13 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1904–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Saltergreen1 sentence2020See Salter, 250 S.W.3d at 712 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance because the defense had failed to use due diligence in obtaining the presence of an absent witness when the trial date had been set for 40 days and the defense had waited until 3 days before trial to contact the witness, who was then allegedly unavailable on the trial date). | 1 | 1 |
State of Missouri v. Nanette Sue Litherlandgreen1 sentence2020See State v. Litherland, 477 S.W.3d 156, 163-65 (Mo. App. 2015) (holding that 13 the trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance when the defense’s sole witness was temporarily unavailable due to having gone into labor early that morning); State v. Blocker, 133 S.W.3d 502, 503-05 (Mo. banc 2004) (holding that the trial court erred in denying a continuance when the defense’s witness, who was under subpoena, was temporarily unavailable due to a family medical emergency); State v. Brown, 517 S.W.3d 617, 630-31 (Mo. App. 2017) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in d | 1 | 1 |
State v. Blockergreen1 sentence2020See State v. Litherland, 477 S.W.3d 156, 163-65 (Mo. App. 2015) (holding that 13 the trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance when the defense’s sole witness was temporarily unavailable due to having gone into labor early that morning); State v. Blocker, 133 S.W.3d 502, 503-05 (Mo. banc 2004) (holding that the trial court erred in denying a continuance when the defense’s witness, who was under subpoena, was temporarily unavailable due to a family medical emergency); State v. Brown, 517 S.W.3d 617, 630-31 (Mo. App. 2017) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in d | 1 | 1 |
State of Missouri v. Calvin Browngreen1 sentence2020See State v. Litherland, 477 S.W.3d 156, 163-65 (Mo. App. 2015) (holding that 13 the trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance when the defense’s sole witness was temporarily unavailable due to having gone into labor early that morning); State v. Blocker, 133 S.W.3d 502, 503-05 (Mo. banc 2004) (holding that the trial court erred in denying a continuance when the defense’s witness, who was under subpoena, was temporarily unavailable due to a family medical emergency); State v. Brown, 517 S.W.3d 617, 630-31 (Mo. App. 2017) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in d | 1 | 1 |
Suber v. Stategreen1 sentence2018See Suber v. State , 516 S.W.3d 386 , 391 (Mo. App. 2017). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Christesongreen2 sentences2016See State v. Christeson, 50 S.W.3d 251, 262 (Mo. banc 2001) (trial court does not abuse its discretion in overruling a motion .for a continuance when counsel had adequate time to prepare). 14 Finally, Jones claims that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the motion for a continuance because defense counsel had entered an appearance only three months before trial, because counsel was out of the country for a month during that period, and because counsel was preparing other defendants’ cases while also preparing for Jones’ trial. 2016See State v. Christeson, 50 S.W.3d 251, 262 (Mo. banc 2001) (trial court does not abuse its discretion in overruling a motion for a continuance when counsel had adequate time to prepare). 14 Finally, Jones claims that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the motion for a continuance because defense counsel had entered an appearance only three months before trial, because counsel was out of the country for a month during that period, and because counsel was preparing other defendants’ cases while also preparing for Jones’ trial. | 1 | 1 |
Cain v. Hershewegreen1 sentence1991Cain v. Hershewe, 777 S.W.2d 298, 301 [4] (Mo.App.1989). | 1 | 1 |
Bindley v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Companygreen1 sentence1978Initially, we note that Missouri law recognizes the “inherent right and power of a court, of its own motion and independently of statute or court rule, to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute . ” Bindley v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 335 S.W.2d 64, 69 [1] (Mo.1960); Salle v. Holland Furnace Co., 337 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Mo.1960). | 1 | 1 |
Salle Ex Rel. Mandel v. Holland Furnace Co.green1 sentence1978Initially, we note that Missouri law recognizes the “inherent right and power of a court, of its own motion and independently of statute or court rule, to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute . ” Bindley v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 335 S.W.2d 64, 69 [1] (Mo.1960); Salle v. Holland Furnace Co., 337 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Mo.1960). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re PD
green
1 sentence2012Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Polavarapu v. General Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence2003The Commission referenced changes in § 287.210.3, but indicated that the changes “did not change the provisions with regard to the grounds for continuance.” The Commission also cited Polavarapu v. General Motors, 897 S.W.2d 63 (Mo.App.1995), as possibly allowing the testimony on other grounds. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Brown v. State
green
1 sentence1990Wright v. State, 738 S.W.2d 478 , 481 (Mo.App.1987). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Myers v. Moreno
green
1 sentence1986Kindly advise me if you wish the matter continued until the first available date at the end of the Commission’s docket.” Myers v. Moreno, supra, at 86 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. McClain
green
1 sentence1973The recent decision of our Supreme Court, en banc, in State v. McClain, 498 S.W.2d 798 (Mo.1973), decided September 10, 1973, is clear, logical and controlling authority for the decision of this appeal. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Missouri Ex Rel. Hurwitz v. North
green
2 sentences1967Hurwitz v. North, 304 Mo. 607 , 264 S.W. 678, 682 , aff. 271 U.S. 40 , 46 S.Ct. 384 , 70 L.Ed. 818 , where it was held: “ * * * As to the oral application for continuance, it should be added that there is no substantial reason for postponing a proceeding like this until after the criminal prosecution is concluded. * * * ” Having failed in his efforts to obtain the dismissal of the charges pending before the Board or a continuance of the hearing appellant then orally requested time in which to seek an injunction to restrain the Board from proceeding with the hearing. 1967Hurwitz v. North, 304 Mo. 607 , 264 S.W. 678, 682 , aff. 271 U.S. 40 , 46 S.Ct. 384 , 70 L.Ed. 818 , where it was held: “ * * * As to the oral application for continuance, it should be added that there is no substantial reason for postponing a proceeding like this until after the criminal prosecution is concluded. * * * ” Having failed in his efforts to obtain the dismissal of the charges pending before the Board or a continuance of the hearing appellant then orally requested time in which to seek an injunction to restrain the Board from proceeding with the hearing. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
State Ex Rel. Hurwitz v. North
green
2 sentences1967Hurwitz v. North, 304 Mo. 607 , 264 S.W. 678, 682 , aff. 271 U.S. 40 , 46 S.Ct. 384 , 70 L.Ed. 818 , where it was held: “ * * * As to the oral application for continuance, it should be added that there is no substantial reason for postponing a proceeding like this until after the criminal prosecution is concluded. * * * ” Having failed in his efforts to obtain the dismissal of the charges pending before the Board or a continuance of the hearing appellant then orally requested time in which to seek an injunction to restrain the Board from proceeding with the hearing. 1967Hurwitz v. North, 304 Mo. 607 , 264 S.W. 678, 682 , aff. 271 U.S. 40 , 46 S.Ct. 384 , 70 L.Ed. 818 , where it was held: “ * * * As to the oral application for continuance, it should be added that there is no substantial reason for postponing a proceeding like this until after the criminal prosecution is concluded. * * * ” Having failed in his efforts to obtain the dismissal of the charges pending before the Board or a continuance of the hearing appellant then orally requested time in which to seek an injunction to restrain the Board from proceeding with the hearing. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Hall v. Wesster
green
1 sentence1909In that case, this court, following Hall v. Wesster, supra, in our State, and many cases from other jurisdictions, further held, that while the extent of the injury is vital, when a nuisance, unrelated to contractual rights, is the gravamen of the action, if parties settle their rights in regard to a parcel of land by covenants, these must be observed, whether their non-observance will inflict injury or not, the plaintiff having the right to restrain-, even a continuous breach which is beneficial to him, and to stand on the very letter of his obligation, “for a party may not make a solemn enga | 1 | 1909–1909 |
St. Louis Safe Deposit & Savings Bank v. Kennett Estate
neutral
1 sentence1909Louis Safe Deposit Bank v. Kennett’s Est., etc., 101 Mo. App. 370 , Judge Goode, in a thoroughly considered opinion, held, all the members of the court concurring, that a party may restrain a continuous breach which is beneficial to him and stand on the very letter of his obligation, for a party cannot make a solemn obligation and then disregard it on the plea, that no harm will result to the other party, the court further holding, in that case, that the mere failure to object at the time to a violation of the covenants and restrictions as to building, contained in the deeds of the parties, wa | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Sanders v. Dixon
green
1 sentence1909In that case, this court, following Hall v. Wesster, supra, in our State, and many cases from other jurisdictions, further held, that while the extent of the injury is vital, when a nuisance, unrelated to contractual rights, is the gravamen of the action, if parties settle their rights in regard to a parcel of land by covenants, these must be observed, whether their non-observance will inflict injury or not, the plaintiff having the right to restrain-, even a continuous breach which is beneficial to him, and to stand on the very letter of his obligation, “for a party may not make a solemn enga | 1 | 1909–1909 |
State v. Banks
neutral
1 sentence1904In granting or refusing applications for continuance in criminal cases, the ruling of this court on that question has been uniform, that it rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and its action upon such application will not be disturbed, unless it is made to appear that its discretion has been unsoundly or oppresively exercised. [State v. Dettmer, 124 Mo. 426 ; State v. Banks, 118 Mo. 117 .] The application of the defendant in this case was substantially in due form,- it strictly complied with the requirements of the statute. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
State v. Dettmer
neutral
1 sentence1904In granting or refusing applications for continuance in criminal cases, the ruling of this court on that question has been uniform, that it rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and its action upon such application will not be disturbed, unless it is made to appear that its discretion has been unsoundly or oppresively exercised. [State v. Dettmer, 124 Mo. 426 ; State v. Banks, 118 Mo. 117 .] The application of the defendant in this case was substantially in due form,- it strictly complied with the requirements of the statute. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.