expert challenge in Georgia

2018See Fregeau v. Hall , 196 Ga. App. 493 , 494, 396 S.E.2d 241 (1990), citing Wright Body Works v. Columbus Interstate Ins.

2018See Fregeau v. Hall , 196 Ga. App. 493 , 494, 396 S.E.2d 241 (1990), citing Wright Body Works v. Columbus Interstate Ins.

2017“Absent a strong showing that counsel’s actions were not reasonable, we will presume that [trial] strategies were not deficient.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Watkins v. State, 285 Ga. 107, 110 (3) (b) ( 674 SE2d 275 ) (2009).

2017“Absent a strong showing that counsel’s actions were not reasonable, we will presume that [trial] strategies were not deficient.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Watkins v. State, 285 Ga. 107, 110 (3) (b) ( 674 SE2d 275 ) (2009).

2015To be sure, that the trial court sits as a gatekeeper to ensure relevance and reliability is the very idea behind Daubert and its progeny, see Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U. S. 137, 152 (II) (B) ( 119 SCt 1167 , 143 LE2d 238) (1999), and the General Assembly has said that the courts should look to Daubert and its progeny in “interpreting and applying” Rule 702 as a whole, not just in “interpreting and applying” the general standard set out in subsection (b).

2015To be sure, that the trial court sits as a gatekeeper to ensure relevance and reliability is the very idea behind Daubert and its progeny, see Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U. S. 137, 152 (II) (B) ( 119 SCt 1167 , 143 LE2d 238) (1999), and the General Assembly has said that the courts should look to Daubert and its progeny in “interpreting and applying” Rule 702 as a whole, not just in “interpreting and applying” the general standard set out in subsection (b).

2015See Bharadia I, supra, 282 Ga. App. at 559-560 (6) (denial of motion for new trial was challenged, inter alia, on the trial court’s alleged error in finding Bharadia received effective assistance of counsel with respect to counsel’s failure to obtain an expert to test and testify about DNA on certain crime scene evidence other than the gloves).

2015See Bharadia I, supra, 282 Ga. App. at 559-560 (6) (denial of motion for new trial was challenged, inter alia, on the trial court’s alleged error in finding Bharadia received effective assistance of counsel with respect to counsel’s failure to obtain an expert to test and testify about DNA on certain crime scene evidence other than the gloves).

2013(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lynch v. State, 291 Ga. 555, 556 (2) ( 731 SE2d 672 ) (2012). (a) Rolland first contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek funds for or subpoena an expert who could challenge the accuracy of the Intoxilyzer 5000 results.

2013(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lynch v. State, 291 Ga. 555, 556 (2) ( 731 SE2d 672 ) (2012). (a) Rolland first contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek funds for or subpoena an expert who could challenge the accuracy of the Intoxilyzer 5000 results.

2013“As this Court has held repeatedly, absent a proffer of what the testimony of his expert would have been at trial, [Phillips] cannot show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had [her] counsel taken the suggested course.” (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Mora v. State, 295 Ga. App. 641, 648 (3) (d) ( 673 SE2d 23 ) (2009); see also Sarratt v. State, 299 Ga. App. 568, 570 (2) (a) ( 683 SE2d 10 ) (2009).

2013“As this Court has held repeatedly, absent a proffer of what the testimony of his expert would have been at trial, [Phillips] cannot show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had [her] counsel taken the suggested course.” (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Mora v. State, 295 Ga. App. 641, 648 (3) (d) ( 673 SE2d 23 ) (2009); see also Sarratt v. State, 299 Ga. App. 568, 570 (2) (a) ( 683 SE2d 10 ) (2009).

2013“The authority to grant or deny a criminal defendant’s motion for the appointment of an expert witness rests with the sound discretion of the trial court, and, absent abuse of that discretion, the trial court’s ruling will be upheld.” Crawford v. State, 267 Ga. 881, 883 (2) ( 485 SE2d 461 ) (1997).

2013“The authority to grant or deny a criminal defendant’s motion for the appointment of an expert witness rests with the sound discretion of the trial court, and, absent abuse of that discretion, the trial court’s ruling will be upheld.” Crawford v. State, 267 Ga. 881, 883 (2) ( 485 SE2d 461 ) (1997).

2013“As this Court has held repeatedly, absent a proffer of what the testimony of his expert would have been at trial, [Phillips] cannot show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had [her] counsel taken the suggested course.” (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Mora v. State, 295 Ga. App. 641, 648 (3) (d) ( 673 SE2d 23 ) (2009); see also Sarratt v. State, 299 Ga. App. 568, 570 (2) (a) ( 683 SE2d 10 ) (2009).

2013“As this Court has held repeatedly, absent a proffer of what the testimony of his expert would have been at trial, [Phillips] cannot show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had [her] counsel taken the suggested course.” (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Mora v. State, 295 Ga. App. 641, 648 (3) (d) ( 673 SE2d 23 ) (2009); see also Sarratt v. State, 299 Ga. App. 568, 570 (2) (a) ( 683 SE2d 10 ) (2009).

1995The denial of defendant’s pre-trial motion for the appointment of an expert to conduct an independent DNA analysis is enumerated as error, on the ground that this deprived defendant of a “fair trial and equal treatment under the law because of his economic status.” Unlike blood samples, ballistics reports, and other routine scientific analyses, defendant’s request for the appointment of an independent expert to challenge the State’s analysis of DNA band patterns arguably “involves critical evidence [within the meaning of Sabel v. State, 248 Ga. 10, 16 (6) ( 282 SE2d 61 ), overruled in part on

1995The denial of defendant’s pre-trial motion for the appointment of an expert to conduct an independent DNA analysis is enumerated as error, on the ground that this deprived defendant of a “fair trial and equal treatment under the law because of his economic status.” Unlike blood samples, ballistics reports, and other routine scientific analyses, defendant’s request for the appointment of an independent expert to challenge the State’s analysis of DNA band patterns arguably “involves critical evidence [within the meaning of Sabel v. State, 248 Ga. 10, 16 (6) ( 282 SE2d 61 ), overruled in part on

2018Because we hold that an issue of fact exists as to whether the expert exception applies, the next inquiry is whether "it would have been readily apparent to a layman reading the insurance policy, based upon the plain and ordinary meaning of clear and unambiguous language, that the risk causing the loss was not covered." Washburne , 207 Ga. App. at 5 , 427 S.E.2d 18 .

2018Because we hold that an issue of fact exists as to whether the expert exception applies, the next inquiry is whether "it would have been readily apparent to a layman reading the insurance policy, based upon the plain and ordinary meaning of clear and unambiguous language, that the risk causing the loss was not covered." Washburne , 207 Ga. App. at 5 , 427 S.E.2d 18 .

2022Additionally, Rule 702 (c) (2) (A) and (B) “provide that an expert on the standard of care in a medical malpractice case must have a particular sort of knowledge and experience, either by virtue of having recently practiced the profession . . . or having recently taught it.” Id.

2021Rule 702 “ensure[s] that an expert on the standard of care in a medical malpractice case has an informed basis for testifying about the standard of care that presently prevails in the specific profession and specialty at issue” and “has significant familiarity with the area of practice in which the expert opinion is to be given.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dubois, 297 Ga. at 586 (2). “[E]ven if an expert is generally qualified as to the acceptable standard of conduct of the medical 13 professional in question, the expert cannot testify unless he also satisfies the specific requirement

2024Pretermitting whether trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to present the testimony of a handwriting expert at trial, White “has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that the expert’s testimony would have made a difference in h[er] trial.” Parker v. State, 305 Ga. 136, 141 ( 823 SE2d 313 ) (2019).

2024Pretermitting whether trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to present the testimony of a handwriting expert at trial, White “has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that the expert’s testimony would have made a difference in h[er] trial.” Parker v. State, 305 Ga. 136, 141 ( 823 SE2d 313 ) (2019).

2022See also Hankla v. Postell, 293 Ga. 9 692, 694-695 ( 749 SE2d 726 ) (2013) (expert must have actual knowledge and experience in the relevant area through active practice or teaching in three of the five years preceding the care at issue).

2022See also Hankla v. Postell, 293 Ga. 9 692, 694-695 ( 749 SE2d 726 ) (2013) (expert must have actual knowledge and experience in the relevant area through active practice or teaching in three of the five years preceding the care at issue).

2021Unfounded speculation does not add up to a showing of professionally deficient performance by trial counsel.” Pyburn v. State, 301 Ga. App. 372, 376 (2) (b) ( 687 SE2d 909 ) (2009) (citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted).

2021Unfounded speculation does not add up to a showing of professionally deficient performance by trial counsel.” Pyburn v. State, 301 Ga. App. 372, 376 (2) (b) ( 687 SE2d 909 ) (2009) (citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted).

2020Under the expert exception, “the insured is relieved of the responsibility to minutely examine the policy.” MacIntyre & Edwards, supra at 81 (1).

2020So the expert exception does not apply because “if it is readily apparent that the insured did not get the coverage he requested, the duty to read will still bar a lawsuit against the agent even if the insured relied upon the agent’s expertise.” Id. 6 With regard to the special relationship or other unusual circumstances exception, this court has held that a confidential relationship exists where one party is so situated as to exercise a controlling influence over the will, conduct, and interest of another or where, from a similar relationship of mutual confidence, the law requires the utmost

2014See Grant v. State, 295 Ga. 126, 130 (5) ( 757 SE2d 831 ) (2014).

2014See Grant v. State, 295 Ga. 126, 130 (5) ( 757 SE2d 831 ) (2014).

2012See id.

2008(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368, 370 (3) ( 498 SE2d 579 ) (1998). 9.

2008(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Robinson v. State, 231 Ga. App. 368, 370 (3) ( 498 SE2d 579 ) (1998). 9.

2005See John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 262 Ga. App. 531, 535 (2) ( 586 SE2d 26 ) (2003).

2005See John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 262 Ga. App. 531, 535 (2) ( 586 SE2d 26 ) (2003).

2004Id. at 846-848 (1).

1999Cruz-Padillo v. State, 262 Ga. 629, 631 (4) ( 422 SE2d 849 ) (1992).

1999Cruz-Padillo v. State, 262 Ga. 629, 631 (4) ( 422 SE2d 849 ) (1992).

1998See Walker, supra; Orr, supra. 4.

1998See Walker, supra; Orr, supra. 4.

1995The denial of defendant’s pre-trial motion for the appointment of an expert to conduct an independent DNA analysis is enumerated as error, on the ground that this deprived defendant of a “fair trial and equal treatment under the law because of his economic status.” Unlike blood samples, ballistics reports, and other routine scientific analyses, defendant’s request for the appointment of an independent expert to challenge the State’s analysis of DNA band patterns arguably “involves critical evidence [within the meaning of Sabel v. State, 248 Ga. 10, 16 (6) ( 282 SE2d 61 ), overruled in part on

1995The denial of defendant’s pre-trial motion for the appointment of an expert to conduct an independent DNA analysis is enumerated as error, on the ground that this deprived defendant of a “fair trial and equal treatment under the law because of his economic status.” Unlike blood samples, ballistics reports, and other routine scientific analyses, defendant’s request for the appointment of an independent expert to challenge the State’s analysis of DNA band patterns arguably “involves critical evidence [within the meaning of Sabel v. State, 248 Ga. 10, 16 (6) ( 282 SE2d 61 ), overruled in part on

1995The denial of defendant’s pre-trial motion for the appointment of an expert to conduct an independent DNA analysis is enumerated as error, on the ground that this deprived defendant of a “fair trial and equal treatment under the law because of his economic status.” Unlike blood samples, ballistics reports, and other routine scientific analyses, defendant’s request for the appointment of an independent expert to challenge the State’s analysis of DNA band patterns arguably “involves critical evidence [within the meaning of Sabel v. State, 248 Ga. 10, 16 (6) ( 282 SE2d 61 ), overruled in part on

1995The denial of defendant’s pre-trial motion for the appointment of an expert to conduct an independent DNA analysis is enumerated as error, on the ground that this deprived defendant of a “fair trial and equal treatment under the law because of his economic status.” Unlike blood samples, ballistics reports, and other routine scientific analyses, defendant’s request for the appointment of an independent expert to challenge the State’s analysis of DNA band patterns arguably “involves critical evidence [within the meaning of Sabel v. State, 248 Ga. 10, 16 (6) ( 282 SE2d 61 ), overruled in part on

1994Huskins v. State, 245 Ga. 541 ( 266 SE2d 163 ) (1980); Kendrick v. State, 123 Ga. App. 785, 790 ( 182 SE2d 525 ) (1971).

1994Huskins v. State, 245 Ga. 541 ( 266 SE2d 163 ) (1980); Kendrick v. State, 123 Ga. App. 785, 790 ( 182 SE2d 525 ) (1971).

1986It is not enough to assert that expert analysis might produce evidence helpful to the defense, i.e., to embark on a ‘fishing expedition.’ ” Sims v. State, 251 Ga. 877, 880 (4) (c) ( 311 SE2d 161 ) (1984).

1986It is not enough to assert that expert analysis might produce evidence helpful to the defense, i.e., to embark on a ‘fishing expedition.’ ” Sims v. State, 251 Ga. 877, 880 (4) (c) ( 311 SE2d 161 ) (1984).