slapp motion in Maine

2017First, the issues the parties may be allowed to conduct discovery on or litigate are strictly limited to the elements of the plaintiff’s burden in opposing the anti-SLAPP motion—whether the defendant’s petitioning activity was “devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law” and whether the activity “caused actual injury” to the plaintiff. 14 M.R.S. § 556; see Nader I, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 33 , 41 A.3d 551 .

2017First, the issues the parties may be allowed to conduct discovery on or litigate are strictly limited to the elements of the plaintiff’s burden in opposing the anti-SLAPP motion—whether the defendant’s petitioning activity was “devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law” and whether the activity “caused actual injury” to the plaintiff. 14 M.R.S. § 556; see Nader I, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 33 , 41 A.3d 551 .

2019DISCUSSION A. Kendrick's Special Motion to Dismiss [¶8] Kendrick first appeals from the court's denial of his special motion to dismiss, arguing that the court erred by finding that the activity alleged in HWH's complaint is not protected petitioning activity. 1 "We review the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion de novo." See Gaudette v. Mainely Media, LLC (Gaudette II) , 2017 ME 87 , ¶ 10, 160 A.3d 539 . [¶9] A "Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) refers to litigation instituted not to redress legitimate wrongs, but instead to dissuade or punish the defendant's First Amendment e

2019DISCUSSION A. Kendrick's Special Motion to Dismiss [¶8] Kendrick first appeals from the court's denial of his special motion to dismiss, arguing that the court erred by finding that the activity alleged in HWH's complaint is not protected petitioning activity. 1 "We review the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion de novo." See Gaudette v. Mainely Media, LLC (Gaudette II) , 2017 ME 87 , ¶ 10, 160 A.3d 539 . [¶9] A "Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) refers to litigation instituted not to redress legitimate wrongs, but instead to dissuade or punish the defendant's First Amendment e

2022We have stated several times that this first step in the anti-SLAPP inquiry is “purely a question of law for the court’s decision.” Gaudette v. Davis (Gaudette I), 2017 ME 86 , ¶ 16, 160 A.3d 1190 , abrogated in part by Thurlow v. Nelson, 2021 ME 58, ¶ 19 , 263 A.3d 494 ; see also Desjardins, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 8 , 162 A.3d 228 .

2022We have stated several times that this first step in the anti-SLAPP inquiry is “purely a question of law for the court’s decision.” Gaudette v. Davis (Gaudette I), 2017 ME 86 , ¶ 16, 160 A.3d 1190 , abrogated in part by Thurlow v. Nelson, 2021 ME 58, ¶ 19 , 263 A.3d 494 ; see also Desjardins, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 8 , 162 A.3d 228 .

2020"Recent precedent suggests that an anti­ SLAPP motion is appropriate when the plaintiffs lawsuit or claim is a retaliatory effort 3 Fournier gave a "Victim hnpact Statement" to the Topsham Police Department in support of Thibeault and Brooks (mentioned below) requesting harassment notices against Quirion. 2 based solely on the moving party's petitioning conduct." Town ofMadawaska v. Cayer, 2014 NIE 121, '1I 13, 103 A.3d 547 .

2019"Recent precedent suggests that an anti- SLAPP motion is appropriate when the plaintiff's lawsuit or claim is a retaliatory effort based solely on the moving party's petitioning conduct." Town ofMadawaska v. Cayer, 2014 ME 121 , 'JI 13, 103 A.3d 547 .

2012Corp., 427 Mass. 156 , 691 N.E.2d 935, 943 (1998). [9] As we interpret the language of the anti-SLAPP statute applicable to the second step of our anti-SLAPP analysis, we must keep in mind the conflicting rights to petition implicated by the statute. 2.

2012Corp., 427 Mass. 156 , 691 N.E.2d 935, 943 (1998). [9] As we interpret the language of the anti-SLAPP statute applicable to the second step of our anti-SLAPP analysis, we must keep in mind the conflicting rights to petition implicated by the statute. 2.

2022See Weinstein v. Old Orchard Beach Family Dentistry LLC., et. al., 2022 ME 16, 15 , --- A.3d --- ("The Plaintiff's failure to meet either portion of their prima facie burden requires that the Court grant the special motion to dismiss with no further procedure.").

2022"Actual injury means a reasonably certain monetary valuation of the injury suffered by the Plaintiff." Weinstein, 2022 ME 16 , ,r 7, ---A.3d---.

2020See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 388 (2011) (“The right to petition allows citizens to express their ideas, hopes, and concerns to their government and their elected representatives . . . .”); Hearts with Haiti, Inc. v. Kendrick, 2019 ME 26 , ¶ 14, 202 A.3d 1189 (“The purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute is to protect against meritless claims brought to delay, distract, and punish activists for speaking out.”) (emphasis omitted)). [¶18] Because the trial court accurately and correctly determined that the investigative report at issue in this appeal did not constitute petitioning

2012See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. ___ , 131 S.Ct. 2488, 2498 , 180 L.Ed.2d 408 ("Petitions to the government assume an added dimension when they seek to advance political, social, or other ideas of interest to the community as a whole."). [9] The Duracraft opinion addressed this potential constitutional infirmity in the Massachusetts statute by interpreting the phrase "based on" in its statute as requiring that the moving party show at the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis that the plaintiff's claims against him are "`based on' the petitioning activities alone and have no substa

2022We have stated several times that this first step in the anti-SLAPP inquiry is “purely a question of law for the court’s decision.” Gaudette v. Davis (Gaudette I), 2017 ME 86 , ¶ 16, 160 A.3d 1190 , abrogated in part by Thurlow v. Nelson, 2021 ME 58, ¶ 19 , 263 A.3d 494 ; see also Desjardins, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 8 , 162 A.3d 228 .

2022We have stated several times that this first step in the anti-SLAPP inquiry is “purely a question of law for the court’s decision.” Gaudette v. Davis (Gaudette I), 2017 ME 86 , ¶ 16, 160 A.3d 1190 , abrogated in part by Thurlow v. Nelson, 2021 ME 58, ¶ 19 , 263 A.3d 494 ; see also Desjardins, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 8 , 162 A.3d 228 .

2022See, e.g., Maietta Constr., Inc., 2004 ME 53, ¶¶ 9, 10 , 847 A.2d at 1173 at 1173-74. 21 Schelling, 2008 ME 59, ¶¶ 18-19 , 942 A.2d 1226 ; see also Camden Nat’l Bank v. Weintraub, 2016 ME 101, ¶ 13 , 143 A.3d 788 (citing Schelling to define “actual injury” for the purposes of an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss); Desjardins v. Reynolds, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 14 , 162 A.3d 228 (citing to the Schelling and Maietta family of cases to distinguish “actual injury” in anti-SLAPP cases from “actual injury” in “common law causes of action”). [¶28] We have held that the Legislature must be clear when it changes the

2022See, e.g., Maietta Constr., Inc., 2004 ME 53, ¶¶ 9, 10 , 847 A.2d at 1173 at 1173-74. 21 Schelling, 2008 ME 59, ¶¶ 18-19 , 942 A.2d 1226 ; see also Camden Nat’l Bank v. Weintraub, 2016 ME 101, ¶ 13 , 143 A.3d 788 (citing Schelling to define “actual injury” for the purposes of an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss); Desjardins v. Reynolds, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 14 , 162 A.3d 228 (citing to the Schelling and Maietta family of cases to distinguish “actual injury” in anti-SLAPP cases from “actual injury” in “common law causes of action”). [¶28] We have held that the Legislature must be clear when it changes the

2017First, the moving party “must demonstrate that the anti-SLAPP statute applies by showing that the claims against it are based on the exercise of that party’s constitutional right to petition,” Nader II, 2013 ME 51, ¶ 13 , 66 A.3d 571 ; accord Gaudette v. Davis, 2017 ME 86 , ¶¶ 8, 16, 160 A.3d 1190 .

2017First, the moving party “must demonstrate that the anti-SLAPP statute applies by showing that the claims against it are based on the exercise of that party’s constitutional right to petition,” Nader II, 2013 ME 51, ¶ 13 , 66 A.3d 571 ; accord Gaudette v. Davis, 2017 ME 86 , ¶¶ 8, 16, 160 A.3d 1190 .

2022We have stated several times that this first step in the anti-SLAPP inquiry is “purely a question of law for the court’s decision.” Gaudette v. Davis (Gaudette I), 2017 ME 86 , ¶ 16, 160 A.3d 1190 , abrogated in part by Thurlow v. Nelson, 2021 ME 58, ¶ 19 , 263 A.3d 494 ; see also Desjardins, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 8 , 162 A.3d 228 .

2022We have stated several times that this first step in the anti-SLAPP inquiry is “purely a question of law for the court’s decision.” Gaudette v. Davis (Gaudette I), 2017 ME 86 , ¶ 16, 160 A.3d 1190 , abrogated in part by Thurlow v. Nelson, 2021 ME 58, ¶ 19 , 263 A.3d 494 ; see also Desjardins, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 8 , 162 A.3d 228 .

2022See, e.g., Maietta Constr., Inc., 2004 ME 53, ¶¶ 9, 10 , 847 A.2d at 1173 at 1173-74. 21 Schelling, 2008 ME 59, ¶¶ 18-19 , 942 A.2d 1226 ; see also Camden Nat’l Bank v. Weintraub, 2016 ME 101, ¶ 13 , 143 A.3d 788 (citing Schelling to define “actual injury” for the purposes of an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss); Desjardins v. Reynolds, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 14 , 162 A.3d 228 (citing to the Schelling and Maietta family of cases to distinguish “actual injury” in anti-SLAPP cases from “actual injury” in “common law causes of action”). [¶28] We have held that the Legislature must be clear when it changes the

2022See, e.g., Maietta Constr., Inc., 2004 ME 53, ¶¶ 9, 10 , 847 A.2d at 1173 at 1173-74. 21 Schelling, 2008 ME 59, ¶¶ 18-19 , 942 A.2d 1226 ; see also Camden Nat’l Bank v. Weintraub, 2016 ME 101, ¶ 13 , 143 A.3d 788 (citing Schelling to define “actual injury” for the purposes of an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss); Desjardins v. Reynolds, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 14 , 162 A.3d 228 (citing to the Schelling and Maietta family of cases to distinguish “actual injury” in anti-SLAPP cases from “actual injury” in “common law causes of action”). [¶28] We have held that the Legislature must be clear when it changes the

2022See, e.g., Maietta Constr., Inc., 2004 ME 53, ¶¶ 9, 10 , 847 A.2d at 1173 at 1173-74. 21 Schelling, 2008 ME 59, ¶¶ 18-19 , 942 A.2d 1226 ; see also Camden Nat’l Bank v. Weintraub, 2016 ME 101, ¶ 13 , 143 A.3d 788 (citing Schelling to define “actual injury” for the purposes of an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss); Desjardins v. Reynolds, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 14 , 162 A.3d 228 (citing to the Schelling and Maietta family of cases to distinguish “actual injury” in anti-SLAPP cases from “actual injury” in “common law causes of action”). [¶28] We have held that the Legislature must be clear when it changes the

2022See, e.g., Maietta Constr., Inc., 2004 ME 53, ¶¶ 9, 10 , 847 A.2d at 1173 at 1173-74. 21 Schelling, 2008 ME 59, ¶¶ 18-19 , 942 A.2d 1226 ; see also Camden Nat’l Bank v. Weintraub, 2016 ME 101, ¶ 13 , 143 A.3d 788 (citing Schelling to define “actual injury” for the purposes of an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss); Desjardins v. Reynolds, 2017 ME 99, ¶ 14 , 162 A.3d 228 (citing to the Schelling and Maietta family of cases to distinguish “actual injury” in anti-SLAPP cases from “actual injury” in “common law causes of action”). [¶28] We have held that the Legislature must be clear when it changes the

2021See, e.g., Block v. Tanenhaus, 815 F.3d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 2016) (Using a “probability of success [standard where] a non-movant’s burden in opposing [an anti-SLAPP motion] is the same as that of a non-movant opposing summary judgment . . . .”); Healthsmart Pac., Inc. v. Kabateck, 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589, 599 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (“[T]he plaintiff then has the burden to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the claim . . . [and] [t]he court, without resolving evidentiary conflicts, must determine whether the plaintiff’s showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustai

2021Inst. v. Mann, 150 A.3d 1213, 1234 (D.C. 2016) (“likelihood of success”); Doe v. Kan.

2021See, e.g., Block v. Tanenhaus, 815 F.3d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 2016) (Using a “probability of success [standard where] a non-movant’s burden in opposing [an anti-SLAPP motion] is the same as that of a non-movant opposing summary judgment . . . .”); Healthsmart Pac., Inc. v. Kabateck, 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589, 599 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (“[T]he plaintiff then has the burden to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the claim . . . [and] [t]he court, without resolving evidentiary conflicts, must determine whether the plaintiff’s showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustai

2013See Chitsazzadeh v. Kramer & Kaslow, 199 Cal.App.4th 676 , 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 910, 914 (2011) (holding that an interpretation requiring courts to consider the merits of an untimely anti-SLAPP motion would “negate” the sixty-day provision of California’s anti-SLAPP statute); Olsen, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d at 915 (“Discretion to permit or deny an untimely motion cannot turn on the final determination of the merits of the motion.”); see also Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof'ls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 11 , 896 A.2d 271 (“All words in a statute are to be given meaning, and none are to be treated as surplusage i

2013Our review for an abuse of discretion generally involves three questions: *517 (1) are factual findings, if any, supported by the record according to the clear error standard[?] (2) did the court understand the law applicable to its exercise of discretion[?] and (3) given all the facts and applying the appropriate law, was the court’s weighing of the applicable facts and choices within the bounds of reasonableness[?] Pettinelli v. Yost, 2007 ME 121, ¶ 11 , 930 A.2d 1074 ; see also Smith v. Rideout, 2010 ME 69, ¶ 13 , 1 A.3d 441 (outlining circumstances in which we have found an abuse of discre

2013Our review for an abuse of discretion generally involves three questions: *517 (1) are factual findings, if any, supported by the record according to the clear error standard[?] (2) did the court understand the law applicable to its exercise of discretion[?] and (3) given all the facts and applying the appropriate law, was the court’s weighing of the applicable facts and choices within the bounds of reasonableness[?] Pettinelli v. Yost, 2007 ME 121, ¶ 11 , 930 A.2d 1074 ; see also Smith v. Rideout, 2010 ME 69, ¶ 13 , 1 A.3d 441 (outlining circumstances in which we have found an abuse of discre

2013See Chitsazzadeh v. Kramer & Kaslow, 199 Cal.App.4th 676 , 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 910, 914 (2011) (holding that an interpretation requiring courts to consider the merits of an untimely anti-SLAPP motion would “negate” the sixty-day provision of California’s anti-SLAPP statute); Olsen, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d at 915 (“Discretion to permit or deny an untimely motion cannot turn on the final determination of the merits of the motion.”); see also Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof'ls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 11 , 896 A.2d 271 (“All words in a statute are to be given meaning, and none are to be treated as surplusage i

2013See Chitsazzadeh v. Kramer & Kaslow, 199 Cal.App.4th 676 , 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 910, 914 (2011) (holding that an interpretation requiring courts to consider the merits of an untimely anti-SLAPP motion would “negate” the sixty-day provision of California’s anti-SLAPP statute); Olsen, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d at 915 (“Discretion to permit or deny an untimely motion cannot turn on the final determination of the merits of the motion.”); see also Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof'ls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 11 , 896 A.2d 271 (“All words in a statute are to be given meaning, and none are to be treated as surplusage i

2013See Chitsazzadeh v. Kramer & Kaslow, 199 Cal.App.4th 676 , 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 910, 914 (2011) (holding that an interpretation requiring courts to consider the merits of an untimely anti-SLAPP motion would “negate” the sixty-day provision of California’s anti-SLAPP statute); Olsen, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d at 915 (“Discretion to permit or deny an untimely motion cannot turn on the final determination of the merits of the motion.”); see also Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof'ls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 11 , 896 A.2d 271 (“All words in a statute are to be given meaning, and none are to be treated as surplusage i

2013See Chitsazzadeh v. Kramer & Kaslow, 199 Cal.App.4th 676 , 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 910, 914 (2011) (holding that an interpretation requiring courts to consider the merits of an untimely anti-SLAPP motion would “negate” the sixty-day provision of California’s anti-SLAPP statute); Olsen, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d at 915 (“Discretion to permit or deny an untimely motion cannot turn on the final determination of the merits of the motion.”); see also Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof'ls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 11 , 896 A.2d 271 (“All words in a statute are to be given meaning, and none are to be treated as surplusage i

2012However, no matter how "slight" the burden may appear, any burden "that a state law imposes on a political party, an individual voter, or a discrete class of voters . . . must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation." Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191 , 128 S.Ct. 1610 ; see Anderson, 460 U.S. at 794 , 103 S.Ct. 1564 ("[I]n the context of a Presidential election, state-imposed restrictions implicate a uniquely important national interest."). [12] Nader argues that the First Amendment to the Constitution protects as "petitioning activity" on

2012However, no matter how "slight" the burden may appear, any burden "that a state law imposes on a political party, an individual voter, or a discrete class of voters . . . must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation." Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191 , 128 S.Ct. 1610 ; see Anderson, 460 U.S. at 794 , 103 S.Ct. 1564 ("[I]n the context of a Presidential election, state-imposed restrictions implicate a uniquely important national interest."). [12] Nader argues that the First Amendment to the Constitution protects as "petitioning activity" on