6 Arizona opinions name it 1 courts 2005–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Maycock v. Asilomar Development, Inc.green2 sentences2008See id; Maycock v. Asilomar Dev., Inc., 207 Ariz. 495, ¶ 24 , 88 P.3d 565, 570 (App.2004) (if statute’s “language is unambiguous, we give effect to the language and do not use other rules of statutory construction in its interpretation”). 2008See id; Maycock v. Asilomar Dev., Inc., 207 Ariz. 495, ¶ 24 , 88 P.3d 565, 570 (App.2004) (if statute’s “language is unambiguous, we give effect to the language and do not use other rules of statutory construction in its interpretation”). | 2 | 2 |
Trantor v. Fredriksongreen1 sentence2022Trantor v. Fredrikson, 179 Ariz. 299, 300 (1994) (“Because a trial court and opposing counsel should be afforded the opportunity to correct any asserted defects before error may be raised on appeal, absent extraordinary circumstances, errors not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal.”) (citations omitted). ¶23 The court also cited an unadmitted exhibit to support its finding that Caleb “switched schools a couple of months into the year.” As Father concedes, other evidence supports this finding. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Montgomery v. Millergreen1 sentence2019Montgomery v. Miller, 234 Ariz. 289, 297, ¶ 15 (App. 2014). ¶9 Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure require a meaningful pretrial expert witness disclosure comprised of an expert’s name, address and qualifications; the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion; a statement of the compensation to be paid for the expert’s work and testimony in the case; and a list of all cases in the past 4 years in which the witness testified as an expert at a hearing or tri | 1 | 1 |
Potter v. H. Kern Wisner, M.D., P.C.green2 sentences2005See, e.g., Vigil v. Herman, 102 Ariz. 31, 34 , 424 P.2d 159, 162 (1967) (stating that, in a medical malpractice case, the standard of care may be established by the defendant doctor’s own testimony); Stallcup v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 49 , 282 P.2d 791, 796 (1955) (same); Potter v. Wisner, 170 Ariz. 331, 339 , 823 P.2d 1339, 1347 (App.1991) (recognizing that a defendant physician’s own practice was at least some evidence of the standard of care, and concluding that the case was properly submitted to the jury notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to call an independent expert on the standard 2005See, e.g., Vigil v. Herman, 102 Ariz. 31, 34 , 424 P.2d 159, 162 (1967) (stating that, in a medical malpractice case, the standard of care may be established by the defendant doctor’s own testimony); Stallcup v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 49 , 282 P.2d 791, 796 (1955) (same); Potter v. Wisner, 170 Ariz. 331, 339 , 823 P.2d 1339, 1347 (App.1991) (recognizing that a defendant physician’s own practice was at least some evidence of the standard of care, and concluding that the case was properly submitted to the jury notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to call an independent expert on the standard | 1 | 1 |
Peacock v. Samaritan Health Servicegreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Vigil v. Herman, 102 Ariz. 31, 34 , 424 P.2d 159, 162 (1967) (stating that, in a medical malpractice case, the standard of care may be established by the defendant doctor’s own testimony); Stallcup v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 49 , 282 P.2d 791, 796 (1955) (same); Potter v. Wisner, 170 Ariz. 331, 339 , 823 P.2d 1339, 1347 (App.1991) (recognizing that a defendant physician’s own practice was at least some evidence of the standard of care, and concluding that the case was properly submitted to the jury notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to call an independent expert on the standard 2005See, e.g., Vigil v. Herman, 102 Ariz. 31, 34 , 424 P.2d 159, 162 (1967) (stating that, in a medical malpractice case, the standard of care may be established by the defendant doctor’s own testimony); Stallcup v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 49 , 282 P.2d 791, 796 (1955) (same); Potter v. Wisner, 170 Ariz. 331, 339 , 823 P.2d 1339, 1347 (App.1991) (recognizing that a defendant physician’s own practice was at least some evidence of the standard of care, and concluding that the case was properly submitted to the jury notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to call an independent expert on the standard | 1 | 1 |
Evans v. Bernhardgreen2 sentences2005Ctr., 157 Ariz. 192, 195 , 755 P.2d 1180, 1183 (App.1988) (concluding that the trial court properly rejected a proposed jury instruction that a violation of a hospital's protocol was evidence of negligence on the part of the hospital); Evans v. Bernhard, 23 Ariz.App. 413, 416 , 533 P.2d 721, 724 (1975) ("The personal and individualistic method of practice of [the defendant physician] is not sufficient to establish a reasonable basis for any inference that he has departed from the general medical custom and practice in the community, nor can it support a conclusion that he was negligent in any 2005Ctr., 157 Ariz. 192, 195 , 755 P.2d 1180, 1183 (App.1988) (concluding that the trial court properly rejected a proposed jury instruction that a violation of a hospital's protocol was evidence of negligence on the part of the hospital); Evans v. Bernhard, 23 Ariz.App. 413, 416 , 533 P.2d 721, 724 (1975) ("The personal and individualistic method of practice of [the defendant physician] is not sufficient to establish a reasonable basis for any inference that he has departed from the general medical custom and practice in the community, nor can it support a conclusion that he was negligent in any | 1 | 1 |
Stallcup v. Coscarartgreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Vigil v. Herman, 102 Ariz. 31, 34 , 424 P.2d 159, 162 (1967) (stating that, in a medical malpractice case, the standard of care may be established by the defendant doctor’s own testimony); Stallcup v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 49 , 282 P.2d 791, 796 (1955) (same); Potter v. Wisner, 170 Ariz. 331, 339 , 823 P.2d 1339, 1347 (App.1991) (recognizing that a defendant physician’s own practice was at least some evidence of the standard of care, and concluding that the case was properly submitted to the jury notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to call an independent expert on the standard 2005See, e.g., Vigil v. Herman, 102 Ariz. 31, 34 , 424 P.2d 159, 162 (1967) (stating that, in a medical malpractice case, the standard of care may be established by the defendant doctor’s own testimony); Stallcup v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 49 , 282 P.2d 791, 796 (1955) (same); Potter v. Wisner, 170 Ariz. 331, 339 , 823 P.2d 1339, 1347 (App.1991) (recognizing that a defendant physician’s own practice was at least some evidence of the standard of care, and concluding that the case was properly submitted to the jury notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to call an independent expert on the standard | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Campbellgreen2 sentences2005Ctr., 157 Ariz. 192, 195 , 755 P.2d 1180, 1183 (App.1988) (concluding that the trial court properly rejected a proposed jury instruction that a violation of a hospital's protocol was evidence of negligence on the part of the hospital); Evans v. Bernhard, 23 Ariz.App. 413, 416 , 533 P.2d 721, 724 (1975) ("The personal and individualistic method of practice of [the defendant physician] is not sufficient to establish a reasonable basis for any inference that he has departed from the general medical custom and practice in the community, nor can it support a conclusion that he was negligent in any 2005Ctr., 157 Ariz. 192, 195 , 755 P.2d 1180, 1183 (App.1988) (concluding that the trial court properly rejected a proposed jury instruction that a violation of a hospital's protocol was evidence of negligence on the part of the hospital); Evans v. Bernhard, 23 Ariz.App. 413, 416 , 533 P.2d 721, 724 (1975) ("The personal and individualistic method of practice of [the defendant physician] is not sufficient to establish a reasonable basis for any inference that he has departed from the general medical custom and practice in the community, nor can it support a conclusion that he was negligent in any | 1 | 1 |
Bell v. Maricopa Medical Centergreen2 sentences2005Ctr., 157 Ariz. 192, 195 , 755 P.2d 1180, 1183 (App.1988) (concluding that the trial court properly rejected a proposed jury instruction that a violation of a hospital's protocol was evidence of negligence on the part of the hospital); Evans v. Bernhard, 23 Ariz.App. 413, 416 , 533 P.2d 721, 724 (1975) ("The personal and individualistic method of practice of [the defendant physician] is not sufficient to establish a reasonable basis for any inference that he has departed from the general medical custom and practice in the community, nor can it support a conclusion that he was negligent in any 2005Ctr., 157 Ariz. 192, 195 , 755 P.2d 1180, 1183 (App.1988) (concluding that the trial court properly rejected a proposed jury instruction that a violation of a hospital's protocol was evidence of negligence on the part of the hospital); Evans v. Bernhard, 23 Ariz.App. 413, 416 , 533 P.2d 721, 724 (1975) ("The personal and individualistic method of practice of [the defendant physician] is not sufficient to establish a reasonable basis for any inference that he has departed from the general medical custom and practice in the community, nor can it support a conclusion that he was negligent in any | 1 | 1 |
Vigil v. Hermangreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Vigil v. Herman, 102 Ariz. 31, 34 , 424 P.2d 159, 162 (1967) (stating that, in a medical malpractice case, the standard of care may be established by the defendant doctor’s own testimony); Stallcup v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 49 , 282 P.2d 791, 796 (1955) (same); Potter v. Wisner, 170 Ariz. 331, 339 , 823 P.2d 1339, 1347 (App.1991) (recognizing that a defendant physician’s own practice was at least some evidence of the standard of care, and concluding that the case was properly submitted to the jury notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to call an independent expert on the standard 2005See, e.g., Vigil v. Herman, 102 Ariz. 31, 34 , 424 P.2d 159, 162 (1967) (stating that, in a medical malpractice case, the standard of care may be established by the defendant doctor’s own testimony); Stallcup v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 49 , 282 P.2d 791, 796 (1955) (same); Potter v. Wisner, 170 Ariz. 331, 339 , 823 P.2d 1339, 1347 (App.1991) (recognizing that a defendant physician’s own practice was at least some evidence of the standard of care, and concluding that the case was properly submitted to the jury notwithstanding the plaintiff's failure to call an independent expert on the standard | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sanchez v. Old Pueblo Anesthesia, P.C.
green
2 sentences2012Thus, it relies on this court’s decision in Sanchez , in which we stated, “in the plain, unambiguous language of § 12-2604(A), our legislature has determined that an expert in one field may not under any circumstances testify as an expert on the standard of care for a specialist in another field.’’ 218 Ariz. 317, ¶ 17 , 183 P.3d at 1290 . 2012Thus, it relies on this court’s decision in Sanchez , in which we stated, “in the plain, unambiguous language of § 12-2604(A), our legislature has determined that an expert in one field may not under any circumstances testify as an expert on the standard of care for a specialist in another field.’’ 218 Ariz. 317, ¶ 17 , 183 P.3d at 1290 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.