continuance hearing in Washington

2019However, counsel’s characterization of the matter as a “CamQbell continuance” suggests it is a request for a continuance by defense counsel to ensure effective representation but objected to by the defendant, as was approved in Campbell, 103 Wn.2d at 15 . - 37 - No. 77117-5-1/38 To trigger the balancing analysis, a defendant must first show that the delay “crossed a line from ordinary to presumptively prejudicial.” Id. (citing Doqqett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 651—52, 112 5.

2019However, counsel’s characterization of the matter as a “CamQbell continuance” suggests it is a request for a continuance by defense counsel to ensure effective representation but objected to by the defendant, as was approved in Campbell, 103 Wn.2d at 15 . - 37 - No. 77117-5-1/38 To trigger the balancing analysis, a defendant must first show that the delay “crossed a line from ordinary to presumptively prejudicial.” Id. (citing Doqqett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 651—52, 112 5.

2026“A criminal defendant has a fundamental right to be present at all critical stages of a trial.” State v. Irby, 170 Wn.2d 874, 880 , 246 P.3d 796 (2011).

2017Zyion Houston-Sconiers, No. 92605-1, slip op. at 31 (Wash. Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/926051.pdf. quotation marks omitted)(quoting State v. Irby, 170 Wn.2d 17 Id. (internal 874, 881, 246 P.3d 796 (2011)). 7 No. 74026-1-1/8 Whether a defendant's constitutional right to be present has been violated is a question of law we review de novo.18 A defendant's right to be present is not absolute.19 In In re Personal Restraint of Benn, the supreme court held that Gary Benn did not have a right to be present at a continuance hearing.29 This is because his absence during the hear

2020Trummel v. Mitchell, 156 Wn.2d 653, 670-71 , 131 P.3d 305 (2006).

2020Trummel v. Mitchell, 156 Wn.2d 653, 670-71 , 131 P.3d 305 (2006).

2020Trummel v. Mitchell, 156 Wn.2d 653, 670-71 , 131 P.3d 305 (2006).

2020Trummel v. Mitchell, 156 Wn.2d 653, 670-71 , 131 P.3d 305 (2006).

2006Trammel claims that he was entitled to a continuance under the factors set forth in Balandzich v. Demeroto, 10 Wn.

2006Trummel claims that he was entitled to a continuance under the factors set forth in Balandzich v. Demeroto, 10 Wash. App. 718, 720 , 519 P.2d 994 (1974).

2026Restraint of Benn, the Washington Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant did not have the right to be present during a continuance hearing because the hearing 15 No. 59926-1-II did not involve the presentation of evidence, decisions about the admissibility of evidence, or the availability of a defense or theory of the case. 134 Wn.2d 868, 920 , 952 P.2d 116 (1998).

2026“A criminal defendant has a fundamental right to be present at all critical stages of a trial.” State v. Irby, 170 Wn.2d 874, 880 , 246 P.3d 796 (2011).

2026Restraint of Benn, the Washington Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant did not have the right to be present during a continuance hearing because the hearing 15 No. 59926-1-II did not involve the presentation of evidence, decisions about the admissibility of evidence, or the availability of a defense or theory of the case. 134 Wn.2d 868, 920 , 952 P.2d 116 (1998).

2019However, counsel’s characterization of the matter as a “CamQbell continuance” suggests it is a request for a continuance by defense counsel to ensure effective representation but objected to by the defendant, as was approved in Campbell, 103 Wn.2d at 15 . - 37 - No. 77117-5-1/38 To trigger the balancing analysis, a defendant must first show that the delay “crossed a line from ordinary to presumptively prejudicial.” Id. (citing Doqqett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 651—52, 112 5.

2019Ct. 2686, 120 L.

2016Id. at 925 .

2016Butler, 116 Wn.

2015We disagree. "'[Ijmposition of restitution is generally within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion."2 Restitution must be based on easily ascertainable damages, but the amount of harm need not be established with specific accuracy.3 Evidence is sufficient to support an award of restitution if it provides a reasonable basis for estimating loss and does not require the 2 State v. Enstone. 137 Wn.2d 675, 679 , 974 P.2d 828 (1999) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Davison. 116 Wn.2d 917, 919 , 809 P.2d 1374 (1991)). 3 State v. Kinn

2015We disagree. "'[Ijmposition of restitution is generally within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion."2 Restitution must be based on easily ascertainable damages, but the amount of harm need not be established with specific accuracy.3 Evidence is sufficient to support an award of restitution if it provides a reasonable basis for estimating loss and does not require the 2 State v. Enstone. 137 Wn.2d 675, 679 , 974 P.2d 828 (1999) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Davison. 116 Wn.2d 917, 919 , 809 P.2d 1374 (1991)). 3 State v. Kinn

2015We disagree. "'[Ijmposition of restitution is generally within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion."2 Restitution must be based on easily ascertainable damages, but the amount of harm need not be established with specific accuracy.3 Evidence is sufficient to support an award of restitution if it provides a reasonable basis for estimating loss and does not require the 2 State v. Enstone. 137 Wn.2d 675, 679 , 974 P.2d 828 (1999) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Davison. 116 Wn.2d 917, 919 , 809 P.2d 1374 (1991)). 3 State v. Kinn

2015App. 537, 540 , 977 P.2d 606 (1999).

2015We disagree. "'[Ijmposition of restitution is generally within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion."2 Restitution must be based on easily ascertainable damages, but the amount of harm need not be established with specific accuracy.3 Evidence is sufficient to support an award of restitution if it provides a reasonable basis for estimating loss and does not require the 2 State v. Enstone. 137 Wn.2d 675, 679 , 974 P.2d 828 (1999) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Davison. 116 Wn.2d 917, 919 , 809 P.2d 1374 (1991)). 3 State v. Kinn

2015Turner v. Kohler. 54 Wn.

2015We disagree. "'[Ijmposition of restitution is generally within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion."2 Restitution must be based on easily ascertainable damages, but the amount of harm need not be established with specific accuracy.3 Evidence is sufficient to support an award of restitution if it provides a reasonable basis for estimating loss and does not require the 2 State v. Enstone. 137 Wn.2d 675, 679 , 974 P.2d 828 (1999) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Davison. 116 Wn.2d 917, 919 , 809 P.2d 1374 (1991)). 3 State v. Kinn

2015We disagree. "'[Ijmposition of restitution is generally within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion."2 Restitution must be based on easily ascertainable damages, but the amount of harm need not be established with specific accuracy.3 Evidence is sufficient to support an award of restitution if it provides a reasonable basis for estimating loss and does not require the 2 State v. Enstone. 137 Wn.2d 675, 679 , 974 P.2d 828 (1999) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Davison. 116 Wn.2d 917, 919 , 809 P.2d 1374 (1991)). 3 State v. Kinn

2015Nonetheless, we may affirm the trial court on any basis supported by the record.20 While Adee contends that this erroneous assumption led the court to deny him a continuance to challenge the State's evidence, the record indicates that the court also 18 id, 19jo\ 20 State v. Marks. 95 Wn.

2015State v. Moore, 178 Wn.

2014Further, we impute the defendant' s attorney' s actions to the defendant when done in the course and scope of the representation, so we weigh any request for a continuance by the defense attorney against the defendant, even where the defendant objects. 011ivier, 178 Wn.2d at 832 -35 ( citing Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81 , .89 -91, 129 S. Ct. 1283 ., 173 L.

2014Further, we impute the defendant' s attorney' s actions to the defendant when done in the course and scope of the representation, so we weigh any request for a continuance by the defense attorney against the defendant, even where the defendant objects. 011ivier, 178 Wn.2d at 832 -35 ( citing Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81 , .89 -91, 129 S. Ct. 1283 ., 173 L.

2014Further, we impute the defendant' s attorney' s actions to the defendant when done in the course and scope of the representation, so we weigh any request for a continuance by the defense attorney against the defendant, even where the defendant objects. 011ivier, 178 Wn.2d at 832 -35 ( citing Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81 , .89 -91, 129 S. Ct. 1283 ., 173 L.

2013App. at 709, 711 , and Division One’s decision Allen, 169 Wn.

2009State v. Cross, 156 Wash.2d 580, 613 , 132 P.3d 80 (2006); see RPC 1.2(a).

2009State v. Cross, 156 Wash.2d 580, 613 , 132 P.3d 80 (2006); see RPC 1.2(a).