30 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1966–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences1985See Jones v. State, 449 So.2d 253 (Fla.1984). 1985See Jones v. State, 449 So.2d 253 (Fla. 1984). | 2 | 2 |
Steiner v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.green1 sentence2026P. 1.280(c)(1). 2 opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.”); Steiner v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 364 So. 2d 47, 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (explaining party “having failed to follow the rule even to move for a continuance of the hearing on the motion, may not claim error in the appellate court because the trial judge proceeded as provided by the rules.”). | 1 | 1 |
Ins. Co. v. Julien P. Benjamin Equip. Co.green1 sentence2021Co., 481 So. 2d 511, 514 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (“At the request of INA, made at the first scheduled hearing on the motion, the trial court, acting well within its discretion, granted a continuance of the hearing to another date certain on condition that INA would not be permitted to file affidavits or other documents and thereby generate new issues not already made.”); see also Parc Cent. | 1 | 1 |
Trocola v. Stategreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., Trocola v. State, 867 So. 2d 1229 , 1230–32 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (finding that trial court abused its discretion in denying defense’s request for a continuance where defense was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to investigate and prepare defenses). | 1 | 1 |
Kosch v. Koschgreen1 sentence2016See Walker v. Walker, 80 So.3d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quot *593 ing Kosch v. Kosch) 113 So.2d 547, 550 (Fla.1959)) (“Due process requires that the party against whom relief is sought have ‘reasonable notice which affords an opportunity to be heard.’ ”); Conner v. Conner, 800 So.2d 724, 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing Harreld v. Harreld, 682 So.2d 635, 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)) (“Due process requires actual notice and time to prepare.”). | 1 | 1 |
Conner v. Connergreen1 sentence2016See Walker v. Walker, 80 So.3d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quot *593 ing Kosch v. Kosch) 113 So.2d 547, 550 (Fla.1959)) (“Due process requires that the party against whom relief is sought have ‘reasonable notice which affords an opportunity to be heard.’ ”); Conner v. Conner, 800 So.2d 724, 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing Harreld v. Harreld, 682 So.2d 635, 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)) (“Due process requires actual notice and time to prepare.”). | 1 | 1 |
Harreld v. Harreldgreen1 sentence2016See Walker v. Walker, 80 So.3d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quot *593 ing Kosch v. Kosch) 113 So.2d 547, 550 (Fla.1959)) (“Due process requires that the party against whom relief is sought have ‘reasonable notice which affords an opportunity to be heard.’ ”); Conner v. Conner, 800 So.2d 724, 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing Harreld v. Harreld, 682 So.2d 635, 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)) (“Due process requires actual notice and time to prepare.”). | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Walkergreen1 sentence2016See Walker v. Walker, 80 So.3d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quot *593 ing Kosch v. Kosch) 113 So.2d 547, 550 (Fla.1959)) (“Due process requires that the party against whom relief is sought have ‘reasonable notice which affords an opportunity to be heard.’ ”); Conner v. Conner, 800 So.2d 724, 725 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing Harreld v. Harreld, 682 So.2d 635, 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)) (“Due process requires actual notice and time to prepare.”). | 1 | 1 |
Henderson v. Stategreen1 sentence2014Any injunction shall be extended if necessary to remain in full force and effect during any period of continuance.’ § 741.30(5)(c), Fla. Stat. (201 [3]).” Dietz v. Dietz, 127 So.3d 1279, 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (“Section 741.30 ‘does not provide for the issuance of a series of temporary injunctions in lieu of a permanent injunction.’ ” (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Yost v. UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COM'Ngreen1 sentence2010While Mr. Alvarez’s failure to object to hearsay would not preclude us from considering the sufficiency of competent evidence to support the referee’s findings, Yost v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 848 So.2d 1235, 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), the employer’s then-struggling case was repaired when there was no opposition to its request for a continuance of the hearing to allow additional testimony. | 1 | 1 |
Leviton v. Philly Steak-Out, Inc.green1 sentence2008P. 1.510(f) (giving the court discretion to order a continuance of a hearing on a motion for summary judgment to allow the party to obtain affidavits or take discovery in order to "present by affidavit facts essential to justify opposition" to the motion); cf. Leviton v. Philly Steak-Out, Inc., 533 So.2d 905, 906 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (noting that when a party does not "request a continuance of the summary judgment hearing so that they could complete their discovery," the party "cannot now be heard to complain that they were not given a reasonable time to complete same"). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen1 sentence2000Smith v. State, 525 So.2d 477, 479 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); McKay, 504 So.2d at 1282 . | 1 | 1 |
Carbonell v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUN.green1 sentence1998A party seeking a continuance under rule 1.510(f) has “the burden of showing, by affidavit, the existence and availability of other evidence, its relevance, the efforts taken to produce it, and that any failure to do so is not the result of the movant’s inexcusable delay.” Carbonell v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 675 So.2d 705, 706 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). | 1 | 1 |
Lane v. Stategreen1 sentence1997Accord Lane v. State, 388 So.2d 1022, 1026 (Fla.1980) (need for competency hearing is activated by defendant's irrational behavior or evidence of mental illness that raises a doubt as to the defendant's present competence). | 1 | 1 |
Batista v. Walter & Bernsteingreen1 sentence1995See Batista v. Walter & Bernstein, P.A., 378 So.2d 1321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). | 1 | 1 |
| Winslow v. DEPT. OF PROF. & OCCUP REG.green | 1 | 1 |
| Page v. Staleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McKay v. State
green
2 sentences2003In McKay v. State, 504 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), the First District set out seven factors to consider in determining whether denial of a continuance was error due to lack of adequate time to prepare a defense. 2003In McKay v. State, 504 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), the First District set out seven factors to consider in determining whether denial of a continuance was error due to lack of adequate time to prepare a defense. | 4 | 1988–2003 |
Binger v. King Pest Control
green
1 sentence2026The court had already set aside a day for the hearing, and there was no indication from the record 10 that if there wasn't enough time to accommodate Mr. Beltran's live testimony a continuance of the hearing couldn't have been convened.4 In Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So. 2d 1310 (Fla. 1981), the supreme court provided guidance when considering a pretrial failure to disclose a witness at trial. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Fernandes v. Boisvert
green
1 sentence2015Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Pardo v. State
green
1 sentence2012On certiorari review, the Sixth Circuit held that an “arresting officer’s unexcused, unexplained nonappearance denied the [suspendee] the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the officer at the formal hearing within thirty days, as contemplated by the DHSMV rules.” Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Erace v. Erace
neutral
1 sentence2009We find as well-taken the Torreses’ contention on appeal that, because discovery was provided late and they did not learn until approximately two months before the summary judgment hearing that MK Tours had destroyed documentary evidence allegedly subject to production, a continuance of the hearing on summary judgment was needed to complete- discovery on the issue of the alleged duty to warn. 1 See Erace v. Erace, 683 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (concluding that summary judgment is premature prior to plaintiffs completion of discovery), and cases cited therein. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Buck v. United States
green
1 sentence2003We (and I was on the panel) per curiam affirmed the trial court’s discretionary ruling not to grant the continuance because the standard required by Geralds v. State, 674 So.2d 96 (Fla.1996), cert denied, Geralds v. Florida, 619 U.S. 891 , 117 S.Ct. 230 , 136 L.Ed.2d 161 , was not met 3 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Geralds v. State
green
1 sentence2003We (and I was on the panel) per curiam affirmed the trial court’s discretionary ruling not to grant the continuance because the standard required by Geralds v. State, 674 So.2d 96 (Fla.1996), cert denied, Geralds v. Florida, 619 U.S. 891 , 117 S.Ct. 230 , 136 L.Ed.2d 161 , was not met 3 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Doerr v. State
green
1 sentence1994Doerr v. State, 383 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1980). [3] These are: (a) that two jurors were improperly excused for cause; (b) that irrelevant evidence was improperly admitted, including packages of cigarettes, money, a shotgun, and ammunition; (c) that Detective Carter gave improper character testimony when he stated that he had "dealt with [Allen] before"; (d) that certain guilt-phase jury instructions should not have been given, while others were improperly denied, including instructions on possession of recently stolen property, circumstantial evidence, independent act, and third-degree murder; (e) | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Vasil v. State
green
1 sentence1994Doerr v. State, 383 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1980). [3] These are: (a) that two jurors were improperly excused for cause; (b) that irrelevant evidence was improperly admitted, including packages of cigarettes, money, a shotgun, and ammunition; (c) that Detective Carter gave improper character testimony when he stated that he had "dealt with [Allen] before"; (d) that certain guilt-phase jury instructions should not have been given, while others were improperly denied, including instructions on possession of recently stolen property, circumstantial evidence, independent act, and third-degree murder; (e) | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Brown v. United States
green
1 sentence1994Doerr v. State, 383 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1980). [3] These are: (a) that two jurors were improperly excused for cause; (b) that irrelevant evidence was improperly admitted, including packages of cigarettes, money, a shotgun, and ammunition; (c) that Detective Carter gave improper character testimony when he stated that he had "dealt with [Allen] before"; (d) that certain guilt-phase jury instructions should not have been given, while others were improperly denied, including instructions on possession of recently stolen property, circumstantial evidence, independent act, and third-degree murder; (e) | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Daskalakis v. Executive Commercial Services, Ltd.
green
1 sentence1994Doerr v. State, 383 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1980). [3] These are: (a) that two jurors were improperly excused for cause; (b) that irrelevant evidence was improperly admitted, including packages of cigarettes, money, a shotgun, and ammunition; (c) that Detective Carter gave improper character testimony when he stated that he had "dealt with [Allen] before"; (d) that certain guilt-phase jury instructions should not have been given, while others were improperly denied, including instructions on possession of recently stolen property, circumstantial evidence, independent act, and third-degree murder; (e) | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Vasil v. Florida
green
1 sentence1994Doerr v. State, 383 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1980). [3] These are: (a) that two jurors were improperly excused for cause; (b) that irrelevant evidence was improperly admitted, including packages of cigarettes, money, a shotgun, and ammunition; (c) that Detective Carter gave improper character testimony when he stated that he had "dealt with [Allen] before"; (d) that certain guilt-phase jury instructions should not have been given, while others were improperly denied, including instructions on possession of recently stolen property, circumstantial evidence, independent act, and third-degree murder; (e) | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Ross v. State
green
1 sentence1994Doerr v. State, 383 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1980). [3] These are: (a) that two jurors were improperly excused for cause; (b) that irrelevant evidence was improperly admitted, including packages of cigarettes, money, a shotgun, and ammunition; (c) that Detective Carter gave improper character testimony when he stated that he had "dealt with [Allen] before"; (d) that certain guilt-phase jury instructions should not have been given, while others were improperly denied, including instructions on possession of recently stolen property, circumstantial evidence, independent act, and third-degree murder; (e) | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Lawrence
green
1 sentence1991In State v. Lawrence, 560 So.2d 400 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), the state requested a continuance at a hearing on a motion to suppress physical evidence when its only witness failed to appear. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| DM v. State green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Fitzpatrick
green
1 sentence1989Respondent attempts to distinguish the instant case from Fitzpatrick, supra, by noting that this case is a first-degree murder prosecution while Fitzpatrick was a noncapital case. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Blackstock v. Newman green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| JB v. Korda green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Corley v. Meese green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State v. Casseus green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Richardson v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Raydel, Ltd. v. Medcalfe green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| McNutt v. Sherrill green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Steckel green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
| CIA. Ecuatoriana De Aviacion, CA v. US and Overseas Corp. green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.