continuance hearing in Nebraska

2019In re Interest of H.P.A., 237 Neb. 410 , 466 N.W.2d 90 (1991).

2019In re Interest of H.P.A., 237 Neb. 410 , 466 N.W.2d 90 (1991).

2023NELSON Cite as 313 Neb. 464 We accordingly held in State v. Turner 17 that the period of a continuance of the hearing of the defendant’s motions, granted at the request of the State, was automatically excluded under § 29-1207(4)(a).

2020If the deficient performance occurred, it was in the failure to timely file the witness list, not the acknowledgment of the result of doing so. 28 State v. Chairez, supra note 5 . 29 Id. 30 Id. 31 Id. 32 Brief for appellant at 35. - 265 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. SIERRA Cite as 305 Neb. 249 (c) Failure to Request Continuance at Hearing on State’s Motion in Limine We find no merit to Sierra’s assertion that his attorney was ineffective for failing to request a continuance at the hearing on the State’s motion in limine.

2020Sierra also assigns that his attorney was deficient by fail- ing to (1) comply with discovery; (2) serve notice of Sierra’s alibi; (3) move for a continuance at the hearing on the motion - 257 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. SIERRA Cite as 305 Neb. 249 in limine; (4) call Sierra’s fiance as a witness for the defense; (5) depose Sierra’s brother, mother, and fiance, as well as two potential alibi witnesses, prior to trial; (6) communicate with Sierra to prepare for trial; (7) assert a double jeopardy claim; (8) move to suppress identification evidence and e

2018Most importantly, the court properly relied upon Sedlacek’s affidavit, which was submitted during the June 13 summary judgment hearing, in granting summary judgment in favor of Sedlacek. (b) Limited Continuance We equally find no merit to Lombardo’s claim that the court erred in deciding Sedlacek’s motion for summary judgment 16 Altaffer v. Majestic Roofing, 263 Neb. 518 , 641 N.W.2d 34 (2002). - 416 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 299 Nebraska R eports LOMBARDO v. SEDLACEK Cite as 299 Neb. 400 without allowing Lombardo adequate time for discovery to rebut Sedlacek’s prima facie case.

2018Most importantly, the court properly relied upon Sedlacek’s affidavit, which was submitted during the June 13 summary judgment hearing, in granting summary judgment in favor of Sedlacek. (b) Limited Continuance We equally find no merit to Lombardo’s claim that the court erred in deciding Sedlacek’s motion for summary judgment 16 Altaffer v. Majestic Roofing, 263 Neb. 518 , 641 N.W.2d 34 (2002). - 416 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 299 Nebraska R eports LOMBARDO v. SEDLACEK Cite as 299 Neb. 400 without allowing Lombardo adequate time for discovery to rebut Sedlacek’s prima facie case.

1987We further held in Lynch at 859-60 , 394 N.W.2d at 660 , “There is no abuse of discretion by the court in denying a continuance unless it clearly appears that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of that denial.” The bill of exceptions filed herein contains only the proceedings of the hearing on defendant’s motion for a continuance and the hearing on the motion for a new trial after defendant’s conviction.

1967State v. Kent, 174 Neb. 115 , 116 N. W. 2d 31 . *394 Under the circumstances in this case, the denial of the defendant’s motion for a continuance was not error.

1967State v. Kent, 174 Neb. 115 , 116 N. W. 2d 31 . *394 Under the circumstances in this case, the denial of the defendant’s motion for a continuance was not error.

1957See, Hyslop v. State, 159 Neb. 802 , 68 N. W. 2d 698 ; Cox v. State, 159 Neb. 811 , 68 N. W. 2d 497 .

1957See, Hyslop v. State, 159 Neb. 802 , 68 N. W. 2d 698 ; Cox v. State, 159 Neb. 811 , 68 N. W. 2d 497 .

1955The fact that the continuance was to another day and place did not change its substance or give it the character described in Procter & Gamble Co. v. United States, one which constrained the railroad company to obedience unless it was annulled or suspended by judicial decree.” In Federal Power Commission v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U. S. 375 , 58 S. Ct. 963 , 82 L.

1955The fact that the continuance was to another day and place did not change its substance or give it the character described in Procter & Gamble Co. v. United States, one which constrained the railroad company to obedience unless it was annulled or suspended by judicial decree.” In Federal Power Commission v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U. S. 375 , 58 S. Ct. 963 , 82 L.

1934The identical question was discussed in Cooper v. State, 120 Neb. 598 , and many previous cases examined.

1914It would be a singular rule which allows a defendant to take advantage of the order of a court made on his own request and apparently for his own benefit.” In Heidemann v. Noxon, supra, it was held that the justice, by continuing the case, did not lose jurisdiction of it.

1914In Heidemann v. Noxon, 83 Neb. 175 , it was held in paragraph 2 of ¡the syllabus: “The examining magistrate does not lose jurisdiction of the case by granting a continuance of the hearing on the request of the defendant.” In the opinion {p. 177) this court say: “It is further insisted that the justice had no authority to continue the case and take a ¡recognizance from the defendant for his appearance on the day for which the hearing was set, and that the hearing had in the absence of the defendant was illegal.” In discussing this the court say: “Relating to the second point, it will be borne i