continuance hearing in California

2026Moreover, appellants suggest that the court should have attempted to “mitigate the untimeliness of the filing” by allowing appellants “a continuance and opportunity to have the declaration considered on the merits.” The party opposing summary judgment may seek a continuance of the hearing “upon a good faith showing by affidavit that a continuance is needed to obtain facts essential to justify opposition to the motion.” (Lerma v. County of Orange (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 709, 715 , citing § 437c, subd. (h).) But appellants did not request a continuance or make any such showing in their opposition

2025(Lerma, supra, 12 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 715 .) “The party seeking the continuance must justify the need, by detailing both the particular essential facts that may exist and the specific reasons why they cannot then be presented.” (Id. at p. 716.) We review a trial court’s ruling on a request for a continuance of a hearing on a summary judgment motion for an abuse of discretion.

2025(See Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 451 [upholding the denial of a continuance where the defendant “made no showing that he could produce specific, relevant mitigating evidence within a reasonable time”]; Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 670 ; People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 505 [no abuse of discretion in denying a continuance when the defense offered only “vague expressions of hope” that additional time would lead to the identification of a helpful expert].) Consistent with this 28 The prosecution rested, and the defense began to put on its case, on May 18, 2009, two weeks after the c

2015A trial court may grant a continuance in a criminal case only for good cause. (§ 1050, subd. (e).) “The decision whether to grant a continuance of a hearing to permit counsel to secure the presence of a witness rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citations.] ‘To establish good cause for a continuance, [Dominique] had the burden of showing that he had exercised due diligence to secure the witness’s attendance, that the witness’s expected testimony was material and not cumulative, that the testimony could 4. be obtained within a reasonable time, and that the facts to which the wit

2013Proc., § 437c, subd. (h); see Zamudio v. City and County of San Francisco (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 445, 454 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 664 ] [plaintiff waived objection to defendant’s apparent failure to produce discoverable documents by failing to seek a continuance of the hearing pursuant to Code Civ.

2013Proc., § 437c, subd. (h); see Zamudio v. City and County of San Francisco (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 445, 454 [ 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 664 ] [plaintiff waived objection to defendant’s apparent failure to produce discoverable documents by failing to seek a continuance of the hearing pursuant to Code Civ.

2025He argued the People had not established good cause for a trial continuance because they had supported their motion with hearsay rather than competent evidence; failed to establish 40 entitlement to a continuance under the factors articulated in Owens v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 238 (Owens) and the state Constitution; and failed to meet the Barker balancing test.

2006"The decision whether to grant a continuance of a hearing to permit counsel to secure the presence of a witness rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1171 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ]; Owens v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 238, 250-251 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 466 , 617 P.2d 1098 ].) `To establish good cause for a continuance, [a party has] the burden of showing that he had exercised due diligence to secure the witness's attendance, that the witness's expected testimony was material and not cumulative, that the testimony could be obtaine

2022Co. v. C & Z Timber Co. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1271, 1281 [“[P]ossible theories that were not fully developed or factually presented to the trial court cannot create a ‘triable issue’ on appeal.”].) Additionally, Smith’s brief repeats the argument she makes in the appeal concerning Dr. Gade that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her fifth request for a continuance of the hearing on Dr. Gade’s summary judgment motion.

1990Co. v. C & Z Timber Co. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1271, 1280 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 466 ].) An exception is created by Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h), which mandates that the court grant a continuance of a hearing on a motion for summary judgment “ ‘ “upon a good faith showing by affidavit that a continuance is needed to obtain facts essential to justify opposition to the motion.” ’ [Citations.]” ( 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 1280 , italics in original.) In the present case, however, appellant’s attorney failed to present any affidavit or declaration to the court, or to indicate orally th

2022Nor did they make any effort to register the name (by filing a one-page statement) until more than a year later, during the pendency of this appeal. 20 California Supreme Court explained in McGill v. Citibank, N.A., supra, 2 Cal.5th at page 962 , the savings clause in section 2 “‘indicates’ that Congress’s ‘purpose’ in enacting the FAA ‘was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.’” (Quoting Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin (1967) 388 U.S. 395, 404, fn. 12 ; accord, Patterson v. Superior Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 473 , 491; see Ting v. AT&T (9th Cir. 2

2022Nor did they make any effort to register the name (by filing a one-page statement) until more than a year later, during the pendency of this appeal. 20 California Supreme Court explained in McGill v. Citibank, N.A., supra, 2 Cal.5th at page 962 , the savings clause in section 2 “‘indicates’ that Congress’s ‘purpose’ in enacting the FAA ‘was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.’” (Quoting Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin (1967) 388 U.S. 395, 404, fn. 12 ; accord, Patterson v. Superior Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 473 , 491; see Ting v. AT&T (9th Cir. 2

2022Nor did they make any effort to register the name (by filing a one-page statement) until more than a year later, during the pendency of this appeal. 20 California Supreme Court explained in McGill v. Citibank, N.A., supra, 2 Cal.5th at page 962 , the savings clause in section 2 “‘indicates’ that Congress’s ‘purpose’ in enacting the FAA ‘was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.’” (Quoting Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin (1967) 388 U.S. 395, 404, fn. 12 ; accord, Patterson v. Superior Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 473 , 491; see Ting v. AT&T (9th Cir. 2

2022Nor did they make any effort to register the name (by filing a one-page statement) until more than a year later, during the pendency of this appeal. 20 California Supreme Court explained in McGill v. Citibank, N.A., supra, 2 Cal.5th at page 962 , the savings clause in section 2 “‘indicates’ that Congress’s ‘purpose’ in enacting the FAA ‘was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.’” (Quoting Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin (1967) 388 U.S. 395, 404, fn. 12 ; accord, Patterson v. Superior Court (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 473 , 491; see Ting v. AT&T (9th Cir. 2

2021In order to obtain a motion for a continuance of the hearing, written notice shall be filed at least two court days prior to the date set for hearing, together with affidavits or declarations detailing specific facts showing that a continuance is necessary, unless the court for good cause entertains an oral motion for continuance.” (§ 352, subd. (a)(1)–(2).) A court may continue any hearing in dependency proceedings, including a section 366.26 hearing. (§ 352, subd. (a); see also In re Michael R. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 687, 694 .) However, “[c]ontinuances in juvenile dependency proceedings are d

2015(See § 352, subd. (a); In re Gerald J. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1187 [noting " '[t]ime is of the essence in offering permanent planning for dependent children' " and noting a "reviewing court will reverse an order denying a continuance only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion"]; see also In re David H. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1635 [noting "[c]ontinuances in juvenile dependency proceedings are disfavored"].) DISPOSITION The order terminating the parental rights of mother and father and finding minor adoptable is affirmed.

2020(See, e.g., Rydder v. Rydder, supra, 49 F.3d at pp. 373-374 [reducing fees by almost half “because of Mrs. Rydder’s straitened financial circumstances”]; Whallon v. Lynn, supra, 356 F.3d at p. 141 [noting district court’s reduction by two thirds of the total fee award was within district court’s discretion]; Berendsen v. Nichols (D.Kan. 1996) 938 F.Supp. 737, 739 [reducing requested fees and costs by 15 percent in light of father's financial status and support of his children].) 17 Tammy objected to the severely shortened notice of the fees motion she received and requested a continuance of th

2020(See, e.g., Rydder v. Rydder, supra, 49 F.3d at pp. 373-374 [reducing fees by almost half “because of Mrs. Rydder’s straitened financial circumstances”]; Whallon v. Lynn, supra, 356 F.3d at p. 141 [noting district court’s reduction by two thirds of the total fee award was within district court’s discretion]; Berendsen v. Nichols (D.Kan. 1996) 938 F.Supp. 737, 739 [reducing requested fees and costs by 15 percent in light of father's financial status and support of his children].) 17 Tammy objected to the severely shortened notice of the fees motion she received and requested a continuance of th

2020(See, e.g., Rydder v. Rydder, supra, 49 F.3d at pp. 373-374 [reducing fees by almost half “because of Mrs. Rydder’s straitened financial circumstances”]; Whallon v. Lynn, supra, 356 F.3d at p. 141 [noting district court’s reduction by two thirds of the total fee award was within district court’s discretion]; Berendsen v. Nichols (D.Kan. 1996) 938 F.Supp. 737, 739 [reducing requested fees and costs by 15 percent in light of father's financial status and support of his children].) 17 Tammy objected to the severely shortened notice of the fees motion she received and requested a continuance of th

2020(See, e.g., Rydder v. Rydder, supra, 49 F.3d at pp. 373-374 [reducing fees by almost half “because of Mrs. Rydder’s straitened financial circumstances”]; Whallon v. Lynn, supra, 356 F.3d at p. 141 [noting district court’s reduction by two thirds of the total fee award was within district court’s discretion]; Berendsen v. Nichols (D.Kan. 1996) 938 F.Supp. 737, 739 [reducing requested fees and costs by 15 percent in light of father's financial status and support of his children].) 17 Tammy objected to the severely shortened notice of the fees motion she received and requested a continuance of th

2018Continuance motion "In seeking a continuance of a summary judgment motion, a plaintiff has essentially two options." (Hamilton v. Orange County Sheriff's Dept. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 759, 764 (Hamilton).) The first is to comply with section 437c, subdivision (h).

2018Continuance motion "In seeking a continuance of a summary judgment motion, a plaintiff has essentially two options." (Hamilton v. Orange County Sheriff's Dept. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 759, 764 (Hamilton).) The first is to comply with section 437c, subdivision (h).

2016He did not object to the continuance of the hearing to February 26, 2015. "[H]is failure to press for a ruling [and to object to a continuance] waives the issue on appeal. [Citation.]" ( People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926 , 984, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ; see also In re Richard H. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1351 , 1362, 285 Cal.Rptr. 917 ["Since appellant did not object to any of the continuances, he has waived his right to claim any harm from the delay"].) Had the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, we would have upheld its ruling.

2016He did not object to the continuance of the hearing to February 26, 2015. "[H]is failure to press for a ruling [and to object to a continuance] waives the issue on appeal. [Citation.]" ( People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926 , 984, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ; see also In re Richard H. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1351 , 1362, 285 Cal.Rptr. 917 ["Since appellant did not object to any of the continuances, he has waived his right to claim any harm from the delay"].) Had the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, we would have upheld its ruling.

2015(Lewinter v. Genmar Industries, Inc. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1224 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 305 ] [appellate court will not review an objection to a trial court ruling on a summary judgment motion when the objecting party “failed to request a continuance of the hearing on the summary judgment motion for the purpose of conducting additional discovery”]; see Clark v. Optical Coating Laboratory, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 150, 182, fn. 32 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 812 ] *1057 [“[t]o the extent . . . plaintiffs argue in passing that they should have been permitted to conduct further discovery in connection wit

2015(Lewinter v. Genmar Industries, Inc. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1224 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 305 ] [appellate court will not review an objection to a trial court ruling on a summary judgment motion when the objecting party “failed to request a continuance of the hearing on the summary judgment motion for the purpose of conducting additional discovery”]; see Clark v. Optical Coating Laboratory, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 150, 182, fn. 32 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 812 ] *1057 [“[t]o the extent . . . plaintiffs argue in passing that they should have been permitted to conduct further discovery in connection wit

2014(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(f); Litwin v. iRenew Bio Energy Solutions, LLC, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 883 [“[p]rocedural due process requires that affected parties be provided with ‘the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’”]; In re Vitamin Cases (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 820, 829 [“[t]he primary purpose of procedural due process is to provide affected parties with the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” but “[i]t does not guarantee any particular procedure but is rather an ‘elusive concept,’ requiring only ‘“notice reasonab

2014(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.769(f); Litwin v. iRenew Bio Energy Solutions, LLC, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 883 [“[p]rocedural due process requires that affected parties be provided with ‘the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’”]; In re Vitamin Cases (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 820, 829 [“[t]he primary purpose of procedural due process is to provide affected parties with the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” but “[i]t does not guarantee any particular procedure but is rather an ‘elusive concept,’ requiring only ‘“notice reasonab

2024Section 437c, subdivision (h) mandates a continuance of the hearing “ ‘ “ ‘upon a good faith showing by 8 affidavit that a continuance is needed to obtain facts essential to justify opposition to the motion.’ ” ’ ” (Mahoney v. Southland Mental Health Associates Medical Group (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 167, 170 .) A continuance is not mandatory, however, when no affidavit is submitted or when the submitted affidavit fails to make the necessary factual showing.

2015“If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication or both that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, then be presented, the court shall deny the motion, or 5 order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had or may make any other order as may be just.” (§ 437c, subd. (h).) “‘“‘Generally, [the] power to determine when a continuance should be granted is within the discretion of the court, and there is no right to a continuance as a matter of law. [Citation.]’”’

2023A request for a continuance is governed by section 352, which provides that a juvenile court may grant a continuance of a hearing only upon a showing of good cause and only if the continuance is not “contrary to the interest of the minor.” (§ 352, subds. (a), (b).) “In considering the minor’s interests, the court shall give substantial weight to a minor’s need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements.” (§ 352, subd. (a).) As this language reflects, the Legislature 8 int

2022Subdivision (a)(3) of section 352 provides: “In order to obtain a motion for a continuance of the hearing, written notice shall be filed at least two court days prior to the date set for hearing, together with affidavits or declarations detailing specific facts showing that a continuance is necessary, unless the court for good cause entertains an oral motion for continuance.” (§ 352, subd. (a)(3); see also, Cal.Rules of Ct., rule 5.550(a)(4).) The juvenile court may continue a dependency hearing at a parent’s request for good cause shown. (§ 352, subd. (a).) “Courts have interpreted this polic

2022Subdivision (a)(3) of section 352 provides: “In order to obtain a motion for a continuance of the hearing, written notice shall be filed at least two court days prior to the date set for hearing, together with affidavits or declarations detailing specific facts showing that a continuance is necessary, unless the court for good cause entertains an oral motion for continuance.” (§ 352, subd. (a)(3); see also, Cal.Rules of Ct., rule 5.550(a)(4).) The juvenile court may continue a dependency hearing at a parent’s request for good cause shown. (§ 352, subd. (a).) “Courts have interpreted this polic

2011(In re Elijah V. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 576 , 585 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 774 ].) In order to obtain a continuance of a hearing, written notice shall be filed at least two court days prior to the date set for the hearing, “unless the court for good cause entertains an oral motion for continuance.” (Welf. & Inst.

2022(People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 553 [“ ‘appointed defense counsel lacks authority to waive his or her client’s statutory speedy trial rights when the client personally objects to a continuance and the sole reason for the continuance is defense counsel’s obligation to another client.’ ” ].) In denying the continuances, the court properly weighed Wilson’s wishes, any mitigated hardship to Schwartz, and the burden on the court given the difficulty of getting and managing the large jury pools needed for this case which, by Schwartz’s own admission, had “come up to the verge of trial readin

2015(Ibid.) On appeal, our Supreme Court held that a defendant’s right to a speedy trial could be waived by defense counsel, even over the defendant’s objection, so long as defense counsel was acting “‘competently in the client’s best interest.’” (Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 553 .) The Lomax court noted that this right could not be waived, however, when the client personally objected to the continuance and “‘the sole reason for the continuance is defense counsel’s obligation to another client. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) The Lomax court upheld the trial court’s granting of the continuanc