expert analysis in California

1962Defendant would require the prosecution to negative all possibility of tampering.” The court further said: “Undoubtedly the party relying on an expert analysis of demonstrative evidence must show that it is in fact the evidence found at the scene of the crime, and that between receipt and analysis there has been no substitution or tampering (see People v. Coleman, 100 Cal. App.2d 797, 801 [ 224 P.2d 837 ]; 21 A.L.R.2d 1216 ,1219,1236-1237), but it has never been suggested by the cases, what the practicalities of proof could not tolerate, that this burden is an absolute one requiring the party

1962Defendant would require the prosecution to negative all possibility of tampering.” The court further said: “Undoubtedly the party relying on an expert analysis of demonstrative evidence must show that it is in fact the evidence found at the scene of the crime, and that between receipt and analysis there has been no substitution or tampering (see People v. Coleman, 100 Cal. App.2d 797, 801 [ 224 P.2d 837 ]; 21 A.L.R.2d 1216 ,1219,1236-1237), but it has never been suggested by the cases, what the practicalities of proof could not tolerate, that this burden is an absolute one requiring the party

1993(People v. Karmelich, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 455 [chemist testified he did not perform a quantitative analysis, and could not say whether the substance contained more than one-tenth of 1 percent heroin]; People v. Harris (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 498, 501 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 285 ] [“the expert did not test for, and did not testify as to, the purity of the substance, although it admittedly was adulterated”]; People v. Carmical (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 103, 108, 107 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 504 ] [no “quantitative chemical analysis” needed even though the chemist “was unable to state the amount of pure heroin pres

1993(People v. Karmelich, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 455 [chemist testified he did not perform a quantitative analysis, and could not say whether the substance contained more than one-tenth of 1 percent heroin]; People v. Harris (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 498, 501 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 285 ] [“the expert did not test for, and did *66 not testify as to, the purity of the substance, although it admittedly was adulterated”]; People v. Carmical (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 103, 108, 107 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 504 ] [no “quantitative chemical analysis” needed even though the chemist “was unable to state the amount of pure heroin

1993(People v. Karmelich, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 455 [chemist testified he did not perform a quantitative analysis, and could not say whether the substance contained more than one-tenth of 1 percent heroin]; People v. Harris (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 498, 501 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 285 ] [“the expert did not test for, and did *66 not testify as to, the purity of the substance, although it admittedly was adulterated”]; People v. Carmical (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 103, 108, 107 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 504 ] [no “quantitative chemical analysis” needed even though the chemist “was unable to state the amount of pure heroin

1993(People v. Karmelich, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 455 [chemist testified he did not perform a quantitative analysis, and could not say whether the substance contained more than one-tenth of 1 percent heroin]; People v. Harris (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 498, 501 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 285 ] [“the expert did not test for, and did *66 not testify as to, the purity of the substance, although it admittedly was adulterated”]; People v. Carmical (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 103, 108, 107 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 504 ] [no “quantitative chemical analysis” needed even though the chemist “was unable to state the amount of pure heroin

1993(People v. Karmelich, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 455 [chemist testified he did not perform a quantitative analysis, and could not say whether the substance contained more than one-tenth of 1 percent heroin]; People v. Harris (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 498, 501 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 285 ] [“the expert did not test for, and did *66 not testify as to, the purity of the substance, although it admittedly was adulterated”]; People v. Carmical (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 103, 108, 107 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 504 ] [no “quantitative chemical analysis” needed even though the chemist “was unable to state the amount of pure heroin

1993(People v. Karmelich, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 455 [chemist testified he did not perform a quantitative analysis, and could not say whether the substance contained more than one-tenth of 1 percent heroin]; People v. Harris (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 498, 501 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 285 ] [“the expert did not test for, and did *66 not testify as to, the purity of the substance, although it admittedly was adulterated”]; People v. Carmical (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 103, 108, 107 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 504 ] [no “quantitative chemical analysis” needed even though the chemist “was unable to state the amount of pure heroin

1962(See, e.g., People v. Brown, 92 Cal.App.2d 360, 365 [ 206 P.2d 1095 ] ; Commonwealth v. Mazarella, 279 Pa. 465, 472 [ 124 A. 163 ].) “ The burden on the party offering the evidence is to show to the satisfaction of the trial court that, taking all the circumstances into account including the ease or difficulty with which the particular evidence could have been altered, it is reasonably certain that there was no alteration.

1962(See, e.g., People v. Brown, 92 Cal.App.2d 360, 365 [ 206 P.2d 1095 ] ; Commonwealth v. Mazarella, 279 Pa. 465, 472 [ 124 A. 163 ].) “ The burden on the party offering the evidence is to show to the satisfaction of the trial court that, taking all the circumstances into account including the ease or difficulty with which the particular evidence could have been altered, it is reasonably certain that there was no alteration.

1962(See, e.g., People v. Brown, 92 Cal.App.2d 360, 365 [ 206 P.2d 1095 ] ; Commonwealth v. Mazarella, 279 Pa. 465, 472 [ 124 A. 163 ].) “ The burden on the party offering the evidence is to show to the satisfaction of the trial court that, taking all the circumstances into account including the ease or difficulty with which the particular evidence could have been altered, it is reasonably certain that there was no alteration.

1962(See, e.g., People v. Brown, 92 Cal.App.2d 360, 365 [ 206 P.2d 1095 ] ; Commonwealth v. Mazarella, 279 Pa. 465, 472 [ 124 A. 163 ].) “ The burden on the party offering the evidence is to show to the satisfaction of the trial court that, taking all the circumstances into account including the ease or difficulty with which the particular evidence could have been altered, it is reasonably certain that there was no alteration.

2021We clarified in People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566 (Riser), that “the party relying on an expert analysis of demonstrative evidence must show that it is in fact the evidence found at the scene of the crime, and that between receipt and analysis there has been no substitution or tampering . . . .” (Id. at p. 580.) There, we “set[] forth the rules for establishing chain of custody: ‘The burden on the party offering the evidence is to show to the satisfaction of the trial court that, taking all the circumstances into account including the ease or difficulty with which the particular evidence co

1967As is correctly said in People v. Riser, 47 Cal.2d 566, 580 [ 305 P.2d 1 ] (disapproved on another point in People v. Morse, 60 Cal.2d 631 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 201 , 388 P.2d 33 , 12 A.L.R.3d 810 ]) : “Undoubtedly the party relying on an expert analysis of demonstrative evidence must show that it is in fact the evidence found at the scene of the crime, and that between receipt and analysis there has been no substitution or tampering. ...” The record indicates that the marijuana seeds passed through many hands—from O ’Neil to Zakarian, from Zakarian to Sanguenetti, from Sanguenetti to Galloway, from

2003(Torres v. Superior Court, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d 181 , disapproved on other grounds in Heller v. Norcal Mutual Ins.

1994Although the plaintiff had conceded a "limited waiver" of his statutory physician-patient privilege as defined in Evidence Code section 994, he contended that the doctor owed him a "fiduciary duty to refuse affirmative assistance to [his adversary] in litigation respecting his physical condition." ( Torres, supra, 221 Cal. App.3d at p. 184 ; accord, Province, supra, 20 Cal. App.4th at p. 1684 .) The Torres court held that the physician could testify subject to a protective order prohibiting ex parte interviews between defendant's counsel and the physician-expert witness to ensure plaintiff's p

2025Except in cases where section 1799.110 applies, “the standard of care for physicians is the reasonable degree of skill, knowledge and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the medical profession under similar circumstances.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 470 (Avivi).) Moreover, as our Supreme Court observed in Brown, “[t]he unmistakable general trend … has been toward liberalizing the rules relating to the testimonial qualifications of medical experts.” ( Brown, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 645.) In Brown, the trial court refused to permit

2025Except in cases where section 1799.110 applies, “the standard of care for physicians is the reasonable degree of skill, knowledge and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the medical profession under similar circumstances.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 470 (Avivi).) Moreover, as our Supreme Court observed in Brown, “[t]he unmistakable general trend … has been toward liberalizing the rules relating to the testimonial qualifications of medical experts.” ( Brown, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 645.) In Brown, the trial court refused to permit

2025Except in cases where section 1799.110 applies, “the standard of care for physicians is the reasonable degree of skill, knowledge and care ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the medical profession under similar circumstances.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 470 (Avivi).) Moreover, as our Supreme Court observed in Brown, “[t]he unmistakable general trend … has been toward liberalizing the rules relating to the testimonial qualifications of medical experts.” ( Brown, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 645.) In Brown, the trial court refused to permit

2023Responding to Dr. Hebert’s and Dr. Friedlich’s opinions, he asserted that “[f]or an expert to claim that the outcome would have been the same even if Dr. Vong had decided to deliver this baby sooner does not make sense.” He explained that “[t]he longer the baby remained undelivered the more damage was done as a result of the APGAR of 1 at 1 minute and 1 at 5 minutes and cord gases of 7.07 arterial and 7.17 venous.” It was his medical opinion that had Dr. Vong called for the cesarean at 11:00 a.m. and performed the surgery by 11:30 a.m., “more likely than not this baby would be alive and well.”

2022The McDonald court noted that the trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude expert testimony on witness identification, stating: “ ‘[W]e do not intend to “open the gates” to a flood of expert evidence on the subject.’ ” (McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 377 .) The court further stated that “such evidence will not often be needed, and in the usual case the appellate court will continue to defer to the trial court’s discretion in this matter.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) In People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 509 (Sanders), the Supreme Court reaffirmed McDonald but found its facts dist

2021Left to such speculation the court must exclude the evidence. [Citations.] Conversely, when it is the barest speculation that there was tampering, it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt remains go to its weight.’ ” (People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 559 (Diaz).) The trial court acted within its discretion when it held the district attorney had properly accounted for the hair’s chain of 54 PEOPLE v. JOHNSEN Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. custody and thus Cooper’s testimony offered only “the barest speculation that there was tampering.” (Riser, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 581 .) By

2021(Cf. People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1264 [trial court may order disclosure of unredacted defendant statements before testimony of an expert the defense “ ‘definitely’ ” will call]; Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 695 .) The trial court also indicated that the discovery sanction addressed Dr. Ney’s failure to take notes when interviewing defendant just before he testified, a concern similarly outside the scope of the discovery statute.

2015(Cf. Woods, supra, at pp. 184-185 [“Requiring pretrial disclosure of the raw results of standardized psychological and intelligence tests administered and relied upon by an expert the defense intends to call at trial allows access to information necessary to prepare the case, reduces the chance of surprise at trial, furthers the attainment of truth and lessens the risk of a judgment based on incomplete testimony”].) Petitioners have not shown that the Legislature’s intent and purpose with regard to section 2032.610, subdivision (a), support their argument.

2013(See People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 678 [counsel not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless objection].) II Failure To Call An Expert To Challenge The Scientific Value Of Hooks’s Gunshot Residue Testimony Defendant contends defense counsel was ineffective because he failed to call an expert to challenge the scientific value of Hooks’s gunshot residue testimony.

1994I, § 14.1, note (Deering’s Supp. 1994).) As we have said in the past: “The purpose of section 1054 et seq. is to promote ascertainment of truth by liberal discovery rules which allow parties to obtain information in order to prepare their cases and reduce the chance of surprise at trial. [Citation.] Reciprocal discovery is intended to protect the public interest in a full and truthful disclosure of critical facts, to promote the People’s interest in preventing a last minute defense, and to reduce the risk of judgments based on incomplete testimony. [Citation.]” (People v. Jackson (1993) 15 Cal

1994I, § 14.1, note (Deering’s Supp. 1994).) As we have said in the past: “The purpose of section 1054 et seq. is to promote ascertainment of truth by liberal discovery rules which allow parties to obtain information in order to prepare their cases and reduce the chance of surprise at trial. [Citation.] Reciprocal discovery is intended to protect the public interest in a full and truthful disclosure of critical facts, to promote the People’s interest in preventing a last minute defense, and to reduce the risk of judgments based on incomplete testimony. [Citation.]” (People v. Jackson (1993) 15 Cal