henderson., 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 584, 594 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of facts that would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment under the applicable evidentiary standard."); Robertson v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 470 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that where an element of a claim must be proven by clear and convincing evidence at trial, the sufficiency of the plaintiff s prima facie showing on an anti-SLAPP motion is determined with the higher standard of proof in mind); Looney v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 192-93 (Ct.

2022Now, Willick and Sanson await the district court's determination on the motion's second prong.4 "Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes aim to protect First Amendment rights by providing defendants with a procedural mechanism to dismiss meritless lawsuit[s] that a party initiates primarily to chill a defendant's exercise of his or her First Amendment free speech rights' before incurring the costs of litigation." Coker v. Sassone, 135 Nev. 8 , 10, 432 P.3d 746, 748 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Stubbs v. Strickland, 129 Nev. 146, 150 , 297 P.3d 326, 329 (2013)); Stubbs, 129 Nev. at 151 , 297 P

2022Now, Willick and Sanson await the district court's determination on the motion's second prong.4 "Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes aim to protect First Amendment rights by providing defendants with a procedural mechanism to dismiss meritless lawsuit[s] that a party initiates primarily to chill a defendant's exercise of his or her First Amendment free speech rights' before incurring the costs of litigation." Coker v. Sassone, 135 Nev. 8 , 10, 432 P.3d 746, 748 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Stubbs v. Strickland, 129 Nev. 146, 150 , 297 P.3d 326, 329 (2013)); Stubbs, 129 Nev. at 151 , 297 P

2021In addition, Smith argues that the amount of the attorney fees and costs the district court awarded was unreasonable under the factors set forth in Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969).

2021In addition, Smith argues that the amount of the attorney fees and costs the district court awarded was unreasonable under the factors set forth in Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969).

2020Abrams did not prove with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on her claims Because Sanson satisfied prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we must evaluate Abrams showing under prong two: whether her claims had minimal merit.3 See NRS 41.665(2) (stating that a plaintiffs burden under prong two is the same as a plaintiff's burden under California's anti- SLAPP law); Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 712-13 (Cal. 2002) (establishing the "minimal merit" burden for a plaintiff).

2020Abrams did not prove with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on her claims Because Sanson satisfied prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we must evaluate Abrams showing under prong two: whether her claims had minimal merit.3 See NRS 41.665(2) (stating that a plaintiffs burden under prong two is the same as a plaintiff's burden under California's anti- SLAPP law); Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 712-13 (Cal. 2002) (establishing the "minimal merit" burden for a plaintiff).

2020In assessing whether Abrams' claims arising from protected communications have minimal merit, we must review each challenged claim independently and 3We need not review the likelihood of prevailing on the claims based on the Schoen statements because those statements do not satisf37 the first prong and are not protected. 13 assess Abrams probability of prevailing.4 See Baral v. Schnitt, 376 P.3d 604, 613-14 (Cal. 2016).

2020In assessing whether Abrams' claims arising from protected communications have minimal merit, we must review each challenged claim independently and 3We need not review the likelihood of prevailing on the claims based on the Schoen statements because those statements do not satisf37 the first prong and are not protected. 13 assess Abrams probability of prevailing.4 See Baral v. Schnitt, 376 P.3d 604, 613-14 (Cal. 2016).

2020The constructive discharge for purposes of adjudicating attorney lien and $200,000 quantum meruit award We review a "district court's findings of fact for an abuse of discretion" and "will not set aside those findings unless they are clearly erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence." NOLM, LLC v. Cty. of Clark, 120 Nev. 736, 739 , 100 P.3d 658, 660-61 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2020The constructive discharge for purposes of adjudicating attorney lien and $200,000 quantum meruit award We review a "district court's findings of fact for an abuse of discretion" and "will not set aside those findings unless they are clearly erroneous or not supported by substantial evidence." NOLM, LLC v. Cty. of Clark, 120 Nev. 736, 739 , 100 P.3d 658, 660-61 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2019In Shapiro, we explained that the Legislature had not defined public concern," and so we adopted California principles to guide the analysis. 133 Nev. at 39-40, 389 P.3d at 268 (adopting California's test for determining whether a statement is an issue of public interest as articulated in Piping Rock Partners, Inc. v. David Lerner Assocs., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 2d 957, 968 (N.D.

2019In Shapiro, we explained that the Legislature had not defined public concern," and so we adopted California principles to guide the analysis. 133 Nev. at 39-40, 389 P.3d at 268 (adopting California's test for determining whether a statement is an issue of public interest as articulated in Piping Rock Partners, Inc. v. David Lerner Assocs., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 2d 957, 968 (N.D.

2019See Dowling v. Zimmerman, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174, 179-81 (Ct. App. 2001) (upholding a district court's decision to grant attorney's anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss a complaint filed by landlord against attorney, based on attorney's letter to homeowners' association detailing landlord's unlawful detainer action against attorney's tenant clients, because the matter was under review by a public body).

2019See Dowling v. Zimmerman, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174, 179-81 (Ct. App. 2001) (upholding a district court's decision to grant attorney's anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss a complaint filed by landlord against attorney, based on attorney's letter to homeowners' association detailing landlord's unlawful detainer action against attorney's tenant clients, because the matter was under review by a public body).

2018Op. 11, 412 P.3d 68, 70 (2018). 2 'The Legislature amended the anti-SLAPP statute in 2015 Among other things, the amendments require a plaintiff in the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis to demonstrate with "prima facie evidence," instead of "clear and convincing evidence," a probability of prevailing on the claim. 2015 Nev.

2018Op. 11, 412 P.3d 68, 70 (2018). 2 'The Legislature amended the anti-SLAPP statute in 2015 Among other things, the amendments require a plaintiff in the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis to demonstrate with "prima facie evidence," instead of "clear and convincing evidence," a probability of prevailing on the claim. 2015 Nev.

2017In City of Montebello v. Vasquez, the SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 13 (0) 1947A ceu Supreme Court of California reviewed a lower court's denial of an anti- SLAPP motion because the communication did not implicate First Amendment rights. 376 P.3d 624, 632 (Cal. 2016).

2017In City of Montebello v. Vasquez, the SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 13 (0) 1947A ceu Supreme Court of California reviewed a lower court's denial of an anti- SLAPP motion because the communication did not implicate First Amendment rights. 376 P.3d 624, 632 (Cal. 2016).

2018Id. at 445 .

2018Id. at 445 .

2018Id. at 92 .

2018Id. at 92 .

2024Ass'n, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 5 (0) I947A Clark County's second counterargument is that we already held in John v. Douglas County School District, 125 Nev. 746, 760 , 219 P.3d 1276, 1286 (2009), that governmental entities are entitled to bring an anti-SLAPP motion.

2024Ass'n, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 5 (0) I947A Clark County's second counterargument is that we already held in John v. Douglas County School District, 125 Nev. 746, 760 , 219 P.3d 1276, 1286 (2009), that governmental entities are entitled to bring an anti-SLAPP motion.

2026Thus, with respect to the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we address only whether the communications were made "in good faith in that [they were] truthful or [were] made without knowledge of [their} falsehood," Williams v. Lazer, 137 Nev. 437 , 440, 495 P.3d 93, 97 (2021) (citation modified), or were statements of opinion that "cannot be false," Zilverberg, 137 Nev. at 69, 481 P.3d at 1228.

2026Thus, with respect to the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we address only whether the communications were made "in good faith in that [they were] truthful or [were] made without knowledge of [their} falsehood," Williams v. Lazer, 137 Nev. 437 , 440, 495 P.3d 93, 97 (2021) (citation modified), or were statements of opinion that "cannot be false," Zilverberg, 137 Nev. at 69, 481 P.3d at 1228.

2026Op. 56 , 555 P.3d at 278 (explaining that "a public figure defamation claim does not have minimal merit, as a matter of law, if the plaintiffs evidence of actual malice would not be sufficient—even if credited—to sustain a favorable verdict under the clear and convincing standard").

2026When considering an award of attorney fees based on a partially successful anti-SLAPP motion, California courts first determine "the lodestar amount for the hours expended on the successful claims, and, if the work on the successful and unsuccessful causes of action was overlapping, the court should then consider the defendant's relative success on the motion in achieving his or her objective, and reduce the amount if appropriate." Malin v. Singer, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292, 309 (Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Mann, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 618 ).

2026Additionally, where a moving party partially prevails on their anti-SLAPP motion, the district court must analyze the factors outlined in Malin, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 309 , to determine the extent to which attorney fees are warranted.