line inquiry in Missouri

2023Movant argues State v. Crew, 803 S.W.2d 669 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991), is applicable in holding “[i]t is reversible error for an attorney during voir dire to attempt to obtain from the venire a commitment or a pledge to act in a specific way if certain facts are elicited or certain contingencies arise at trial.” Id. (italics added).

2023Movant argues State v. Crew, 803 S.W.2d 669 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991), is applicable in holding “[i]t is reversible error for an attorney during voir dire to attempt to obtain from the venire a commitment or a pledge to act in a specific way if certain facts are elicited or certain contingencies arise at trial.” Id. (italics added).

2018However, more than thirty years ago, in Hampton v. Commonwealth, this Court held that, despite the difficulty of providing specificity among twelve counts of child sexual abuse wherein "the trial testimony regarding dates was quite naturally confused and somewhat uncertain," nevertheless, convictions could be upheld when the evidence was "ample to separately identify the various offenses charged." 666 S.W.2d 737 , 740 (Ky. 1984).

2016Id. 13 The case at bar is unlike Sanders, Phelps or Aye.

2016Id.

2011This is illustrated by State v. Revelle, 957 S.W.2d 428 (Mo.App.

2011This is illustrated by State v. Revelle, 957 S.W.2d 428 (Mo.App.

2000The test of "arbitrary or unreasonable" is an important clarification of this Court's statement in Harrell, 781 S.W.2d at 62 , that the "right of access means simply the right to pursue in the courts the causes of action the substantive law recognizes." *550 The line of analysis articulated by Judge Holstein in Wheeler is most appropriate for recognizing the power of the legislature to "design the framework of the substantive law" [15] by abolishing or modifying common law or statutorily based claims, yet keeping a meaningful right to a "certain remedy" where the law recognizes a cause of acti

2000The test of “arbitrary or unreasonable” is an important clarification of this Court’s statement in Harrell, 781 S.W.2d at 62 , that the “right of access means simply the right to pursue in the courts the causes of action the substantive law recognizes.” The line of analysis articulated by Judge Holstein in Wheeler is most appropriate for recognizing the power of the legislature to “design the framework of the substantive law” 15 by abolishing or modifying common law or statutorily based claims, yet keeping a meaningful right to a “certain remedy” where the law recognizes a cause of action.

1993Moreover, “[wjhere the one party, on cross-examination of a witness, opens up a line of inquiry which is designed to discredit the witness in the eyes of the jury, the courts go very far ... in permitting the other party, on re-direct examination, to bring out those aspects of the matter which are favorable to the witness, even though, without the foundation afforded by the cross-examination, the evidence thus brought out would be wholly unjustifiable.” Id. (citations omitted).

1990This Court presented the issue in the following terms: Where an insurance company, which is part of a line of insurance, provides indemnity coverage but specifically eschews defense obligations, is the next carrier in the line that provides defense coverage required to pay defense costs for the preceding liability phase as well as its own liability phase? 716 S.W.2d at 365 .

1990This Court held that the next carrier in the Occidental line — namely Highlands— should not drop down, because “[tjhere was no language in the Highlands policy requiring it to fill in defense gaps left by the Columbia policy.” Id. at 366 .

1990In Brown , the prosecutor informed a defense witness that if he testified he could later be charged with a crime, asked the witness whether he had sought counsel, asked him if he had any desire to seek counsel, asked him if he was voluntarily testifying, asked him if he was familiar with the Miranda rights, etc. This line of inquiry by the prosecutor, the court stated, was “clearly designed to dissuade the witness from testifying.” Id. at 59 .

1988Lock-hart, 698 S.W.2d at 15 .

1986As already held in this opinion an insurer’s duty to defend is purely contractual, Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. Rhoades, supra, 405 S.W.2d at 815 , and is separate from the contractual obligation to indemnify.

1986The law governing declaration of a mistrial is set forth succinctly in State v. Davis, 653 S.W.2d 167 (Mo. banc 1983) where the court said: The declaration of a mistrial is a drastic remedy that should be employed only in those extraordinary circumstances in which prejudice to the defendant can be removed no other way.

1985As ruled in State v. Hines, 583 S.W.2d 204 [1] (Mo.App.1979): “[F]ishing expeditions by counsel in collateral matters must have an end, and it must be left up to the trial court when a particular line of inquiry may or may not be pursued further.” These cases control our decision here.

1984In this setting we conclude that the right of confrontation is paramount to the State’s policy of protecting a juvenile offender.” Davis has been adopted in Missouri in State v. Russell, 625 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. banc 1981).

1984In its recent decision in Payton v. New York, supra, 48 L.W. [4375] at 4380 [ 445 U.S. 573 at 590 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 at 1382 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 ], the Supreme Court identified the line at which the requirement for an arrest warrant takes hold as "the entrance to the house” and the "threshold”.

1984In its recent decision in Payton v. New York, supra, 48 L.W. [4375] at 4380 [ 445 U.S. 573 at 590 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 at 1382 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 ], the Supreme Court identified the line at which the requirement for an arrest warrant takes hold as "the entrance to the house” and the "threshold”.

1983Paepke, 300 S.W. at 847 .

1981If the majority is correct in construing this objection as a request for a contempt citation alone, then I would say that the Assistant Circuit Attorney should have been cautioned that if she persisted in this line of inquiry she would be cited for contempt because, as Judge Eager recognized in State v. Mobley, supra, l.c. 581: "All lawyers and judges know that a jury's knowledge of prior convictions is, in itself, a most damning thing in the trial of a criminal case.

1981If the majority is correct in construing this objection as a request for a contempt citation alone, then I would say that the Assistant Circuit Attorney should have been cautioned that if she persisted in this line of inquiry she would be cited for contempt because, as Judge Eager recognized in State v. Mobley, supra, l.c. 581: “All lawyers and judges know that a jury’s knowledge of prior convictions is, in itself, a most damning thing in the trial of a criminal case.

1979State v. Foster, 349 S.W.2d 922 (Mo.1961).

1975This case can be readily distinguished from State v. Wren, 486 S.W.2d 447 (Mo.1972).

1975This case can be readily distinguished from State v. Wren, 486 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1972).