line inquiry in California

2015Specifically, he objects to the following question, which was withdrawn after defense counsel objected: “In your opinion would ‘Primo’ and Jose Vega-Robles have committed the crime [of shooting Grockett] in association with F.A.I.M with the specific intent to further criminal conduct?” “ ‘The deliberate asking of questions calling for inadmissible and prejudicial answers is misconduct.’ ” (People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 532 .) For purposes of the defendant’s argument, we assume it is improper to ask for an expert’s “opinion of the knowledge or intent of a defendant on trial,” and to name

2015Specifically, he objects to the following question, which was withdrawn after defense counsel objected: “In your opinion would ‘Primo’ and Jose Vega-Robles have committed the crime [of shooting Grockett] in association with F.A.I.M with the specific intent to further criminal conduct?” “ ‘The deliberate asking of questions calling for inadmissible and prejudicial answers is misconduct.’ ” (People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 532 .) For purposes of the defendant’s argument, we assume it is improper to ask for an expert’s “opinion of the knowledge or intent of a defendant on trial,” and to name

2022Castillo had a duty to “pursue diligently those leads indicating the existence of evidence favorable to the defense.” (In re Neely (1993) 6 Cal.4th 901, 919 .) While it is generally counsel’s prerogative to pursue a particular line of inquiry, Castillo’s decision not to explore mitigation of damages is unreasonable if based upon inadequate investigation. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 690–691 [“[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation”].) “We also

2020(See In re Lucas, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 725– 731.) D.

2021Standard of Review “California decisions have held for decades that even absent a request, and even over the parties’ objections, the trial court must instruct on a lesser offense necessarily included in the charged offense if there is substantial evidence the defendant is guilty only of the lesser.” (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 118 ; see People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154, 162 .) The duty extends to every lesser included offense supported by substantial evidence; it is not satisfied “when the court instructs [solely] on the theory of that offense most consistent with th

2021A. Standard of Review “California decisions have held for decades that even absent a request, and even over the parties’ objections, the trial court must instruct on a lesser offense necessarily included in the charged offense if there is substantial evidence the defendant is guilty only of the lesser.” (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 118 ; see People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 .) The duty extends to every lesser included offense supported by substantial evidence; it is not satisfied “when the court instructs [solely] on the theory of that offense most consistent with the

2021Standard of Review “California decisions have held for decades that even absent a request, and even over the parties’ objections, the trial court must instruct on a lesser offense necessarily included in the charged offense if there is substantial evidence the defendant is guilty only of the lesser.” (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 118 ; see People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154, 162 .) The duty extends to every lesser included offense supported by substantial evidence; it is not satisfied “when the court instructs [solely] on the theory of that offense most consistent with th

2021A. Standard of Review “California decisions have held for decades that even absent a request, and even over the parties’ objections, the trial court must instruct on a lesser offense necessarily included in the charged offense if there is substantial evidence the defendant is guilty only of the lesser.” (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 118 ; see People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 .) The duty extends to every lesser included offense supported by substantial evidence; it is not satisfied “when the court instructs [solely] on the theory of that offense most consistent with the

2019Here, constitutional concerns are at odds with the alleged statutory protections of an attorney's work product; "[t]he 'Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.' " ( Foster, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 1747 , quoting Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. 478 , 128 S.Ct. 1203 .) "The jury is to be 'a criminal defendant's fundamental "protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice." ' [Citations.] Permitting racial prejudice in the jury system damages 'both the fact and the perception' of the jury's role as 'a vital check against the wrongful

2019Here, constitutional concerns are at odds with the alleged statutory protections of an attorney's work product; "[t]he 'Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.' " ( Foster, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 1747 , quoting Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. 478 , 128 S.Ct. 1203 .) "The jury is to be 'a criminal defendant's fundamental "protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice." ' [Citations.] Permitting racial prejudice in the jury system damages 'both the fact and the perception' of the jury's role as 'a vital check against the wrongful

2019Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney." ( Id. at p. 510, 67 S.Ct. 385 .) Thus, "the general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney's course of preparation" requires the party seeking to invade it "to establish adequate reasons to justify production ...." ( Id. at p. 512, 67 S.Ct. 385 .) The California Supreme Court has similarly held in the civil context that a witness statement is protected from disclosure as long as the attorney's *83 impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal r

2019Not even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney." ( Id. at p. 510, 67 S.Ct. 385 .) Thus, "the general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney's course of preparation" requires the party seeking to invade it "to establish adequate reasons to justify production ...." ( Id. at p. 512, 67 S.Ct. 385 .) The California Supreme Court has similarly held in the civil context that a witness statement is protected from disclosure as long as the attorney's *83 impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal r

2019Here, constitutional concerns are at odds with the alleged statutory protections of an attorney's work product; "[t]he 'Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.' " (Foster, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 1747 , quoting Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. 478 .) "The jury is to be 'a criminal defendant's fundamental "protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice." ' [Citations.] Permitting racial prejudice in the jury system damages 'both the fact and the perception' of the jury's role as 'a vital check against the wrongful exercise of power

2019Here, constitutional concerns are at odds with the alleged statutory protections of an attorney's work product; "[t]he 'Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.' " ( Foster, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 1747 , quoting Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. 478 , 128 S.Ct. 1203 .) "The jury is to be 'a criminal defendant's fundamental "protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice." ' [Citations.] Permitting racial prejudice in the jury system damages 'both the fact and the perception' of the jury's role as 'a vital check against the wrongful

2019Here, constitutional concerns are at odds with the alleged statutory protections of an attorney's work product; "[t]he 'Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.' " ( Foster, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 1747 , quoting Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. 478 , 128 S.Ct. 1203 .) "The jury is to be 'a criminal defendant's fundamental "protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice." ' [Citations.] Permitting racial prejudice in the jury system damages 'both the fact and the perception' of the jury's role as 'a vital check against the wrongful

2019Here, constitutional concerns are at odds with the alleged statutory protections of an attorney's work product; "[t]he 'Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.' " ( Foster, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 1747 , quoting Snyder, supra, 552 U.S. at p. 478 , 128 S.Ct. 1203 .) "The jury is to be 'a criminal defendant's fundamental "protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice." ' [Citations.] Permitting racial prejudice in the jury system damages 'both the fact and the perception' of the jury's role as 'a vital check against the wrongful

2016As Costco explained, despite what might be the dominant purpose of a communication, "when the communication is a confidential one between attorney and client, the entire communication, including its recitation or summary of factual material, is privileged ." ( Costco, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 736 , 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 758 , 219 P.3d 736 , italics added.) Costco 's analysis, applied here, leads inexorably to the conclusion that the legal invoices at issue are privileged under sections 952 and 954. 5 Even more pernicious than the majority's improper addition of a nonstatutory prerequisite to the atto

2016As Costco explained, despite what might be the dominant purpose of a communication, "when the communication is a confidential one between attorney and client, the entire communication, including its recitation or summary of factual material, is privileged ." ( Costco, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 736 , 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 758 , 219 P.3d 736 , italics added.) Costco 's analysis, applied here, leads inexorably to the conclusion that the legal invoices at issue are privileged under sections 952 and 954. 5 Even more pernicious than the majority's improper addition of a nonstatutory prerequisite to the atto

2014In re Richard S. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 857 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 819 P.2d 843 ] held that when construing former rule 244 (now rule 2.831) the parties who have stipulated to a referee sitting as a temporary judge waive any claim of error based on the failure to strictly adhere to the procedural requirements of the rule.

2014In re Richard S. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 857 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 819 P.2d 843 ] held that when construing former rule 244 (now rule 2.831) the parties who have stipulated to a referee sitting as a temporary judge waive any claim of error based on the failure to strictly adhere to the procedural requirements of the rule.

2013As the Attorney General observes, citing People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 495 , trial counsel may not have wished to further emphasize Gallegos‟s flight to Mexico, and the record does not support the conclusion there could have been no reasonable tactical reason to forego this line of inquiry.

2013As the Attorney General observes, citing People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 495 , trial counsel may not have wished to further emphasize Gallegos’s flight to Mexico, and the record does not support the conclusion there could have been no reasonable tactical reason to forego this line of inquiry.

2013(People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 569 .) Gallegos‟s claim fails.

2013(People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 569 .) Gallegos’s claim fails.

1988The prosecution objected to defense counsel’s questions about whether defendant had made any incriminating statements after waiving his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]), and reminded the court that it had precluded this line of inquiry by an earlier in-chambers ruling.

1988The prosecution objected to defense counsel’s questions about whether defendant had made any incriminating statements after waiving his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ]), and reminded the court that it had precluded this line of inquiry by an earlier in-chambers ruling.

1968Dr. Fuller had already exercised discretion by agreeing to analyze the possible ingested plant substance to determine its toxicity. . . . [E]xercise-ofdiseretion had ended at that point and thereafter the inquiry would be limited to whether there had been an exercise of due care under a duty assumed. . . . [0]nee the determination has been made that a service will be furnished and the service is undertaken, then public policy demands (except when the Legislature specifically decrees otherwise) that government be held to the same standard of care the law requires of its private citizens in the

1968Dr. Fuller had already exercised discretion by agreeing to analyze the possible ingested plant substance to determine its toxicity.... [E]xercise-of-discretion had ended at that point and thereafter the inquiry would be limited to whether there had been an exercise of due care under a duty assumed.... [O]nce the determination has been made that a service will be furnished and the service is undertaken, then public policy demands (except when the Legislature specifically decrees otherwise) that government be held to the same standard of care the law requires of its private citizens in the perfo

1968United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States (1964) 379 U.S. 951 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 549 , 85 S.Ct. 452 ] (decision to conduct air flights was discretionary, but failure to warn commercial airline was not) ; United States v. White (9th Cir. 1954) 211 F.2d 79, 82 (decision not to “dedud” army firing range assumed to be discretionary, but telling person about to go onto range that it was safe not discretionary) ; Costley v. United States (5th Cir. 1950) 181 F.2d 723, 724-725 (discretionary function to admit patient to hospital, but no immunity for treatment thereafter); Bulloch v. United States (D.

1968United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States (1964) 379 U.S. 951 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 549 , 85 S.Ct. 452 ] (decision to conduct air flights was discretionary, but failure to warn commercial airline was not); United States v. White (9th Cir.1954) 211 F.2d 79, 82 (decision not to "dedud" army firing range assumed to be discretionary, but telling person about to go onto range that it was safe not discretionary); Costley v. United States (5th Cir.1950) 181 F.2d 723, 724-725 (discretionary function to admit patient to hospital, but no immunity for treatment thereafter); Bulloch v. United States (D.

1968United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States (1964) 379 U.S. 951 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 549 , 85 S.Ct. 452 ] (decision to conduct air flights was discretionary, but failure to warn commercial airline was not); United States v. White (9th Cir.1954) 211 F.2d 79, 82 (decision not to "dedud" army firing range assumed to be discretionary, but telling person about to go onto range that it was safe not discretionary); Costley v. United States (5th Cir.1950) 181 F.2d 723, 724-725 (discretionary function to admit patient to hospital, but no immunity for treatment thereafter); Bulloch v. United States (D.

1968United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States (1964) 379 U.S. 951 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 549 , 85 S.Ct. 452 ] (decision to conduct air flights was discretionary, but failure to warn commercial airline was not); United States v. White (9th Cir.1954) 211 F.2d 79, 82 (decision not to "dedud" army firing range assumed to be discretionary, but telling person about to go onto range that it was safe not discretionary); Costley v. United States (5th Cir.1950) 181 F.2d 723, 724-725 (discretionary function to admit patient to hospital, but no immunity for treatment thereafter); Bulloch v. United States (D.

1963The remainder of the examination with respect to Gardner’s being on parole was improper.” See also People v. Wynn, 44 Cal.App.2d 723 [ 112 P.2d 979 ], at page 732: “This line of inquiry went far beyond that allowed by law, for a cross-examiner’s questions must be limited to the fact of conviction and the nature of the crime; he may not go into the details or circumstances surrounding the crime [citations]; and certainly the cross-examiner cannot delve into the question of the length of time served and conditions or circumstances surrounding the parole of a defendant.

1963The remainder of the examination with respect to Gardner’s being on parole was improper.” See also People v. Wynn, 44 Cal.App.2d 723 [ 112 P.2d 979 ], at page 732: “This line of inquiry went far beyond that allowed by law, for a cross-examiner’s questions must be limited to the fact of conviction and the nature of the crime; he may not go into the details or circumstances surrounding the crime [citations]; and certainly the cross-examiner cannot delve into the question of the length of time served and conditions or circumstances surrounding the parole of a defendant.

1946It is stated by the authorities that the line so agreed on becomes in legal effect the true line, that the agreement as to the line may be in parol and that it does not operate to convey title to the land which may lie between the agreed line and the true line, but that it fixes the line itself and the description carries title up to the agreed line, regardless of its accuracy; that the agreement as to the line is not in violation of the statute of frauds, because it does not transfer title; that the parties hold up to the agreed line by virtue of their original deeds and not by virtue of the

1946It is stated by the authorities that the line so agreed on becomes in legal effect the true line, that the agreement as to the line may be in parol and that it does not operate to convey title to the land which may lie between the agreed line and the true line, but that it fixes the line itself and the description carries title up to the agreed line, regardless of its accuracy; that the agreement as to the line is not in violation of the statute of frauds, because it does not transfer title; that the parties hold up to the agreed line by virtue of their original deeds and not by virtue of the

2024Normally the right to confront one’s accusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at trial to question witnesses.” 3 ( Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at pp. 52–53, fn. omitted.) The Ritchie court declined to address whether the failure to order disclosure of the agency records violated the Sixth Amendment’s compulsory process clause, explaining that “the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to 3 In dissent, Justice Brennan joined by Justice Marshall disagreed with the lead opinion’s reading of the confrontation clause, arguing that “cross- examination may be restricted . . . throu

2024Normally the right to confront one’s accusers is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at trial to question witnesses.” 3 ( Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at pp. 52–53, fn. omitted.) The Ritchie court declined to address whether the failure to order disclosure of the agency records violated the Sixth Amendment’s compulsory process clause, explaining that “the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to 3 In dissent, Justice Brennan joined by Justice Marshall disagreed with the lead opinion’s reading of the confrontation clause, arguing that “cross- examination may be restricted . . . throu

2024(People v. Dworak, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 900 .) Prosecutorial Misconduct Carter next contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct in cross-examination by asking Carter if other 21 witnesses had lied in their testimony, and then compounded the misconduct by amplifying this line of inquiry in closing argument.

2024(Kwan, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 182 .) “ ‘In civil cases the word “wilful” as ordinarily used in courts of law, does not necessarily imply anything blameable, or any malice or wrong toward the other party, or perverseness or moral delinquency, but merely that the thing done or omitted to be done, was done or omitted intentionally.