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5 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 2023–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakargreen2 sentences2025Page 40 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 42 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Aguilar v. Eick Elder v. Kauffman, supra, 204 Conn. App. 825 (‘‘[p]roof of probable cause is not as demanding as proof by a preponderance of the evidence’’); People’s United Bank v. Kudej, 134 Conn. App. 432, 442 , 39 A.3d 1139 (2012) (noting ‘‘the very low burden of proof required in a probable cause hearing’’); cf. Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar, 611 F.3d 590, 598 (9th Cir. 2010) (‘‘the second step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry is often called the ‘mini- mal merit’ prong’’); Priore v. Haig, supra, 344 Conn. 670 (D’Auria, J., concurring) 2024See Elder v. Kauffman, supra, 204 Conn. App. 825 ; People’s United Bank v. Kudej, supra, 134 Conn. App. 442 ; see also Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar, 611 F.3d 590, 598 (9th Cir. 2010) (‘‘the second step of the anti- SLAPP inquiry is often called the ‘minimal merit’ prong’’); cf. Priore v. Haig, supra, 344 Conn. 670 (D’Auria, J., concurring) (‘‘the special motion to dis- miss permitted under § 52-196a is easily defeated under a probable cause standard’’). | 2 | 2 |
Julie Hersh v. John Tatum and Mary Ann Tatumgreen2 sentences2023See Spirtos v. Yemenidjian, 137 Nev. 711 , 714, 499 P.3d 611 (2021) (concluding, under similarly worded statute, that ‘‘[the defendant’s] denial that he made the alleged statement [was] irrelevant to step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis’’ (emphasis omitted)); Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017) (dismissal under Texas’ anti-SLAPP statute was not precluded by fact that defendant denied making statements at issue because ‘‘[t]he basis of a legal action is not determined by the defendant’s admis- sions or denials but by the plaintiff’s allegations,’’ and, ‘‘[w]hen it is clear from the p 2023See Spirtos v. Yemenidjian, 137 Nev. 711 , 714, 499 P.3d 611 (2021) (concluding, under similarly worded statute, that ‘‘[the defendant’s] denial that he made the alleged statement [was] irrelevant to step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis’’ (emphasis omitted)); Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017) (dismissal under Texas’ anti-SLAPP statute was not precluded by fact that defendant denied making statements at issue because ‘‘[t]he basis of a legal action is not determined by the defendant’s admis- sions or denials but by the plaintiff’s allegations,’’ and, ‘‘[w]hen it is clear from the p | 2 | 2 |
SPIRTOS v. YEMENIDJIANgreen2 sentences2023See Spirtos v. Yemenidjian, 137 Nev. 711 , 714, 499 P.3d 611 (2021) (concluding, under similarly worded statute, that ‘‘[the defendant’s] denial that he made the alleged statement [was] irrelevant to step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis’’ (emphasis omitted)); Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017) (dismissal under Texas’ anti-SLAPP statute was not precluded by fact that defendant denied making statements at issue because ‘‘[t]he basis of a legal action is not determined by the defendant’s admis- sions or denials but by the plaintiff’s allegations,’’ and, ‘‘[w]hen it is clear from the p 2023See Spirtos v. Yemenidjian, 137 Nev. 711 , 714, 499 P.3d 611 (2021) (concluding, under similarly worded statute, that ‘‘[the defendant’s] denial that he made the alleged statement [was] irrelevant to step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis’’ (emphasis omitted)); Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017) (dismissal under Texas’ anti-SLAPP statute was not precluded by fact that defendant denied making statements at issue because ‘‘[t]he basis of a legal action is not determined by the defendant’s admis- sions or denials but by the plaintiff’s allegations,’’ and, ‘‘[w]hen it is clear from the p | 2 | 2 |
Navellier v. Slettengreen2 sentences2025Freeman v. Schack, 154 Cal. App. 4th 719, 733 , 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867 (2007); accord Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 94 , 52 P.3d 703 , 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (2002) (courts cannot add proof of validity requirement to first prong of anti-SLAPP analysis and any claimed illegitimacy of defendant’s acts is only rele- vant to second prong); Malin v. Singer, 217 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1304 , 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292 (2013) (defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s allegations irrelevant to first prong and ‘‘is more suited to the second step of an anti-SLAPP motion’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cost 2025Freeman v. Schack, 154 Cal. App. 4th 719, 733 , 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867 (2007); accord Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 94 , 52 P.3d 703 , 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (2002) (courts cannot add proof of validity requirement to first prong of anti-SLAPP analysis and any claimed illegitimacy of defendant’s acts is only rele- vant to second prong); Malin v. Singer, 217 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1304 , 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292 (2013) (defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s allegations irrelevant to first prong and ‘‘is more suited to the second step of an anti-SLAPP motion’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cost | 1 | 1 |
Godin v. Schencksgreen1 sentence2025D., supra, 229 Conn. App. 345–47 (concluding that § 52-196a ‘‘does not . . . violate the plaintiffs’ con- stitutional right to a jury trial’’ under Connecticut constitution because it ‘‘does not require fact-finding by the court’’); see also Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79 , 90 n.18 (1st Cir. 2010) (observing that ‘‘[t]here may be a concern’’ that Maine anti-SLAPP statute violates seventh amendment right to trial by jury to extent that it allows ‘‘a judge to resolve a disputed material issue of fact’’ in acting on anti-SLAPP motion); Thurlow v. Nelson, supra, 263 A.3d 501 (noting that ‘‘[m]any | 1 | 1 |
Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minnesotagreen1 sentence2025D., supra, 229 Conn. App. 345–47 (concluding that § 52-196a ‘‘does not . . . violate the plaintiffs’ con- stitutional right to a jury trial’’ under Connecticut constitution because it ‘‘does not require fact-finding by the court’’); see also Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79 , 90 n.18 (1st Cir. 2010) (observing that ‘‘[t]here may be a concern’’ that Maine anti-SLAPP statute violates seventh amendment right to trial by jury to extent that it allows ‘‘a judge to resolve a disputed material issue of fact’’ in acting on anti-SLAPP motion); Thurlow v. Nelson, supra, 263 A.3d 501 (noting that ‘‘[m]any | 1 | 1 |
Dr. Jesse Smith, M.D. v. Crestview NuV, LLC, on Its Own Behalf and Derivatively on Behalf of NuVivo Bioscience Solutions, LLC.green1 sentence2025Notably, courts in several jurisdictions have described the hearing required under their anti-SLAPP statutes as ‘‘a nonevidentiary hearing.’’ Jogan Health, LLC v. Scripps Media, Inc., 565 P.3d 1160 , 1166 (Colo. App. 2025); see, e.g., id. (‘‘[t]he [trial] court held a noneviden- tiary hearing; reviewed the parties’ briefs, documentary evidence, and affidavits; and granted the [defendants’] special motion to dismiss’’); Emory University v. Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc., 320 Ga. App. 442, 442 , 740 S.E.2d 219 (2013) (‘‘[a]fter a nonevidentiary hearing, the trial court denied th | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Opinion of the Justices
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2 sentences2025D., supra, 229 Conn. App. 345–47 (concluding that § 52-196a ‘‘does not . . . violate the plaintiffs’ con- stitutional right to a jury trial’’ under Connecticut constitution because it ‘‘does not require fact-finding by the court’’); see also Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79 , 90 n.18 (1st Cir. 2010) (observing that ‘‘[t]here may be a concern’’ that Maine anti-SLAPP statute violates seventh amendment right to trial by jury to extent that it allows ‘‘a judge to resolve a disputed material issue of fact’’ in acting on anti-SLAPP motion); Thurlow v. Nelson, supra, 263 A.3d 501 (noting that ‘‘[m]any 2025D., supra, 229 Conn. App. 345–47 (concluding that § 52-196a ‘‘does not . . . violate the plaintiffs’ con- stitutional right to a jury trial’’ under Connecticut constitution because it ‘‘does not require fact-finding by the court’’); see also Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79 , 90 n.18 (1st Cir. 2010) (observing that ‘‘[t]here may be a concern’’ that Maine anti-SLAPP statute violates seventh amendment right to trial by jury to extent that it allows ‘‘a judge to resolve a disputed material issue of fact’’ in acting on anti-SLAPP motion); Thurlow v. Nelson, supra, 263 A.3d 501 (noting that ‘‘[m]any | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino
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2 sentences2025Freeman v. Schack, 154 Cal. App. 4th 719, 733 , 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867 (2007); accord Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 94 , 52 P.3d 703 , 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (2002) (courts cannot add proof of validity requirement to first prong of anti-SLAPP analysis and any claimed illegitimacy of defendant’s acts is only rele- vant to second prong); Malin v. Singer, 217 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1304 , 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292 (2013) (defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s allegations irrelevant to first prong and ‘‘is more suited to the second step of an anti-SLAPP motion’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cost 2025Freeman v. Schack, 154 Cal. App. 4th 719, 733 , 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867 (2007); accord Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 94 , 52 P.3d 703 , 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (2002) (courts cannot add proof of validity requirement to first prong of anti-SLAPP analysis and any claimed illegitimacy of defendant’s acts is only rele- vant to second prong); Malin v. Singer, 217 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1304 , 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292 (2013) (defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s allegations irrelevant to first prong and ‘‘is more suited to the second step of an anti-SLAPP motion’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cost | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Freeman v. Schack
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2 sentences2025Freeman v. Schack, 154 Cal. App. 4th 719, 733 , 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867 (2007); accord Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 94 , 52 P.3d 703 , 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (2002) (courts cannot add proof of validity requirement to first prong of anti-SLAPP analysis and any claimed illegitimacy of defendant’s acts is only rele- vant to second prong); Malin v. Singer, 217 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1304 , 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292 (2013) (defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s allegations irrelevant to first prong and ‘‘is more suited to the second step of an anti-SLAPP motion’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cost 2025Freeman v. Schack, 154 Cal. App. 4th 719, 733 , 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867 (2007); accord Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 94 , 52 P.3d 703 , 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (2002) (courts cannot add proof of validity requirement to first prong of anti-SLAPP analysis and any claimed illegitimacy of defendant’s acts is only rele- vant to second prong); Malin v. Singer, 217 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1304 , 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292 (2013) (defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s allegations irrelevant to first prong and ‘‘is more suited to the second step of an anti-SLAPP motion’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cost | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Emory University v. Metro Atlanta Task Force for Homeless, Inc.
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2 sentences2025Notably, courts in several jurisdictions have described the hearing required under their anti-SLAPP statutes as ‘‘a nonevidentiary hearing.’’ Jogan Health, LLC v. Scripps Media, Inc., 565 P.3d 1160 , 1166 (Colo. App. 2025); see, e.g., id. (‘‘[t]he [trial] court held a noneviden- tiary hearing; reviewed the parties’ briefs, documentary evidence, and affidavits; and granted the [defendants’] special motion to dismiss’’); Emory University v. Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc., 320 Ga. App. 442, 442 , 740 S.E.2d 219 (2013) (‘‘[a]fter a nonevidentiary hearing, the trial court denied th 2025Notably, courts in several jurisdictions have described the hearing required under their anti-SLAPP statutes as ‘‘a nonevidentiary hearing.’’ Jogan Health, LLC v. Scripps Media, Inc., 565 P.3d 1160 , 1166 (Colo. App. 2025); see, e.g., id. (‘‘[t]he [trial] court held a noneviden- tiary hearing; reviewed the parties’ briefs, documentary evidence, and affidavits; and granted the [defendants’] special motion to dismiss’’); Emory University v. Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc., 320 Ga. App. 442, 442 , 740 S.E.2d 219 (2013) (‘‘[a]fter a nonevidentiary hearing, the trial court denied th | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Davis v. Cox
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2 sentences2025D., supra, 229 Conn. App. 345–47 (concluding that § 52-196a ‘‘does not . . . violate the plaintiffs’ con- stitutional right to a jury trial’’ under Connecticut constitution because it ‘‘does not require fact-finding by the court’’); see also Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79 , 90 n.18 (1st Cir. 2010) (observing that ‘‘[t]here may be a concern’’ that Maine anti-SLAPP statute violates seventh amendment right to trial by jury to extent that it allows ‘‘a judge to resolve a disputed material issue of fact’’ in acting on anti-SLAPP motion); Thurlow v. Nelson, supra, 263 A.3d 501 (noting that ‘‘[m]any 2025D., supra, 229 Conn. App. 345–47 (concluding that § 52-196a ‘‘does not . . . violate the plaintiffs’ con- stitutional right to a jury trial’’ under Connecticut constitution because it ‘‘does not require fact-finding by the court’’); see also Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79 , 90 n.18 (1st Cir. 2010) (observing that ‘‘[t]here may be a concern’’ that Maine anti-SLAPP statute violates seventh amendment right to trial by jury to extent that it allows ‘‘a judge to resolve a disputed material issue of fact’’ in acting on anti-SLAPP motion); Thurlow v. Nelson, supra, 263 A.3d 501 (noting that ‘‘[m]any | 1 | 2025–2025 |
All One God Faith, Inc. v. Organic & Sustainable Industry Standards, Inc.
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2 sentences2025D., supra, 229 Conn. App. 346 (‘‘a court considering a special motion to dismiss does not need to make factual find- ings’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mulvihill v. Spinnato, supra, 228 Conn. App. 794–95 (explaining that ‘‘courts reviewing [special motions to dismiss] are obligated to construe the pleadings, affidavits, and other proof submitted in the light most favorable to the non- moving party’’; they do not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims in ruling on anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss); Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 39 Cal. 4th 260, 291 , 139 P.3d 30 , 4 2025D., supra, 229 Conn. App. 346 (‘‘a court considering a special motion to dismiss does not need to make factual find- ings’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mulvihill v. Spinnato, supra, 228 Conn. App. 794–95 (explaining that ‘‘courts reviewing [special motions to dismiss] are obligated to construe the pleadings, affidavits, and other proof submitted in the light most favorable to the non- moving party’’; they do not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims in ruling on anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss); Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 39 Cal. 4th 260, 291 , 139 P.3d 30 , 4 | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People's United Bank v. Kudej
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2 sentences2025Page 40 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 42 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Aguilar v. Eick Elder v. Kauffman, supra, 204 Conn. App. 825 (‘‘[p]roof of probable cause is not as demanding as proof by a preponderance of the evidence’’); People’s United Bank v. Kudej, 134 Conn. App. 432, 442 , 39 A.3d 1139 (2012) (noting ‘‘the very low burden of proof required in a probable cause hearing’’); cf. Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar, 611 F.3d 590, 598 (9th Cir. 2010) (‘‘the second step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry is often called the ‘mini- mal merit’ prong’’); Priore v. Haig, supra, 344 Conn. 670 (D’Auria, J., concurring) 2025Page 40 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 42 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Aguilar v. Eick Elder v. Kauffman, supra, 204 Conn. App. 825 (‘‘[p]roof of probable cause is not as demanding as proof by a preponderance of the evidence’’); People’s United Bank v. Kudej, 134 Conn. App. 432, 442 , 39 A.3d 1139 (2012) (noting ‘‘the very low burden of proof required in a probable cause hearing’’); cf. Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar, 611 F.3d 590, 598 (9th Cir. 2010) (‘‘the second step of the anti-SLAPP inquiry is often called the ‘mini- mal merit’ prong’’); Priore v. Haig, supra, 344 Conn. 670 (D’Auria, J., concurring) | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif
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2 sentences2025D., supra, 229 Conn. App. 346 (‘‘a court considering a special motion to dismiss does not need to make factual find- ings’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mulvihill v. Spinnato, supra, 228 Conn. App. 794–95 (explaining that ‘‘courts reviewing [special motions to dismiss] are obligated to construe the pleadings, affidavits, and other proof submitted in the light most favorable to the non- moving party’’; they do not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims in ruling on anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss); Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 39 Cal. 4th 260, 291 , 139 P.3d 30 , 4 2025D., supra, 229 Conn. App. 346 (‘‘a court considering a special motion to dismiss does not need to make factual find- ings’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mulvihill v. Spinnato, supra, 228 Conn. App. 794–95 (explaining that ‘‘courts reviewing [special motions to dismiss] are obligated to construe the pleadings, affidavits, and other proof submitted in the light most favorable to the non- moving party’’; they do not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims in ruling on anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss); Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 39 Cal. 4th 260, 291 , 139 P.3d 30 , 4 | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Coretronic Corp. v. Cozen O'Connor
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2 sentences2025Freeman v. Schack, 154 Cal. App. 4th 719, 733 , 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867 (2007); accord Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 94 , 52 P.3d 703 , 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (2002) (courts cannot add proof of validity requirement to first prong of anti-SLAPP analysis and any claimed illegitimacy of defendant’s acts is only rele- vant to second prong); Malin v. Singer, 217 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1304 , 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292 (2013) (defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s allegations irrelevant to first prong and ‘‘is more suited to the second step of an anti-SLAPP motion’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cost 2025Freeman v. Schack, 154 Cal. App. 4th 719, 733 , 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867 (2007); accord Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 94 , 52 P.3d 703 , 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (2002) (courts cannot add proof of validity requirement to first prong of anti-SLAPP analysis and any claimed illegitimacy of defendant’s acts is only rele- vant to second prong); Malin v. Singer, 217 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1304 , 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292 (2013) (defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s allegations irrelevant to first prong and ‘‘is more suited to the second step of an anti-SLAPP motion’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cost | 1 | 2025–2025 |
City of Costa Mesa v. D'Alessio Investments
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2 sentences2025Freeman v. Schack, 154 Cal. App. 4th 719, 733 , 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867 (2007); accord Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 94 , 52 P.3d 703 , 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (2002) (courts cannot add proof of validity requirement to first prong of anti-SLAPP analysis and any claimed illegitimacy of defendant’s acts is only rele- vant to second prong); Malin v. Singer, 217 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1304 , 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292 (2013) (defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s allegations irrelevant to first prong and ‘‘is more suited to the second step of an anti-SLAPP motion’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cost 2025Freeman v. Schack, 154 Cal. App. 4th 719, 733 , 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867 (2007); accord Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 94 , 52 P.3d 703 , 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (2002) (courts cannot add proof of validity requirement to first prong of anti-SLAPP analysis and any claimed illegitimacy of defendant’s acts is only rele- vant to second prong); Malin v. Singer, 217 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1304 , 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292 (2013) (defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s allegations irrelevant to first prong and ‘‘is more suited to the second step of an anti-SLAPP motion’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cost | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Armin v. Riverside Community Hospital
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2 sentences2025Notably, courts in several jurisdictions have described the hearing required under their anti-SLAPP statutes as ‘‘a nonevidentiary hearing.’’ Jogan Health, LLC v. Scripps Media, Inc., 565 P.3d 1160 , 1166 (Colo. App. 2025); see, e.g., id. (‘‘[t]he [trial] court held a noneviden- tiary hearing; reviewed the parties’ briefs, documentary evidence, and affidavits; and granted the [defendants’] special motion to dismiss’’); Emory University v. Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc., 320 Ga. App. 442, 442 , 740 S.E.2d 219 (2013) (‘‘[a]fter a nonevidentiary hearing, the trial court denied th 2025Notably, courts in several jurisdictions have described the hearing required under their anti-SLAPP statutes as ‘‘a nonevidentiary hearing.’’ Jogan Health, LLC v. Scripps Media, Inc., 565 P.3d 1160 , 1166 (Colo. App. 2025); see, e.g., id. (‘‘[t]he [trial] court held a noneviden- tiary hearing; reviewed the parties’ briefs, documentary evidence, and affidavits; and granted the [defendants’] special motion to dismiss’’); Emory University v. Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc., 320 Ga. App. 442, 442 , 740 S.E.2d 219 (2013) (‘‘[a]fter a nonevidentiary hearing, the trial court denied th | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Lowes v. Thompson
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1 sentence2025App. 406, 411 , 546 P.3d 311 (‘‘unchallenged evidence of a waiver of the rights protected by the anti-SLAPP statute can satisfy a plaintiff’s burden to defeat an anti-SLAPP motion once a defendant has satisfied [its] burden at the first step’’), review allowed, 372 Or. 560 , 551 P.3d 398 (2024). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Dillon v. Seattle Deposition Reporters, LLC
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1 sentence2025Page 26 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0 28 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1 Aguilar v. Eick factual conflicts’’); Dillon v. Seattle Deposition Report- ers, LLC, 179 Wn. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Malin v. Singer
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2 sentences2025Freeman v. Schack, 154 Cal. App. 4th 719, 733 , 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867 (2007); accord Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 94 , 52 P.3d 703 , 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (2002) (courts cannot add proof of validity requirement to first prong of anti-SLAPP analysis and any claimed illegitimacy of defendant’s acts is only rele- vant to second prong); Malin v. Singer, 217 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1304 , 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292 (2013) (defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s allegations irrelevant to first prong and ‘‘is more suited to the second step of an anti-SLAPP motion’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cost 2025Freeman v. Schack, 154 Cal. App. 4th 719, 733 , 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 867 (2007); accord Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 94 , 52 P.3d 703 , 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (2002) (courts cannot add proof of validity requirement to first prong of anti-SLAPP analysis and any claimed illegitimacy of defendant’s acts is only rele- vant to second prong); Malin v. Singer, 217 Cal. App. 4th 1283, 1304 , 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292 (2013) (defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s allegations irrelevant to first prong and ‘‘is more suited to the second step of an anti-SLAPP motion’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cost | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co.
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2 sentences2025Cf. Sweetwater Union High School District v. Gilbane Building Co., 6 Cal. 5th 931, 949 , 434 P.3d 1152 , 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880 (2019) (to be considered by court in ruling on anti-SLAPP motion, it must be reasonably possible that materials submitted by parties will be ‘‘admissible at trial’’). 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 21 Aguilar v. Eick (2022) (defendants ‘‘attached a police report’’ in support of special motions to dismiss); Gimpelson v. Hartford Courant Co., LLC, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2022 WL 1585356 , *1 n.2 (Conn. Super. 2025Cf. Sweetwater Union High School District v. Gilbane Building Co., 6 Cal. 5th 931, 949 , 434 P.3d 1152 , 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880 (2019) (to be considered by court in ruling on anti-SLAPP motion, it must be reasonably possible that materials submitted by parties will be ‘‘admissible at trial’’). 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 19 0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 21 Aguilar v. Eick (2022) (defendants ‘‘attached a police report’’ in support of special motions to dismiss); Gimpelson v. Hartford Courant Co., LLC, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2022 WL 1585356 , *1 n.2 (Conn. Super. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.