slapp motion in California

2026There, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 (Baral).) In deciding whether the plaintiff’s cause of action is subject to an anti-SLAPP motion, “the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) “‘On appeal, we review the trial court’s decision de novo, engaging in the same two-step process to determine, as a matter

2026DISCUSSION Overview of the Anti-SLAPP Law Courts must strike causes of action arising from a defendant’s exercise of First Amendment rights unless plaintiff shows a probability of prevailing on the claim. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The law is construed “broadly” (id., subd. (a)) as “a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral).) An order granting an anti-SLAPP motion is appealable. (§ 425.16, subd. (i).) Review is de novo.

2026(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 .) Respondents’ Petitioning Activity The first prong of the SLAPP analysis focuses on “the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92 ) and “whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity.” (Id. at p. 89.) This encompasses “any written or oral statement or writing” in a judicial proceeding, or in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a judicial body, and “any ot

2026(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 .) Respondents’ Petitioning Activity The first prong of the SLAPP analysis focuses on “the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92 ) and “whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity.” (Id. at p. 89.) This encompasses “any written or oral statement or writing” in a judicial proceeding, or in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a judicial body, and “any ot

2026(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 .) Respondents’ Petitioning Activity The first prong of the SLAPP analysis focuses on “the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92 ) and “whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity.” (Id. at p. 89.) This encompasses “any written or oral statement or writing” in a judicial proceeding, or in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a judicial body, and “any ot

2026(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 .) Respondents’ Petitioning Activity The first prong of the SLAPP analysis focuses on “the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92 ) and “whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity.” (Id. at p. 89.) This encompasses “any written or oral statement or writing” in a judicial proceeding, or in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a judicial body, and “any ot

2026Ware fails to demonstrate error in the trial court’s finding that he failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success To overcome an anti-SLAPP motion, “the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 ; see also HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 212 [“In opposing an anti-SLAPP motion, the plaintiff cannot rely on the alle

2026Prong Two: Probability of Success on the Merits Under the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis, a plaintiff “need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit.’” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 (Soukup).) To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff “‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’” (Ibid.) “In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting an

2026(Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67 ; § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) This in turn requires us to consider whether Stockdale’s breach of contract complaint arose from acts taken by defendants or their agent in furtherance of the “right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) As to prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Stockdale notes in its brief: “[Stockdale] recognizes the Supreme Court has determined ‘the mere fact the constitutional speech occurred in violation of a contract did n

2025(Ibid.) Courts will not recognize exceptions to the rule unless they are “ ‘clearly mandated.’ ” (Baycol, at p. 757.) One such exception is an order granting or denying an anti- SLAPP motion to strike. (§ 425.16, subd. (i); see also, § 904.1, subd. (a)(13) [authorizing appeal from an order granting or denying a motion to strike under section 425.16].) The Legislature determined that the right to an immediate appeal is necessary to protect First Amendment interests when a 3 meritorious motion is denied (Doe v. Luster (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 139, 145 (Doe)), and it also protects against overbroad

2026Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) provides, in relevant part: “A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] … [¶] … [i]n any … judicial proceeding, [and/or] in any other official proceeding authorized by law[.]” The litigation privilege “is relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.” (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 323 .) Thus, if the litigation privilege precludes a finding of liability for breach on the part of Mario and Sienna, Stockdale cann

2026(Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 315-317, 320 ; City of Montebello, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 424 ; Collier v. Harris (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 41, 54-55 .) However, if a factual dispute exists about the legitimacy of the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff must establish the illegality in the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

2025(City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78 .) “[I]n ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063 .) Courts are required to “respect the distinction between activities that form the basis for a claim and those that merely lead to the liability-creating activity or provide evidentiary support for the claim.” (Id. at p. 1064.) “[T]he mere fact that an ac

2025(City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78 .) “[I]n ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063 .) Courts are required to “respect the distinction between activities that form the basis for a claim and those that merely lead to the liability-creating activity or provide evidentiary support for the claim.” (Id. at p. 1064.) “[T]he mere fact that an ac

2026(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 .) Respondents’ Petitioning Activity The first prong of the SLAPP analysis focuses on “the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92 ) and “whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity.” (Id. at p. 89.) This encompasses “any written or oral statement or writing” in a judicial proceeding, or in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a judicial body, and “any ot

2026(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 .) Respondents’ Petitioning Activity The first prong of the SLAPP analysis focuses on “the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92 ) and “whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity.” (Id. at p. 89.) This encompasses “any written or oral statement or writing” in a judicial proceeding, or in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a judicial body, and “any ot

2026Prong Two: Stockdale has Burden to Show a Probability of Success on the Merits of Breach of Contract Claim To establish a reasonable probability of prevailing under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, “the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Wilson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 821 .) “In deciding the question of potential merit, the trial court considers the pleadings and evidentiary submissions of both

2025To determine whether this motion should be granted, the trial court must engage in a two-step process.” (Hansen v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 171 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1543 (Hansen); Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53 , 67 (Equilon).) The first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis requires the court to decide “whether the defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity.” (Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67 ; § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The defendant makes this showing by demonstrating t

2026(Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884 .) “To do so, the plaintiff must show the complaint is legally sufficient and ‘ “ ‘supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” ’ (Taheri Law Group v. Evans (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 482, 488 .) We review an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion de novo.

2026(Cf. Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 892 [“[i]f conduct that supplies a necessary element of a claim is protected, the defendant’s burden at the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis has been carried”].) We also reject defendants’ assertion that their motion should have succeeded because Garcia’s “ ‘actual objective’ ” is to “ ‘interfere with and burden’ ” their free speech.

2026By definition, a malicious prosecution suit alleges that the defendant committed a tort by filing a lawsuit. [Citation.] Accordingly, every Court of Appeal that has addressed the question has concluded that malicious prosecution causes of action fall within the purview of the anti- SLAPP statute. [Citations.]” (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728 , 734–735, fn. omitted.) We therefore agree with the trial court that Asif sufficiently established that plaintiffs’ claim for malicious prosecution arises from his protected activity under prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

2025In the notice of motion, Wang “reserve[d] the right to claim her attorney fees through a subsequent noticed motion or as part of a cost memorandum.” The notice of motion indicated that the motion would “be based on this notice; the accompanying opening brief, declarations of [Wang, her attorney, and the person who delivered the recall petitions to Sauseda], and proposed order; and any and all arguments and admissible evidence offered in support of 1 “SLAPP is an acronym for ‘strategic lawsuit against public participation.’” (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 732, fn. 1 .

2026Attorney’s Fees and Costs “[U]nder Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c), any SLAPP defendant who brings a successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney fees.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131 .) Here, the Scripps defendants and the Lawyer defendants, each separately represented, filed separate attorney’s fee requests accompanied by declarations from the respective attorneys.

2026(See Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1141–1142 [“[O]nce [the anti-SLAPP] motion was successful, attorney fees were mandatory.”].) The inquiry does not require the trial court to pass upon the merits of the arguments made in the anti-SLAPP motion or the merits of the complaint, such that the trial court’s decision could contradict the outcome of an appeal on the underlying motion.

2026(Kashian, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 908 ; Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1062–1065.) Having determined that Barenholtz carried his burden to establish that the five tort causes of action arise from his protected activity, we turn to the question of whether Jesse has established a probability of success on his tort claims under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

2025Robles moved to strike the cause of action against him pursuant to section 425.16–a motion widely known as an “anti- SLAPP motion.” (See Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055 (Rusheen) [defining anti-SLAPP].) The trial court determined the cause of action against Robles arose from Robles’s protected litigation activity in pursuing, seeking to confirm, and protecting his judgment against Yazdi in the 2015 case.

2026(Cuevas-Martinez v. Sun Salt Sand, Inc. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1117 , citation omitted.) We cannot, as Sarraf would have us do, disregard our Supreme Court’s 9 Though we do not consider Sarraf’s evidence except to determine if it defeats Bagish’s showing as a matter of law, we note Sarraf avoids stating under penalty of perjury that Bagish made a threat to “‘slash’” him. 13 longstanding prohibition on resolving factual claims, weighing credibility, and comparing the weight of the evidence in the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. ( Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384–385; Oasis West Re

2025(See Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 819–820.) The trial court elected to analyze and rule on the second step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry, concluding even if Contreras’s activity were protected, her motion should still be denied.

2026In Williams v. Saga Enterprises, Inc. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 142, 149 , the court admitted excerpts of a reporter’s transcript from a criminal trial, finding that “[w]hile the reporter's transcript is from another case, the effect of the examination made of [the witness] is the same as would be a declaration supplied by him in this case.” In Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 942 (Sweetwater),the Supreme Court cited Williams and admitted sworn grand jury testimony as the equivalent of a declaration for an anti-SLAPP motion because “the important asp

2026In Williams v. Saga Enterprises, Inc. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 142, 149 , the court admitted excerpts of a reporter’s transcript from a criminal trial, finding that “[w]hile the reporter's transcript is from another case, the effect of the examination made of [the witness] is the same as would be a declaration supplied by him in this case.” In Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 942 (Sweetwater),the Supreme Court cited Williams and admitted sworn grand jury testimony as the equivalent of a declaration for an anti-SLAPP motion because “the important asp

2026Ware fails to demonstrate error in the trial court’s finding that he failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success To overcome an anti-SLAPP motion, “the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 ; see also HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 212 [“In opposing an anti-SLAPP motion, the plaintiff cannot rely on the alle

2026Prong Two: Probability of Success on the Merits Under the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis, a plaintiff “need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit.’” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 (Soukup).) To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff “‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’” (Ibid.) “In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting an

2026Prong Two: Probability of Success on the Merits Under the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis, a plaintiff “need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit.’” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 (Soukup).) To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff “‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’” (Ibid.) “In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting an

2026(Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 785, fn. 1, 788 .) A motion brought under section 425.16 is called an anti-SLAPP motion. 2 a creditor.

2025(Ibid; see § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Section 425.16 “establishes a procedure 7 where the trial court evaluates the merits of the lawsuit using a summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation. [Citation.] In doing so, section 425.16 seeks to limit the costs of defending against such a lawsuit.” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192 ; Newport Harbor II, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 642 .) An anti-SLAPP motion “may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court’s discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper.” (§ 42

2025Dist. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 192, 197 .) Under section 425.16, the “trial court evaluates the merits of the lawsuit using a summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation.” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192 .) Section 425.16 provides, in pertinent part: “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the

2024(See Sunset Drive Corp. v. City of Redlands (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 215, 226 [“[a]bsent a sufficient showing of justification for the failure to raise an issue in a timely fashion, we need not consider any issue which, although raised at oral argument, was not adequately raised in the briefs”].) 9 Appellants do not argue that respondents failed to establish the first prong of the anti-SLAPP motion because the complaint contained causes of action that were “mixed in that they [were] based on both protected and unprotected activity.” (Peregrine Funding, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 672 ; see also

2024(Locke v. Mitchell (1936) 7 Cal.2d 599, 602 ; Beroiz v. Wahl, supra, 17. 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 492 .) Although the anti-SLAPP statute “places on the plaintiff the burden of substantiating its claims, a defendant that advances an affirmative defense to such claims properly bears the burden of proof on the defense.” (Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 676 .) Thus, “[d]uring the second prong of a court’s anti-SLAPP analysis, a defendant bears the burden of proving a privilege’s applicability.” (Neurelis, Inc. v. Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc.

2026(ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1020 .) Where work on successful and unsuccessful claims overlaps, a trial court should reduce the lodestar amount to reflect the moving defendant’s relative success in achieving its litigation objectives and should only award fees proportionate to the extent the anti-SLAPP motion changed the lawsuit in a practical way.

2025DISCUSSION Defendants who prevail on an anti-SLAPP motion are entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs. (§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1); Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 339 (Mann).) Defendants who partially prevail “must generally be considered a prevailing party unless the results of the motion were so insignificant that the party did not achieve any practical benefit from bringing the motion.” (Mann, at p. 340.) Partial success “reduces but does not eliminate the entitlement to attorney fees.” 3 (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993 , 101

2026Plaintiff relies on authorities applicable to defendants who partially succeed on an anti-SLAPP motion, pursuant to which attorney fees “should be commensurate with the extent to which the motion changed the nature and character of the lawsuit in a practical way.” (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 345 ; City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 782 ; Gumarang v. Braemer on Raymond, LLC (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 370 , 388.) Such cases are 3 Plaintiff also argues that the fee order must be reversed because the trial court’s ruling on the underlying a

2026Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) “[A] party who partially prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion must generally be considered a prevailing party unless the results of the motion were so insignificant that the party did not achieve any practical benefit from bringing the motion.” (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 340 .) “This analysis includes factors such as the extent to which the defendant’s litigation posture was advanced by the motion, whether the same factual allegations remain to be litigated, whether discovery and motion practice have been narrowed, and the ex

2026The defendant must concede the point, or the evidence conclusively demonstrate it, for a claim of illegality to defeat an anti-SLAPP motion at the first step.” (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 424 .) “[T]he Supreme Court’s use of the phrase ‘illegal’ was intended to mean criminal, and not merely violative of a statute.” (Mendoza v. ADP Screening & Selection Services, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1654 .) 8 “Our Supreme Court has emphasized that the exception for illegal activity is very narrow and applies only in undisputed cases of illegality.” (Zucchet v. Galardi (201

2026The defendant must concede the point, or the evidence conclusively demonstrate it, for a claim of illegality to defeat an anti-SLAPP motion at the first step. [Citation.]” (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 424 .) Plaintiffs did not conclusively demonstrate that Bigelow engaged in illegal conduct as a matter of law and Bigelow did not concede that he had engaged in such illegal conduct.

2026It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.’ ” (Monster Energy, at p. 788; see Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 714 (Taus) [the court should grant the section 425.16 motion “ ‘if, as a matter of law, the defendant’s evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff’s attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim’ ”].) “[I]n cases involving allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the plaintiff is required to establish a probability of prevailing on an

2025(Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720 .) While the allegations are sufficient to state a claim for defamation per se, allegations alone are insufficient to overcome an anti-SLAPP motion.

2025Rather, [we] accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluate the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.’”’ [Citation.]” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781 , 791–792.) “[A] plaintiff’s burden at the second anti-SLAPP step is a low one, requiring only a showing that a cause of action has at least ‘minimal merit within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 793.) “Only a cause of action that lacks ‘even minimal merit’ constitutes a SLAPP.” (Overstock.co

2025Code, § 44.) For an alleged defamatory statement to be actionable, it must be a “statement of fact,” not “a constitutionally protected statement of opinion.” (Brodeur v. Atlas Entertainment, Inc. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 665, 680 ; see also Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 688, 701 .) And if the plaintiff is a public figure, he must also “ ‘show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defamatory statement was made with actual malice—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false.’ ” (Sanchez v. Bezos (2022) 8

2022(Id. at p. 671.) We explained that in Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th 376 , the Supreme Court of California held an anti-SLAPP motion could reach separate claims within a single pleaded cause of action and disapproved the contrary rule from Mann, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at page 106 , that a court need not parse the cause of action and leave only those portions that have merit.

2022(Id. at p. 671.) We explained that in Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th 376 , the Supreme Court of California held an anti-SLAPP motion could reach separate claims within a single pleaded cause of action and disapproved the contrary rule from Mann, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at page 106 , that a court need not parse the cause of action and leave only those portions that have merit.

2026(Kashian, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 908 ; Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1062–1065.) Having determined that Barenholtz carried his burden to establish that the five tort causes of action arise from his protected activity, we turn to the question of whether Jesse has established a probability of success on his tort claims under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

2026(See Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 764 .) 8 18 Cal.App.5th 95, 101 , 113–115 [affirming order granting defendants’ anti- SLAPP motion because the challenged conduct was the defendants’ representation of a corporation in two court cases, which was protected under § 425.16, subd. (e)(2)]; Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 929, 941–942 [defendants’ statements urging plaintiff’s former employees to sue plaintiff for employment violations were protected under § 425.16, subd. (e)(2)]; Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892 , 907– 908 [concluding