slapp motion in California

2026In short, in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.” (Id. at pp. 1062-1063.) Courts should be “attuned to and . . . respect the distinction between activities that form the basis for a claim and those that merely lead to the liability- creating activity or provide evidentiary support for the claim.” (Id. at p. 1064; see Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394 [“Assertions that are ‘merely incidental[,]’ . . . ‘collateral[,]’ ” or “prov

2026(Id., subd. (b)(1).) The law is construed “broadly” (id., subd. (a)) as “a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral).) An order granting an anti-SLAPP motion is appealable. 4 (§ 425.16, subd. (i).) Review is de novo.

2026Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995 , 1009.) First, “the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’ protected activity in which the defendant 8 has engaged.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 , quoting § 425.16, subd. (b)(1); see § 425.16, subd. (e) [defining protected activity].) Second, if the defendant satisfies the first step, the plaintiff must show “there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The plaintiff must esta

2026Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995 , 1009.) First, “the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’ protected activity in which the defendant 8 has engaged.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 , quoting § 425.16, subd. (b)(1); see § 425.16, subd. (e) [defining protected activity].) Second, if the defendant satisfies the first step, the plaintiff must show “there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The plaintiff must esta

2026First Amendment Petitioning Activity The first prong of the SLAPP analysis focuses on “the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92) and “whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected speech or petitioning activity.” (Id. at p. 89.) This includes “any written or oral statement” in a judicial proceeding or in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a judicial body, and “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1

2026First Amendment Petitioning Activity The first prong of the SLAPP analysis focuses on “the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92) and “whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected speech or petitioning activity.” (Id. at p. 89.) This includes “any written or oral statement” in a judicial proceeding or in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a judicial body, and “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1

2026FACTUAL BACKGROUND Because this appeal arises from an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion, we base this background upon “ ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits upon which the liability or defense is based.’ ” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 3 .) In September 2024, rapper Sean Combs, more commonly known as Diddy, was indicted in a highly publicized prosecution involving charges of racketeering, sex trafficking, and transportation for purposes of prostitution.

2026Prong Two: Probability of Success on the Merits Under the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis, a plaintiff “need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit.’” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 (Soukup).) To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff “‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’” (Ibid.) “In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting an

2026(Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67 ; § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) This in turn requires us to consider whether Stockdale’s breach of contract complaint arose from acts taken by defendants or their agent in furtherance of the “right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) As to prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Stockdale notes in its brief: “[Stockdale] recognizes the Supreme Court has determined ‘the mere fact the constitutional speech occurred in violation of a contract did n

2025(Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67 .) Concluding that Pham’s complaint arose from Olivia’s alleged aiding and abetting of the wrongful transfer of the property (and not from the 2014 stipulated order), the trial court did not consider the second step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry—whether Pham had shown that her claims had “at least ‘minimal merit.’ ” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 .) A panel of this court reversed, concluding that Pham’s claims did arise from protected activity, and remanded to the trial cour

2026Our Supreme Court detailed the procedure for the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis in Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th 995 : In “determining whether the plaintiff’s claims arise from protected activity . . . , courts are to ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.’ [Citation.] The defendant’s burden is to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity.” (Id. at p. 1009.) Thus, “[i]f a caus

2026Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995 , 1009.) First, “the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’ protected activity in which the defendant 8 has engaged.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 , quoting § 425.16, subd. (b)(1); see § 425.16, subd. (e) [defining protected activity].) Second, if the defendant satisfies the first step, the plaintiff must show “there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) The plaintiff must esta

2026The litigation privilege is relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that “it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.” (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 323 .) The privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.

2026Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) provides, in relevant part: “A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] … [¶] … [i]n any … judicial proceeding, [and/or] in any other official proceeding authorized by law[.]” The litigation privilege “is relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.” (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 323 .) Thus, if the litigation privilege precludes a finding of liability for breach on the part of Mario and Sienna, Stockdale cann

2025The City met its burden to show issuance and filing of the Rosen citation was protected activity “A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1062 ; accord, City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78 .) “‘[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’” (Park, at p. 1063; accord, Cotati, at pp. 76-77.) “Instead, the focus is on 12 determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is

2025As we explain below, the motion was correctly decided and we therefore affirm the superior court’s order.4 “In deciding whether to grant a defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion, courts engage in a two-step, burden-shifting analysis.” (Golden Gate Land Holdings, LLC v. Direct Action Everywhere (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 82 , 88.) “Under the first step,” relevant here, “a court considers whether the defendant has made ‘a prima facie showing that the plaintiff’s “cause of action . . . aris[es] from” an act by the defendant “in furtherance of the [defendant’s] right of petition or free speech . . . in connecti

2026(Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 891.) Though “minimal merit” is needed to survive an anti-SLAPP motion (Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 89), Shia cannot make a minimal merit showing here.

2026In short, in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.” (Id. at pp. 1062-1063.) Courts should be “attuned to and . . . respect the distinction between activities that form the basis for a claim and those that merely lead to the liability- creating activity or provide evidentiary support for the claim.” (Id. at p. 1064; see Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394 [“Assertions that are ‘merely incidental[,]’ . . . ‘collateral[,]’ ” or “prov

2026(Id., subd. (e)(1), (2); see Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106 , 1117-1118.) If defendants make a sufficient showing under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the burden shifts to plaintiffs to show the targeted causes of action are legally sufficient and supported by evidence that, if credited, would sustain a judgment for plaintiffs. ( Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384, 396; Bowen, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 160.) “Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and

2026(Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 .) Respondents’ Petitioning Activity The first prong of the SLAPP analysis focuses on “the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92 ) and “whether the cause of action is based on the defendant’s protected free speech or petitioning activity.” (Id. at p. 89.) This encompasses “any written or oral statement or writing” in a judicial proceeding, or in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a judicial body, and “any ot

2014(Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 325 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 606 , 139 P.3d 2 ].) *684 To show a probability of prevailing on the claim, a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion “ ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ [Citations.]” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 19 , 50 P.3d 733 ], abrogated by statute on another point of law as stated in Hutton v. Hafif (2007) 150

2014(Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 325 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 606 , 139 P.3d 2 ].) *684 To show a probability of prevailing on the claim, a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion “ ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ [Citations.]” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 19 , 50 P.3d 733 ], abrogated by statute on another point of law as stated in Hutton v. Hafif (2007) 150

2026By definition, a malicious prosecution suit alleges that the defendant committed a tort by filing a lawsuit. [Citation.] Accordingly, every Court of Appeal that has addressed the question has concluded that malicious prosecution causes of action fall within the purview of the anti-SLAPP statute. [Citations.]” (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728 , 734-735, fn. omitted.) We therefore agree with the trial court that Asif sufficiently established that plaintiffs’ claim for malicious prosecution arises from his protected activity under prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

2025The complaint alleged 1 “SLAPP is an acronym for ‘strategic lawsuit against public participation.’ ” (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 732, fn. 1 .) The anti-SLAPP motion was brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the “anti-SLAPP statute”).

2026(Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1130 .) The trial court’s fee determination “ ‘ “will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1132.) Courts have also stated that “ ‘ “[t]he only proper basis of reversal of the amount of an attorney fees award is if the amount awarded is so large or small that it shocks the conscience and suggests that passion and prejudice influenced the determination.” ’ ” (Faton v. Ahmedo (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1173 .) Analysis Plaintiff first contends that the fee order should be vacated and remande

2026Attorney’s Fees and Costs “[U]nder Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c), any SLAPP defendant who brings a successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney fees.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131 .) Here, the Scripps defendants and the Lawyer defendants, each separately represented, filed separate attorney’s fee requests accompanied by declarations from the respective attorneys.

2026(See Ed. Code, §§ 44110– 44114.) On September 30, 2024, Defendants moved to strike the complaint pursuant to section 425.16–widely known as an “anti-SLAPP motion.” (See Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055 .) They argued Escamilla’s claims were based on their activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute, and Escamilla could not show she was likely to prevail on the merits.

2026In May 2024, Leon and Vasquez each moved to strike the complaint pursuant to section 425.16—widely known as an “anti-SLAPP motion.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055 .) They argued the complaint arose from their “discussions and written communications” about the October 2021 meeting, which was activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.

2026(Cuevas-Martinez v. Sun Salt Sand, Inc. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1117 , citation omitted.) We cannot, as Sarraf would have us do, disregard our Supreme Court’s 9 Though we do not consider Sarraf’s evidence except to determine if it defeats Bagish’s showing as a matter of law, we note Sarraf avoids stating under penalty of perjury that Bagish made a threat to “‘slash’” him. 13 longstanding prohibition on resolving factual claims, weighing credibility, and comparing the weight of the evidence in the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. ( Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384-385; Oasis West Re

2025(See Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 819-820.) The trial court elected to analyze and rule on the second step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry, concluding even if Contreras’s activity were protected, her motion should still be denied.

2026In Sweetwater, supra, our Supreme Court reiterated that “evidence may be considered at the anti-SLAPP motion stage if it is reasonably possible the evidence set out in supporting affidavits, declarations or their equivalent will be admissible at trial.” (Id., 6 Cal.5th at p. 947 .) On the other hand, evidence relying on “ ‘the sort of evidentiary problem a plaintiff will be incapable of curing by the time of trial’ ” cannot be considered.

2026In Sweetwater, supra, our Supreme Court reiterated that “evidence may be considered at the anti-SLAPP motion stage if it is reasonably possible the evidence set out in supporting affidavits, declarations or their equivalent will be admissible at trial.” (Id., 6 Cal.5th at p. 947 .) On the other hand, evidence relying on “ ‘the sort of evidentiary problem a plaintiff will be incapable of curing by the time of trial’ ” cannot be considered.

2026(Monster Energy, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 788 .) However, finding statements were protected in the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis did not end our inquiry.

2026(Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781, 788 ; Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park).) “In other words, we employ the same two-pronged procedure as the trial court in determining whether the anti-SLAPP motion was properly granted.” (Mendoza v. ADP Screening & Selection Services, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1652 .) We consider 13 “the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) In considering the pleadings and declarations, we

2026(HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 212 [“In opposing an anti-SLAPP motion, the plaintiff cannot rely on the allegations 10 of the complaint, but must produce evidence that would be admissible at trial.”].) We therefore conclude that Salazar has failed to meet his burden under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP statute.

2026Prong Two: Probability of Success on the Merits Under the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis, a plaintiff “need only establish that his or her claim has ‘minimal merit.’” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291 (Soukup).) To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff “‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’” (Ibid.) “In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting an

2025For the same reasons set forth in this section, we conclude Huang has failed to meet her burden on prong one of the anti-SLAPP analysis as to that statement because there was insufficient evidence of the context in which the statement was made. 25 The second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis follows a “summary-judgment-like procedure.” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192 .) We “consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) Looking at those affidavits, “[w]e

2025(Ibid; see § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Section 425.16 “establishes a procedure 7 where the trial court evaluates the merits of the lawsuit using a summary-judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation. [Citation.] In doing so, section 425.16 seeks to limit the costs of defending against such a lawsuit.” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192 ; Newport Harbor II, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 642 .) An anti-SLAPP motion “may be filed within 60 days of the service of the complaint or, in the court’s discretion, at any later time upon terms it deems proper.” (§ 42

2024(Locke v. Mitchell (1936) 7 Cal.2d 599, 602 ; Beroiz v. Wahl, supra, 17. 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 492 .) Although the anti-SLAPP statute “places on the plaintiff the burden of substantiating its claims, a defendant that advances an affirmative defense to such claims properly bears the burden of proof on the defense.” (Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 676 .) Thus, “[d]uring the second prong of a court’s anti-SLAPP analysis, a defendant bears the burden of proving a privilege’s applicability.” (Neurelis, Inc. v. Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc.

2024(See Sunset Drive Corp. v. City of Redlands (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 215, 226 [“[a]bsent a sufficient showing of justification for the failure to raise an issue in a timely fashion, we need not consider any issue which, although raised at oral argument, was not adequately raised in the briefs”].) 9 Appellants do not argue that respondents failed to establish the first prong of the anti-SLAPP motion because the complaint contained causes of action that were “mixed in that they [were] based on both protected and unprotected activity.” (Peregrine Funding, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 672 ; see also

2026(ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1020 .) Where work on successful and unsuccessful claims overlaps, a trial court should reduce the lodestar amount to reflect the moving defendant’s relative success in achieving its litigation objectives and should only award fees proportionate to the extent the anti-SLAPP motion changed the lawsuit in a practical way.

2025DISCUSSION Defendants who prevail on an anti-SLAPP motion are entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs. (§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1); Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 339 (Mann).) Defendants who partially prevail “must generally be considered a prevailing party unless the results of the motion were so insignificant that the party did not achieve any practical benefit from bringing the motion.” (Mann, at p. 340.) Partial success “reduces but does not eliminate the entitlement to attorney fees.” 3 (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993 , 101

2026The defendant must concede the point, or the evidence conclusively demonstrate it, for a claim of illegality to defeat an anti-SLAPP motion at the first step. [Citation.]” (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 424 .) Plaintiffs did not conclusively demonstrate that Bigelow engaged in illegal conduct as a matter of law and Bigelow did not concede that he had engaged in such illegal conduct.

2026First, the moving defendant must make a prima facie showing ‘that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken “in furtherance of the [defendant]’s right of petition or free speech . . . .”’ [Citation.]” (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 420 .) If the defendant carries this burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at least “‘minimal merit.’” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384-385 .) We review an order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion de novo.

2026With exceptions not at issue here, “a prevailing defendant on a special [anti-SLAPP] motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) “[A] party who partially prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion must generally be considered a prevailing party unless the results of the motion were so insignificant that the party did not achieve any practical benefit from bringing the motion.” (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 340 .) “This analysis includes factors such as the extent to which the d

2026Plaintiff relies on authorities applicable to defendants who partially succeed on an anti-SLAPP motion, pursuant to which attorney fees “should be commensurate with the extent to which the motion changed the nature and character of the lawsuit in a practical way.” (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 345 ; City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 782 ; Gumarang v. Braemer on Raymond, LLC (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 370 , 388.) Such cases are 3 Plaintiff also argues that the fee order must be reversed because the trial court’s ruling on the underlying a

2026It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.’ ” (Monster Energy, at p. 788; see Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 714 (Taus) [the court should grant the section 425.16 motion “ ‘if, as a matter of law, the defendant’s evidence supporting the motion defeats the plaintiff’s attempt to establish evidentiary support for the claim’ ”].) “[I]n cases involving allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the plaintiff is required to establish a probability of prevailing on an

2025(Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720 .) While the allegations are sufficient to state a claim for defamation per se, allegations alone are insufficient to overcome an anti-SLAPP motion.

2022(Id. at p. 671.) We explained that in Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th 376 , the Supreme Court of California held an anti-SLAPP motion could reach separate claims within a single pleaded cause of action and disapproved the contrary rule from Mann, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at page 106 , that a court need not parse the cause of action and leave only those portions that have merit.

2022(Id. at p. 671.) We explained that in Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th 376 , the Supreme Court of California held an anti-SLAPP motion could reach separate claims within a single pleaded cause of action and disapproved the contrary rule from Mann, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at page 106 , that a court need not parse the cause of action and leave only those portions that have merit.

2026(Kashian, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 908 ; Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1062-1065.) Having determined that Barenholtz carried his burden to establish that the five tort causes of action arise from his protected activity, we turn to the question of whether Jesse has established a probability of success on his tort claims under the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

2026(See Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 764 .) 8 18 Cal.App.5th 95, 101 , 113-115 [affirming order granting defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion because the challenged conduct was the defendants’ representation of a corporation in two court cases, which was protected under § 425.16, subd. (e)(2)]; Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 929, 941-942 [defendants’ statements urging plaintiff’s former employees to sue plaintiff for employment violations were protected under § 425.16, subd. (e)(2)]; Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892 , 907– 908 [concluding t

2025Rather, [we] accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluate the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.’”’ [Citation.]” (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781 , 791-792.) “[A] plaintiff’s burden at the second anti-SLAPP step is a low one, requiring only a showing that a cause of action has at least ‘minimal merit within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 793.) “Only a cause of action that lacks ‘even minimal merit’ constitutes a SLAPP.” (Overstock.co

2022(Overstock, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 700 .) 31 DISPOSITION The trial court’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

2026(Cf. Grewal v. Jammu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977, 1000-1003 [a defendant’s right to pursue an interlocutory appeal after losing an anti-SLAPP motion, while obtaining a stay of all proceedings affecting the merits of the case, is the aspect of the anti-SLAPP statute most subject to abuse].) 2.

2026This requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that their cause of action is both legally sufficient (Grewal v. Jammu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977, 989 [“plaintiff needs to show only a ‘minimum level of legal sufficiency and 4 Moreover, a trial court cannot resolve factual disputes by way of an anti-SLAPP motion. 5 We address the second prong for the sake of completeness even though we acknowledge it is not strictly necessary given our finding on the first prong.