expert rule in Utah

2011Id. [9] 2006 UT App 303 , 141 P.3d 629 . [10] 2006 UT App 303 , 141 P.3d 629 . [11] Id. ¶ 4. [12] Id. ¶ 5. [13] Id. [14] Id. ¶ 6. [15] Id. [16] Id. [17] Id. ¶¶ 12, 36. [18] Id. ¶ 14 (alteration in original) (quoting Patel v. Gayes, 984 F.2d 214, 217-18 (7th Cir.1993)). [19] Id. ¶ 11 n. 3 ("Because the trial court's decision to strike the [treating physician's] affidavit was based solely on the failure to designate [him] as an expert under rule 26(a)(3)(A), we do not address whether [the treating physician] was required to file an expert report under rule 26(a)(3)(B)."). [20] See First Equity F

2011Id. [9] 2006 UT App 303 , 141 P.3d 629 . [10] 2006 UT App 303 , 141 P.3d 629 . [11] Id. ¶ 4. [12] Id. ¶ 5. [13] Id. [14] Id. ¶ 6. [15] Id. [16] Id. [17] Id. ¶¶ 12, 36. [18] Id. ¶ 14 (alteration in original) (quoting Patel v. Gayes, 984 F.2d 214, 217-18 (7th Cir.1993)). [19] Id. ¶ 11 n. 3 ("Because the trial court's decision to strike the [treating physician's] affidavit was based solely on the failure to designate [him] as an expert under rule 26(a)(3)(A), we do not address whether [the treating physician] was required to file an expert report under rule 26(a)(3)(B)."). [20] See First Equity F

2025These are all comments made by the public that are not public clamor, but are reasonable concerns based on evidence in the record that cast doubt onto whether the expert analysis under the Parking Mitigation Plan was reliable. ¶17 The court concluded that “facts in the record reasonably support questions regarding the reliability of the expert analysis underlying the Parking Mitigation Plan, and reasonably support skepticism regarding the effectiveness of the Parking Mitigation 20240065-CA 8 2025 UT App 130 VR CPC Holdings v. Park City Plan proposed by [the Resort].” The district court thereby

2024“An error is harmless and does not require reversal if it is sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.” State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45, ¶ 33 , 349 P.3d 712 (quotation simplified). ¶62 Here, after agreeing with several of Second Expert’s concerns and critiques of First Expert’s rule 35 evaluation of Father, the court stated that it ultimately “found little value in much of his diagnostic expert opinion” and that it agreed with only some of his “conclusions regarding characteristics and personality traits”

2024“An error is harmless and does not require reversal if it is sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.” State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45, ¶ 33 , 349 P.3d 712 (quotation simplified). ¶62 Here, after agreeing with several of Second Expert’s concerns and critiques of First Expert’s rule 35 evaluation of Father, the court stated that it ultimately “found little value in much of his diagnostic expert opinion” and that it agreed with only some of his “conclusions regarding characteristics and personality traits”

2023Id. ¶124 Suhail also seems to suggest that had Counsel investigated Technician’s opinions more thoroughly, he could have called an expert to challenge Technician’s testimony about sole-counterfeiting.

2022Referring to two separate CJC interviews conducted two weeks apart, the State asked Detective if “there [was] anything from that 20190980-CA 11 2022 UT App 97 State v. Aguilar first interview to that second interview that changed substantially?” Detective responded, “No.” Aguilar argues that trial counsel “should have objected to the question, which was leading, and requested [Detective’s] testimony [be] stricken and the jury admonished to disregard her response.” Aguilar further argues that Detective testified as an expert in violation of rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and improperly

2022Evid. 702(b), or that the testimony violated rule 704(b), which applies to opinions about criminal defendants, see id.

2011Id. [9] 2006 UT App 303 , 141 P.3d 629 . [10] 2006 UT App 303 , 141 P.3d 629 . [11] Id. ¶ 4. [12] Id. ¶ 5. [13] Id. [14] Id. ¶ 6. [15] Id. [16] Id. [17] Id. ¶¶ 12, 36. [18] Id. ¶ 14 (alteration in original) (quoting Patel v. Gayes, 984 F.2d 214, 217-18 (7th Cir.1993)). [19] Id. ¶ 11 n. 3 ("Because the trial court's decision to strike the [treating physician's] affidavit was based solely on the failure to designate [him] as an expert under rule 26(a)(3)(A), we do not address whether [the treating physician] was required to file an expert report under rule 26(a)(3)(B)."). [20] See First Equity F

2011Id. [9] 2006 UT App 303 , 141 P.3d 629 . [10] 2006 UT App 303 , 141 P.3d 629 . [11] Id. ¶ 4. [12] Id. ¶ 5. [13] Id. [14] Id. ¶ 6. [15] Id. [16] Id. [17] Id. ¶¶ 12, 36. [18] Id. ¶ 14 (alteration in original) (quoting Patel v. Gayes, 984 F.2d 214, 217-18 (7th Cir.1993)). [19] Id. ¶ 11 n. 3 ("Because the trial court's decision to strike the [treating physician's] affidavit was based solely on the failure to designate [him] as an expert under rule 26(a)(3)(A), we do not address whether [the treating physician] was required to file an expert report under rule 26(a)(3)(B)."). [20] See First Equity F

2011Id. [9] 2006 UT App 303 , 141 P.3d 629 . [10] 2006 UT App 303 , 141 P.3d 629 . [11] Id. ¶ 4. [12] Id. ¶ 5. [13] Id. [14] Id. ¶ 6. [15] Id. [16] Id. [17] Id. ¶¶ 12, 36. [18] Id. ¶ 14 (alteration in original) (quoting Patel v. Gayes, 984 F.2d 214, 217-18 (7th Cir.1993)). [19] Id. ¶ 11 n. 3 ("Because the trial court's decision to strike the [treating physician's] affidavit was based solely on the failure to designate [him] as an expert under rule 26(a)(3)(A), we do not address whether [the treating physician] was required to file an expert report under rule 26(a)(3)(B)."). [20] See First Equity F

2011Id. [9] 2006 UT App 303 , 141 P.3d 629 . [10] 2006 UT App 303 , 141 P.3d 629 . [11] Id. ¶ 4. [12] Id. ¶ 5. [13] Id. [14] Id. ¶ 6. [15] Id. [16] Id. [17] Id. ¶¶ 12, 36. [18] Id. ¶ 14 (alteration in original) (quoting Patel v. Gayes, 984 F.2d 214, 217-18 (7th Cir.1993)). [19] Id. ¶ 11 n. 3 ("Because the trial court's decision to strike the [treating physician's] affidavit was based solely on the failure to designate [him] as an expert under rule 26(a)(3)(A), we do not address whether [the treating physician] was required to file an expert report under rule 26(a)(3)(B)."). [20] See First Equity F

2011Id. [9] 2006 UT App 303 , 141 P.3d 629 . [10] 2006 UT App 303 , 141 P.3d 629 . [11] Id. ¶ 4. [12] Id. ¶ 5. [13] Id. [14] Id. ¶ 6. [15] Id. [16] Id. [17] Id. ¶¶ 12, 36. [18] Id. ¶ 14 (alteration in original) (quoting Patel v. Gayes, 984 F.2d 214, 217-18 (7th Cir.1993)). [19] Id. ¶ 11 n. 3 ("Because the trial court's decision to strike the [treating physician's] affidavit was based solely on the failure to designate [him] as an expert under rule 26(a)(3)(A), we do not address whether [the treating physician] was required to file an expert report under rule 26(a)(3)(B)."). [20] See First Equity F

2011Id. [9] 2006 UT App 303 , 141 P.3d 629 . [10] 2006 UT App 303 , 141 P.3d 629 . [11] Id. ¶ 4. [12] Id. ¶ 5. [13] Id. [14] Id. ¶ 6. [15] Id. [16] Id. [17] Id. ¶¶ 12, 36. [18] Id. ¶ 14 (alteration in original) (quoting Patel v. Gayes, 984 F.2d 214, 217-18 (7th Cir.1993)). [19] Id. ¶ 11 n. 3 ("Because the trial court's decision to strike the [treating physician's] affidavit was based solely on the failure to designate [him] as an expert under rule 26(a)(3)(A), we do not address whether [the treating physician] was required to file an expert report under rule 26(a)(3)(B)."). [20] See First Equity F

2004Butler is similarly distinguishable because there we had to decide whether the trial court erred in finding a proffered witness unqualified to testify as an expert under rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 909 P.2d at 233 .

2004To avoid opening the door for such results, we think it clear that when a witness seeks to testify regarding matters that are necessarily based on that witness’s “scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge,” that witness must be qualified as an expert under rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, and all reliability, reporting, or otherwise applicable statutory commands must then be followed with respect to that testimony. 4 ¶ 21 The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir.1997), is instructive.