expert analysis in Pennsylvania

2020See generally Blackwell v. Wyeth, 971 A.2d 235, 254 (Md. 2009) (“The ‘analytical gap’ concept also has been employed by some of our sister states in a Frye analysis.” (citing, inter alia, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Goeb)).12 12 Maryland maintains a variant of the Frye test which distinguishes between generally accepted methodology and generally accepted analysis, while clarifying that both are required “to avoid the pitfalls of an ‘analytical gap.’” Blackwell, 971 A.2d at 255 .

2020See generally Blackwell v. Wyeth, 971 A.2d 235, 254 (Md. 2009) (“The ‘analytical gap’ concept also has been employed by some of our sister states in a Frye analysis.” (citing, inter alia, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Goeb)).12 12 Maryland maintains a variant of the Frye test which distinguishes between generally accepted methodology and generally accepted analysis, while clarifying that both are required “to avoid the pitfalls of an ‘analytical gap.’” Blackwell, 971 A.2d at 255 .

2020See, e.g., Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 816 (Minn. 2000) (applying a Frye analysis to require a proponent of scientific evidence to show that the “methodology used [by the expert] is reliable and in the particular instance produced reliable results,” and affirming the exclusion of testimony from an expert whose analysis made “too great a leap” from the data gathered (emphasis added)).

2020See, e.g., Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 816 (Minn. 2000) (applying a Frye analysis to require a proponent of scientific evidence to show that the “methodology used [by the expert] is reliable and in the particular instance produced reliable results,” and affirming the exclusion of testimony from an expert whose analysis made “too great a leap” from the data gathered (emphasis added)).

2026Ultimately, our Supreme Court in Ballard found “no abuse of discretion in the trial court finding that [the expert’s] opinion of the death penalty, his testimony in prior cases, and the fact of the exclusion of his testimony in [a prior, unrelated case], were proper areas of inquiry in an attempt to establish that the doctor was an expert with a defense bias in capital cases.” Id. at 397.

2026However, the Ballard Court also determined that although there was no abuse of discretion about questioning an expert about a prior case, our Supreme Court judicially cautioned that such questioning should not “push[] the bounds of relevancy given the obvious complications involving factual distinctions, different evidentiary standards, and the dubious relevance of another court's discretionary rulings.” Id. at 398 n.19.

2025Here, the circumstantial evidence is “more consistent with a crime than with an accident.” Commonwealth v. McMullen, 681 A.2d 717, 722 (Pa. 1996).

2025See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moore, 353 A.2d 808, 810 (Pa. 1976) (finding that inculpatory statement was properly admitted in arson case even though the expert could not rule out an accidental cause; “[b]ecause arson is rarely committed in the presence of others, circumstantial evidence, even if standing alone, may be used to establish the corpus delicti”); see also Reyes, 681 A.2d at 727 (“The corpus delicti, like other facts, may be shown by circumstantial evidence; it is sufficient if these circumstances are consistent with a crime even though they are also consistent with … an accident.”).

2025See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moore, 353 A.2d 808, 810 (Pa. 1976) (finding that inculpatory statement was properly admitted in arson case even though the expert could not rule out an accidental cause; “[b]ecause arson is rarely committed in the presence of others, circumstantial evidence, even if standing alone, may be used to establish the corpus delicti”); see also Reyes, 681 A.2d at 727 (“The corpus delicti, like other facts, may be shown by circumstantial evidence; it is sufficient if these circumstances are consistent with a crime even though they are also consistent with … an accident.”).

2024Trial, 10/26/1998, at 70, 73. 66 This Court has explained that such fabrications can evince consciousness of wrongdoing “and hence are indicatory of guilt.” Commonwealth v. Carbone, 574 A.2d 584, 589 (Pa. 1990) (“The fabrication of false and contradictory statements by an accused are evidence from which a jury may infer that they were made with ‘an intent to mislead the police or other authorities, or to establish an alibi or innocence, and hence are indicatory of guilt.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Gockley, 192 A.2d 693, 701 (Pa. 1963))). 67 N.T.

2024Trial, 10/26/1998, at 70, 73. 66 This Court has explained that such fabrications can evince consciousness of wrongdoing “and hence are indicatory of guilt.” Commonwealth v. Carbone, 574 A.2d 584, 589 (Pa. 1990) (“The fabrication of false and contradictory statements by an accused are evidence from which a jury may infer that they were made with ‘an intent to mislead the police or other authorities, or to establish an alibi or innocence, and hence are indicatory of guilt.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Gockley, 192 A.2d 693, 701 (Pa. 1963))). 67 N.T.

2022See Commonwealth v. Collins, 957 A.2d 237, 259 (Pa. 2008). -6- J-S10017-22 was afoot; object to the testimony that Smith had been arrested for possession of drugs; request a jury instruction regarding how the jury should evaluate fingerprint evidence; present an expert to challenge the reliability of the fingerprint evidence; object to the constructive possession jury instruction; and object to the admission of a tape recording between Smith and his wife.

2021See Jacobs, 922 A.2d at 960 .

2019See Commonwealth v. Melvin, 172 A.3d 14, 24 (Pa. Super. 2017) (noting that a challenge to the trial court’s failure to provide funds for an expert is not a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence).

2019Thus, Appellant’s deficient Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement does not prevent our Court from addressing this issue. - 14 - J-S44002-19 not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

1976In our view his opinion deserves jury consideration.’ Bialek v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 430 Pa. 176, 181 , 242 A.2d 231, 233 (1968).

1976In our view his opinion deserves jury consideration.’ Bialek v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 430 Pa. 176, 181 , 242 A.2d 231, 233 (1968).