continuance hearing in Texas

2026So Franklin was required to show prejudice under both the continuance standard, see Janecka, 937 S.W.2d at 468 ; Milem, 2025 WL 1536399 , at *2-3, and the ineffective-assistance standard, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ; Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 307 , and he failed to do so.

2008See Janecka , 937 S.W.2d at 468 .

2025Chambers v. Levbarg, No. 03-98-00138-CV, 2000 WL 217879 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 25, 2000, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986)). 6 Though the record does not contain an express ruling on the motion, the trial court implicitly denied the request for a continuance by hearing the Divinity parties’ motion for summary judgment.

2010See Villegas v. Carter , 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986).

2021See Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 161 (Tex. 2004) (“The trial court may order a continuance of a summary judgment hearing if it appears ‘from the affidavits of a party opposing the 16 motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition.’”) (quoting TEX.

2017See, e.g., Joe, 145 S.W.3d at 161-62 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance for jurisdictional discovery where discovery sought was not material to issue of official immunity); Quested, 440 S.W.3d at 282-83 (same where no showing that jurisdictional discovery sought was material to assessment of plea); Klumb, 405 S.W.3d at 227-28 (same where “[n]one of the discovery mentioned by Plaintiffs could have raised a fact issue material to the determination of the jurisdictional plea”).

2002See O'Neal v. State , 623 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Tex. Crim.

2002See O=Neal v. State, 623 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Tex. Crim.

2026So Franklin was required to show prejudice under both the continuance standard, see Janecka, 937 S.W.2d at 468 ; Milem, 2025 WL 1536399 , at *2-3, and the ineffective-assistance standard, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ; Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 307 , and he failed to do so.

2026So Franklin was required to show prejudice under both the continuance standard, see Janecka, 937 S.W.2d at 468 ; Milem, 2025 WL 1536399 , at *2-3, and the ineffective-assistance standard, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S. Ct. at 2064 ; Nava, 415 S.W.3d at 307 , and he failed to do so.

2024One recognized exception to this confrontation requirement is the common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, which “exempts a statement from the restrictions of the Confrontation Clause” when a defendant engages in conduct that is “‘designed to prevent the witness from testifying.’” Brown v. State, 618 S.W.3d 352 , 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008)); see also Colone v. State, 573 S.W.3d 249, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). -3- In his second issue on appeal, Rivera challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for a continuance of the hearin

2024One recognized exception to this confrontation requirement is the common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, which “exempts a statement from the restrictions of the Confrontation Clause” when a defendant engages in conduct that is “‘designed to prevent the witness from testifying.’” Brown v. State, 618 S.W.3d 352 , 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008)); see also Colone v. State, 573 S.W.3d 249, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). -3- In his second issue on appeal, Rivera challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for a continuance of the hearin

2023See Diocese of Galveston-Hous. v. Stone, 892 S.W.2d 169, 174 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding) (“Thus, we believe that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in taking steps to clarify the factual context of the Diocese’s jurisdictional challenge and that the mandamus at this stage of the proceeding is premature.”); see also In re Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 2010 WL 3596844 , at *2 (denying mandamus relief for the trial court’s order granting a continuance of a hearing on a plea to the jurisdiction where the record failed to establish that the court had not set the hearing

2020“We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw for abuse of discretion.” Barnett v. State, 344 S.W.3d 6, 24 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d) (citing King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 566 (Tex. Crim.

2020“We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw for abuse of discretion.” Barnett v. State, 344 S.W.3d 6, 24 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d) (citing King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 566 (Tex. Crim.

2019See Smith v. State, No. 06-14-00158-CR, 2015 WL 1246009 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 17, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). 2 Counsel also could have decided that an objection would lead to a continuance of the hearing to assure the appearance of the analyst, whose testimony establishing the reliability of 1 We do not cite any of these unpublished cases for their precedential value, but merely to explain the current state of the law on this issue in Texas. 2 Although this unpublished case has no precedential value, we may take guidance from it “as an aid in develop

2018See Beard v. Gonzalez, 924 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, orig. proceeding) (if opponent of motion to transfer venue wants to claim inadequate time to conduct discovery, it must preserve error by filing motion for continuance).

2017See, e.g., Joe, 145 S.W.3d at 161-62 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance for jurisdictional discovery where discovery sought was not material to issue of official immunity); Quested, 440 S.W.3d at 282-83 (same where no showing that jurisdictional discovery sought was material to assessment of plea); Klumb, 405 S.W.3d at 227-28 (same where “[n]one of the discovery mentioned by Plaintiffs could have raised a fact issue material to the determination of the jurisdictional plea”).

2017See, e.g., Joe, 145 S.W.3d at 161-62 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for continuance for jurisdictional discovery where discovery sought was not material to issue of official immunity); Quested, 440 S.W.3d at 282-83 (same where no showing that jurisdictional discovery sought was material to assessment of plea); Klumb, 405 S.W.3d at 227-28 (same where “[n]one of the discovery mentioned by Plaintiffs could have raised a fact issue material to the determination of the jurisdictional plea”).

2015See, e.g., Ketchum v. State, 199 S.W.3d 581, 593 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. ref’d) (“Even assuming he preserved error, Ketchum did not state that a continuance was necessary to discover or prepare a defense and, accordingly, he received the notice minimally required to satisfy due process.”); Majors v. State, No. 07-07-0259-CR, 2008 WL 5401593 , *7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d) (“…it appears to this court that appellant’s position is exactly the same as that described in Villescas. 13 Appellant did not request a continuance and had no defense to the second enhancement paragra

2014See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 ; Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Tex. Crim.