expert defense in Florida

2018See Crosby v. State, 175 So. 3d 382, 383 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (explaining a trial court is not required to conduct a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210 competency hearing after appointing an expert at defense counsel’s request made pursuant to Rule 3.216, “unless the defendant’s attorney decides to actually raise the defense of insanity or assert incompetence to proceed.”); see also State v. Guyton, 445 So. 2d 644, 644-45 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (discussing rules 3.210 and 3.216).

2018See Crosby v. State, 175 So. 3d 382, 383 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (explaining a trial court is not required to conduct a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210 competency hearing after appointing an expert at defense counsel’s request made pursuant to Rule 3.216, “unless the defendant’s attorney decides to actually raise the defense of insanity or assert incompetence to proceed.”); see also State v. Guyton, 445 So. 2d 644, 644-45 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (discussing rules 3.210 and 3.216).

2012Court of State, 262 P.3d 360, 369 (Nev.2011); see also Wilder v. Eberhart, 977 F.2d 673, 676 (1st Cir.1992) (holding that a defendant in a medical malpractice case may produce other possible causes of the plaintiffs injury and that those possible causes need not be proven with certainty or more probably than not); Benkendorf v. Advanced Cardiac Specialists Chartered, 228 Ariz. 528 , 269 P.3d 704, 708 (Ariz.Ct.App.2012) (agreeing with the majority of jurisdictions that have held that an expert defense witness who is called to address causation in a medical malpractice case may testify about pos

2012Court of State, 262 P.3d 360, 369 (Nev.2011); see also Wilder v. Eberhart, 977 F.2d 673, 676 (1st Cir.1992) (holding that a defendant in a medical malpractice case may produce other possible causes of the plaintiffs injury and that those possible causes need not be proven with certainty or more probably than not); Benkendorf v. Advanced Cardiac Specialists Chartered, 228 Ariz. 528 , 269 P.3d 704, 708 (Ariz.Ct.App.2012) (agreeing with the majority of jurisdictions that have held that an expert defense witness who is called to address causation in a medical malpractice case may testify about pos

2012Court of State, 262 P.3d 360, 369 (Nev.2011); see also Wilder v. Eberhart, 977 F.2d 673, 676 (1st Cir.1992) (holding that a defendant in a medical malpractice case may produce other possible causes of the plaintiffs injury and that those possible causes need not be proven with certainty or more probably than not); Benkendorf v. Advanced Cardiac Specialists Chartered, 228 Ariz. 528 , 269 P.3d 704, 708 (Ariz.Ct.App.2012) (agreeing with the majority of jurisdictions that have held that an expert defense witness who is called to address causation in a medical malpractice case may testify about pos

2012Court of State, 262 P.3d 360, 369 (Nev.2011); see also Wilder v. Eberhart, 977 F.2d 673, 676 (1st Cir.1992) (holding that a defendant in a medical malpractice case may produce other possible causes of the plaintiffs injury and that those possible causes need not be proven with certainty or more probably than not); Benkendorf v. Advanced Cardiac Specialists Chartered, 228 Ariz. 528 , 269 P.3d 704, 708 (Ariz.Ct.App.2012) (agreeing with the majority of jurisdictions that have held that an expert defense witness who is called to address causation in a medical malpractice case may testify about pos

2012Court of State, 262 P.3d 360, 369 (Nev.2011); see also Wilder v. Eberhart, 977 F.2d 673, 676 (1st Cir.1992) (holding that a defendant in a medical malpractice case may produce other possible causes of the plaintiffs injury and that those possible causes need not be proven with certainty or more probably than not); Benkendorf v. Advanced Cardiac Specialists Chartered, 228 Ariz. 528 , 269 P.3d 704, 708 (Ariz.Ct.App.2012) (agreeing with the majority of jurisdictions that have held that an expert defense witness who is called to address causation in a medical malpractice case may testify about pos

2003See Fabianke v. Weaver, 527 So.2d 1253, 1257 (Ala.1988) (noting, "Of course, the testimony of the psychologist was not offered to prove the standard of care required of a medical doctor," while not "find[ing] that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing [other] testimony of the psychologist"); Bell v. Hart, 516 So.2d 562, 570 (Ala.1987) (affirming determination in a medical malpractice action that a pharmacist and a psychologist were not qualified to "testify whether a medical doctor followed the proper standard of care in prescribing the drug Elavil.

2003See Fabianke v. Weaver, 527 So.2d 1253, 1257 (Ala.1988) (noting, "Of course, the testimony of the psychologist was not offered to prove the standard of care required of a medical doctor," while not "find[ing] that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing [other] testimony of the psychologist"); Bell v. Hart, 516 So.2d 562, 570 (Ala.1987) (affirming determination in a medical malpractice action that a pharmacist and a psychologist were not qualified to "testify whether a medical doctor followed the proper standard of care in prescribing the drug Elavil.

1993See Thompson v. Thompson, 576 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1991) (goodwill should be a factor in valuing law or medical practice as a marital asset if goodwill was accumulated during marriage). *1133 Excluding goodwill and using the only figure given by an expert at the hearing, the practice should have been valued at $100,000; yet the trial court valued it at $30,000.

1992Although I conclude that the legislature, in enacting section 742.12(1), has clearly and expressly manifested its intent, I am not unaware that the Third District in Vidal v. Rivas, 556 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), construed the following language in section 742.12(2) as directory only: "If the test results or the expert analysis of the inherited characteristics is disputed, the court, upon reasonable request of a party, shall order that an additional test be made... ." In so deciding, the court applied the rule recognized in S.R. v. State, 346 So.2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 1977), stating that alth

1990See, e.g., Pouncy v. State, 353 So.2d 640 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). [6] Under Count II of the information the state charges that the defendant "on the 21st day of September, A.D. 1986, ... did handle, fondle or make an assault upon [the victim], a child under the age of sixteen (16) years in a lewd, lascivious or indecent manner, to-wit: did fondle the buttocks of [the victim]," in violation of section 800.04(1).