14 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. Brannongreen2 sentences2025We disagree. ¶ 10 A continuance of a hearing “shall be granted only for good cause,” C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-11, meaning that “there are unforeseen and exceptional circumstances requiring a continuance.” Miller v. Brannon, 207 P.3d 923, 932 (Colo. App. 2009). 2024We disagree. ¶ 15 A continuance of a hearing “shall be granted only for good cause,” C.R.C.P. 121, § 1- 11, meaning that “there are unforeseen and exceptional circumstances requiring a continuance.” Miller v. 8 Brannon , 207 P.3d 923, 932 (Colo. App. 2009). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Scalesgreen2 sentences2025See Scales, 763 P.2d at 1047-48 (noting that a continuance may be chargeable to the defendant if caused by some “affirmative action evincing consent by the defendant”); accord State v. Dale, 360 N.W.2d 687, 690 (S.D. 1985) (holding that the defendant’s objection that he could not prepare his defense by the proposed trial dates was, in effect, a request for a continuance); cf. People v. Wilson, 972 P.2d 701, 705 (Colo. App. 1998) (explaining that defense counsel’s motion to dismiss for violation of speedy trial was the equivalent of a motion for a continuance when defense counsel said that, due 2001While continuances have also been held chargeable to a defendant within the meaning of subsection 4058), even under certain circumstances in which no specific request was made by either him or his counsel, see, eg., People v. Scales, 763 P.2d 1045 (Colo.1988) (where substitution of counsel requiring additional time to prepare for trial was caused by defendant's conduct), it is at least clear that a motion for a continuance by defense counsel in open court with the consent of the defendant is a request for a continuance, governed by subsection 4058) of the statute, rather than merely a delay, g | 1 | 2 |
State v. Dalegreen1 sentence2025See Scales, 763 P.2d at 1047-48 (noting that a continuance may be chargeable to the defendant if caused by some “affirmative action evincing consent by the defendant”); accord State v. Dale, 360 N.W.2d 687, 690 (S.D. 1985) (holding that the defendant’s objection that he could not prepare his defense by the proposed trial dates was, in effect, a request for a continuance); cf. People v. Wilson, 972 P.2d 701, 705 (Colo. App. 1998) (explaining that defense counsel’s motion to dismiss for violation of speedy trial was the equivalent of a motion for a continuance when defense counsel said that, due | 1 | 1 |
People v. Chavezgreen1 sentence2025See Scales, 763 P.2d at 1047-48 (noting that a continuance may be chargeable to the defendant if caused by some “affirmative action evincing consent by the defendant”); accord State v. Dale, 360 N.W.2d 687, 690 (S.D. 1985) (holding that the defendant’s objection that he could not prepare his defense by the proposed trial dates was, in effect, a request for a continuance); cf. People v. Wilson, 972 P.2d 701, 705 (Colo. App. 1998) (explaining that defense counsel’s motion to dismiss for violation of speedy trial was the equivalent of a motion for a continuance when defense counsel said that, due | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2025See Scales, 763 P.2d at 1047-48 (noting that a continuance may be chargeable to the defendant if caused by some “affirmative action evincing consent by the defendant”); accord State v. Dale, 360 N.W.2d 687, 690 (S.D. 1985) (holding that the defendant’s objection that he could not prepare his defense by the proposed trial dates was, in effect, a request for a continuance); cf. People v. Wilson, 972 P.2d 701, 705 (Colo. App. 1998) (explaining that defense counsel’s motion to dismiss for violation of speedy trial was the equivalent of a motion for a continuance when defense counsel said that, due | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Marriage of Rodrickgreen1 sentence2024See Dean , ¶ 13; see also Rodrick , 176 P.3d at 814. ¶ 22 Father also argues that because he never consent ed to service by electronic means as required under C.R.C.P. 5(b)(2)(D), the magistrate erroneously held him in default or “allowed a default hearing to proceed .” He is mistaken. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hamptongreen1 sentence2017The trial court granted a continuance for that hearing so defense counsel could adequately prepare and participate—and defense counsel did so, cross-examining several witnesses at the October 26 hearing. ¶ 16 Turning to the denial of the continuance for ‘the beginning of trial, we must step into the shoes of the trial judge and examine “the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request [was] denied.” Hampton, 758 P.2d at 1354 (alteration added) (quoting Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589 , 84 S.Ct. 841 ). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jeffersongreen1 sentence2013See People v. Jefferson, 981 P.2d 613, 615 (Colo.App.1998) (upholding trial court's decision to grant a continuance because defense counsel was unprepared for trial and denying the defendant's attempt to revoke his speedy trial waiver). | 1 | 1 |
Rosenberg v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. 1green1 sentence1985See Rosenberg v. The Board of Education of School District No. 1, 710 P.2d 1095 (Colo.1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Bellgreen1 sentence2025But see People v. Bell, 669 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Colo. 1983) (“The key to interpreting [section 18-1-405(6)(f)] is to determine whether the defendant caused the delay. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ronquillo v. People
green
2 sentences2024Ronquillo , ¶ 35, 404 P.3d at 270 . ¶ 12 “[I]f the defendant is not entitled to a continuance under Brown , the trial court must require the defendant to cho ose between keeping retained counsel or waiving the rig ht to counsel 6 and proceeding pro se.” People v. Gilbert , 2022 CO 23 , ¶ 22, 510 P.3d 538, 545. 2024Ronquillo , ¶ 35, 404 P.3d at 270 . ¶ 12 “[I]f the defendant is not entitled to a continuance under Brown , the trial court must require the defendant to cho ose between keeping retained counsel or waiving the rig ht to counsel 6 and proceeding pro se.” People v. Gilbert , 2022 CO 23 , ¶ 22, 510 P.3d 538, 545. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Brown
green
2 sentences2017But in others, a delay in proceedings may be necessary to accommodate the change in counsel, and the court should determine whether the defendant is entitled to a continuance under the test we set out in Brown, ¶¶ 24-26, 322 P.3d at 220-21 . 2 As we explained, “[W]hen deciding whether to grant a continuance to allow a defendant, to change counsel, the trial court must conduct a multi-factor balancing test and determine whether the public’s interest in the efficiency and integrity of the judicial system outweighs the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice.” Id. at ¶ 2, 322 P.3d 2017But in others, a delay in proceedings may be necessary to accommodate the change in counsel, and the court should determine whether the defendant is entitled to a continuance under the test we set out in Brown, ¶¶ 24-26, 322 P.3d at 220-21 . 2 As we explained, “[W]hen deciding whether to grant a continuance to allow a defendant, to change counsel, the trial court must conduct a multi-factor balancing test and determine whether the public’s interest in the efficiency and integrity of the judicial system outweighs the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice.” Id. at ¶ 2, 322 P.3d | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Ungar v. Sarafite
green
2 sentences2017The trial court granted a continuance for that hearing so defense counsel could adequately prepare and participate—and defense counsel did so, cross-examining several witnesses at the October 26 hearing. ¶ 16 Turning to the denial of the continuance for ‘the beginning of trial, we must step into the shoes of the trial judge and examine “the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request [was] denied.” Hampton, 758 P.2d at 1354 (alteration added) (quoting Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589 , 84 S.Ct. 841 ). 2017The trial court granted a continuance for that hearing so defense counsel could adequately prepare and participate—and defense counsel did so, cross-examining several witnesses at the October 26 hearing. ¶ 16 Turning to the denial of the continuance for ‘the beginning of trial, we must step into the shoes of the trial judge and examine “the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request [was] denied.” Hampton, 758 P.2d at 1354 (alteration added) (quoting Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589 , 84 S.Ct. 841 ). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Larsen-Oldaker v. Industrial Commission
neutral
1 sentence1988We noted in Larsen-Oldaker v. Industrial Commission, 735 P.2d 209 (Colo.App.1987) that a party’s appearance and failure to request a continuance at a hearing was a factor to be considered on appeal. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
McGregor v. People
green
2 sentences1982McGregor v. People, 176 Colo. 309 , 490 P.2d 287 (1971). 1982McGregor v. People, 176 Colo. 309 , 490 P.2d 287 (1971). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Kloberdanz v. People
neutral
2 sentences1976While we encourage the prosecution to endorse additional witnesses prior to trial, Reed v. People, 171 Colo. 421 , 467 P.2d 809 (1970), and do not condone the late endorsement of witnesses by the prosecution where diligent preparation would have revealed their materiality at an earlier *371 time, see Eckhardt v. People, 126 Colo. 18 , 247 P.2d 673 (1952); Kloberdanz v. People, 95 Colo. 30 , 31 P.2d 1111 (1934), nevertheless, there is no reversible error under the circumstances of this case. 1976While we encourage the prosecution to endorse additional witnesses prior to trial, Reed v. People, 171 Colo. 421 , 467 P.2d 809 (1970), and do not condone the late endorsement of witnesses by the prosecution where diligent preparation would have revealed their materiality at an earlier *371 time, see Eckhardt v. People, 126 Colo. 18 , 247 P.2d 673 (1952); Kloberdanz v. People, 95 Colo. 30 , 31 P.2d 1111 (1934), nevertheless, there is no reversible error under the circumstances of this case. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Reed v. People
green
2 sentences1976While we encourage the prosecution to endorse additional witnesses prior to trial, Reed v. People, 171 Colo. 421 , 467 P.2d 809 (1970), and do not condone the late endorsement of witnesses by the prosecution where diligent preparation would have revealed their materiality at an earlier *371 time, see Eckhardt v. People, 126 Colo. 18 , 247 P.2d 673 (1952); Kloberdanz v. People, 95 Colo. 30 , 31 P.2d 1111 (1934), nevertheless, there is no reversible error under the circumstances of this case. 1976While we encourage the prosecution to endorse additional witnesses prior to trial, Reed v. People, 171 Colo. 421 , 467 P.2d 809 (1970), and do not condone the late endorsement of witnesses by the prosecution where diligent preparation would have revealed their materiality at an earlier *371 time, see Eckhardt v. People, 126 Colo. 18 , 247 P.2d 673 (1952); Kloberdanz v. People, 95 Colo. 30 , 31 P.2d 1111 (1934), nevertheless, there is no reversible error under the circumstances of this case. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Eckhardt v. People
green
2 sentences1976While we encourage the prosecution to endorse additional witnesses prior to trial, Reed v. People, 171 Colo. 421 , 467 P.2d 809 (1970), and do not condone the late endorsement of witnesses by the prosecution where diligent preparation would have revealed their materiality at an earlier *371 time, see Eckhardt v. People, 126 Colo. 18 , 247 P.2d 673 (1952); Kloberdanz v. People, 95 Colo. 30 , 31 P.2d 1111 (1934), nevertheless, there is no reversible error under the circumstances of this case. 1976While we encourage the prosecution to endorse additional witnesses prior to trial, Reed v. People, 171 Colo. 421 , 467 P.2d 809 (1970), and do not condone the late endorsement of witnesses by the prosecution where diligent preparation would have revealed their materiality at an earlier *371 time, see Eckhardt v. People, 126 Colo. 18 , 247 P.2d 673 (1952); Kloberdanz v. People, 95 Colo. 30 , 31 P.2d 1111 (1934), nevertheless, there is no reversible error under the circumstances of this case. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Miller v. First National Bank of Englewood
green
2 sentences1968In Miller v. First National Bank of Englewood, 156 Colo. 358 , 399 P.2d 99 , a quiet title decree in favor of the Bank on a motion for summary judgment was reversed and the cause was remanded for the reason that the trial court -abused its discretion in not allowing Miller a continuance of the hearing on the summary judgment motion to permit him to take certain- depositions and to utilize other discovery procedures in order to resist the motion and amend his answer. 1968In Miller v. First National Bank of Englewood, 156 Colo. 358 , 399 P.2d 99 , a quiet title decree in favor of the Bank on a motion for summary judgment was reversed and the cause was remanded for the reason that the trial court -abused its discretion in not allowing Miller a continuance of the hearing on the summary judgment motion to permit him to take certain- depositions and to utilize other discovery procedures in order to resist the motion and amend his answer. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.